It is opportune to outline in one despatch the significant points in the situation now confronting NATO. Next month General Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), is paying his first official visit to Canada since assuming his command last November. A month later three members of the present Canadian Government will be participating for the first time in a ministerial meeting of the NATO Council.

2. SACEUR on his visit to Ottawa will refrain from taking up any points of direct concern to Canada unless any of these points are raised by one of the Canadian Ministers. He will confine himself to sketching the broad outlines of NATO defence policy and the basic strategy for the defence of Europe. This is what he has done on each of the first official visits he has paid to the capitals of other countries contributing forces to his command.

3. At the ministerial meeting in December the Council will be asked to approve the recommendations arising out of the 1957 Annual Review. Mr.Spaak is preparing a paper on the main problems confronting the Alliance. These are likely to be mainly political and his purpose no doubt will be to focus attention on steps necessary to reinforce the Alliance. In addition Ministers will be afforded an opportunity of reviewing the current international situation in the light of recent Soviet moves. Finally, the Ministers will have before them a report of an important Committee concerned with civil emergency planning.

4. For some months NATO has been going through an agonizing reappraisal of its policy for the defence of Europe, such as seems to occur at regular intervals of every three years. These reappraisals are concerned with the best means of countering the overwhelming superiority in conventional forces possessed by the Soviet Union. In order to explain the present crisis in NATO defence policy, it is desirable first of all to give a brief account of previous reappraisals.

5. In the early days of NATO, following the signature of the Treaty in 1949, efforts in the military field were directed towards raising conventional forces that could withstand the shock of a Soviet attack. Even then defence was based on the line of the Rhine. This left a large part of the Netherlands undefended and gave rise to the suspicion in the minds of Frenchmen, Italians and others that the United States were contemplating a peripheral strategy based on withdrawal to behind the Pyrenees with the final stand on that line. They did not relish the prospect of Soviet occupation to be followed by liberation. These misgivings became more pronounced as it was seen that the requirements drawn up by the military were quite unrealistic in the light of political and economic capabilities.

6. In 1950, without previous diplomatic preparation, the United States proposed the participation of the Germans in European defence, pointing out that this alone would permit a forward strategy based on a line east of the Rhine. Since a forward strategy implied defence of German territory they argued it was right that Germans should participate in that defence. This proposal shocked and alarmed the French who were only brought around by the initiation of negotiations for a European army to which the six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) comprising the European Defence Community (EDC) would contribute forces.

7. There still remained the problem of the gap or the difference between what the military considered necessary and what the nations could afford to contribute. An attack on this problem was begun at the Council meeting held in Ottawa in 1951, when the so-called TCC (Temporary Council Committee) exercise was initiated. This consisted of a thorough and comprehensive enquiry into the capabilities of each NATO country to contribute forces which would make possible the forward strategy. The result was the acceptance of force goals at the Lisbon meeting of the Council in February, 1952. These provided for a shield of approximately 65 first line divisions. At Lisbon the decision was also reached for a regular Annual Review which would seek to accomplish annually what the TCC had done on a shock basis, i.e. equate military requirements with national politico-economic capabilities.

8. In the following years it became apparent that even the more scientifically based Lisbon goals were beyond the capacity of the NATO nations. This led to another reappraisal and the adoption at the December, 1954 meeting of the Council of a new strategy based on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to counter an all-out attack by the Soviet Union. Under this new concept it was found possible to reduce the shield forces to the more manageable total of around thirty divisions.

9. In the period which has intervened between the 1954 decision and the present crisis, two developments occurred to delay the realization of the objective of 30 divisions for the shield forces. One of these was the progressive withdrawal of French forces to deal with the situation in Algeria. The other was the slowness in the build-up of German forces, although after the collapse of EDC in 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany had been admitted as a full member of NATO participating on an equal basis in its own right and not indirectly as a contributor to the European army under EDC. There was also an over-all relaxation of tension following the death of Stalin in 1953 and resulting from the cumulative effects of the Soviet peace campaign, a campaign which received a rude shock through the events in Hungary last November.

