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Volume #14 - 296. | |
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CHAPTER IV NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY | |
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PART
2 ABC TALKS AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS: MARCH 10, 1948-JUNE 23, 1948 | |
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296. |
DEA/283 (S) |
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Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to High Commissioner for United Kingdom | |
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TELEGRAM 220 TOP SECRET. PERSONAL. MOST IMMEDIATE. |
London,
March 10th, 1948 |
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Please see Canadian Prime Minister urgently and give him following message from Prime Minister, Begins: You will have seen in Mr. Noel-Baker's message of 9th March the international background against which we here are framing our policy.† Events are moving even quicker than we at first apprehended and there are grave indications from many sources that the next Russian move will be to make demands on Norway. Prom our latest report from our Ambassador in Oslo which Sir Alexander Clutterbuck will show you, there is reason to fear that Russia may move soon. Norwegian Government have consulted United States and ourselves as to the help that they could expect if attacked. As a first step we think that United States and United Kingdom representatives in Oslo should be instructed to infuse some courage into Norwegian Government pointing out that Turkey and Persia have successfully resisted Soviet demands and that Norway would be ill-advised to put her foot on the slippery slope by sacrificing her right to conclude pacts with whomsoever she chooses and that if she eventually requires outside support she is more likely to get it by showing resolution than by temporising. We cannot be sure however that encouragement of this kind will alone induce Norwegian Government to hold out. On the other hand we cannot at this moment afford to risk Norwegian defection which would not only involve the collapse of the whole Scandinavian system but would also prejudice our chances of calling a halt to expansion of Soviet influence over Western Europe and would in fact mean the appearance of Russia on the Atlantic. 2. In this situation only a bold move can avert the danger and the pace already set by Russia tells us that there is no time to lose. 3. The conclusion which we have reached is that the most effective course is to take very early steps to conclude under Article 51 of the Charter a regional Atlantic pact of mutual assistance in which all the countries threatened by a Russian move on the Atlantic could participate. These countries might be, besides the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada, Eire, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, France, Portugal and Spain when it agaln has a democratic regime. 4. As we see it if the threat is to be effectively met we must look to the creation of three systems which would bring in the many countries concerned. Firstly the United Kingdom-France-Benelux system with United States backing, secondly, a system of Atlantic security with which the United States would be even more closely concerned, and thirdly, a Mediterranean security system which would particularly affect Italy. We are pressing ahead with the first but in view of the threat to Norway the Atlantic security system is now even more important and urgent. Failure to act now may mean a repetition of our experience with Hitler and we should again have to witness the slow deterioration of our position until we were forced to resort to war in much less favourable circumstances. 5. In this grave situation I think it right to put our ideas at once before you and the United States Secretary of State. I am convinced that we should study without delay the establishment of such an Atlantic security system so that we inspire necessary confidence to consolidate the west against Soviet infiltration and at sanie time inspire Soviet Government with sufficient respect for the west to remove temptation from them and so ensure a long period of peace. Our idea would be that if the Canadian and United States Governments agree, officials of the three Governments should meet in Washington and very secretly explore the proposal for an Atlantic system. I hope that this will commend itself to you. 6. I am informing the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa in general terms of the situation and our views on it. Ends. | |
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