While undoubtedly Wrong has been keeping you posted from Washington, it seems just possible that it would be useful for me to report there is good reason to believe that on 17th October Strang had an important talk with Nickerson on agenda and tactics for forthcoming Council of Foreign Ministers.

2. Hickerson began by saying that while Marshall had not yet given the subject much thought, State Department were of opinion that such a talk on pick and shovel level would prove most useful (what delightful Hickersonian memories the phrase recalls).

3. He then asked if Bevin was really so optimistic that success might still be achieved as some of his public utterances might lead one to believe. Strang replied that while he did not think that Secretary of State was very hopeful, he was anxious not to say or do anything that might prove a bar to a fruitful outcome. Marshall, Hickerson said, was not hopeful and had no taste for a repetition of the Moscow Conference. It was not his intention to remain in London for much more than a fortnight unless developments were really promising. State Department therefore felt Conference should probe three or four important items such as economic principles, economic unity, freedom of travel and of association and in the event that soundings under these heads showed no change in Soviet attitude to adjourn Conference sine die.

4. Hickerson then said that his information was that for propaganda purposes Soviets might spring a proposal for both east and west to withdraw their occupation forces from Germany. State Department did not much like idea because a Soviet reoccupation not only of the east but of the whole of Germany would be easy, while a return by the west would be very difficult. He did not think proposal should be rejected out of hand, but should be agreed to as being desirable provided Russians also withdraw their troops from Austria and the lines of communication leading thereto, agreed to joint export import programme and freedom of travel throughout Germany to which he felt sure Molotov would not agree. Strang agreed.

5. They also both agreed that Soviets would do everything in their power to get a foothold in the management of the Ruhr so as to bar progress in carrying out the Marshall Plan should this come into effect.

6. Hickerson felt that tasks thrown to Deputies, namely procedure for Peace Treaty and form of Central German Government, were academic pending agreement on economic unity. Difference of view between United Kingdom and United States regarding organization of Central Government remains unresolved.

7. In event of failure of Council of Foreign Ministers, Hickerson thought a provisional western German organization should be set up which, while having considerable executive powers should not be called a Parliament or a Government. Western technique of control should be modified by granting Germans far more executive responsibility than heretofore, the occupying Powers contenting themselves with ensuring compliance with Directives and of course security. Western presence in Berlin should be fought for to the last ditch. The Control Council must continue to meet. We did not think Russians would tear up Protocol which established them here. Both sides agree that former are building up a case of western violations that could be used as justification for doing so.

8. Parties are to meet again this Week.