Volume #23 - 520.|
EUROPE DE L'EST ET L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE
Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures|
au secrétaire du Cabinet
le 15 octobre 1956|
Dear Mr. Bryce,
As requested in your letter of July 19,? I enclose a report on the operations of the CBC International Service which has been prepared by the Political Co-ordination Section of this Department for the proposed meeting of the special committee of officials.
This report gives a satisfactory outline of the relations between this Department and the CBC-IS, with interesting and important comments on the reception of the short-wave service and the use of transcriptions, and sets out a statement of principles of broadcasting to Soviet and satellite countries for approval by the committee. It does not, however, in my opinion get down to the root of the matter which is the question of the ultimate responsibility within the Government for the operation of the International Service.
The original Order-in-Council, PC 8168 of September 18, 1942, set out very clearly the responsibilities of the CBC and of the Department of External Affairs with regard to the International Service. Paragraph 6 of the Order-in-Council reads:
The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation has, in its national broadcasting service under the Canadian Broadcasting Act, 1936, acquired and gained considerable experience in radio broadcasting and associated programmes, technical and administrative operations. It has trained personnel many of whose services could automatically be applied to the short-wave service. Many of its regular programmes would be used for short wave transmission and it would be responsible for the building of the special short-wave programmes which would largely interlock with those on the national system. It is recommended, therefore, that the Corporation is better equipped than any other body and is the logical one to administer, operate, supervise and control the short-wave broadcasting stations and associated facilities. In view of the fact that such short-wave broadcasts would constitute a factor affecting Canada's relations with the other countries of the Commonwealth, and with foreign countries, the work of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in this field should be carried on in consultation with the Department of External Affairs.
It seems clear from this that the original intention was that the Corporation should be directly and continually responsible for the work of the International Service and that the Department of External [Affairs] should provide advice in matters affecting our relations with other countries.
It appears however that over the past five or six years the CBC management has not done much to administer, operate, supervise and control the shortwave broadcasting stations... When Mr. Désy was appointed Director General in 1952 the CBC management in Ottawa seem to have taken the line that they had no further responsibility for the International Service, apart from mere housekeeping details. Mr. Désy set up machinery which allowed for closer liaison between the International Service and the Department of External Affairs in the matter of providing background information and information on Government policy in international affairs, but his appointment did not mean - or at least was not intended to mean - that this Department had assumed an interest in the day to day operation of the shortwave broadcasting service.
With the appointment of Mr. Delafield as Director of the International Service, in succession to Mr. Désy, the nominal link with this Department was broken, but I doubt that the CBC management resumed any closer direction of CBC-IS affairs. As far as the Department is aware, the International Service seems to be regarded by the CBC as a separate establishment operated by its own senior officials, with a minimum of interference from the Corporation. There is little cross fertilization of ideas between the national service and the international service, or easy transfer from say, the West Coast division to the International Service or vice versa. No doubt many of the positions in the International Service requiring a knowledge of foreign languages are highly specialized, but this should not apply to all positions.
The Department of External Affairs has no interest in taking over the responsibility of the operation of the International Service, which is primarily a radio matter and should be run by the best available experts in the field. We think however that better results could be achieved if the CBC management exercised its responsibility to administer, operate, supervise and control the International Service. The present situation is probably as unsatisfactory to the CBC as it is to this Department.
I understand that in their brief? to the special committee the CBC will stress the necessity of building, sooner or later, new short-wave transmitters, which will presumably cost several million dollars. It may well be that unless these new transmitters are provided our short-wave broadcasts will only reach a small part of their potential audience. However, I should be reluctant to support a request for the necessary appropriation unless some fairly radical changes were made in the present set-up of the International Service.
I wonder if you and I could meet with Mr. Dunton sometime before the special committee meets, to discuss whether this problem of responsibility for the International Service should be considered by the committee.
