The French and Canadian authorities have found common ground in emphasizing nuclear disarmament in the current disarmament negotiations. Their reasons for taking this view have been rather different, however. There is considerable evidence to suggest that French preoccupation with nuclear disarmament has more to do with the state of their own nuclear weapons programme than with world anxiety over the nuclear arms race. A French spokesman said recently that France would not accept the treaty on nuclear tests which is being negotiated by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, because such a treaty, by freezing the development of nuclear weapons, would leave France in a permanently inferior position. French insistence in the disarmament talks on priority for nuclear disarmament and for the closest connection between the end of military production of fissionable material and the conversion of stocks of this material to peaceful purposes also appears related to a desire not to lose any advantage France may have gained from having embarked upon an independent programme of nuclear weapons development.

Although France’s efforts in the field of nuclear energy have a broad base in research which can be traced back to pre-war years, it was not until 1956 that France officially entered the nuclear arms race. The programme, which initially proceeded at a slow pace, gained momentum after General de Gaulle’s advent to power.

Our estimate of French nuclear capabilities is mainly based on our knowledge of French technical potential in the field of weapon fabrication and on our assessment of French production of fissile material. We have no doubt that the French have sufficient reserves of plutonium to conduct a substantial nuclear programme. In addition, it is generally agreed, even by United States scientists, that France possesses a highly competent team of nuclear scientists and technicians. The recent tests in the Sahara appear, on the basis of initial analyses, to have been surprisingly efficient and there is no reason to believe that the French will encounter any insuperable difficulties in building up a stock-pile of nuclear weapons. According to a report received by the United Kingdom authorities from a reliable source, the French are also conducting work on an H-bomb which they may test in 1962.

The French Government recently announced that a new supersonic bomber capable of delivering nuclear weapons would be made available to the French air force at the beginning of 1963. In addition, there is a substantial programme for the development and production of a wide range of rockets and guided missiles. As well as developing short-range rockets which are already in production, the French have, during the past two years, made plans for the acquisition of an intermediate range ballistic missile. Although France cannot be said to possess an effective deterrent at the present time, it is reasonable, assuming a continued test programme, to expect that by 1964 it will have an arsenal of nuclear warheads which would enable it to mount a sizeable attack against any part of Europe, including the European part of the Soviet Union.

The long-term military value of a French nuclear deterrent will depend in large measure on the progress achieved by other nuclear powers during the next five years. If the United States and the Soviet Union come to possess invulnerable strike forces, France would have to consider the possibility that the United States would not be prepared to defend Europe at the cost of total annihilation. In such circumstances an independent French or European deterrent force might have great value, since the Soviet Union would have to consider accepting a substantial degree of damage as the cost of a major attack in Europe even if it judged that the United States would not intervene.

In an address to both Houses of the United Kingdom Parliament on April 7, General de Gaulle called for the destruction of nuclear weapons as part of a controlled disarmament plan, but he made it clear that France would only abandon its nuclear weapons programme if other powers agreed to relinquish their nuclear capabilities. French persistence in the face of adverse reactions in Africa and Asia to the bomb tests in the Sahara, and in spite of the obvious strains which such a programme imposes on the economy appears to be based on the following considerations. French military strategy, since de Gaulle’s advent to power, has undergone profound changes. The French President has in the latest volume of his memoirs stated that the future of the world will be decided in Europe, and that the objective of French policy should be to produce a strategic grouping of military powers which would assure the security and stability of Europe. In recent months de Gaulle has also reiterated his conviction that France as well as other European powers have interests to protect and promote in the world which will not always coincide with those of the United States and other NATO allies. France can therefore no longer rely exclusively on the United States nuclear retaliatory power to defend its national interests. In General de Gaulle’s view effective re-emergence of France as a leading European power is largely dependent, both for reasons of international prestige and strategy, on the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent.

The development of a retaliatory force of some size, combined with the financial strains imposed by the Algerian war, will certainly place a heavy burden on the French economy. It may be that General de Gaulle hopes that other European nations, such as Italy and West Germany, may in time agree to participate in the development of an independent European deterrent and to contribute financially to the achievement of that goal. It is also possible that France believes that, if it achieves a certain level of efficiency, the United States or the United Kingdom authorities will undertake to share the burden of the French programme by giving France secret nuclear information or by assisting French efforts in the field of missile developments.

It would be interesting to hear what President de Gaulle might himself have to say about the political and strategic basis of France’s nuclear weapons programme. You may also wish to express to him Canada’s misgivings about the conduct of further nuclear tests and the resulting potential dangers to the health of mankind.

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How? if the French has a vulnerable missile force and Soviets an invulnerable one, and the Soviets struck first? Surely this is the whole point: the evidence suggests that at best, — and at tremendous cost — France will have by 1964 a small 1960-vintage deterrent which by then will be obsolete and therefore militarily ineffective. If this were not so, why have the UK just abandoned the Blue Streak? And if the UK are so desperate for new devices to contribute to a mobile deterrent, what can the French hope to contribute with Blue Streak type missiles in 1964? [J.H. Taylor]

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Khrushchev said he has 20 rockets aimed at France right now — in 1960. [J.H. Taylor]

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What about WEU? [J.H. Taylor]