Present:
The Minister of Public Works
and Acting Prime Minister (Mr. Green) in the Chair,
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Fleming),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Brooks),
The Solicitor General (Mr. Balcer),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Churchill),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Fulton),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Nowlan),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. MacLean),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Starr) (for afternoon meeting only),
The Postmaster General (Mr. William Hamilton),
The Minister without Portfolio (Mr. Macdonnell),
The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Comtois),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Monteith),
The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Alvin Hamilton),
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith),
The Minister of Defence Production (Mr. O'Hurley),
The Secretary of State (Mr. Courtemanche) (for afternoon meeting only).
The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Fournier), (Mr. Martin).

DEFENCE MEETINGS IN PARIS CANADA-UNITED STATES MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE; N.A.T.O. MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING

4. The Minister of National Defence said that the Ministers of Finance and Defence Production, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and himself would be going to a meeting of the Canada-United States Committee of Ministers of Defence in Paris on December 15th, following which they would attend the usual December meeting of the N.A.T.O. Council in ministerial session. This would be the first meeting of the Canada-U.S. committee since it was established last summer¹⁹⁸ when President Eisenhower was in Ottawa. Advantage was being taken of the N.A.T.O. sessions to hold the Canada-U.S. committee meeting in Paris as well. Normally the latter could be expected to meet in North America. A number of important matters were to be considered at both meetings on which decisions of the Cabinet were required beforehand. These had been discussed by the four Ministers concerned, together with their advisers.

(Discussion on particular items to come up at these meetings is recorded separately below).

canada-united states ministerial committee on defence;

acquisition and storage of defensive nuclear weapons in canada

(previous reference october 15)?

5. The Minister of National Defence recalled that officials had been authorized to discuss with U.S. officials the question of acquiring and storing defensive nuclear weapons in Canada for the use of Canadian forces and for U.S. forces stationed in Canada.¹⁹⁹ [one sentence was removed/une phrase a été supprimée] The U.S. officials had suggested that the matter might best be dealt with in a general exchange of notes which would cover the requirements of defensive nuclear weapons and include the following general provisions, [ten lines were removed/dix lignes ont été supprimées]

At the meeting in Paris it was proposed to follow up the whole matter with the U.S. secretaries. The items involved were warheads for Bomarc missiles in Canada and for Lacrosse weapons in Europe, MBI nuclear air-to-air rockets for use of the R.C.A.F. in Canada and for U.S. use at Goose Bay [two lines were removed/deux lignes ont été supprimées]

The central question of policy was whether Canadian forces should be as well equipped as U.S. forces alongside them and performing the same tasks. The U.S. authorities would probably raise the question of storage of offensive weapons at Goose Bay for the Strategic Air Command. Mr. Pearkes and the other ministers felt that this matter should not be dealt with until questions relating to the defensive armament for Canadian forces had first been settled. As regards Goose Bay, storage for SAC purposes was already available but it was empty and would remain so until the Canadian government said otherwise. It was not the intention of the U.S. Air Force that such weapons as might eventually be stored there would be used in initial strikes originating from North America but only as replenishment for aircraft going out on another mission once a war has started.

When the time came for the President of the United States to release the defensive weapons, this would presumably be released to the Prime Minister and the Canadian government could make what arrangements it wishes for further delegation of authority in regard to their use. At the moment he thought such authority might be delegated to the Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command. In what precise circumstances these weapons would then be employed would depend on the tactical situation. The Air Defence Commander's authority under NORAD extended not only to Canadian air defence squadrons but also to the two U.S. defence squadrons stationed at Goose Bay. The point to be remembered was that under U.S. law only the President could authorize the release of U.S. nuclear weapons, whether they were used by U.S. or other forces.

In essence, the proposal to be discussed with the U.S. secretaries involved the making of arrangements for storage in Canada of the weapons he had described to be available for use as soon as the President authorized their release.