I am sending additional copies of the attached report to Mr. Dwyer for distribution to the members of the Committee. No distribution is being given to this letter. Yours sincerely,
[PIÈCE JOINTE 1/ENCLOSURE 1]
Rapport de la section de la coordination des politiques
Report by Political Co-ordination Section
The Department of External Affairs supports the principle that Canada should maintain an international short-wave broadcasting service. Radio offers an effective way of reaching and influencing people's minds and is accepted by all the major countries of the world as a useful instrument of external policy. The great powers, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, are most heavily engaged in international broadcasting and the tremendous effort made by the USSR and the satellites to jam Western broadcasts is an indication of their belief and fear that such broadcasts are potentially effective.
2. The Department has stated in the past its belief that an effort to explain Western life and policies to the people of the Communist countries is worth while. A departmental memorandum written in January 1954 stated:
If even a modest degree of success is obtained in counteracting incessant Communist propaganda and disabusing the Soviet people of some of the false concepts forced upon them, if the faith in the values of democracy and Christian civilization can be maintained at a healthy level in those countries more recently taken under Soviet sway, the moderate costs of radio broadcasting are well spent.51
3. With the easing of international tension, the conflict of ideas has become increasingly important. Canada has a modest influence in the world's political and military affairs and a considerable one in economic affairs. This influence will be strengthened if our views are as widely known as possible and if other countries have an accurate knowledge and understanding of Canada. Radio can play an important part toward this end.
4. An important consideration in assessing the value to Canada of a short- wave broadcasting service has always been its potential usefulness in wartime. In the last war, radio broadcasting, chiefly conducted by the BBC, was a most effective means of encouraging our friends in Occupied Europe and sowing disaffection in the enemy population. Canada came into this field very late and without experience, but its importance was appreciated. In the event of war Canada would want to play a vigorous part in the allied propaganda effort, of which broadcasting would be a vital part. If we did not possess a short-wave service one would have to be created in a hurry. The short-wave transmitters and the very considerable experience of the present CBC-IS staff are assets which should be kept in readiness. (It is notable that nearly 2 1/2 years elapsed between the decision to set up a short-wave service in September 1942 and its inauguration in February 1945.) It should also be noted that the Canadian Government has a considerable investment in this service. In the eleven years of its existence the CBC-IS has cost over $19 million of which $4 1/2 million has been for capital investment and $14 1/2 million for operating expenditures.
5. The Department reaffirms its belief that the work of the CBC-IS is important. It is chiefly concerned that it should be carried out as effectively as possible and that as necessary methods be adapted to changing conditions.
Eastern European Services
6. In its report of May 22, 1954, the special committee of officials recommended a set of directives for broadcasting to the Soviet and satellite countries which was subsequently approved by the Cabinet Committee.52 These directives were drawn up when there was still very considerable tension between East and West. It is believed that in the changed international atmosphere since the Geneva Conferences of last year, and in the light of the changed internal situation in the USSR and the satellites since the XXth Party Congress, a new directive for CBC-IS broadcasts to the Soviet and satellite countries is required.
7. A draft statement of principles of broadcasting to Soviet and satellite countries is attached as Appendix A. The emphasis has been placed on the projection of Canada, which of course means not only providing information about Canada, but also expressing a Canadian view of international affairs and, where appropriate, of events in the Soviet and satellite countries. The statement suggests that the International Service should attempt to avoid the imputation of being a propaganda organ which seems to be a widely held opinion of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. On the other hand, it should not be merely an imitation of the highly regarded BBC. Our comments on international affairs should reflect the Canadian as a representative Western view. The statement also suggests that direct comments on internal affairs of the USSR and the satellites should be limited, and that our principal criticism of the Communist system can best be expressed indirectly through a positive description of the Canadian way of life, with discussions of common problems and demonstrations of our methods of solving them. Particular attention is drawn to the question of the tone of our broadcasts.
8. It is submitted that a moderate approach will be more likely to attract the listeners' attention and therefore more likely to be effective as propaganda than direct and emotional attacks on communist theory and practice. This approach should find ready acceptance among the educated people in the professions, in the bureaucracy, and in industry, who are most likely to have access to short-wave radios, who are interested in relations between the USSR or the satellites and the outside world, and who have a growing influence in communist society. A second consideration, which should not be allowed to affect the content of our broadcasts, but might well affect their tone is that at some appropriate time a direct approach might be made to the Soviet authorities on the question of jamming. Subsequently similar approaches to the satellite governments might be desirable.
