PART I - POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Introduction:

The Canadian Government is in favour of more effective political consultation among the members of NATO in accordance with the principles outlined below in answer to the questions on this subject.

2. Close and continuing consultation on political matters of common concern is the essence of any durable alliance of free states. In an alliance as vital to the security of its members and to the peace of the world as NATO, such consultation is of prime importance. NATO is today faced with three important problems on the political plane: the need to maintain the unity of the alliance during a period in which international tensions may be less severe than in recent years; the need to develop policies which will strengthen the relationships of interest and understanding between NATO and non-NATO countries, including those of the "uncommitted" areas; and the need to provide a progressive basis of action for the Western world in the face of the continuing and complex challenge of international Communism. The first step in meeting these needs, in the view of the Canadian Government, is to provide for more effective political consultation. This is necessary in order to eliminate any unnecessary divergence of views and actions among members, to give a greater unity and cohesion to the alliance, to widen the area of understanding between NATO and the emerging governments and peoples of the less developed areas of the world, and to pave the way for taking constructive political initiatives vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.

3. The North Atlantic Treaty makes specific reference to consultation only in the obligation set forth in Article 4 by which the parties "will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened". This is a specific obligation which relates exclusively to a direct threat to any of the parties. In practice, however, as the report of the 1951 Committee on the North Atlantic Community C8(D)/6 indicates, the habit and practice of consultation have extended beyond the special "emergency" situations envisaged in this provision of the treaty to cover wider areas of common concern. This is a necessary and sensible development. Although special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognized in Article 4, to matters of urgent and direct importance to members of NATO, and to "emergency" situations where it is obligatory for members to consult in the light of a threat, it is equally important to exchange views and to consult before the threat develops, and, indeed, to consult in advance in order to prevent the threat from developing at all. If NATO were to avoid consultation until the threat becomes actual, it would not be acting in the sense of its primary responsibility of protecting the mutual security interests of all its members. By the steady and persistent, if gradual development of effective procedures and habits of consultation, while recognizing that the ultimate responsibility for final decisions at present rests with national governments, NATO can best achieve an effective basis for developing a common foreign policy for the alliance in important areas of common concern.

(Question 1) It might be useful to consider the desirability of laying down certain basic principles as guidance for political consultation on matters of common concern, such as the following:

(a) The Council should be kept fully informed of any political development in any area which may affect significantly member countries or the Alliance as a whole.

(b) The duty of informing the Council at an early stage of such developments should be accepted.

(c) The Council should normally not be requested to take decisions or adopt resolutions of political importance without having had the opportunity to consider the matter in the light of all available information.

(d) Member governments should endeavour not to make political declarations significantly affecting the Alliance or its member nations without prior consultation through the Council.

It would be of interest to know the view of member governments on this proposal, with a statement indicating to what extent the above-mentioned principles are acceptable.

4. (Answer) The statement of basic principles which might guide Member Governments in regard to political consultation in NATO is generally acceptable to the Canadian Government which therefore replies in the affirmative to each of the four principles formulated in Question 1. It is considered that two further basic principles might be added to the foregoing in the following terms:

(e) No NATO government should adopt a firm policy on important matters of concern to the whole alliance without early advance consultation with other members of the alliance.

(f) When such consultation has taken place on a NATO basis on important matters of common concern, member governments should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other NATO governments as expressed in these consultations.

5. In order to make these principles operative, the Canadian Government believes that there should be a clearer understanding among member governments as to what is meant by "any political development in any area which may affect significantly member countries or the Alliance as a whole". As a basis for discussion, the Canadian Government suggests that the primary areas of common concern to member governments in the political field include the relationships between members of the Atlantic Community, and between NATO countries and the countries of the Soviet bloc. The principal reason for seeking to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields at the present time is the need to adapt NATO to meet a new Soviet challenge which involves increased political and economic pressures in addition to the existing military threat.