10. Overshadowing all these doubts about the ability of NATO to realize an adequate defence came a discussion over the basic strategy which had placed main reliance for the avoidance of a world war on the nuclear deterrent represented by the bombing capacities of the United States Strategic Air Force (SAC) and the United Kingdom Bomber Command. This arose out of growing concern that the Soviet Union may be catching up in the race for means of delivery of the A and H bombs. This concern can be traced back to the famous massive retaliation speech of Mr.Dulles in January, 1954.¹ Looked at in retrospect this statement did not announce a new doctrine but rather a return to a pre-1950 doctrine when the United States had a monopoly of the atomic weapon. An adviser to the former Democratic Administration, Mr.Paul Nitze, wrote in a recent article (The Reporter September 5 , 1957): It was not a step forward; it was a step backward a step back dictated not by new strategic considerations but by domestic political and budgetary considerations. As we shall see later on this is not the only occasion when a NATO nation has sought to cover up domestic political and budgetary considerations by resort to strategic doctrine.

11. In the meantime the increasing threat of creeping inflation to the economies of all the NATO countries gave rise to a restlessness over the existing levels of defence expenditures. Throughout NATO defence expenditures were frozen at existing levels until in the United States and the United Kingdom efforts were made to reduce these expenditures below the current level. Since the gross national product of almost every NATO country has been increasing, this meant a progressive decline in the proportion of the gross national product devoted to defence.

12. There was a searching in some of the NATO countries for strategic justification of a reduced level of defence expenditures. The Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation began to take hold in the United Kingdom, where pressure on the balance of payments was compelling the choice between the continuation of nuclear armament and the maintenance of conventional forces for the traditional British world-wide police role. The trip-wire concept was conceived. Under this concept only a thin shield was necessary in Europe because an attack on the shield or a tripping of this wire would set off the massive retaliation which was the real deterrent to all-out war.

13. For economic reasons but under the influence of this trip-wire concept the United Kingdom Government introduced last winter their White Paper on Defence. At the same time they unilaterally announced their intention to reduce their forces on the Continent from a total of 77,000 to 50,000 men or in effect from four to three divisions. Since under the Paris Agreement of 1954 they had undertaken to maintain four divisions on the Continent, the concurrence of the Council of the Western European Union (WEU) (the Six EDC countries plus the United Kingdom) was necessary before the United Kingdom could give effect to this reduction. A most acrimonious debate ensued in WEU. The final result was a compromise, whereby the United Kingdom were permitted to effect half of the proposed reduction, or 13,500 men, in this fiscal year, largely in the form of non-combatant troops. The decision as to the other half was deferred until another meeting of the WEU Council, tentatively fixed for October of this year. In the meantime SACEUR was asked for his advice on the military aspects of the proposed reductions and the NATO Council for advice on certain economic and currency aspects. The countries on the Continent made it unmistakably clear that, unless more justification was forthcoming, they could not agree to the withdrawal of a further 13,500 United Kingdom troops from Germany.

14. The basic reasons for the United Kingdom White Paper were economic and financial. The country could no longer stand the strain of being a world power ready at all times to intervene wherever British interests were in jeopardy. When the United Kingdom Minister of Defence went to Washington he was advised by the American Chiefs of Staff to leave the nuclear role chiefly to the United States and to maintain their conventional forces with the financial savings that would thereby ensue. This the United Kingdom refused to do because they feared that in an emergency affecting vital British interests the United States might hesitate to entail the risk of using the ultimate weapon or might not use it in the manner best designed to protect vital British interests. In short they concluded that their position as a great power was more assured by being one of the nuclear powers than by having forces capable of policing large areas of the globe.

15. If the United Kingdom had presented their case to their WEU and NATO partners solely in economic and financial terms, they might have obtained a better hearing, but they cloaked it with a strategic doctrine that was a thin disguise of the trip-wire concept. This doctrine happened to run counter to a political directive drawn up by NATO with United Kingdom concurrence and approved by the Council at the ministerial meeting last December. Briefly, the United Kingdom case is that there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war. Once resort is had to nuclear weapons of any kind an all-out war is inevitable. From this it follows that the size of the shield is not important. What is all important is the capability of immediate and devastating retaliation with the ultimate weapon, the A or the H bomb, delivered either by means of bomber aircraft or by guided missiles.

16. The reaction of the countries on the Continent of Europe to this doctrine has been profound. Unfortunately, this reaction is not well understood in the Anglo-Saxon countries, partly because it was slow to develop and partly because it has not always been correctly appraised by Anglo-Saxon writers on defence subjects, most of whom have their own preconceived ideas to propagate. The first factor to bear in mind is that these countries are wedded to the forward strategy. They are most sensitive to any moves that seem to represent a return to peripheral strategy. They refuse to contemplate the possibility of liberation after occupation. The second factor is their extreme dependence upon the United States as the possessor of the main deterrent to aggression. They see the gradual catching up by the Soviet Union in the nuclear delivery race, a development that has been demonstratively illustrated by the launching of the Soviet earth satellite.²