9. Before any approach is made to the Soviet authorities we would want to be sure that their monitoring service could not produce any scripts of the CBC- IS broadcasts which they might reasonably claim to be abusive or actively hostile. It would be more difficult to obtain suspension of the jamming of broadcasts to the satellite countries, as their governments are less sure of their position and more vulnerable to outside criticism. However, if the Soviet authorities set an example, the satellite authorities might decide to follow suit in due course.
Liaison with the Department of External Affairs
10. The present arrangements for keeping the CBC-IS informed of Government policy and Departmental views on international affairs and for supplying them with available background information for their broadcasts would seem to be adequate. The Political Co-ordination Section of the Department, which was set up in 1953, maintains this liaison through letters of guidance, weekly selections of classified material and by frequent telephone consultation between Ottawa and Montreal. In addition, there is an interchange of visits between members of the section and of other divisions of the Department and of members of the CBC-IS staff. The CBC-IS representative in Ottawa also keeps in constant touch with this Department and with other Government departments.
11. The Department has wondered whether the CBC-IS directing staff might be able to improve its methods of giving policy and editorial guidance and direction to the different language sections and to the Eastern European sections in particular. There appears to be a division of responsibility between the policy co-ordination unit and the supervisor of language sections with regard to the actual output of the sections. In order to apply the principles suggested in the attached Appendix A consistently and successfully, it might be necessary to exercise closer direction over the various language sections, giving them ideas for their programmes, discussing projected scripts and infusing a greater sense of unity and purpose into the total effort. If a suitable person were available, the CBC-IS might consider the appointment of an officer who would be directly responsible to the Director for all programmes to Soviet and satellite countries. There would be no point in making such an appointment unless the person chosen was highly qualified, with expert knowledge of international affairs and of Eastern Europe, experienced in broadcasting and newspaper work and with a wide knowledge of Canada. It would also be most desirable that he should be able to speak at least one of the languages used, so that he could judge directly the work produced. Such a person could not easily be found, but the possibility should be kept in mind.
12. With regard to the personnel of the language sections, the Department has noted that two of the sections, the Polish and the Ukrainian, are headed by Canadian-born citizens, of French and English backgrounds respectively, rather than by former nationals of the countries concerned. This is a development which should be encouraged as experience has shown how difficult it is for the émigré members of the broadcasting staff, even with the best will in the world, to divest themselves of their old loyalties and prejudices. To have effective control the heads of sections ought to be completely familiar with the language of their section and should be assisted and encouraged in their study of it. As a long-term plan the International Service should develop specialists with a thorough knowledge of the various target countries, but with a strong Canadian background.
Reception of CBC-IS Signals
13. Canadian diplomatic missions in areas to which CBC-IS programmes are directed were asked in June and July of this year to carry out a monitoring exercise and to let us know how well they can hear CBC-IS programmes in the language of their posts and in English on radio receivers normally available to members of their staff. The replies received were on the whole very disappointing and are summarized in the attached Appendix B.? Our mission in Prague reported that they were able to hear the beginning of the Czech programme on a number of occasions but that it was heavily jammed after the first few minutes. They were also able to hear CBC-IS programmes in English with fair success. Our mission in Warsaw was completely unable to hear CBC-IS programmes either in Polish or in English, because of jamming and interference. The mission in Moscow reported that they were totally unable to hear CBC-IS signals because of jamming.
14. Reports from missions in Western Europe, including those in Stockholm, Oslo, Bonn, Berlin, The Hague and London, were uniformly discouraging. Only one of fifteen staff members who tried to monitor CBC-IS programmes on their home sets in Bonn was able to hear the programmes with any degree of consistency, using a fairly expensive radio. The staff members of other missions listed above all reported very little success in hearing the programmes. Our Embassy in Madrid reported poor reception of the Latin American service in Spanish but that reception of CBC French and English programmes was satisfactory. None of our missions reported having met a significant number of people who listen to CBC-IS programmes.