6. Although the habit of political consultation in NATO has been growing in recent years, it has not, in the opinion of the Canadian Government, been growing with sufficient rapidity to justify any complacency in present circumstances. Now more than ever before NATO needs to aim at the closest possible coordination of the foreign policies of member governments on all important matters of common concern to the Alliance in order to strengthen its cohesion, and to harmonize the military, political and economic policies of its members. In particular, the Soviet Union is clearly seeking to enter into bilateral negotiations with members of the Alliance to serve its own interests, and it would therefore in principle be desirable for members of NATO to consult on such matters. The NATO Council is the forum best suited for accomplishing both these aims on the basis of carefully thought out principles, but without trying to establish a hard and fast code which would be the antithesis of the flexibility of procedure which is required. What is needed above all is the will to consult.

7. In stressing the need for more effective consultation, it is not intended that NATO should be the instrument for general consultation on minor or less important modifications of policy, which would be impracticable and unnecessary, but rather that consultation on this basis should be reserved for major and important policy developments of common concern to the Alliance. In the last resort the determination of whether minor or major matters are at stake must rest on the judgment of the governments principally concerned. Similarly, it must be recognized that the obligation to consult in NATO on appropriate matters, must not prejudice the necessity for quick action in any real emergency. Here too there will also be an area of judgment involved as to what are the essential elements of a "real emergency". Judgment in both the above situations should not be based on narrow national considerations alone.

8. One of the ways of retaining flexibility and removing some of the inhibitions which at present limit the scope of political consultations through NATO, would be to have it clearly understood that acceptance of the principles of NATO consultation, while essential, does not carry with it any formal or specific obligation for member governments to consult their allies on all matters of common concern, nor to change any of their plans or intended policies in the event that they do not carry the best judgment of all other member governments. It is in this light that we believe that an acceptance of the restrictions outlined in reply to Question 3 below would do more at the present time to encourage the practice of political consultation than agreement in principle to more far-reaching proposals that would in practice be bound to create difficulties and delays.

(Question 2) To what extent and under what circumstances is your Government prepared to participate in the following types of consultation within NATO?

(i) Informal exchanges of information;

(ii) Preparation of common appreciations in the light of current developments;

(iii) Consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus as a basis for determination or guidance of individual government policies;

(iv) Consultation with the aim of arriving at agreement on specific policies or courses of action.

9. (Answer) The Canadian Government would:

(i) willingly participate in informal discussions in the NATO Council of any matter which any member - or the Secretary General - considered of general interest or common concern to the Alliance, given adequate warning for preparation whenever possible;

(ii) participate in providing material for such common appreciations of current political developments as the Council felt it desirable to prepare, normally by means of Secretariat studies for the Council's consideration and subsequently for the information of member governments;

(iii) consult with its allies through the Council with a view to arriving at a general consensus in the light of which member governments would be better able to draw their own conclusions and determine their individual policies;

(iv) consult in certain defined fields of common concern (as explained in greater detail in reply to the next question) with the aim of arriving at agreement on coordinated policies in these specific fields.

10. The main obstacle to more extensive political consultation in each of the four fields mentioned in this question, in the opinion of the Canadian Government, is the inadequacy of security which has too often characterized NATO's political discussions in the past. An improvement of security is essential if recommendations aimed at increasing the effectiveness of NATO consultation are to be implemented. Secondly, a closer observance of discretion with the press would greatly facilitate a more rapid and complete exchange of information through the NATO Council on important matters of policy of common concern. With increasing security and mutual confidence, there will be a greater inclination to discuss delicate matters frankly in the Council at as early a stage in the formulation of national policies as possible, and preferably before firm positions have been taken publicly by member governments. Without them, it will be difficult to make any real progress.

(Question 3) What should be the basis for determining the matters of common concern which might be the subject of consultation under the four headings listed above, and what should be regarded as the factors limiting such consultation, such as respect for liberty of action of each member government and the non-universal character of NATO?

11. (Answer) No rigid formula can be set out in advance, in our view, beyond the general suggestions outlined in response to Questions 1 and 2 above, as criteria for the selection of matters of common concern appropriate for the various types of consultations listed under the four headings in Question 2. The following comments are, however, relevant.

