Your telegram No. 621 of March 4th.† Press reports regarding meeting of Prime Ministers.

We are concerned over the possibility that the character and importance of, the consultations to be held in London are being over emphasized in the United Kingdom. We assume that this is due to three main causes. First the profound anxiety over Soviet policy together with the inevitable uncertainty about the continued firmness of the policy of the United States, produces a desire to play up the combined strength of the Commonwealth as a whole and to lay stress upon the capacity of Commonwealth Governments to take concerted action. Secondly, the Labour Government is anxious to give no ground for charges that it is not an effective" guardian of Imperial interest. Thirdly, the waning faith in the capacity of the UNO to be an effective guardian of peace and security gives rise to renewed interest in the military power of the Commonwealth. Much the same sort of talk about the need for Commonwealth' solidarity was evident in the early 1920's after the United States deserted Wilsonian policies and differences arose between France and the United Kingdom.

2. With respect to Commonwealth Defence, no general proposals for post war co-operation have been made since Cranborne advanced his suggestions in June 1944 at the end of the Prime Ministers' meeting although, a number of plans have been put forward for co operation' in particular tasks. In the language used occasionally by British Ministers and in papers which have been prepared by British Military advisers there are: indications of a desire that some new Commonwealth organization should be created to plan and direct `Imperial defence'. (This is a phrase that we should like to see dropped from the current vocabulary as it leads to unnecessary misunderstandings and irritations and has little value in relation to the strategic realities of today). Canadian responsibility for the defence of Canadian territory, together with our responsibility for defending in collaboration with the United States the approaches to the Northern part of this Continent, is, of course, a very important aspect of thedefence of the British Common-wealth quite apart from our proven war potential in the event of general war. Canadian public opinion, however, in defence questions is not based on the conception of defending Imperial interests as such, a conception which carries with it the ideal of the acceptance of a share of responsibility for defence in areas as remote from Canada as the Persian Gulf and the Bay of Bengal. We are, of course, deeply concerned that the security and strength of the whole British Commonwealth should be maintained but we cannot, conceive this as being effectively safeguarded by exclusive Commonwealth arrangements. The strategic interests of the Commonwealth are so diverse that their protection requires the co-ordination of defense before [sic] individual Commonwealth countries and foreign states. This is obvious in the case of the United Kingdom when one considers British defence interests in Western Europe. In some quarters in London there is difficulty in realizing that it is also obvious elsewhere.

With respect to questions of trade, we have no information that these matters will be brought up during the discussions between the Prime Ministers in London, nor would it seem appropriate that this should occur in view of the carefully prepared programme leading up to the general Conference on International Trade due late this year or early in 1947. You already know that the date now set for preliminary Commonwealth talks in the United Kingdom is about the middle of July, in preparation for the Conference of the drafting Countries now expected about September 1st.

While there is nothing in this telegram of which you are not already aware, it may be useful to you as a guide in dealing with enquiries concerning the consultations between Prime Ministers and related matters.