New Year's Day, 1959, was probably the most memorable New Year's Day for Cuba in this country's history. It marked the fall of a legend, the legend of Batista's invulnerability, and the rise of a new legend, that of the young Cuban guerilla leader who, in two years, starting with a force of a few dozen members, has risen to control a nation of six million people. Although it had become apparent during recent months that Batista's hold on Cuba was slipping, his sud-den departure in the early morning hours of January 1 surprised most residents of Cuba. Many of the exact details of Batista's last hours, the reasons for his sudden decision and the events of January 1 and 2 will probably never be clarified, but the following summary may serve to supplement the spotty reports published by the international press.

2. Fidel Castro has issued his version of the events which forced Batista's flight from Cuba, although this version probably contains some inaccuracies designed to assist Castro in crushing any Batista sympathizers who may hope to retain some influence in the new Government. According to Castro's version, one of the senior army Generals in Havana, General Eulogio A. Cantillo Porras, headed a plot among army officers to swing the army support to Castro. Castro has released the texts of an exchange of letters between General Cantillo and himself, leading up to a meeting in Santiago de Cuba with Cantillo three days before Batista's flight. At this meeting, it was apparently decided that on January 1 Cantillo would announce the army's support for Castro and arrange for the seizure of Batista and all his senior government officials. Castro claims that following his return to Havana, Cantillo notified Castro that the plan would have to be postponed until January 6 and then proceeded to organize his own military junta to seize power in Havana. According to this version, Cantillo warned Batista that the army would seize power on January 1, thus allowing Batista and most of his senior officials to escape from Cuba before the attempted coup. As soon as Batista and his followers had left Havana, Cantillo attempted to set up the Chief Magistrate of the Supreme Court, Dr. Carlos M. Piedra, as the provisional President according to the terms of the 1940 Constitution. This treasonous plot collapsed, according to Castro, because the remainder of Cantillo's junta fled with Batista so that Piedra refused to carry on in the scheme and resigned.

3. Meanwhile, Castro approached the leader of the military garrison in Santiago de Cuba, Colonel José Rego Rubido, with the original scheme as agreed to by Cantillo. Rubido at first refused to lay down arms. Castro then ordered a rebel march on Santiago. However, when news of Piedra's refusal to assume power in Havana was handed to Col. Rubido, he met Castro at the outskirts of Santiago and turned over the complete Santiago garrison peacefully to the Castro forces. As a reward for this gesture, Castro has named Col. Rubido as Chief of the new Cuban Army and has arrested Cantillo, charging him with high treason. It is also worthy of note at this point, that the new Chief of the Cuban Navy, Gaspar Bruch, was the Commanding Officer of a small frigate stationed in Santiago harbour who arranged for the surrender of the naval forces to Castro on January 1. Defection apparently has paid off for both of these former Batista officers.

4. In Havana, news of Batista's flight began to filter out in the early morning hours of January 1. The Havana radio stations confirmed that Batista, most of his Cabinet and 50 or 60 top Government officials had fled the country sometime between 2 and 4 a.m. on January 1. Two notable exceptions were the former head of the Cuban Confederation of Labour, Eusebio Mujal, who is reported to have received asylum in the Argentine Embassy, and the President of the National Bank, Martinez Saenz, who has been arrested. Several other lesser government officials have also succeeded in gaining asylum in one or another of the Latin American Embassies, although the rebel groups have succeeded in seizing many real or suspected Batista supporters or sympathizers. Castro has warned that many heads will fall in revolutionary justice. Recent newspaper reports indicate that more than 1100 police, army and air force personnel plus many civilians are under detention. The rebels have promised military justice for the chief offenders but have indicated that minor officers who acted honourably under orders might be recalled to duty. Apparently at least ten armed forces officers have already been put to death after summary court martials. This does not seem to be too good an omen for fair trials for the others.

