We have been giving some thought to the implications for Canada of recent and future developments in the continent of Africa. While it would be premature to say that we have reached any conclusions, you may wish to know of the lines along which we have been thinking.

The decision to study these African problems has been hastened by the following events:

(1) the publicly announced undertaking of the United Kingdom Government to grant independence to the Gold Coast by the end of 1956 and subsequently to Nigeria (1958) and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1960-62). The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations told me when he was here in October that it was the intention of the present United Kingdom Government, during the life of the existing parliament, to grant independence to these three African territories (and also to the Federation of Malaya and the British Caribbean Federation). Although the timetable for its independence may be set back by the growth of separatism in the North, there is little doubt that the question of the Gold Coast, at least, will be raised at the Prime Ministers' Meeting in June and that the Prime Minister may be asked to define the Canadian position;

(2) the declining influence of the United Kingdom and the dangerous possibility that the U.S.S.R. may increase its influence in north-east Africa and the Middle East. The withdrawal of the British from the Canal Zone and from the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan has created a power vacuum similar to that created when the British withdrew from the North West Frontier of what was then India in 1947. Indications are that the U.S.S.R. may be able, for various reasons, to take swifter advantage of this withdrawal than they were of the earlier one;

(3) the growing strength of the anti-colonial powers in the United Nations, recently increased by the addition of six new anti-colonial members, when the proposal for the admission of new members secured acceptance. While many of these powers have shown an inclination in the current General Assembly to be more responsible than in the past, and some (e.g. Iraq and Pakistan) have been markedly anti-Soviet, nevertheless the opportunities which their growing strength gives to the U.S.S.R., at little or no cost to itself, to propagandize, meddle and generally make trouble in the African area, are considerable;

(4) the emergence of new independent African nations in the British territories may make things difficult for the French, Portuguese and Belgians. We wonder whether the speed at which the United Kingdom proposes to proceed with political emancipation, particularly in West Africa, may not inspire nationalist agitation in territories where the French, Belgians and Portuguese have attempted to impose a political "quarantine" until such time as there is a solid economic and social base for political participation by the native population. In addition to the possible immediate consequences of a lack of co-ordination at the policy level in the dependent territories concerned, the differences in timing and methods of the four colonial powers could cause serious frictions among the administering powers and their allies;⁸⁰

(5) finally, the necessity for the West to put forward some imaginative plan of aid and welfare for an emergent Africa, which may have the effect both of holding the line against Communism in Africa and removing from the West the taint of colonialism. While Canada should probably not take the lead in putting forward any such plan, our views would be listened to with interest because we have no axe to grind. At the same time admission of Nigeria and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to Commonwealth membership gives us practical reasons for expressing an interest in the wider problem of economic aid and technical assistance to the African continent as a whole.

Two problems are involved: the specific question of our relations with the Gold Coast and West Africa, and the more general question of the programme of aid for Africa.

We think that consideration should be given to the establishment, not later than the fiscal year 1957-8, of a Canadian mission accredited to the Gold Coast. This accreditation might later be extended to include the Federation of Nigeria. Our reasons for making this suggestion are as follows:

(1) the colony may very likely be independent by the end of 1956, or at the latest by mid-1957, and its application for membership in the Commonwealth will then be sponsored by the United Kingdom. Presumably we would not wish to oppose it. South Africa, the only Commonwealth member likely to oppose it, has recently indicated (elliptically) that it is prepared to consider the possibility of co-existence with "black" nations on the African continent ( Mr. Strijdom's speech of August 1955);

(2) establishment in the area is strongly recommended by our High Commissioner to the Union of South Africa, who visited the Gold Coast and Nigeria in the summer of 1955 and learned at first-hand of their development;

(3) the British are concerned lest, when they depart, Indian influence (represented by the very able Indian Commissioner in Accra, Raja Rameshwar Rao, formerly Commissioner in East Africa) may become paramount. They fear that unless members of the "old" Commonwealth publicly show their confidence in the newest member, it may be attracted to neutralism. We may not share the concern of the British, but what is perhaps more important from our point of view is the possibility that Soviet may supersede British influence in the area of West Africa;

(4) the symbolic importance of the Gold Coast as the first all- African negro independent nation to emerge from colonial status will not be lost on the rest of Africa, nor on the anti-colonial nations or the Soviet Union. The experiment will be watched with care and we should not appear reluctant to accord the Gold Coast recognition and to establish relations with it;

(5) a mission in Accra could probably do something to promote trade in the West African area in general. The Gold Coast is high on the Trade and Commerce priority list, though they have told us informally that they first wish to undertake a thorough economic survey;

(6) the Governor of the Gold Coast believes that when self government comes there will be "a rush" to establish diplomatic missions there. India and the United States already have missions doing information and political work, and several other countries have trade offices. The Italians and Germans have applied for permission to establish diplomatic relations;

(7) when the Volta River multi-purpose project (in which the Aluminum Company of Canada is a participant) gets under way in 1958, or early in 1959, it would be useful to have a Canadian representative in the Gold Coast to guide the inevitable publicity into favourable channels and also to handle the consular work attendant upon the influx of an expected 500 Canadian technicians and their families.

