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DCER : Volume #24 - 2.DEA/50329-40 : The commonwealth seat on the security council

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Volume #24 - 2.

CHAPITRE I

NATIONS UNIES

PREMIÈRE PARTIE

NATIONS UNIES

SECTION A

DOUZIÈME SESSION DE L'ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE À NEW YORK,
17 SEPTEMBRE AU 14 DÉCEMBRE 1957

SUBDIVISION II

ÉLECTIONS DU CONSEIL

2.

DEA/50329-40

Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
pour le Cabinet

Cabinet Document No. 128-57

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], le 8 juillet 1957

THE COMMONWEALTH SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

  1. In accordance with the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement reached in SanFrancisco in 1945 one of the non-permanent seats of the Security Council has been considered a Commonwealth Seat and by 1955 had been occupied in turn by all the Commonwealth members of the United Nations, excluding the United Kingdom, which has a permanent seat, and South Africa, which chose not to run. With the election of Australia for a two-year term beginning January 1, 1956, a second round was started and Canada stands next in line. The two newest members of the Commonwealth, Ceylon and Ghana, have only recently been admitted to the United Nations and have not displayed any interest in running for election to the Council.

  2. Because of the considerable expansion of membership of the United Nations during the last two years there is a likelihood that conventions governing the allocation of seats will break down or be disregarded. It is important, however, to attempt to maintain the institution of a Commonwealth seat, not only because it contributes to Commonwealth solidarity but also because it affords by far the best opportunity for countries like Canada to have a regular opportunity to serve on the Council. But by the same token it is in our own interest to do all we can to ensure that the newer members of the Commonwealth, without whose participation the statistical justification for a Commonwealth seat in an expanded United Nations would disappear, are convinced that it is to their advantage to remain on the Commonwealth roster. For this reason some thought has been given to the desirability of yielding our turn to one of the Asian members and in particular to India (since at this stage Ceylon appears neither well equipped nor anxious to assume such heavy responsibilities) and of standing for election to the Council two years later.

  3. The principal advantages of such a course are:
    1. It might serve to arrest any tendency on the part of Asian members to drift away from the Commonwealth roster on to the roster of an Asian seat should one be provided by amendment of the Charter.

      It would also constitute effective evidence of our understanding of the legitimate aspirations of the Asian members of the Commonwealth and be well calculated to strengthen their belief in the value of Commonwealth association.

    2. It would afford opportunity for Asia, which is undoubtedly under-represented at present, to be represented on the Council without interference with existing conventional allocation of seats while in the interim it might be possible to reach agreement on an expansion of the membership of the Council.

    3. It would relieve us from accepting further burdensome responsibilities at a time when our available resources are already under severe strain. Two years from now our present engagements in Indo-China and the Middle East may be substantially reduced, whereas membership in the Security Council in 1958-9 would inevitably involve us in a great many additional complex and difficult disputes one of which, the question of Kashmir, is particularly embarrassing for a Commonwealth country.

  4. Soundings were accordingly taken to determine what would be the reaction of some of our principal friends and allies if we were to stand down. As a result it has become clear that, among others, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the United States would very much prefer Canada to be a candidate because, even though they recognize the force of arguments in favour of passing the seat to Asia, they believe that the next two years will be particularly important for determining the future role of the United Nations. Moreover India has indicated that it would be glad to support Canada's candidature for the Security Council and we have had informal indication that Pakistan, while it would vigorously oppose the candidature of India, would readily support that of Canada.

  5. There are a number of additional reasons why Canada should consider standing for election, viz:
    1. Canada has played an active role in the United Nations and is regarded by many members as a country which can be counted upon to help find acceptable solutions to difficult problems; if we run, therefore, our chances for election appear to be very good.

    2. If in the next few years the Gentlemen's Agreement is to break down we might, in addition to losing the principle of a Commonwealth seat, forfeit our opportunity to serve on the Security Council for a long time to come.

    3. Japan has announced its candidature for the seat occupied this year by the Philippines under a temporary arrangement designed to break the deadlock with Yugoslavia in the 1955 elections for the Eastern European seat. Voir/See Volume 21, Document 3. With the support of the United States Japan may well succeed in winning election, in which case Asia would secure representation.

    4. The election of Canada to the Commonwealth seat and of Japan to the Eastern European seat might serve to persuade both the USSR and India that in their own interests they should support the widespread move for a limited expansion of the Security Council which, for different reasons, they have previously opposed; this in turn might serve to maintain respect for the convention upon which the institution of the Commonwealth seat depends.

  6. If we are to run, it is important that we should announce our candidature as soon as possible and on balance, after having discussed the matter with our Commonwealth colleagues during the Prime Ministers' Conference, particularly with the Prime Minister of India, it is my considered opinion that even though election to the Security Council would impose heavy additional responsibilities upon us, we should not be justified in declining to accept the obligations of membership in the Council at this juncture4.

JOHN G. DIEFENBAKER


3 Le 11 juillet 1957, le Cabinet convenait que le Canada devait se faire élire au Conseil de sécurité. Le 1 octobre suivant, le Canada était un des pays élus au Conseil, ayant reçu 72 votes sur les 78 inscrits. Les autres pays étaient le Panama, avec 74 +votes, et le Japon, avec 55votes.
On July 11, 1957, Cabinet agreed that Canada should stand for election to the Security Council. On October1, 1957, Canada was one of the countries elected to the Security Council, receiving 72 votes out of a total of 78 ballots cast. Canada was joined by Panama, which received 74 votes, and Japan, which received 55votes.



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