6. During the discussion the following points emerged:

1. While only President Eisenhower could authorize the release of the weapons, in effect there had to be both U.S. and Canadian consent to their firing and no such weapons could be stored in Canada without the consent of the Canadian government. There could not be much more control than this.
2. It would be impossible to agree to the storage of offensive nuclear weapons at Goose Bay until Canadian forces were in the position of being able to use as modern defensive weapons as U.S. forces. The U.S. secretaries would probably not press this matter in Paris, though it might be raised there.
3. The Prime Minister had said it would be helpful to make a statement soon after the next session of Parliament opened that negotiations with the U.S. on this subject were in hand. It was hoped that a draft of such a statement could be discussed and agreed with the U.S. secretaries at the meeting and ready for the Prime Minister on his return.
4. The arrangements for the custody and security of the weapons had yet to be worked out. [two sentences were removed/deux phrases a été supprimées]
5. If Canadian forces were to be equipped with these weapons, unpleasant as that prospect was, the suggestions proposed seemed to be the best possible way of handling the problem.
6. Whatever the government decided would be criticized. A good many Canadians would not want the weapons stored here for use by Canadian or U.S. forces under any circumstances.
7. No final decisions were being reached at this time. All that was being sought was authority to discuss. It was true that this implied a commitment but the ultimate decision to store weapons for Canadian use had yet to be made.

7. The Cabinet agreed that ministers attending the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee in Paris be authorized to discuss with U.S. secretaries the acquisition of defensive nuclear weapons for Canadian forces and the storage of such weapons in Canada in accordance with the approach proposed by the Minister of National Defence.

CANADA-UNITED STATES MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE; STATE OF READINESS FOR NORAD

8. The Minister of National Defence said that, during the Middle East crisis last summer, CINCNORAD had ordered an increased state of readiness throughout his command. This had, of course, involved the R.C.A.F. and meant, for example, four aircraft being ready at the end of runways instead of the usual two, and more crew on station than was normally the case. NORAD's terms of reference in regard to specifying states of readiness had not been clarified and the situation which had developed in the Middle East made this necessary.²⁰⁰ The ministers who had considered the matter felt that NORAD's power should be limited to declaring increased states of readiness for purposes of training his command and in the event of an unacceptably large number of unidentified aircraft within the warning system. When international tension increased there should first be consultation on the political, diplomatic, and Chiefs of Staff levels with the United States. Agreement with U.S. ministers would be sought on this point in Paris.

9. During the discussion the question was raised as to what would happen if, after consultation, Canada did not reach agreement with the U.S. that an increased state of readiness was required. In reply, it was thought that the ministers might propose that in such circumstances only the U.S. forces should be alerted.

10. The Cabinet noted with approval that at the meeting of the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Defence, agreement would be sought that CINCNORAD should only declare increased states of readiness on his own authority,

1. for purposes of training his command (with due notification to Chiefs of Staff); and,
2. in the event of an unacceptably large number of unidentified aircraft within the warning system.
   canada-united states ministerial committee on defence;
   production sharing
   (previous reference september 8)?

   11. The Minister of National Defence said that good progress had been made in discussions with U.S. officials on the question of sharing in the production of modern weapons and equipment.²⁰¹ It was proposed to pursue the matter further in Paris and emphasize to the U.S. secretaries the importance of sharing in production.

   12. The Cabinet noted with approval that at the meeting of the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee further discussions would be held on the sharing of production for defence. cost sharing of air defence programme
   (previous reference september 8)?

   13. The Minister of National Defence recalled that, when negotiations with the U.S.A.F. had been authorized for the sharing of the costs of the Pinetree radar line extension, Sage, and Bomarc, he had mentioned a possible 50-50 division of costs. The programme included seven new heavy radars, forty-five gap fillers, a Sage direction centre, the improvement of the communications of existing radars, and two 30-missile Bomarc squadrons, all estimated to cost a total of $378 million. It had now been agreed with the U.S.A.F. that Canada undertake the construction and unit equipment side of the programme at a cost of $129 million and the U.S. bear the cost of the technical equipment, which would be approximately $249 million. Because of the precedent of the original Pinetree programme, the U.S.A.F. was disposed to accept this sharing, which was in the ratio of about one-third R.C.A.F. to two-thirds U.S. It was impracticable to reach a division of costs in this ratio by dividing the programmes involved by sites or by items of equipment, hence the nature of the sharing that had been suggested. It had the advantage of simplicity, avoided the danger of differences in technical equipment, and ensured uniformity of construction.