Against this it might be argued that with our limited resources in personnel and money, we ought to go slow in West Africa and concentrate in areas more seriously menaced by Communism, such as South East Asia, where we also have considerable experience. Africa, except Egypt and French North Africa, stands perhaps lower on our priority list.

On the other hand, there are undoubted advantages in establishing relations with British West Africa. We show Africans and anti-colonial powers that we have confidence in the Africans' ability to govern themselves and to fulfil the conditions for membership laid down in the United Nations Charter. We also proclaim to the same group of people that we are free from prejudice by accepting Africans as full and equal members of the Commonwealth as and when they become independent and their membership is sponsored by the United Kingdom. We also provide ourselves with a listening post and opportunities for gathering first-hand information in an area of increasing importance, and one which may be used to counter both Communist propaganda and the anti-colonial nations; an area where Canadian representation is non-existent.

We cannot, of course, assume that because we greet emergent African colonies as equals and proffer them technical assistance or capital aid they will necessarily stay with the Commonwealth, or with the West. It may be, so strong is the force of nationalism in Africa and Asia, that Europeans (including Canadians) operate at a disadvantage as friends of former colonial powers. The U.S.S.R., as the under-developed country that developed itself and as the country whose colonialism, though existent, was decently cloaked behind the mountains of central Asia, may have the last word. Nevertheless, to do too little may be to ensure that the U.S.S.R. will have the last word.

We now come to the wider question of aid and welfare for emergent Africa generally. Perhaps the most effective immediate form which such aid might take is technical assistance, though capital aid will be required on an increasing scale, particularly after the achievement of independence by some of these areas. While there may be some attractiveness in emphasizing the role which the Commonwealth can play in helping its potential future members in this part of the world, it is perhaps unwise to suggest that an aid programme should be limited to either Commonwealth donors or potential Commonwealth recipients. The co-operation of non-Commonwealth colonial powers in Africa must be secured if the full benefit is to be obtained from external economic aid to this region. Moreover the need for a reasonably balanced economic development throughout the entire area is a principle that should be recognized at the outset of any attempt to promote greater economic and political stability in the regions in which we are particularly interested. Serious consideration must also be given to North Africa as well as the underdeveloped areas of the rest of the continent with which this memorandum is chiefly concerned.

If we assume that there would be benefits in enlarging participation in an aid programme beyond the Commonwealth, we must then determine whether it would be prudent to seek to develop a programme similar to the Colombo Plan which includes both Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries (as donors and as recipients). Such an approach could exclude the U.S.S.R. from participation in this particular programme but it is too much to hope that such exclusion will keep the U.S.S.R. out of mischief in these countries through other channels. A more likely development would be the initiation of an "aid race", in which perhaps the U.S.S.R. is already away and running with their offer of economic aid to Egypt. The success of a programme of the Colombo Plan type depends on the willingness of the donor countries to make substantial resources available. We must ask ourselves whether the threat in Africa is sufficiently compelling or recognized to prompt most Western countries, including Canada, to contemplate contributions on an effective scale, given the uncertainty about other demands which may be made on our resources.

An aid programme involving many of the Colonial Powers might be less suspect and perhaps more readily effective if it were sponsored at this stage by the United Nations. While we should not overemphasize the impermeability of the United Nations umbrella, there is much to commend providing assistance through the United Nations and its related institutions, particularly during the transitional stage when many of these areas will be preparing for autonomy. There are a number of existing United Nations resources which can be profitably employed to help the underdeveloped areas of Africa. The technical assistance programmes of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies could do much more than they are at present if the Colonial Powers would make fuller use of their facilities. For its part, Canada could make a particular effort when asked by the United Nations or its agencies to find experts or to provide training places for dependent territories in Africa. Although we cannot earmark our financial contribution for use in particular areas, we might give consideration to increasing our participation to UNTAB by say, $200,000 a year, stressing that this increase was prompted particularly by the needs of Africa (to which we would hope that a large part of these funds as well as a portion of our basic contribution would be devoted). Through close co-operation with the United Nations technical assistance authorities it should be possible to organize requests and deal with them in such a way that there would be prior agreement on particular experts for these countries and that most of these would tend to be selected from Canada or other Commonwealth countries. This would also mean that Iron Curtain personnel would not be likely to participate to any extent, if at all.

