The French Ambassador called on me this afternoon and presented the attached memo-randum? containing his Government's views on the discussion at the General Assembly of the French atomic bomb test in the Sahara. He supplemented his memorandum with an oral argument along the same lines. There is, I think, nothing new in this presentation, which is in accordance with the views already expressed by the French Government. Mr. Lacoste said that he wished, however, to put these views before us on the eve of the debate in New York.

2. The French argument repeats the view that it would be discriminatory against France to ask her to abstain from making a test before the other nuclear powers have reached an agreement on cessation with control as part of a general disarmament programme. It also argues that the French bomb, which would be atomic rather than hydrogen, would be far less dangerous than those exploded by other countries and that the testing place in the Sahara is far more isolated than those used by the other atomic powers. Mr. Lacoste was anxious to know whether or not we would support France in the debate and how we would vote. I told him that it was difficult to say how we would vote as we did not know what form the resolution would take. Furthermore, I would not wish to make any firm statement on our intentions pending your return. However, basing myself on the general instructions on this item to the Delegation which you approved, I said that I was sure that we would not vote in favour of a harsh resolution directed against France. The Canadian Government's view was that it did want a cessation of nuclear tests but under an adequate system of control. I did not think that we would be seriously concerned over the possible radiation effects of the French bomb. If we had any reservations on the subject, it would be rather in connection with our anxiety to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. When Mr. Lacoste pressed to find out whether we would abstain or vote against a resolution on the subject, I repeated that it was difficult to foresee the nature of the resolution. I was sure that you would not want to join in a hostile stand against the French. It was possible, however, that a resolution might emerge in the Assembly which was not directed against France but merely expressed general uneasiness over the spread of nuclear weapons. It might be difficult for the Canadian Delegation to vote against such a resolution.

3. In conclusion, Mr. Lacoste said that a number of NATO countries including Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Turkey had promised to vote against any resolution on the subject. He thought it would be unfortunate if all NATO countries did not take a unified stand on this subject in support of a NATO member. He did hope that in our voting we would bear in mind our responsibility to an ally. I said that the interest of our NATO allies was always a primary interest in determining our votes in the United Nations. However, there was a difference, I thought, between supporting an agreed NATO policy and supporting the policy of a member state which was not the result of a NATO decision. In response to his specific request I said that we would ask the Delegation in New York to keep in close touch with the French Delegation although I assured him that this was something they would do as a matter of course.

J.W. H[OLMES]