The following were present at the dinner:

Mr. Pearson
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Wrong
Mr. Freeman Matthews
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Ignatieff

The following were the main subjects discussed:

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1. NATO Problems

Mr. Pearson explained that one of the purposes of his forthcoming visit to Europe was to turn over the Chairmanship of the North Atlantic Council at the end of his tenure of this office for a calendar year to the Foreign Minister of Denmark. He said that since he was a candidate for election to the presidency of the forthcoming General Assembly of the U.N. he thought that it was particularly important that he should turn over his office now, rather than wait until the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting on December 15.²¹ Mr. Acheson readily agreed that this was desirable.

Mr. Pearson said that he also wished to discuss current NATO problems with Lord Ismay, with particular reference to preparations for the annual review and the decisions which would have to be taken at the Ministerial meeting on force targets. He hoped that it would be possible this time to avoid the kind of controversy which arose before and after the Lisbon Council meeting as a result of statements which appeared in the press comparing the alleged performances of the respective signatories in meeting the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee and to avoid as well the issue of ambiguous announcements of military objectives. While he recognized that decisions would have to be taken by the Ministers to complete the Lisbon 1952 programme as quickly as possible and to continue the military buildup, balancing military, economic and political considerations, he hoped that it would not be necessary to confront governments with specific qualitative targets which they would be urged publicly to fulfil in 1953. This was not meant to imply that firm figures might not be set for 1953, but we should avoid public debate on the subject prior to NATO agreement, and also avoid as far as possible the projection of figures beyond 1953 in such a way that we appear to accept them as agreed.

He also wished to examine, while he was in Europe, the implications of the announced cutback in the British defence programme with particular reference to the thesis which had been put forward in justifying it. He was worried about the effect of this and recent French statements on NATO objectives and NATO morale. This thesis assumed a revision of the strategic concept governing North Atlantic military planning by assuming a greater reliance upon the strategic and tactical use of new weapons and of air power. This thesis, while it had certain superficial attractions, as it seemed to justify reductions in overall military expenditures and particularly the reduction of ground forces which would have to be made available after the first 60 to 90-day period following D-Day, had serious political implications, particularly in respect of probable reactions in continental Europe where once again they might think they were being considered as expendable.

Mr. Acheson made it clear that he had no sympathy for the British thesis. It seemed to him that it was a rationalization advanced to justify the decision taken by the British Government for political reasons to cut back its defence programme. The British argument, he said, could not be justified by the facts. The strategic use of atomic weapons would not materially affect the campaign which would have to be fought to stop the advance of the Soviet forces in Europe. The strategic counter-offensive which would be launched from the United States would only have longer-term effects upon the Soviet war potential. In the meantime, it was essential that there should be sufficient ground forces with tactical air support to stop the Soviet advance. No one had suggested that these forces should be of a magnitude which would permit them to mount a counter-offensive to drive the Soviet forces into the Soviet Union. The assumption was that, initially, the Soviet forces would advance a considerable distance into Western Europe and it would be necessary to launch at least an initial counter-offensive in order to stop the momentum of the Soviet advance. This explains the necessity of having covering forces immediately available for combat, with forces in reserve which would be made available within 30, 60 or 90 days of the beginning of the battle.

Mr. Acheson said that the British thesis also seemed to assume the existence of new types of special weapons which could be used tactically in the land battle to compensate for the numerical superiority of the Soviet ground forces. Mr. Acheson said that while it was true that the United States was experimenting with the development of a number of what he called "Buck Rogers" gadgets, none of these could be counted upon for use in the field until about 1956.

Mr. Acheson said that the British thesis also seemed to assume that the Soviet Union has no intention of launching a general war in the next two or three years. If by this it was meant that the Soviet leaders were not likely to decide to go to war on the calculation that Western military power now being built up might later place them at a greater military disadvantage, he was inclined to agree. This, however, he suggested, was not the real danger. The risks of general war were more likely, in his opinion, to arise from a different set of circumstances. There were certain circumstances, he particularly mentioned Korea and Berlin, in which the national security interests of the Soviet Union and the United States and other powers were so directly engaged that some unforeseen development might unloose a chain of events (none of which by themselves might be decisive), but which, taken together, might precipitate a general war. For instance, a serious air offensive launched against the U.N. forces in Korea from across the Yalu River would represent a most serious challenge to the security of U.S. forces in Korea that might well precipitate a chain of events. In Berlin, Mr. Acheson thought it was unthinkable that Western Powers could give up a position which the Soviet Government had in its power to make untenable from a military point of view.

The second type of situation which Mr. Acheson regarded as inherently containing the risks of general war was a local conflict in which the interests of the United States, as well as the Soviet Union, became increasingly and directly involved. He cited as an example the present situation in Indo-China and in the Middle East. Neither in Indo-China nor in the Middle-East had the United States sufficient resources to take preventive action in advance. The United States, therefore, had to improvise with the military resources available such action as was necessary to impede the fulfilment of Communist designs.

Returning to the question of the NATO force targets, Mr. Acheson said that the main object of NATO military planning at present was to build up the minimum forces necessary to stop the initial Soviet attack. In order to provide the basis for the necessary request to Parliaments for the authorization of funds, force targets seemed to him essential. Mr. Pearson then said it was the process of establishing them and the publicity given to that process which worried him. Mr. Acheson suggested that a distinction might be made between the tactics employed in the presentation of such targets to the public and their use by governments for supporting defence appropriations. He did not see, however, how it was possible to avoid establishing firm force targets for 1953; otherwise, the United States, for example, would not have any firm basis on which to request Congress for foreign military aid in support of the NATO defence programme. He implied that it might be possible to reduce to some extent NATO targets insofar as the military requirements recommended by the Standing Group proved to be beyond the economic capabilities of the respective NATO members. It was necessary, however, in his view, to continue the build-up of forces to the extent that the economic resources of the member nations would permit. The possibility of using new atomic weapons, tactical and strategic, could not affect NATO military planning in the next two or three years.

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