2. Nevertheless, it must be expected that the same kind of situation will arise over other matters from time to time in the future. Some thought has been given by the United Kingdom Government to the considerations which should determine our procedure in such circumstances, and it is felt that it would be most helpful to exchange views now, in advance of the event, on the best method of handling any problem of this kind which may arise. An analysis of the considerations involved is contained in the annexure to this memorandum, and the United Kingdom Government would very much appreciate any comments on the suggestions put forward.

1. It is the aim of the United Kingdom Government both

(a) to carry out our long established practice for the exchange of information and views with other Commonwealth Governments, and

(b) to encourage the United States to take us fully into their confidence.

2. It is hardly necessary to repeat that the United Kingdom Government attach the highest importance to consultation with other Commonwealth Governments and intend to carry out their obligations to other Commonwealth Governments to keep them fully and currently informed of developments on all major issues.

3. There can also be no question about the great importance of encouraging the United States to consult with us on all major issues fully and while their ideas are taking shape. All Commonwealth Governments wish to see the development of the greatest possible measure of mutual confidence between members of the Commonwealth and the United States, and it must be a first objective to do everything possible to build it up. In Korea, as we all know, one of the greatest dangers has always been that of the United States taking the bit between their teeth and going ahead without consulting any of their allies on steps which may have consequences affecting us all.

4. These two objectives - consultation with other members of the Commonwealth and consultation with the United States - are not incompatible, but it would be wrong to disguise from ourselves that difficulties will arise on occasions. In asking for a purely bilateral exchange of views with the United Kingdom on the issue of a warning following an armistice in Korea, the United States were, we believe, actuated to a large extent by the consideration that in this and in other similar cases they could be seriously embarrassed if their preliminary consultation with the United Kingdom led directly to approaches being made to them at that early stage by representatives of other members of the Commonwealth. The United States have, of course, their own obligations in respect of other foreign countries (e.g., in relation to Korea they have special obligations towards all countries with forces in Korea), and it is understandable that they may feel themselves in a difficulty in opening the door to consultations with five Commonwealth Governments while refraining from saying anything to foreign countries such as France.

5. We must avoid a position in which the United States might seek to impose an embargo on our conveying information to other Commonwealth Governments or else withdraw their confidence from ourselves. At present there are welcome signs that the United States are anxious to exchange views with us very fully at an early stage in their thinking. It is felt that other Commonwealth Governments will agree that in the common cause it is most desirable to encourage this and that everything possible should therefore be done to meet United States difficulties and susceptibilities.

6. The problem would be greatly eased if, when particularly delicate issues are under preliminary discussion between ourselves and the United States (of which we shall certainly wish to keep other Commonwealth Governments informed), other Commonwealth Governments could refrain from initiating direct enquiries or discussion on those particular issues with the United States in the early stages. This is a position which the United Kingdom Government are very ready to accept for their part - namely that, if another Commonwealth Government is in preliminary discussion direct with the United States, the United Kingdom Government, while kept informed, would themselves refrain from opening up discussion on the subject with the United States until they had received an indication from either the United States or the other Commonwealth Government concerned that the way was clear for such an extension of the discussion.

7. In any bilateral discussions between the United States and ourselves we would of course always be prepared, if so requested, to pass on to the United States any views which another Commonwealth Government might wish to offer. But normally, no doubt, other Commonwealth Governments would prefer to make their views known to the United States direct. The problem is one of timing - as was exemplified in connection with the recent telegrams on Korea. What is essential is that other Commonwealth Governments should be brought into direct consultation by the United States in such a way and at such a stage in the discussions as to enable their views to be considered in time to affect the final outcome. We would wish to help to secure this whenever the United States comes to us first on a bilateral basis.