The General Assembly, at its Fourth Session beginning in September, will have to elect three non-permanent members of the Security Council to take the place of Argentina, Canada and the Ukraine. On June 23 we addressed identical telegrams to London (No. 1138)† and Washington (No. 1603),† copy attached, outlining our preliminary views and asking Mr. Wrong and Mr. Wilgress to sound out the State Department and the Foreign Office on this subject.

2. From the attached replies (No. 1767 from Washingtont and No. 1329 from London,† both dated June 28) it is evident that on the official level London, Washington and ourselves do not entirely agree at this stage on which countries should be supported for the three vacancies. It is, I think, generally accepted that the Latin American Republics will he successful in getting one of their number (present indications favour Ecuador or Uruguay) elected to succeed Argentina. There is, however, a difference of view between Washington and London as to the disposition of the other two vacant seats. The State Department recognize the importance of having an Asian state other than China on the Council, and, subject to Indian behaviour on the Kashmir issue, they regard India as the most obvious candidate. Their view is, however, that India's only chance of election is to the so-called Commonwealth seat, and they think that New Zealand should wait for a later vacancy, The possibility of electing both India and New Zealand simultaneously has apparently not been considered. For the third vacancy they are still thinking in terms of a Soviet satellite or Republic.

3. The Foreign Office have discarded their original hope of getting both India and New Zealand elected, and at this stage prefer New Zealand to India. The reasons given for this preference are broadly that New Zealand would be a more mature and reliable member of the Council, that Indian membership would complicate the solution of current disputes, such as Kashmir, and other problems, e.g. Hong Kong, which might come before the Council; and finally that if the Chinese vote became Communist and if a Soviet satellite were elected at the next Assembly, the Soviet Union would have three votes already, end might even gain Indian support on occasions (presumably on colonial issues) with the result that the proceedings of the Council might come to ."a complete stalemate". The Foreign Office and the Indian Government are now engaged in discussions which the Foreign Office hope will lead to India's standing down and accepting some lesser alternative in compensation. The present Foreign Office view is, however, that if India insists on being a candidate, the United Kingdom will have to support her and attempt to persuade New Zealand to stand down. Until the present discussions with India are concluded the United Kingdom authorities do not intend to consult the State Department, nor have they indicated their attitude to the disposition of the seats now filled by Argentina and the Ukraine.

4. A preliminary Canadian view was first discussed on June 16 at an informal meeting with General McNaughton. The General himself came out very strongly in favour of India and it was agreed that we should consider doing what we could to take the initiative on India's behalf. At the present time this preliminary attitude, as expressed in telegram No. 1138 to London (under reference), appears to be closer to the United States than to the United Kingdom position. We should, I presume, have to accept a nominee of the Latin American Republics as the successor to Argentina on the Council. For the other two seats, I am wondering whether we might not still gain substantial support if we were to suggest the election of both India and New Zealand, the former as a state with great material and moral authority in South East Asia, and the latter as the successor to Canada in the "Commonwealth" seat. (It is possible that the Philippines might be proposed as an appropriate representative of South East Asia, but perhaps if General Romulo were elected to the Presidency of the Assembly, the Filipinos might accept this honour as adequate recognition of their claims).

5. If the prospects of electing both India and New Zealand look dim, however, we should then, I presume, favour India over New Zealand as our own successor, and attempt to persuade the United Kingdom to join with us and the United States in rallying support for India. Our sponsorship of the latter country, of course, would have to be made conditional on its behaviour in the Kashmir issue, and indeed India could be reminded that support in the Assembly of her aspirations for a Council seat would depend on the degree to which she showed a cooperative attitude towards UNCIP.

6. I think it is particularly important that India should be assured of strong support in the forthcoming elections, provided she adopts a reasonable position over Kashmir and other issues such as Hyderabad and, conceivably, French India. It may well be that the Foreign Office underestimates India's suitability for Council membership. In the first place India, by reason of its geographical position, and of the very great moral and material authority which it possesses, would appear to be the one candidate so far mentioned for possible membership of the Council which meets the two criteria set out in Article 23 of the Charter. Functionally, its contribution to the maintenance of international peace would unquestionably be a great DEA/ more valuable than that of New Zealand, and from the standpoint of equitable geographical distribution its claims are just as good. It is true that New Zealand would probably be a more "reliable" member, but the need for an authoritative counterweight to the vote of Communist China, particularly during the next two years when the Council may be faced with its most difficult issues in the Asian area, would seem to outweigh the admitted justice of New Zealand's claim.

7. Furthermore, I think that on the whole the Indians have tended recently to swing away from the policy of independent neutrality which they adopted in the early stages of their membership in the United Nation. Nehru's initiative in calling a conference of Asian states to discuss the Indonesian question, India's cooperation with the United Kingdom over the Burma issue, and the present Indian attitude on Hong Kong may be cited as evidence of a new trend in Indian foreign policy. A responsible, "third-force" independence seems to be taking the place of what was previously a rather irresponsible neutrality. I think it is reasonable to assume that this new trend is likely to be strengthened rather than reversed by India's election to the Council.

8. Finally we must not lose sight of the effect which Commonwealth failure to support India's candidacy nvght have both on Indian relations with the Commonwealth itself and on Indian foreign policy generally. Questions are still being asked in India as to the value of the Commonwealth connection. Support of New Zealand in preference to India might embarrass those who are trying to work out the new relationship between India and the rest of the Commonwealth. It might also arrest the tendency for India to become a bulwark against communist influence in South East Asia.

9. The attached telegram to our High Commissioner in Londont has been drafted for your consideration and signature, if you approve. It summarizes the considerations contained in this memorandum, and asks Mr. Wilgress to place these views before the United Kingdom authorities.³

³Note marginale:/Marginal note:
I do not think that we should attempt to influence either India or New Zealand to stand or not to stand for the S.C. If they both stand, I think that we should support both as good prospective members of the S.C. Certainty we should not give India any reason to think that we do not consider her "reliable". LB P[earson]