I attach for your consideration a copy of a memorandum of August 28? on the subject of Turkey's candidature for one of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council. In a marginal comment on this memorandum you suggested that the time had perhaps come for us to reconsider our increasingly unrealistic policy of refus­ing to pledge advance support for candidates and confining ourselves to an assur­ance of "sympathetic consideration".

2. There are, of course, certain advantages in the policy we have followed in the past. Coupled as it has been with a reluctance formally to canvass support for our own candidatures, it has kept us from becoming involved in the more flagrant horse-trading that inevitably occurs in the context of elections to the principal organs and committees of the United Nations. Secondly, our refusal to make advance commitments has left our hands comparatively free, and has enabled us to support the election of countries whose candidature was not definitely announced until the final stages of the electoral campaign. Finally, by responding to the approaches of all prospective candidates in uniformly neutral terms, we have per­haps succeeded in creating a minimum of disappointment and resentment among candidates we are either unable or unwilling to support.

3. On closer consideration, however, it seems to me that these advantages are somewhat precarious in nature. While elections in the United Nations are held by secret ballot, candidates are, as a rule, fairly certain as to the quarters from which they may expect support or opposition. The net result of our traditionally coy atti­tude, therefore, is probably that we succeed neither in winning friends, as we might by clearly indicating our support for specific candidates, nor in influencing people, where such influence may be required to ensure the election of the most responsible and best qualified candidate.

4. As an illustration of the political advantages which might be derived from an unequivocal advance pledge of support, it would suffice to recall the case of Egypt's recent candidature for election to the Economic and Social Council when we did, in fact, decide to assure the Egyptian Consul-General of our proposed sup­port. Since 1947, when Canada came out in favour of the partition of Palestine, our relations with the Arab world have been cool, if not strained. The Arab thesis has been that Canada was inexorably committed to the policy followed by the major Western powers in the Middle East and a basis of mutual understanding between Canada and the Arab world was thereby precluded from being established. In the light of this slightly exaggerated persecution complex we should perhaps avail our­selves of every opportunity of responding to reasonable overtures on the part of the Arabs, insofar as such a response does not conflict with the general objectives of Canadian policy. Egypt's request that we support its candidature for a seat on the Economic and Social Council presented a good opportunity for creating a more favourable atmosphere in Canadian-Arab relations, and the disadvantages inherent in an advance pledge of support in such a case would seem to be offset by tangible political advantages.

5. Once we have reached a considered decision to support a country for election to one of the principal organs or committees of the United Nations, we should, I think, be prepared to assist our candidate in securing election. The difficulties experienced by Turkey in gaining a sufficient majority for its recent election to the Security Council provide, I believe, a case in point. Canada was strongly convinced that Turkey could play a far more effective role in the Council than the Lebanon, and active Canadian support for Turkey's election might well have succeeded in persuading wavering delegations, where United States efforts to swing the balance in favour of Turkey could be resented as a form of pressure.

6. In the light of these considerations, I believe that we might henceforth abandon the cautious and, in the final analysis, unrealistic attitude we have adopted in the past. Once the field of potential candidates has emerged clearly and we are in a position to reach a definite and final decision, the only sensible course of action would seem to be for us to give explicit assurances to the candidates we propose to support, and to exert some effort in seeing to it that they are elected. This would not, of course, preclude us from confining our response to an assurance of "sympa­thetic consideration" in cases where it would be politically unwise to make an advance commitment or where we were genuinely uncertain as to our eventual line of action.

7. As a corollary of this policy we should be justified, I think, in pressing our own candidature for office in the organs and committees of the United Nations with more vigour than we have displayed on previous occasions. It is, of course, gratify­ing for us to be elected on the initiative of others rather than an a result of a system­atic and formal campaign of canvassing votes on our part, but I doubt if such an approach is likely to increase our chances of election in the immediate future. The delicate restraint, which characterized our recent bid for a vice-presidency in the General Assembly, lost for us the votes of many friendly delegations which, until the very last moment, were uncertain as to the definiteness of our intentions. There can be little doubt that a formal request for support at an early stage in the electoral campaign would have assured Canada's election by a substantial margin.

8. I do not believe that a change in our policy, along the lines indicated in this memorandum, would necessarily have to involve us in electoral horse-trading. It should be quite possible for us to be more forthright in regard to our own candida­ture for office without, at the same time, deviating from our previous practice of supporting other candidates for office solely on the basis of individual merit.

A.D.P H[EENEY]