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Volume #26 - 467. | |
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CHAPITRE X AMÉRIQUE LATINE | |
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2E PARTIE CUBA | |
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SECTION
B VENTES DES ÉQUIPEMENTS MILITAIRES | |
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467. |
PCO |
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Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures pour le Cabinet | |
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DOCUMENT NO. 374-59 SECRET |
Ottawa,
le 25 novembre 1959 |
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EXPORT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE CARIBBEAN AREA | |
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On July 30 Cabinet agreed that in view of the unstable political situation in the Caribbean permits to export significant amounts of military equipment to the Caribbean area, excepting Colombia, be refused. This policy was basically similar to that in force in the United States689 and the United Kingdom at that time. 2. Subsequently, on September 8, mindful of Cabinet's decision and of the fact that the Batista régime had armed several civilian Beaver aircraft for operations against the Castro rebels and of the possible use to which aircraft of this type could be put to support rebel opera-tions in the Dominican Republic, I refused an application for the export of three Beaver air-craft to Cuba. 3. On October 16 the United States Government revised its policy to permit exports of normal types of military equipment in reasonable amounts to Panama, Colombia, Mexico, Haiti and Venezuela. In the case of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, however, shipments of combat equipment, military weapons and munitions, spare parts for such equipment, combat aircraft, military trainer aircraft, and armed patrol vessels will continue to be withheld except for reasonable amounts of necessary spare parts for military aircraft now in possession of the Dominican and Cuban airforces. On October 20 the United Kingdom Government took note of the United States decision but decided to retain its present policy for another few weeks. To date the United Kingdom policy has not been altered. This decision has been influenced by a number of factors including (a) the continued political instability in the area and (b) the pressure being put on the United Kingdom by the United States to refuse the export of Hunter fighters and patrol vessels. 4. We now have a number of applications before us for the export of arms to the Caribbean area, including an application for one Beaver aircraft, fitted with amphibian float gear and long-range tanks, for Cuba. This aircraft had been ordered from the Havilland Aircraft by an American firm for re-export to Cuba and the American firm will be able to obtain an American export permit for the aircraft. Should the application be refused by us, we have indications from the United States export control authorities that the American firm will in all probability be able to obtain a second-hand Beaver in the United States to fill the order. In such an event the United States authorities would apparently be willing to withhold an export permit unless we indicated we had no objections. For their own part, however, they would not be opposed to such an export. 5. The fact that the United States Government is prepared to allow the export of an aircraft of this type to Cuba even though the Cuban Government has been indulging in a violent anti-American propaganda campaign, makes it difficult for us to refuse the application. The Canadian firm, of course, is most anxious to sell the aircraft and our refusal to grant an export permit knowing that a basically similar aircraft could be exported from the United States is another factor making refusal difficult. On the other hand, the Beaver aircraft in question being fitted with floats and with wing tanks capable of extending its range, could be used in offensive action against the Dominican Republic such as in landing agents in the country, or could be used by Castro against insurgents in Cuba should open revolt break out. 6. Although in approving the export of the aircraft we may lay ourselves open to domestic political criticisms should the aircraft in fact be used in Cuba for other than peaceful purposes, I believe that on balance we should approve its exports. However, in making this recommenda-tion with respect to this one aircraft I believe that the over-all policy with regard to the Carib-bean area should not be changed until there is evidence of a lessening of tension in the area.690 [H.C. GREEN] 689Voir/See Washington telegrams 492, March 2,? DEA 11044-DJ-40, and 824, April 6,? DEA 11044- BU-40. 690Le Cabinet étudia ce mémoire le 1er décembre. La licence d'exportation fut refusée. | |
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