The ratification today of the February 1 proclamation by Presidents Nasser and Kuwatly and the subsequent popular referendum will be merely the first steps towards the creation of a detailed framework for the United Arab Republic. Some of the domestic and international implications of the move, such as its effect on Arab representation in the United Nations and possible changes in diplomatic accreditation, are being examined. For the moment, it is perhaps more important to attempt an assessment of the union in the narrower context of its immediate implications for Western diplomacy in the Middle East.

2. Some indication of the United Kingdom position (and inferentially that of the United States) is contained in the attached CRO telegram of February 3† reporting on views said to have been agreed at a meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact: it would be unwise for either power to take the lead in opposing the proposed union, and public reactions should be restrained and cautious. This course would appear to have much to recommend it: the rapidity of the movement and the emotional impetus behind it reflect the existence of strong nationalistic and historical impulses which could quickly take on an anti-Western character at the first hint of Western opposition. Arab nationalists have deeply-rooted feelings of resentment because of what they regard as the unjustifiable fragmentation of the Arab world at the close of the First World War, a development for which they hold the West responsible.

3. In the light of the decision to adopt a cautious public attitude, it may not be entirely clear why the balance of the attached telegram indicates a United Kingdom intention to encourage the remaining Arab states to voice opposition to the proposed union — an intention with which, according to this telegram, the United States is in agreement, although confirmation of this has not appeared in reports on direct talks which our Embassy in Washington have had with State Department officials. At this stage we are without full knowledge of the reasons which dictate this initial reaction of the two powers, but we can infer from known United States and United Kingdom attitudes towards, and interests in, the Middle East that the following considerations would have a strong influence on their thinking about the union:

(1) The United Kingdom would regard the consummation of the union as

1. likely to increase the vulnerability of the West's principal transit routes for Middle Eastern oil, 90 per cent of which passes through Syria and Egypt;
2. a threat to United Kingdom interests in the oil-producing states because such popular support as is enjoyed by the relatively pro-Western régimes of these states would be further undermined by the powerful stimulus which union would give to the popular urge towards Arab unity; and
3. as indicated by the last sentence of paragraph 2 of the attached telegram, a significant step towards the consolidation of President Nasser's influence in the region, and a corresponding reduction in the influence of others including the United Kingdom.

(2) The United States, through the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine,⁶⁹is committed to the support of the régimes in the Arab kingdoms to whose dynasties the popular movement symbolized by the United Arab Republic poses a potential threat. Coupled with this is a recognized reluctance of congressional opinion to countenance United States approval of states which have entered into arms and economic deals with the Soviet bloc and whose anti-Western propaganda is viewed almost entirely as a manifestation of pro-Soviet sympathies in the cold war.

1. intensify internecine rivalry among the Arab states and hence create further instability in the area;
2. tend to emphasize the division of the area into Western-backed and Soviet-backed groupings (particularly if Yemen federates with the new state) which can only play into Soviet hands;
3. tend to arrest the move towards Arab unity which is probably inevitable and which may in the long run be the best defence against Soviet penetration. There is indeed adequate evidence that President Nasser, notwithstanding his having turned to the Soviet bloc for arms and economic aid, is seeking to counteract Soviet influence in the area (particularly by the rigorous proscription of communist party activities in Egypt), and in this he has the eager support of the most powerful Syrian political party, the Baath Socialists, who are clearly responsible for initiating and accelerating the steps towards union as a means of escaping from increasing Soviet pressure exerted through some Syrian military leaders and the Syrian communist party; and
4. in all likelihood, result in charges that the West is interfering in the affairs of the area — particularly, if the pro-Western Arab states set themselves up collectively in opposition to the union.

5. Implicitly the validity of these arguments is acknowledged by the United States and the United Kingdom. Their decision to abstain from public opposition is in itself an admission of the power, and even the inevitability, of the Arab urge towards unity; as is their quiet encouragement of the Arab kingdoms to form a competitive entente which would also attempt to appeal to this fundamental Arab impulse. If, in addition to creating competition for the union, the Arab kings actively oppose it or attempt to encourage internal opposition in Syria, they will paradoxically find themselves allied with precisely those Syrian communist and left-wing elements whose rising influence has been the main cause of Western concern.

6. If you agree with the foregoing analysis,⁷⁰you may wish to authorize a telegram to some of our interested missions giving the general lines of the analysis and indicating that we should avoid adopting a critical attitude towards the union in recognition of:

1. the strength of the Arab desire to achieve some form of unity;
2. the undesirability of appearing to interfere in a matter primarily of concern to the two states involved; and
3. the possibility that the Soviet Union, whose interests are by no means clearly served by the emergence of a large Arab state of fundamentally anti-communist character, may in due course fall out with the new republic.

J.B.C. W[atkins]
for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

⁶⁹La doctrine Eisenhower, avancée à titre d'essai par la Maison-Blanche à la mi-décembre 1956, autorisait le déploiement de forces armées américaines dans tout pays du Moyen-Orient qui demanderait de l'aide contre une agression communiste. Elle a été exprimée officiellement dans le message spécial du président au Congrès sur la situation au Moyen-Orient le 5 janvier 1957. Voir United States, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1957, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958, pp. 6 à 16.
The Eisenhower Doctrine, which was tentatively advanced by the White House in mid-December 1956, authorized the deployment of American military forces in any Middle Eastern nation seeking aid against Communist aggression. It was given formal expression in the President's Special Message to Congress on the situation in the Middle East on January 5, 1957. See United States, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1957, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958, pp. 6-16.

⁷⁰Note marginale:/Marginal note:
I do SE S[MITH]