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DCER : Volume #24 - 136.DEA/50271-E-40 : SECURITY COUNCIL: DISARMAMENT

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Volume #24 - 136.

CHAPITRE I

NATIONS UNIES

PREMIÈRE PARTIE

NATIONS UNIES

SECTION F

DÉSARMEMENT

SUBDIVISION III

DÉLIBÉRATIONS DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

136.

DEA/50271-E-40

Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

TELEGRAM 661

SECRET. OPIMMEDIATE.

New York, le 1er mai 1958

SECURITY COUNCIL: DISARMAMENT

Repeat London, Washington, NATO Paris, Paris (Information).
By Bag Moscow, Bonn, Oslo from London.

On April 29 the Security Council took up the USA proposal concerning an Arctic inspection zone. Also before the Council was a new Soviet draft resolution which was the one of April 21 plus a paragraph bringing in the Summit Conference.

  1. On a point of order Sobolev asked whether Lodge intended to vacate the chair in accordance with rule 20 of the provisional rules of the Council. A move of this kind had been anticipated at a meeting of the Western Four on the previous day. They had agreed that Lodge should not repeat not be driven out as a result of Soviet insinuations and other members of the Council would in effect give Lodge a vote of confidence. The representatives of UK, Panama and France did just this and Lodge stayed in the chair.

  2. Lodge introduced the USA proposal and drew attention to Eisenhower's appeal to Khrushchev to support this proposal. He stressed that the SAC flights were a necessary defensive measure but that if the danger of surprise attack were removed the `need for this defence could be correspondingly lessened'. He quoted supporting remarks from the statements of other members in the Council on April 21. He traced the history of the open skies proposal and effectively used statements by Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Gromyko which indicated a positive if vague reaction to proposals for inspection to guard against surprise attack.

  3. Lodge made clear that the USA proposal was made entirely apart from the general topic of disarmament and stated that the USA was not repeat not attempting by this move to bring the subject of disarmament before the Council. He produced a map of the proposed Arctic Zone. (Copy sent to Ottawa by bag.) He informed the Council that Denmark and Norway had agreed to open their territory to the proposed system of inspection. He ended by saying that The States concerned must work out the actual inspection system, which means that the final product must be satisfactory to all of them.

  4. Lodge's statement was a model of restraint. His quotations from statements of Soviet leaders were selected to convey the impression that the proposal put forward by the USA was not repeat not incompatible with the stand taken by the USSR and that the USA hoped that the scheme would be treated as a genuine attempt to reach a first step on inspection which might, in turn, lead to the other steps necessary for a general disarmament agreement.

  5. By prearrangement Jarring of Sweden spoke next. You will recall that he was silent during the earlier debate on the Soviet item and his speech giving support to the USA proposal was all the more telling. After accepting the USA resolution Jarring expressed preference for an additional paragraph concerning the summit discussions. We have discussed this in detail in a separate telegram.

  6. In marked contrast to Lodge's statement Sobolev's statement was harshly negative. He repeated the charges about the provocative actions of SAC aircraft and spoke of the USA proposal as a diversionary manoeuvre. He complained about the lopsided membership of the proposed technical group and about the USA's continued reliance on an arithmetical majority of votes in the UN. He restated that in the Soviet government's view the solution of international questions, especially disarmament, could be found only at a summit conference. He referred to the disarmament proposals which the USSR had submitted for the agenda of that conference.

  7. The USA proposal had of course not repeat not come as a surprise to Sobolev, so his attitude must have reflected instructions from Moscow. Gromyko had the same day made a toughly negative statement for the press. A negative response from the USSR had not repeat not been ruled out as a possibility by the Western representatives here but these flatly uncompromising pronouncements were sharply in contrast to the general lines of the Council debate.

  8. The text of our statement was sent to you yesterday.99 It was followed by somewhat colourless interventions by Georges-Picot and Dixon. In both these statements there was a tendency to regard the packaged proposals of last summer as the really substantial position of the West on disarmament.

  9. Matsudaira said that the USA proposal was limited, but he welcomed it as a significant first step towards disarmament. In commenting on the inspection zone, he reserved the position of his government on the status of the Kurile islands.

  10. The representatives of Panama, Iraq and China also made statements in support of the USA proposal. Tsiang was privately unhappy about the Swedish amendment and expressed an oblique reservation about it. Lodge then expressed his regret at the nature of Sobolev's statement and said We hope that the passage of a few days will result in a change of mind.

  11. Lodge's statement set the debate on a constructive course which other members, except Sobolev, followed with varying enthusiasm. This created a very favourable impression on other representatives in the Council chamber and presumably on the public here and elsewhere. The net result was a build-up of pressure on the USSR to reconsider its negative stand. The Secretary General's intervention has been assessed in a separate telegram.

  12. We believe that if the Western Powers can maintain the momentum of the current trend in the Council, the balance of advantage will be decidedly in their favour. For this reason we have been encouraging USA officials to continue the tone of restraint and constructiveness which has characterized USA statements so far. They should resist, in our view, the temptation to score relatively trivial propaganda points and to be overly exultant about the response from other Council members, in particular, of course, Sweden and Japan. At this state it seems hard to believe that the USSR will shift its stand to the extent of an abstention but there is no repeat no denying the USA contention that the stakes are high.

[C.S.A.] RITCHIE


99 Voir/See Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 1958, No.58/17.



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