17. The European case has been well put in a recent report (prepared for the Sixth Bilderberg Conference at Fiuggi, Italy) by a retired French air force General, who was formerly at SHAPE, General Pierre M.Gallois. The following is a translation of an extract from that report:
    
    For each of the powers of the Alliance which do not possess nuclear weapons the question is this: might it find itself in such a situation that an incident of major importance for its own security or independence might be considered minor not only by guaranteeing atomic powers, but also by the other member countries of the Alliance? This assessment of the major or minor nature of a threat against Western countries must be estimated according to a new criterion the size of the nuclear risk. Even if a vast airborne nuclear exchange appears improbable, or even impossible, and if everyone knows that they were being blackmailed with fear, it is clear that everyone would weigh the size of the stake and of the risk. And in such a calculation it is very likely that countries not directly and immediately threatened might consider some enemy intervention of major importance for the country against which it is directed to be only a minor incident.

18. The above quotation explains why France is continuing to spend large sums on its nuclear programme at a time when it is engaged in a costly local war in Algeria. It also makes it easy to appreciate the force behind the appeals of European countries to the United States for an amendment to the MacMahon Act which would permit that country to furnish its allies with nuclear weapons. Finally it explains why there has recently developed in some European countries an agitation for more conventional forces, notwithstanding the intolerable burdens this would place on the economies of the countries concerned.

19. The proposed United Kingdom reduction of forces in Germany has been described by writers on the Continent as tip-toeing out of Europe. This reveals a deep-seated fear that the Anglo-Saxon countries may be disposed to leave their allies to their fate if the risk of defence on the Continent appears too great. The European countries have suspected all along that one of the motives the United States had in proposing German rearmament was that this eventually would permit the withdrawal of American forces from Europe. Throughout the discussions in NATO on the United Kingdom reduction of forces there were repeated references to the vital importance of maintaining the continued stationing of American, British and Canadian forces on the Continent of Europe. The Canadian contributions to SACEUR's forces are valued greatly because their quality is relatively superior to their quantity but above all they are valued for the psychological or political reason that they help to assure the continued presence of American and British forces.

20. The theory of reliance on the deterrence of the ultimate weapons was attacked in a book published last summer by a young American, Mr.Henry A. Kissinger. This book is entitled Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and has attracted much attention. Kissinger's thesis is that resort to the ultimate weapon involves such mutual destruction that it is not feasible politically and that both sides will refrain from its use even if one or the other resorts to tactical nuclear weapons. He, therefore, propounds the doctrine of limited nuclear war. He spoilt this thesis by padding his book with concrete examples of how such wars might be conducted, but there is no doubt that the appearance of this book has had an impact on thinking on both sides of the Atlantic.

21. That a change of thinking is taking place in Washington along the lines of Kissinger's thesis may be seen from an interesting article by Mr.Dulles which appeared in the October issue of Foreign Affairs.³ After pointing out that recent tests point to the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and radiation effects of which can be confined substantially to predetermined targets, Mr.Dulles concludes that: In the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt.

22. That some of Kissinger's ideas are shared on the Continent of Europe may be seen by quoting the following extracts from the report of General Gallois referred to above:

"Western Europe is still guaranteed by the airborne nuclear power of the United States. We think that the growth of Soviet nuclear capacity, the quality or even the superiority of this capacity over that of the West, is not of such a nature as to change fundamentally the military aspect of the permanent test of force, which is characteristic of this period. On the other hand, it seems that the political aspect of the problem of common defence may be completely changed. For as long as an airborne nuclear monopoly existed the concept of guarantee had some sense, the risk taken in granting this guarantee was a minor one. This is no longer true".

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"This reasoning could lead to the safety of Western continental European countries being based on the individual possession (or the possession by groups of nations with very closely connected interests) of quantitatively limited nuclear armament, and on their conventional contribution to a collective defence system. The first of these two categories of forces would bring the deterrent to the national level. The second would discourage minor action against one or several allies, and allow the level of the stake to be sufficiently raised to be able to pass gradually to the national, regional, or collective nuclear deterrent."

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23. It has been in this charged atmosphere that General Norstad has been preparing all summer his report that would respond to the request of the WEU Council for advice on the military aspects of the proposed United Kingdom reduction of forces on the Continent of Europe. He very wisely decided not to reply directly to the questions put to him by the WEU Council but to let the answers come out of another report he was preparing. This is a document known as MC70 and is entitled Minimum Force Requirements.⁴ It covers the period up to the end of 1963. SACEUR's contribution will be combined with those of the other two Supreme Commanders, SACLANT (Atlantic) and CINCHAN (English Channel), and then vetted by the Standing Group and the Military Committee before submission to the Council. Since both SACEUR's and SACLANT's contributions contain some revolutionary ideas it is not expected that this procedure can be completed in time for submission of the document to the ministerial meeting of the Council in December. There will, however, be a discussion at that meeting on the procedure for dealing with the document.