   The U.S.A.F. had agreed that the production of the technical equipment, which they would be financing, be shared between the two nations. Beyond this it could be expected that Canada would participate in other NORAD equipment programmes. However, Canadian firms would often have the disadvantage of facing pre-production costs, which in some cases had already been amortized by their U.S. competitors. Because such costs must be met to place Canada in a competitive position, funds for this purpose were to be included in the 1959-60 estimates of the Department of Defence Production.

   He recommended, with the Minister of Defence Production, that he be authorized to come to an agreement with the U.S. that the costs of the programmes he had described be shared with the U.S. on approximately a 1/3 - 2/3 ratio, based on division by type of work, on the understanding that the objectives of production sharing be recognized and that the R.C.A.F. participate in all aspects of the programmes from design to installation.

   An explanatory memorandum had been circulated, (Memorandum, Ministers of National Defence and Defence Production, Dec. 2 - Cab. Doc. 352-58).²⁰²

   14. Mr. Pearkes said it was proposed to confirm in Paris the arrangements that had been reached at the official level.

   15. The Minister of Defence Production added that the prospects of Canadian firms participating in the provision of technical equipment were encouraging.

   16. The Cabinet approved the making of an agreement between Canada and the United States for sharing the costs of the new radar, Sage, and Bomarc air defence programmes in an approximate one-third to two-thirds ratio by Canada paying for construction and unit equipment and the United States for all technical equipment, on the understanding,

   1. that both governments recognized the objectives of production sharing and that a reasonable and representative share of defence production would be placed in Canada; and,
   2. that the R.C.A.F. participated in all aspects of the programmes from design to installation.
      canada-united states ministerial committee on defence;
      reactivation of combined policy committee

   17. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that the United States had proposed that the Canada-U.S.-U.K. Combined Policy Committee, established in 1943 to further the atomic bomb project, be reactivated with expanded terms of reference. This idea stemmed from the Declaration of Common Purpose signed by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan over a year ago²⁰³ and from talks Mr. Macmillan held with the Prime Minister here subsequently.²⁰⁴ The U.K. had agreed that the committee should be reactivated. He outlined briefly what it would be expected to do and the fields in which it would operate. Essentially, it would lead to greater co-operation in military research and development in both the nuclear and non-nuclear fields. However, Canadian representatives would not be able to participate in all of the activities envisaged because the revised U.S. Atomic Energy Act still restricted certain exchanges of information on nuclear weapons. He recommended that the committee be reactivated along the lines proposed by the U.S.

   An explanatory memorandum had been circulated, (Minister's memorandum, Dec. 6 - Cab. Doc. 354-58).²⁰⁵

   18. Mr. Smith added that it would be desirable to tell the Americans in Paris that the government concurred in their proposals.

   19. The Minister of National Defence said that one of the reasons for reactivating the committee was that it would obviate any difficulties or ill feelings amongst the other N.A.T.O. partners which the setting up of new machinery might create.

   20. The Cabinet agreed to the reactivation of the Combined Policy Committee along the lines proposed by the United States.
   canada-united states ministerial committee on defence;
   future meetings

   21. The Minister of National Defence said that Canadian ministers would propose that, in future, meetings be held more than once a year and at a fixed period, and not merely be scheduled for the time when N.A.T.O. ministerial meetings were held. In this way attention would not be drawn to any specific difficult problems.

   22. The Cabinet noted with approval that it would be suggested to United States secretaries that, in future, meetings of the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Defence be held more than once a year and at fixed periods.

   ---

   ¹⁹⁸Voir/See Document 9.

   ¹⁹⁹Pour des documents se rapportant à l'entreposage d'armes nucléaires en territoire canadien, voir 1^er partie, section D de ce chapitre.
   For documents relating to the storage of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, see Part 1, Section D of this chapter.

   ²⁰⁰Voir les documents 99 à 105./See Documents 99-105.

   ²⁰¹Voir/See Document 101.

   ²⁰²Voir/See Document 102.

   ²⁰³Pour le texte de la Déclaration d'objectif commun, voir United States, Department of State, Bulletin, Volume XXXVII, No. 959, November 11, 1957, pp. 739 à 741.
   For the text of the Declaration of Common Purpose, see United States, Department of State, Bulletin, Volume XXXVII, No. 959, November 11, 1957, pp. 739-741.

   ²⁰⁴Voir volume 24, les documents 437 et 438./See Volume 24, Documents 437-438.

   ²⁰⁵Voir/See Volume 24, Document 509.