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Volume #22 - 307. | |||
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CHAPITRE II NATIONS UNIES ET AUTRES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES | |||
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PREMIÈRE PARTIE NATIONS UNIES | |||
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SECTION
A ONZIÈME SESSION DE L'ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE, NEW YORK, 12 NOVEMBRE 1956 AU 8 MARS 1957 | |||
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SUBDIVISION
II REPRÉSENTATION DE LA CHINE | |||
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307. |
DEA/5475-EJ-40 | ||
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Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni | |||
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TELEGRAM PITEL-10 SECRET |
Ottawa,
le 10 août 1956 | ||
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Repeat Paris, Permis NY, Congen NY, NATO Paris and Washington (Information). By Bag all other Missions. CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN UN Background Our High Commissioner, London, reported July 10 that the US has asked the UK for early agreement to a further moratorium on the Chinese representation issue at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, and that the Foreign Office has recommended to Cabinet that it agree to a moratorium for the whole of the eleventh session. 2. Since the State Department may have it in mind to make a similar approach to Canada on this issue, we have considered what response we should make to such an approach. Canadian Views 3. At the White Sulphur Springs meeting, the President and the Secretary of State were made aware that Canada would not occasion any difficulty over Chinese representation in the U.N.,20 at least until after the presidential elections; this did not constitute a commitment with respect to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly which will not meet until after the election. 4. Approval by the British Cabinet of a further moratorium would seem to make it difficult for us as a country which does not recognize Communist China, to adopt a more divergent attitude than the UK which maintains diplomatic relations with Peking. Moreover, the appointment of Senator Knowland to the US Delegation to the next session of the General Assembly seems clearly to presage continued strong resistance by the US to review of the question of Chinese representation at the forthcoming session. Full discussion of the issue might be expected not only to embitter and disrupt proceedings within the UN, but also to produce a violent reaction in the US itself which might well find expression in intemperate criticism of the UN and opposition to less controversial aspects of its work with a consequent weakening of the general western position. While another moratorium may place a further strain on relations between East and West, there does not appear to have been any change in the situation since the last session that holds out any reasonable hope that the United States will be prepared to alter its position towards the issue in the near future. 5. At the Tenth Session 42 members voted in favour of the moratorium, 12 voted against it, and 6 abstained. Mr. Menon has stated that at the 11th session India will "fight" the moratorium resolution, but that he believes the US will succeed in putting it through. It is likely, however, that the proportion of votes in support of a moratorium at this session will be lower than last year. In itself the change in voting proportions will no doubt have a salutary effect on the United States and might go far towards persuading it to reconsider its policy before the twelfth session without there being any requirement for us to alter our position. 6. On the other hand an attempt by us to anticipate such a development by refusing to make a commitment for the next session might well react to our disadvantage, cause the United States to increase their efforts to obtain support for a moratorium and adversely affect our relations with them without achieving any more positive result. 7. If we were to decline to make a commitment we should, of course, be free to abstain whenever the matter came to a vote and thereby adopt a position of apparent neutrality. This, however, would scarcely be consonant with our accepted policy of not taking a "leading position" in this controversy, since a change on our part from support to abstention would attract a good deal of attention; it could be expected to be taken as serving public notice that we were at odds with the US on the whole Chinese issue and would undoubtedly arouse resentment in the US, where there may well be lively recollections of the pressures to which we exposed them as a result of our initiative for the admission of new members. It would probably also stimulate a rash of speculation at home and abroad that we were preparing to recognize the Peking Government. 8. On balance we believe it will be to our advantage to continue to stand with the United States on this issue at the 11th Session. This will not, of course, preclude our reminding them of our misgivings over the continued exclusion of Communist China from the UN and of our expectation that a more positive approach to the problem cannot be deferred much longer. 9. If the State Department decides to approach us on this matter we shall delay our reply, in the knowledge, however, that ultimately we will concur in a further moratorium for the duration of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly. It is hoped that our apparent reluctance to commit ourselves in advance will in itself give some notice that we are no longer as reconciled as in the past with the moratorium arrangement. USE: The contents of this telegram are strictly for your personal
and private information.
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