Volume #13 - 821.|
RELATIONS AVEC LES ÉTATS-UNIS
VISITES DE HAUT NIVEAU
DEA/127 (S) TS|
Le secrtaire d'État aux Affaires extrieures|
l'ambassadeur aux tats-Unis
TOP SECRET. MOST IMMEDIATE.
le 21 avril 1947|
Following for Wrong from Pearson, Begins: Prime Minister may wish to discuss, among other things, the following matters when he secs the President1
1. Forthcoming Visit of President Truman to Ottawa
Programme in broad outline for the visit has been seen by both the Prime Minister and the President. I believe you have a copy of this. Mr. Atherton is leaving for Washington this evening and will be available if any points should be taken up with him.
2. (a) Economic Questions
Growing difficulties of our exchange position vis--vis the United States might be mentioned, with the necessity for sonic steps for the control of imports which may be required here unless we can increase exports to or attract capital from the United States. There is growing reference in the press to the necessity of what is now becoming generally known as a "peace time Hyde Park arrangement".2
(b) Related to the above are the growing difficulties of our export position vis-à-vis European countries as it becomes clear that our loans and credits to those countries will be exhausted before their economic positions will have been restored to something like normal. This may mean either further loans in order to safeguard what we have already invested or bilateral trade policies by the European countries, the effect of which is hound to extend to this continent.
(c) Very closely related to (b) are the developments at the I.T.O. Conference in Geneva. It might be mentioned that there is growing interest in this country in that Conference and especially in the effect of its decisions on Imperial preferences. We are committed to the reduction or abolition of those preferences, but only in return for really effective tariff concessions from the United States. It would be a mistake if any illusions persisted that public opinion in this country would support the abandonment of preferential arrangements in return for mere promises of tariff reductions on the part of the United States.
3. Defence Questions
I do not think that much need be said about this, as arrangements are proceeding satisfactorily. It might, however, be stressed that one reason for this is that the United States have recently been careful to respect the sensitiveness of Canadian public opinion in this matter and have not been pressing the Government too hard or too often to initiate or carry out arrangements. The policy of moderation on both sides is proving to be successful in avoiding public domestic controversy.
4. Participation in German Peace Arrangements
Advantage might be taken of the opportunity to thank the President for the assistance the United States has given us in London and Moscow in the stand which we have taken and which we think is a reasonable one. At the same time, it might be suggested that people in this country, who feel strongly about Canada's rights in this matter, do not welcome the association of those rights with those of Latin American countries whose participation in the war was not comparable with ours. Mention might also be made of our worry that, in an effort to meet the Russian views the United States and the United Kingdom may agree on a compromise which would not meet our position and which we would, therefore, not be able to accept. We still feel strongly that the real work of the drafting of the Peace Treaties will be done in the Committees and Sub-Committees, and that Canada has a right to full membership in certain of those Committees and Sub-Committees.
5. Recent Statements by Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Welles.3 who called attention to Canada's position vis-à-vis the Pan American Union.4 It might be well to let the President know that we are quite satisfied with the existing situation and are not requesting an invitation. It would, however, be dangerous, I suppose, to say anything to the President that he might interpret as a refusal on our part of a possible invitation. In any event, it might be made quite clear to Mr. Truman that it would be very helpful for all concerned if no official steps could be taken by the Union looking toward an invitation until the matter had been discussed with the Canadian Government.
6 If the Prime Minister feels that we should stand for election to the Security Council in September, then advantage might be taken of the opportunity of mentioning this to President Truman in stating our desire to secure the support of all members of the United Nations from this hemisphere. Ends.
1Le premier ministre faisait alors visite privé aux États-Unis.
2Pour l'Accord de Hyde Park, voir le volume 8, document 191.
3Sumner Welles, ancient sous-secrétaire d'État des États-Unis.
4Pour une tude du discours de Vandenberg, voir le document 597.