5. The public announcement of Batista's departure was the signal in Havana for wild rejoicing, which took the form of racing automobiles, blaring horns, cheering crowds dis-playing the red and black Castro colours and the occasional shot. By noon on January 1 the shots were becoming more than occasional. Mobs of unruly youthful Habaneros entered police and army stations which had been surrendered peacefully, seized all available weapons and began to roam the streets. It was unfortunate that Batista chose the eve of a holiday for his flight, since all workers were, therefore, available to take part in whatever rioting might occur. As soon as it became obvious that the provisional government of Carlos Piedra would not be functioning, the disorganization became complete. In spite of occasional pleas for restraint broadcast by the radio, the wandering mobs became more unruly. They sought out suspected Batista sympathizers, killed several (later reports state that 70 people died in Havana street fighting) and put others to flight, savagely looted the homes of former Cabinet Ministers or government officials (including Batista's daughter's residence), looted the army-supported free import stores and seized most of the Havana radio and TV stations. Havana residents were in more danger from these youthful hoodlums than they ever were from the actual 26th of July troops. Road blocks were thrown up on the major Havana streets and any citizens foolish enough to travel were stopped at almost every intersection and forced to identify themselves.

6. This disorganization continued through the afternoon and night of January 1, on January 2 and during the early hours of January 3. By that time, however, legitimate members of the 26th of July movement, complete with up to two years' growth of hair and beards and colourful guerilla costumes, had arrived in Havana. These troops have by now earned considerable res-pect for their orderly and subdued deportment. They immediately issued orders designed to call in the arms held by wandering mobs, placed a strong curfew on Havana residents for the night of January 3 and gradually brought the city under more or less effective control. Meanwhile, the general strike which Castro had called as soon as he learned of Cantillo's perfidy continued in effect until midnight of January 4. As a result, local city transportation collapsed entirely, shortages of food, milk and drinking water became serious for many unprepared Havana residents; garbage collection facilities ceased to function, and traffic conditions degenerated from Havana's usual bad to worse.

7. During the height of the crisis in Havana, the American and Canadian Embassies made arrangements to evacuate in the neighbourhood of 1700 American and Canadian tourists and students stranded in Havana by the general strike. A separate report to Ottawa outlines the steps taken in this regard (our letter No. L-5 of January 5, 1959).?

8. Castro remained in Santiago de Cuba long enough to swear in his candidate for President, Dr. Manuel Urrutia, 57-year old former Judge of the Santiago District Court, to name his new Cabinet (list sent under our letter No. L-2 of January 6? - in a later report we shall attempt to provide some comments on the more important members of the Cabinet) and to proclaim that Santiago de Cuba would be the new capital seat, although no further action has been taken regarding this announcement. Early news releases regarding the pronouncements made by Castro and Urrutia gave no indication of any plans for an election or any suggestion that the new government would be temporary. However, on January 7 the recently elected Congress was dissolved by presidential decree and all Political Parties abolished; however, a promise was issued that elections would be held within 18 to 24 months (a rather long period for a provisional President to retain power). In the meantime, the new President and his Cabinet will rule Cuba by decree, a procedure which Cubans have become accustomed to during the last two years of the Batista régime.

9. As soon as he had installed his candidate as provisional President, Castro began a triumphal journey by land from Santiago to Havana. This slow journey, obviously designed to cement Castro support throughout the island and to allow the 26th of July troops already in Havana time to solidify their positions has been further slowed by the poor condition of the roads, resulting from Castro's earlier activities, and by two to three-hour Castro speeches in each major centre en route. The Cubans, always quick to hail a conquering hero, are apparently turning out in force to cheer Castro on his journey, and at the time of this writing plans are underway to provide a rousing welcome in Havana for the Castro procession, which has grown with each stop. Some concern has been expressed that Castro is delaying his entry to Havana too long and that the revolutionary unity preceding the victory may not persist long after the victory. An indication of this tendency to split into factions appeared on January 7 when the so-called 13th of March Revolutionary Directorate, the survivors of the University Students' armed attack on the Presidential Palace on March 13, 1957, who had created a second front in Las Villas Province, issued a statement demanding participation in the provisional government for all revolutionary organizations, and a part in drawing up the government's programme and setting the date and form of the general elections. Urrutia made a major speech before the University faction in an obvious attempt to prevent an open split from developing. One of the main dangers, however, for Cuba in the forthcoming weeks will be the great possibility of quarrels among the various factions which form the new group of victors. This will be complicated by the presence in Cuba of ex-President Carlos Prío Socarrá, whose political party has been dissolved, but who will without doubt wish to exert some influence in the future reorganization of the Republic. He was, after all, for some time the only source of funds for Castro's rebels.

9. Since this report was drafted we have learned that the Revolutionary Directorate (univer-sity students) have taken over the third floor of the Amber Motor Building in which we are located and that the front door of this office building is now under 24-hour armed guard and some visitors to the Embassy are being stopped and questioned.

HECTOR ALLARD