There has been outstanding for some time a United Kingdom proposal that the Commonwealth contingent in Korea should be withdrawn, and that a joint approach of old Commonwealth members should be made to the United States Government on the matter.

2. The New Zealand Government replied to the United Kingdom proposal on February 5 indicating that it would wish to have an informal indication of the United States Government's reaction to the suggested withdrawal before a final decision on the matter. It skirted the question of a joint approach to the United States authorities suggesting that the United Kingdom should in the first instance sound out the United States authorities.

3. The Australian Government does not plan to oppose the United Kingdom proposal. It would not, however, join in a joint démarche to Washington. When in due course the United Kingdom approach leads the United States authorities to enquire about the future of the Australian contingent, the Australians would explain that it would not be practicable to retain their contingent once the United Kingdom element was withdrawn.

4. Mr. Sandys informed Mr. Dulles, during his visit to Washington on January 29, that the United Kingdom wished to withdraw the United Kingdom contingent from Korea as soon as possible. Mr. Dulles is reported to have said that he would be sorry to see the Commonwealth division withdrawn, as he did not like to see the United Nations forces scaled down in this manner. He said that the presence of the Commonwealth contingent had a great effect in restraining Syngman Rhee from rash adventures. He wondered whether a facade of Commonwealth representation might not be preserved by the maintenance of liaison officers in Korea.

5. The Department of External Affairs believes that there is some, though probably dwindling, political advantage to be obtained from the retention of Commonwealth forces in Korea, and that Canada should not take part in a joint démarche to the State Department. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, agrees that there is some value in keeping the United Nations characteristic of the force in Korea, even though the present Commonwealth contingent there has no particular military value.

6. The economic arguments which have probably led the United Kingdom to make their proposal can be appreciated. We must, as well, admit the right of the United Kingdom to withdraw its troops from Korea if, in its view, circumstances warrant that withdrawal. In the circumstances, however, we see no reason why we should press the United States to agree to a withdrawal of the Commonwealth forces, even though we cannot object to the United Kingdom making its case. The retention of the small Canadian unit currently in Korea (approximately 22 personnel) is not a problem for us.

7. In view of the foregoing the following course of action is recommended:

(a) That we now inform the United Kingdom that:

(i) Canada would offer no objection to the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from Korea;

(ii) the Canadian Government would not, at this stage, think it essential that a joint approach be made to the United States on the subject;

(iii) Canadian authorities would like to be kept informed of United Kingdom discussions with the United States authorities on the subject;

(iv) if the United Kingdom Government should decide to alter the size or the nature of its contribution, the future of the Commonwealth contingent and of the Canadian contribution, would have to be reviewed in the light of circumstances which would then exist.

(b) That our Embassy in Washington be instructed to indicate our attitude informally to the State Department.¹¹¹

L.B. PEARSON