Reference: Our telegram No. 1452 of August 25/55.?

Representatives of the eight interested governments met today, September 7, at the call of the State Department to consider once again the ten-year eligibility formula with respect to the release of Japanese class "A" war criminals. In view of all the discussion which has gone on concerning the ten-year eligibility formula, the meeting took a somewhat surprising turn. The upshot of the meeting was a decision to recommend to governments a kind of "gentlemen's agreement" that class "A" war criminals be considered eligible for parole after serving ten years of their sentences, without governments having to take a firm position on a "formula" and without the interested governments informing the Japanese Government of the adoption of a rigid plan.

2. Agreement in the above term came about partly as a result of a desire to meet The Netherlands position (our telegram 1432 of August 22?) and partly as a result of further elaboration of the United States position. The Netherlands representative said that his government would be prepared to vote for the release of the three war criminals who became eligible for release on September 14, but would not be able to join other governments in approving the ten-year formula. (He implied that his government would probably agree to the release of the other major war criminals as they become eligible after serving ten years of their sentences.) The United States representative said that in the United States conception of the ten-year eligibility formula there was a distinction between eligibility and a decision to release. The United States would regard acceptance of the eligibility formula as simply committing governments to examine the case of an individual war criminal after he had served ten years. Agreement to the formula did not, in the United States view, commit governments to automatic approval of the parole after ten years.

3. The "gentlemen's agreement" approach seemed acceptable to other representatives. Since it did not run counter to your instructions, we offered the opinion that it would probably be acceptable to you.

4. It was agreed, therefore, to recommend to governments that they instruct their Embassies in Tokyo to consult on the sending of similar notes to the Japanese Foreign Office which would deal mainly with the three war criminals eligible for parole on September 14, i.e., Hashimoto, Kaya, and Suzuki, but which would also make passing reference to the ten-year eligibility formula. (The same procedure would be followed when the remaining war criminals became eligible). If this plan of action could be agreed to by governments, it seemed desirable that the substantive paragraph of the notes to the Japanese Government should read as follows:

"The Government of (blank) has consulted with the other Allied Powers concerned, amongst whom it has been decided in accordance with Article 11 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan that Hashimoto, Kaya, and Suzuki may be released on parole, effective upon the completion of ten years imprisonment, on September 14, 1955."

It was thought that the first paragraph of the notes might refer to the recommendations of the Government of Japan for parole of these individuals in much the same terms as has been used in past cases where medical parole has been granted.

5. So far as publicity was concerned, all representatives at the meeting were prepared to accept your suggestion (your telegram 1482 of August 23?) that publicity be left to the Japanese Government.

6. There was some discussion as to whether the terms of the parole should be spelled out, but it became clear that it would be difficult to get agreement among the governments concerned if they were forced to state their individual positions on this score. It seemed desirable, therefore, that no attempt be made to elaborate on what was meant by parole. In practical terms it would probably be synonymous with outright release, but some of the governments represented at the meeting were not prepared to admit this fact in official correspondence with the Japanese Government.

7. If the view reached by the meeting is acceptable to you, you might instruct our Embassy in Tokyo to co-ordinate their action with that of the other interested Embassies there. We should be grateful, however, if you would keep us informed.¹⁵⁸