Volume #27 - 240.|
RELATIONS AVEC LES ÉTATS-UNIS
QUESTIONS DE DÉFENSE ET SÉCURITÉ
ENTREPOSAGE ET BASES LOUÉES AU CANADA
L’ambassadeur aux États-Unis|
au secrétaire d’État aux Affaires extérieures
le 15 janvier 1960|
Reference: Our Tel 2998 Dec 2/59† and your Tels DL-81028 and DL-813† Oct 2/59.
STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON
We met yesterday with Willoughby and other State Department and Defence Department officials and were handed a redraft of the draft note which we presented in accordance with the instructions in your telegram DL-810 October 2, 1959. The text of this redraft is set out below. The suggested deletions from our draft are bracketed and the suggested additions underlined. You will notice also that reasons are set out for the suggested changes. We are following up this telegram with a further message outlining our detailed discussion with USA officials in which we attempted to elucidate to bring the two drafts closer together, and we shall also report on these. Text Begins:
I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and USA governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defenses by a gradual increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by CINCNORAD as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons.
Recognizing the need to strengthen the continental air defences against the threat which exists, and realizing that the full potential of air-to-air defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads, the Canadian government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons in Canada in accordance with the conditions set out in the attached Annex.
I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your government, this note and your reply shall constitute an agreement between our two governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.
1. The weapons under consideration are such [defensive] nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to [the] USA forces under the [command] operational control of CINCNORAD.
Reason: The words "USA" are added for the sake of clarity. The term "operational control" appears to reflect NORAD's terms of reference more accurately than the word "command."
2. These weapons [will] may be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon AFB, Nfld. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the USA government.
Reason: The word "may" provides the flexibility which USA considers desirable. In this connection the USAF has decided to withdraw the squadron now stationed at Harmon AFB, and in the light of this decision, CINCNORAD is considering whether nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons should be stored at Harmon for emergency purposes.
3. [Arrangements for the physical security for the storage sites will be the joint responsibility of the governments of the two countries. Safeguards in the design and handling of these air defence weapons to minimize the possibility of accidental explosion and to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be the responsibility of USA government and will be subject to the approval of the Canadian government].
The joint responsibility of the two governments for the physical security of the storage sites shall be exercised in accordance with the following:
(a) USA shall provide and be responsible for the internal security of the storage sites;
(b) In other respects, arrangements for the physical security of the leased areas within which the storage sites are located shall be subject to existing agreements concerning those areas. Safety standards for the maintenance, transportation, loading, delivery and salvage of these weapons shall be at least equivalent to those observed within USA and, within the scope of existing agreements between the two governments concerning the transfer of classified (atomic) information, shall be a matter for consultation between the appropriate military authorities of USA and Canada.
Reason: USA has noted the importance which the Canadian government attaches to the matter of joint responsibility for the physical security of the storage sites and wishes to accede to this request within the limits prescribed by USA legislation and existing arrangements for these bases. USA, however, would like to know what kind of arrangements the Canadian government wishes to propose in this regard. Under USA legislation, USA is required to retain physical custody of nuclear weapons, and thus USA draft reflects USA requirement to be responsible for the internal security of the sites. It is believed that the other aspects of physical security may be handled according to the terms of the existing agreements for the two bases, but USA would be pleased to consider alternative Canadian proposals to handle this specific problem.
On the matter of safety standards, USA has proposed language which the Department of Defense has informally submitted to Canadian military authorities for the Canadian draft note concerning the storage of atomic weapons in support of Canadian forces. The Canadian language above suggests that safeguards in the design of the atomic weapons will be subject to the approval of the Canadian government. This procedure apparently would entail the transmission of restricted data, a course of action not repeat not authorized under the terms of USA Atomic Energy Act.
4. Ownership and custody of the nuclear warheads shall remain with USA government in accordance with USA law.
Reason: By the addition of the words "and custody" the paragraph reflects more accurately the requirements of USA legislation.
5. [Transportation to or from storage facilities of these weapons and warheads through Canadian air space will be governed by Canadian government regulations. Import and export of these weapons will be subject to Canadian government regulations, and detailed procedures will be negotiated between the appropriate government departments.]
Reason: In the absence of knowing what the Canadian regulations would be governing the transport of nuclear weapons in Canada, USA would prefer the wording of paragraph 5 to reflect that this is a matter to be worked out jointly. The following language could be used. "The transport of these weapons in Canadian territory will be carried out in accordance with procedures agreed between the appropriate agencies of both governments."
6. [Joint responsibility for the removal from storage sites and for the use of these weapons will be shared by the Canadian and USA governments. They] consonant with the joint responsibility of the two governments, these weapons will be used only in situations of grave emergency [and] in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of the North American Air Defense Command as approved by the two governments.
Reason: The first sentence of the Canadian draft poses 2 problems:
(1) It suggests that over and above clearance procedures already in effect with regard to nuclear overflights of Canadian territory and procedures which might be worked out with regard to the movement of nuclear weapons in and out of Canada under paragraph 5 of this annex, special authorization of the Canadian government would be required to remove nuclear weapons from storage, say, for return to USA for periodic checking or other logistical reasons.
(2) It suggests that the agreement of Canada would be required at a time when CINCNORAD would wish to use the weapons in accordance with plans and procedures agreed between the two governments. In USA view this mode of operation could seriously impair the ability of CINCNORAD to act rapidly in situations of grave emergency where action must be taken within minutes.
Accordingly USA proposed language omits any reference to "removal from storage" and ties in the "joint responsibility" of the two governments with use of the weapons "only in situations of grave emergency in accordance with plans and procedures governing the operations of the North American Air Defense Command as approved by both governments."
7. Any test firing of these weapons which may be required will take place outside of Canada.
8. The terms of this agreement will be reviewed [annually] by the two governments at the request of either government and after such review may be terminated by either government upon six months notice.
Reason: The purpose of USA revision is to remove the need to review the agreement automatically at the end of each year, while preserving the requirements that such a review is mandatory at the request of either government.
9. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between authorized agencies of the two governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this agreement. Text Ends.
28Voir/See Volume 26, document 182.