15. The reports from our missions must not be taken as proof that CBC-IS short-wave signals cannot be heard by people who are in the habit of listening to short-wave broadcasts. Most members of Canadian missions abroad are obviously not accustomed to short-wave listening and their personal reports have little technical value. It is however their belief that short-wave listeners in most countries are a rather specialized group, representing only a very small proportion of the general population. The report by the BBC Monitoring Service, summarized in Appendix B, presumably based on the use of powerful receivers, with its preponderance of fair, or fair/poor and poor reports for the month of May 1956 does not give much assurance that even this specialized group is well served. There is evidence that CBC-IS programmes relayed by the BBC on medium-wave are received satisfactorily in Europe.
16. It may be that the European area, with its heavy concentration of broadcasting stations in every country and of jamming stations in the satellites and the USSR, is particularly difficult to reach by shortwave from Canada. It is also realized that 1956 is a particularly bad year for reception because of the sunspot cycle. Reports from other parts of the world, including South America, Australia and Japan, and the many listeners' letters received by the CBC-IS, would indicate that the signals are usually received very satisfactorily. The best solution to this problem might be the provision of new and more powerful short-wave transmitters to replace the present transmitters at Sackville, N.B. which were built fourteen years ago.
Relays and Transcriptions
17. It is the Department's view that whenever they can be used, relays and transcriptions of Canadian programmes are a great deal more effective than short-wave programmes. Nearly every mission which reported difficulty in hearing the short-wave broadcasts, expressed enthusiasm for the use of transcriptions and recommended their increase. Our Ambassador in Norway, Mr. Ronning, said:
The programmes prepared in Canada which are broadcast over the Norwegian long-wave system are of tremendous value. I listen to these broadcasts and I hear comments very frequently after each one from people in Oslo who have been impressed. The trouble is that there are so few of such broadcasts. I am quite certain that arrangements could be made for a larger number of such broadcasts.
Our missions in The Hague, Bonn, Berlin, London, Stockholm and Madrid all made similar comments.
18. The Department of External Affairs would support any proposals put forward by the International Service to increase and widen the scope of the transcription service. It is not suggested, however, that the weekend service of broadcasts to the Netherlands, Italy and the Scandinavian countries should be abandoned altogether. It seems reasonable that the regular weekly service is necessary to give continuity to the work of the language sections, which would in any case be responsible for increasing the output of transcribed programmes. There are also many types of programme useful to Canada which do not lend themselves to transcriptions or which would not be acceptable to foreign broadcasting organizations in this form and can only be sent out on the short- wave service.
19. The Department thinks that, generally speaking, arrangements for placing of transcriptions should be made directly by the CBC-IS with the broadcasting authorities concerned. It is however important that the missions be kept informed of all CBC-IS dealings with radio organizations in their territory. Our missions are of course glad to help in establishing contacts and expediting delivery of discs, when necessary.
20. The point was made by our mission in Berlin that German broadcasting authorities might be more interested in broadcasting Canadian programmes if they could expect some degree of reciprocity. The CBC might want to consider whether arrangements between the International Service and the National Network to this end could be improved.
21. The Department would also be interested in building up libraries of 12- inch LP transcriptions in missions which request them, which could be lent to radio stations and to schools, colleges and private individuals, in the same way as NFB films are used at present. It welcomed the initiation of this project a few years ago and hopes that it may be extended.
22. It is understood that the CBC-IS report will mention the question of developing international exchanges of television programmes and whether the International Service should have primary responsibility in this field. As the National Film Board and CBC-TV are already establishing contacts with TV authorities in different countries, this is a matter which the Committee should consider. Should the International Service have a budget allocation for processing television kinescopes for placement abroad or should Canadian participation in television abroad be left to the National Film Board and to exchange arrangements made directly by CBC-TV? Our missions have pointed out that television is developing rapidly in many countries which have shown an interest in our radio programmes and this important medium for the further projection of Canada should not be neglected.