The International Bank provides an existing source for capital assistance and a number of loans have already been made to United Kingdom or other Colonial territories. The International Finance Corporation will soon come into operation and provide a further source for external capital assistance.

We should not lose sight of the increasing pressure in the United Nations to create a special fund for economic development. These pressures may prove to be irresistible. In fact, Canada has agreed to participate in the work of an ad hoc committee to examine further the practicability of establishing a SUNFED. When we determine our position with respect to SUNFED, which it may not be possible to delay more than a year or two, it will be worth remembering that this type of fund could constitute a useful source for capital assistance to the territories of Africa, particularly after they have achieved autonomy. A SUNFED, of course, would be under very strong lobbying pressures and since we cannot earmark our own contribution it might be difficult to ensure that funds were not granted to states less worthy or needy than the African territories. If we take an active part in the preparation of the arrangements and criteria for SUNFED and in its operation, we may be able to help ensure that projects in Africa receive sympathetic consideration. The creation of a SUNFED might also make it more difficult for the U.S.S.R. to carry out unilateral aid programmes since they would be under some compulsion to use the mechanism of a SUNFED which has been promoted in the United Nations by many of the countries which the U.S.S.R. is interested in wooing.

If it should not prove possible or desirable for an effective SUNFED to come into existence, a Colombo Plan type of programme may prove desirable and feasible at a later stage. However, it is impossible to forecast at this time the other demands which may be made on Canadian resources in several years' time when most of these territories will have achieved statehood. It is to be hoped that funds on an appreciable scale will be available to enable aid from Canada and other developed countries to be effectively mustered to help these new countries in their early and crucial stage of development. While we must keep these objectives in mind, we can perhaps avoid the unnecessary risk of creating false hopes among the peoples of Africa if, at this time, we stress that the fullest use should be made of facilities and resources which now exist under the United Nations and which, with modest increases, would appear to be fairly adequate for the immediate needs of the African territories during the next few years.

We have, finally, to consider the general question: "How high should Africa (apart from its Commonwealth associations and our possible commitments to the British) rank on our list of priorities?" On humanitarian grounds and in terms of the resources which are available to be developed and their potential contribution to the world's economy, aid to Africa should rank at least as high as any other region. However, in so far as we may have an interest in allocating technical and financial aid to underdeveloped countries in such a manner as to prevent them from being infiltrated by the Communists, and to counteract any bad tastes left by the colonial era, Africa may not have as high a priority as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The relevant priorities of all of these areas will have to be weighed very carefully as we plan our aid programme and we should not lose sight of the fact that factors which affect it are constantly changing to at least a partial degree. An aid system related to the broad base of the United Nations permits the respective priorities of areas to be continually re-examined.

Obviously a good deal of consultation between interested countries, particularly potential donors, will be required if we are to take positive steps to provide more aid to Africa. In addition to participating in the general discussions on this question in ECOSOC and in the United Nations we should perhaps be ready to engage in informal but frank discussions with other Western countries. Because of the implications of the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung and because of our desire to maintain a high degree of co-operation with the Asian countries we might also wish to discuss this question at an early stage with some of the more important Asian Colombo Plan countries. India is known as an active mischief- maker in Africa, but it may be a reasonable risk to assume that if she were associated with these discussions she might be less mischievous and more co-operative than if she were excluded.

CONCLUSIONS

Gold Coast

Consideration should be given to the establishment, not later than the fiscal year 1957-8, of a Canadian mission accredited to the Gold Coast, a dual accreditation to Nigeria possibly being arranged later. In reaching a final decision, the position occupied by Africa in any system of priorities involving our limited resources in personnel and money, and the potential threat to the area of Communism should be taken into consideration.

Aid to Africa

The least suspect and most readily effective form of aid would appear to be that sponsored by the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. Although we cannot earmark our contribution for use in particular areas, we might give consideration to increasing our participation in UNTAB. There are also possibilities in SUNFED, despite the strong lobbying pressures to which it would be subject when and if created. If SUNFED does not come into existence, a Colombo Plan type of programme might prove desirable and feasible at a later stage.

With the possible establishment in West Africa, we should consider how high Africa might rank on our list of priorities and weigh its qualifications carefully against those of Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

J. L[ÉGER]