24. SACEUR's contribution to MC70 was given a preview first of all at a presentation to national Chiefs of Staff on September 18th and secondly at a presentation to the NATO Ambassadors on October 2nd. The latter presentation was rendered necessary by the exigencies of the WEU time-table. The presentation consisted of briefings by General Norstad and his senior officers. Normally nothing is revealed officially to the Council of papers prepared by the Supreme Commanders until they are approved by the Military Committee.

25. We have seen that there are three schools of thought. First that represented by the British who place main reliance on deterrence by the ultimate weapon and who advocate a thin shield. The second school is that of those who question reliance on the deterrent under existing conditions and favour a return to large conventional forces in order to assume the integrity of national territories against political blackmail or piecemeal nibbling. The third school is that which lies between the other two and is represented by the doctrine accepted by NATO since 1954.

26. In his contribution to MC70 General Norstad has confirmed and further elaborated this accepted NATO doctrine. Without minimizing in any way the deterrent effect of the ultimate weapon he designates the shield as an essential part of the deterrent. He continues to require a shield of around 30 divisions. These shield forces are to have both nuclear and conventional capabilities. They have to be prepared to fight either type of warfare using that degree of force required to deal with the situation. To make possible the provision of the forces he needs, General Norstad proposes economies through the abolition of forces he does not need. The emphasis is still on the first thirty days. Hence he proposes drastic cuts in second echelon forces that cannot be available within this period. He proposes reductions in the number of aircraft but this is more than compensated for by an overall increase in strike power.

27. It is becoming clear that with the complexity of modern weapons the emphasis is being placed more and more on highly trained regular troops. Field Marshal Montgomery has affirmed that the day of the levy en masse of men to fight a war is over. General Norstad says as much by relegating reserve forces to a very low priority and not requiring them to be assigned to him. He does not go so far, however, as to recommend the abolition of national service because this is the only way some NATO countries can raise forces economically. He puts forward the revolutionary suggestion of an international division under his command ready to be airborne to any part of the NATO area.

28. Hitherto SACLANT has been accused of preparing for war under a concept opposite to that on which SACEUR bases his strategy. His duty is to keep the sea-lanes open and this has presupposed a war of longer than thirty days duration. SACLANT's contribution to MC70 is reported to be based on a forward defence. Under this strategic concept there would be concentration on keeping the Soviet submarines out of the Atlantic instead of concentrating on destroying them after they have got into the Atlantic. This would assume naval forces in being, whereas at present SACLANT has no forces assigned to him but only forces ear-marked for him. This revised concept would enable SACLANT to pay more attention to the early stages of a nuclear war. It is reported that the Standing Group are questioning the concept and this is one of the factors which will contribute to the delay in presenting MC70 formally to the Council.

29. The United Kingdom Government are in a quandary as a result of SACEUR's presentation of his contribution to MC70. General Norstad has confirmed the necessity for a strong shield and hence supports the arguments advanced by the countries on the Continent of Europe against the proposed withdrawal of further United Kingdom forces from Germany. There is now little hope that these countries will agree to the further withdrawal of 13,500 men in the next fiscal year. The United Kingdom wish to avoid another heated debate in the WEU Council with all the damage this would cause to their prestige. In particular, they fear the effect this might have on the difficult negotiations for the association of a Free Trade Area with the Common Market comprised of their six partners in WEU. General Norstad paid a private visit to London on October 9th and had talks with Mr.Selwyn Lloyd and Mr.Duncan Sandys. They asked him for his advice. He advised they adopt a proposal he made earlier in the year and agree to leave on the Continent the strategic reserve of 5,000 men. This would reduce the number of United Kingdom troops to be withdrawn in the next fiscal year to 8,500 men. At the same time the United Kingdom could point out that there remains unsolved the currency question relating to the strain on their balance of payments from maintaining troops in Germany. There is a clause in the Paris Agreement of 1954 pertaining to this question, but up to now the discussions on this subject have been abortive, partly due to the obduracy of the German Minister of Finance. It is probable that the questions which have arisen in WEU over the proposed withdrawal of part of the United Kingdom forces stationed in Germany will be settled out of court and that there will be no discussion of these questions at the ministerial meeting of the NATO Council in December.