[PIÈCE JOINTE 2/ENCLOSURE 2]
PRINCIPLES OF BROADCASTING TO SOVIET AND SATELLITE COUNTRIES
The object of CBC-IS broadcasts to Soviet and satellite people is primarily the projection of Canada as part of a co-ordinated political offensive of the Western world. The Eastern European services should promote understanding and friendship between their listeners and the Canadian people by presenting the Canadian view of international affairs, emphasizing that it is part of the Western viewpoint; by reporting events in Canada and by providing a picture of the Canadian way of life. Our principal means of expressing our criticism of the communist system should be through factual descriptions of life in Canada which the listener can contrast with conditions within the Soviet orbit.
2. As the Canadian service is generally only carried on two short-wave frequencies in the midst of a great volume of broadcasts from the BBC, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, etc., our programmes should have a distinctive quality and appeal which will attract and hold an audience among the limited number of persons who are interested in listening to short-wave broadcasts and who possess the necessary radio equipment. For this reason the tone of our broadcasts should not differ from that used in broadcasting to the rest of the world. They should be restrained and moderate in approach, clear and vivid in language and style and should show respect for the foreign listeners' intelligence, common-sense and national feelings. An additional factor to be considered is that the Soviet authorities have recently stopped deliberately jamming the BBC broadcasts in Russia; until jamming of CBC-IS programmes is lifted our service to the USSR, at least, will operate under a serious handicap in the competition for listeners. A consistent, moderate, though uncompromising approach in our broadcasts may make it easier to suggest to the Soviet authorities at some future date that if they are sincere in their desire to promote good relations with Canada they should put an end to the jamming of our short-wave broadcasts.
3. It is generally agreed that the backbone of the short-wave service to Soviet and satellite countries must be the news. We should present a reliable, balanced and completely objective international news service to counter the one- sided presentation of news in their own press and radio. There should be no suppression of news which might put the Western powers in an unfavourable light. Indeed, the problems of the Western community should be exploited in frank discussion to contrast the freedom of the members of that community with the rigid conformity which characterizes the internal relationships of the Soviet bloc. Because it is the voice of Canada, a deliberately generous share of interesting news of Canadian affairs should be included in the bulletins. Whenever available, reliable items of Eastern European news should also be included.
4. A considerable proportion of the programmes will be commentary on international affairs. This should be given from a Canadian point of view, giving due attention to the explanation of Canadian Government policy. Good coverage should be given to the United Nations, NATO and the Commonwealth about which Soviet and satellite listeners may not be well informed. Inevitably there will be discussion of Soviet foreign policy on which our views presumably will be of interest to listeners in Eastern Europe. When the Soviet Union acts in a dangerous and irresponsible manner, or when it tries to disguise with high- sounding propaganda actions really designed to enhance its power position, we should not hesitate to say so but should do so coolly and frankly, with restraint and reasonableness. On the other hand, when the Soviet Union acts in a responsible and helpful manner, we should be at pains to welcome the fact and should certainly not automatically question the sincerity of its motives.
5. Comment on the internal affairs of the Soviet Union or of the satellite states should occupy only a very small proportion of the total programme content. In any discussion of internal affairs developments which suggest a move toward a more liberal atmosphere should be welcomed and listeners should be encouraged to think of further specific concessions, similar to those which are enjoyed in the West. The theme of the superiority of the Western and the inferiority of the Soviet way of life should not continually be belaboured in the abstract. In dealing with news of internal affairs authentic reports of events or conditions which have been hidden by the Soviet or satellite authorities from their people should be featured. To deal with a development in Eastern Europe which is highly significant of the local way of life, but perhaps insufficiently spectacular to merit lengthy treatment, an item should be produced on a comparable theme from Canadian life, with only a passing allusion to the Eastern European development, so that the facts themselves point up the contrast.