30. We have seen that MC70 will not be ready for formal presentation to the Council in time for the December ministerial meeting. Consequently Ministers will not have to take a stand on the proposals in this document until sometime in 1958. Enough, however, will be known, at least of SACEUR's proposals, to permit them to be reflected in a discussion of the defence problems facing the Alliance which is one of the items on the agenda. This may take the form of a sort of preliminary discussion of the main lines of MC70 without leading to definite conclusions or decisions. Enough is known also of the broad lines of MC70 to permit of an intelligent discussion of the procedures to be followed in giving effect to the proposals in the document, which is another item on the agenda for the December ministerial meeting. Here we have some concern that the NATO Secretariat may be harbouring the idea of a large scale multilateral exercise to give effect to MC70. Fortunately for us, General Norstad has already made his views on this question known in an informal statement he made on October 2nd to some NATO Ambassadors. He said that in his view all that is required to give effect to MC70 are bilateral conversations between the Supreme Commanders and each of the Governments plus the maximum possible use of the established Annual Review procedure. At the December meeting, however, Ministers will be asked to decide whether MC70 should be discussed in the first instance at a meeting of Defence Ministers or at a meeting attended by Foreign, Finance and Defence Ministers. The United States are in favour of the latter course, but Ishould think a great deal will depend upon the degree of insight into these problems the Foreign and Finance Ministers acquire at the December meeting. A meeting of Defence Ministers only would be less unwieldy for the purpose in view. The only substantive decision in the military field Ministers will be asked to take at the December meeting will be to approve the Annual Review for 1957 which sets firm force goals for 1958, provisional goals for 1959 and goals for planning purposes for 1960.

31. The first part of the agenda for the ministerial meeting in December is mainly political. It is not known yet on what points Mr.Spaak will touch in his report on the Main Problems confronting the Alliance. It is thought his object will be to reinforce NATO solidarity. He may deal with such questions as a common policy for the Middle East, measures to bring about a settlement of the Cyprus dispute and steps to lessen the economic dependence of Iceland on the Soviet bloc. Mr.Spaak is a born integrator with much practical experience in European integration. It is possible that some of his suggestions may be designed to bring about the closer integration of the NATO countries. We should be afforded an inkling of Mr.Spaak's latest thinking in the addresses and broadcasts he is to deliver on his visit to the United States towards the end of this month.

32. The item on the agenda for the December meeting providing for a review of the current international situation is intended to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views. It is an item for information and not for action. No conclusions or decisions are intended to emerge from the discussion under this item, but it is hoped that the exchange of views will enable all NATO Governments to take into account in formulating their policies the views expressed by their NATO partners. In this way, if not common policies, at least policies consistent with NATO objectives can be followed by the Governments.

33. Finally, the agenda for the December ministerial meeting will contain an item relating to the report of the Senior Committee on Civil Emergency Planning. This Committee is chaired by Mr. Spaak and is composed of officials in national capitals primarily responsible for planning in this field. They are meeting in Paris this week to finalize the report which they will submit to the December ministerial meeting. It is possible that their report will contain recommendations entailing increased expenditures by governments for civilian planning for an emergency. If so, Ministers will want to consider these recommendations along with those in the purely defence field. It has not yet been worked out how the two sets of recommendations can best be co-related.

34. This completes the review of the principal points with which the Canadian Ministers will be brought in touch both during the visit of General Norstad to Ottawa on November 13th and 14th and as a result of the participation of three Canadian Ministers in the Ministerial meeting of the NATO Council on December 16th to 18th.

L.D. WILGRESS

¹ Voir/See Volume 20, Documents 443-445.

² L'Union soviétique avait lancé le satellite Spoutnik le 4 octobre1957, mettant ainsi en évidence l'état d'avancement du programme soviétique de missiles balistiques en particulier et des capacités scientifiques soviétiques en général.
The Soviet Union had launched the Sputnik satellite on October 4, 1957, demonstrating the advanced state of the Soviet ballistic missile program in particular and Soviet scientific capabilities in general.

³ Voir/See John Foster Dulles, Challenge and Response in United States Policy, Foreign Affairs Vol.36 No.1 (1957), pp.25-43.

⁴ Le texte du MC-70, qui établissait les contributions minimales en main-d'oeuvre et en matériel pour les pays de l'OTAN entre 1958 et 1963, demeure classifié.
The text of MC-70, which mandated the minimum manpower and materiel contributions for NATO countries between 1958 and 1963, remains classified.