6. Discussion of Communist theory, qua theory, should be cut out altogether. The Russian people already have a surfeit of Marx and Lenin and their boredom with it should be recognized. Effectively to challenge theory in a series of short broadcasts which have to deal with so much else is virtually impossible. Let the challenge to theory come more subtly in a sustained pragmatic approach to developments which is ultimately more effective and more typical of Canadians.
Projection of Canada
7. The projection of Canada should now occupy a higher proportion of space in Eastern European programmes. It should perform a dual purpose of promoting understanding of our way of life and of our country, and of allowing listeners to make comparisons with their own conditions. In this connotation most of our criticism of the Communist way of life should be made by example alone. It should be implicit rather than explicit. The presentation should be entirely straightforward, letting the facts speak for themselves.
8. Exchanges of visits between Canada and Soviet Russia, or the satellite countries, would be given good coverage but should be used as a peg on which to hang the projection of Canada. We should try to obtain radio interviews with Soviet visitors for short-wave broadcasts or, if this proves feasible, for broadcast on Soviet radio.
9. The presence in Canada of sizeable ethnic groups from the countries to which we broadcast should be exploited although, of course, the CBC-IS should never be represented as their particular spokesman. The purpose of such programmes should be to promote closer relations and sympathy between Canada and the countries concerned and not to foment discontent against the Soviet and satellite régimes. The material successes of these new Canadians, their satisfaction with conditions in Canada and pride in their Canadian citizenship, their preservation of their native cultures and their continuing love for their homeland should all be made clear, as a demonstration of the reasons why several generations of their people have come to Canada.
Tone of Broadcasts
10. If the above principles are to be followed, great attention should be paid to the tone of our broadcasts which influences the attitude of the listener.
Individuals in communist-controlled countries are subjected to a constant stream of bombastic propaganda from their own authorities and are apt to discount and disbelieve overt propaganda from the West. Our listeners should be made to feel that we are not trying to convert them, but merely to express and explain the Canadian point of view on matters of mutual interest. Generalized and over-simplified condem nations of the Communist system serve no purpose. Judgment must be made of specific issues and conveyed gently. Phrases loaded with emotion should be avoided at all times - e.g. bloody battle, wrath of the Polish people, hated régime, etc. (The supervisors of the International Service may need to remind some of their talented émigré staff members that they are speaking not as Poles or Czechs or Russians but as Canadians who are by nature considerably less emotional and who take a more detached view of events and conditions in Europe.)
The vivid concrete image should be preferred at all times to the theoretical and abstract. In discussions of international news, of Eastern European affairs, or of Canada, the facts must be encouraged to speak for themselves. Lectures and homilies should be avoided. Rather than a general discussion of hydro-electric power in Canada, for example, a picture of one particular power station might be presented; rather than figures about the amount of electricity consumed in Canada, the great part played by electrical equipment in our daily lives could be illustrated. Direct evidence should be used whenever possible - interviews with people, including visitors and immigrants, actuality broadcasts, etc. The criterion for any programme should be that it is alive and of interest to a reasonably wide group of listeners. If it is dull it will be a failure.
(c) Respect for the Listeners
A continuing effort should be made by the authors of scripts to place themselves in the position of their audience and to show respect and consideration for the listeners' intelligence, common sense and national pride, and to show appreciation of the difficulties under which they live. Preaching and moralizing should be avoided. Listeners should not be told as news, facts about their own country which they know all too well such as the shortage of housing, the high cost of living, long hours of work, etc. These facts can be referred to but they should be used intelligently and sympathetically in a way which will not antagonize the listeners.
In discussing problems of a free society, we should not apologize for them or explain them away, but by describing how we are tackling them, demonstrate what is meant by freedom. Rather than condemning communist actions, questions should be asked to exploit the puzzling discrepancy between the dictates of common sense and the communist policy underlying the event. Sharp hostility should be avoided - the attitude should be that of an interested observer. Improvements in the communist régime should be welcomed and hope expressed for their extension.
11. The above suggestions for moderation in tone should not mean any weakening in the force and effectiveness of our broadcasts to the Soviet and satellite area. They are put forward in the hope that what the International Service has to say about world affairs and about Canada will have a greater chance of influencing the target audience.
12. While the above principles should be followed in all of the services to Eastern Europe, the different situation in the countries concerned will require some variations in approach.
13. It should be remembered that an entire generation of Russians has lived under communism for their whole lives and that the possibility of a counter- revolution has long since disappeared. Material conditions have improved substantially in the USSR during the past few years and the people are not basically dissatisfied with the Soviet system. They are conscious of the USSR's strength as a great power and are proud of their national achievements. They have also been so thoroughly imbued with their own peace propaganda that they are inclined to believe that all threats of war come from the imperialist camp. However, the intellectual and political developments of the past three years - the destalinization campaign, the encouragement of criticism, discussions of democratization and decentralization - are evidence that new ideas are appearing and offer new opportunities for the West to force the Russians to think for themselves. In attempting to reach their minds, our efforts should be concentrated on dispelling the ignorance and misunderstanding caused by their isolation from the rest of the world, and on encouraging the native desire for a more liberal régime.
14. Although the Ukrainian service of the CBC-IS owes its existence to direct pressure from the various Ukrainian associations in Canada, its programmes should not be allowed to differ in any significant way from those of the Russian service and should be guided by the same general principles. It should avoid any tendency to identify itself with the Ukrainian community, although naturally it will use the strong Ukrainian element in Canada as a means to obtain the interest of the Ukrainian listeners.
15. It is not the policy of the Canadian Government to advocate the setting up of an independent Ukrainian state, and our broadcasts must not give a false impression on this point. We recognize that the Ukraine has a strong cultural tradition which ought to be encouraged and maintained, although we believe that an independent Ukraine is politically unobtainable so long as the USSR remains a major power. We should encourage the Ukraine to foster their cultural traditions and keep them informed of the strong interest in preserving Ukrainian history in Canada. In commenting on the trend towards liberalization we might suggest that the Ukrainian S.S.R. should be granted a genuine federal relationship within the Soviet Union. The analogy of the federal solution in Canada to our bi-national problem might be demonstrated.
16. It is likely also that the Ukrainian audience of the CBC-IS is predominately rural and the Ukrainian service should bear this in mind in its selection of programme material. Greater direct use might be made of Canadian- Ukrainian material in the form of actuality broadcasts, interviews, etc. The Return to the Homeland campaign should be countered by demonstrating in live broadcasts the attractiveness of life for Ukrainians in Canada. CBC-IS should make use of the special nature of the Ukrainian community to add interest to its broadcasts to the Soviet Union, but should not allow itself to be used by the Ukrainian community.
Polish, Czech and Slovak Services
17. As the evidence shows that the Communist régimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia have not captured the support of more than a minority of the people of these countries, it can be assumed that nearly all of the listeners to our programmes in these countries will show some sympathy for the Western point of view. Our broadcasts, therefore, should give the impression that they are directed to friends who have known something about Western culture and traditions, and who can conceive of alternative solutions to problems more readily than can the Russians.
18. Our broadcasts should show an awareness of the ferment going on in the satellite countries, sympathy for the struggle of an area which has long lacked economic development and suffered from rural unemployment and appreciation of the desire of the people for a better standard of living and greater freedom. At the same time we should not lecture them, nor, as outsiders, either attempt to advise them how to fight their battle or hold out false hopes of liberation which could only be brought about by a major war. They should be encouraged to continue in their struggle to achieve a better and freer life in an alien system which has been imposed upon them.
19. Any tendency towards Titoism in the satellite governments should be
welcomed. Our broadcasts should appeal to the national pride of the Czechs,
Poles, etc., and encourage them wherever possible to assert their independence
of the Soviet Union. We must recognize that the satellites, for geographical
reasons alone, will be forced to maintain some kind of alliance with the USSR
but it can be suggested that it need not be complete domination and that the
people of these countries should not allow themselves to be exploited. In this
connection the Russian colonial treatment of the satellites in matters of
trade, investment, etc. can also be brought out.