(i) Although discussion should not lead to action which would constitute interference in the domestic affairs of any member of the Alliance, this limitation should not be interpreted in any narrow or legalistic sense. NATO is not, in our view, an operating but a coordinating agency in the political field. For this reason consultation should only extend beyond discussion and exchanges of view if all members of the Alliance agree on the further measures to be taken. We would, however, recommend that the Council recognize the right of any member to raise any subject of common concern to NATO for discussion, even when it may be possible that unanimity does not exist on the holding of such a discussion; there should in other words be no veto - even informally - on NATO discussions. On the other hand, not only is intervention excluded, except when there is general agreement that NATO action is required and appropriate, but it will be found more useful for discussions of contentious matters to be held as at present in either restricted or private sessions of the Council.

(ii) NATO appreciations of current political developments should not hesitate to record controversial minority opinions; otherwise these documents will tend to reduce themselves to a "lowest common denominator".

(iii) In view of the high degree of integration achieved in the military forces of NATO and the obvious fact that the fate of all members of the Alliance is inextricably linked, the NATO Council should aim at providing the basis for working towards a common foreign policy for the Alliance in important matters of common concern. While consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus may not pre-determine national policies, nor are member governments obliged in every case to consult through NATO before deciding their own policies, member governments should seek to develop their national policies in the light of the interests and views of other NATO governments as expressed in these consultations.

(iv) In connection with consultation aiming at agreement on specific policies or courses of action, the useful limits of such NATO action should be borne in mind. In view of the frequent need for prompt action, joint exercises (such as the preparation of replies to the Bulganin letters on disarmament) should be confined to seeking a basis of agreement on principles and attitudes, and should not extend to detailed drafting by representatives of 15 governments which is likely to make for delays and even irritations.

12. It is desirable for the maximum possible agreement to be reached through NATO on specific issues. Nevertheless, the Council as long as it is composed of the representatives of sovereign states cannot commit its member governments to common policies. In cases where agreement on specific policies or courses of action is sought, the Council has to proceed by way of recommendation to governments. To share in such consultation places a general responsibility on all governments to see to it that full weight is given to such recommendations in arriving at their final decisions and policies.

13. The Canadian Government is therefore convinced that a considerable expansion in the NATO Council's functions in the field of political consultation is both possible and desirable even without any constitutional change. The essential principle is that no NATO government should adopt a firm policy on important matters of concern to the whole Alliance without early advance consultation with other members of the Alliance. Any tendency, for NATO consultation to be on an exclusive basis, in matters where the interests of others are affected, should be resisted. NATO consultations will usually supplement rather than replace consultations through other international organizations and through normal diplomatic channels. The special obligations and responsibilities of the major powers on certain issues (e.g., German reunification) should be kept in mind; but NATO should not be by-passed on matters of concern to all members. (The discussions in the Council before the Geneva Conferences last year were good precedents, and could be carried further in future.)

14. In all NATO's political consultations and discussions, most of which we would assume would take place in restricted or private session, it will be necessary to give constant and careful attention to the impact of Council communiqués and of the actions and public statements of NATO members on public opinion, not only in NATO countries but the world over. We should strive to be more aware of attitudes and reactions in the "uncommitted" countries for whose allegiance or sympathy the USSR is now making strenuous efforts. NATO is not, and must not appear to be, merely a military alliance of the "colonial" powers and their supporters. For these reasons NATO political consultations should not be preoccupied exclusively with the protection of the security of the Atlantic area and the maintenance of the unity of the Member States, but should reflect greater concern for improving the position of the Organization in all parts of the world, by taking, wherever real opportunities exist, forward looking initiatives in developing common lines of policy vis-à-vis the USSR, instead of merely consulting on how to react to Soviet initiatives aimed at destroying the cohesion of the Alliance. The future of NATO, in our view, will depend on the extent to which NATO governments bring themselves to accept and act upon this more positive role for the Organization in the political field.

(Question 4) To what extent can NATO assist in the peaceful settlement of inter- member disputes and differences? In view of the provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty, should procedures of conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes, similar to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international agreements be adopted by NATO?

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

15. (Answer) In an association of free and sovereign states, divergences of view and even disputes between its members are to be expected. This is merely the reflection of the fact of political change and development. What is important is that such divergences and disputes should be settled in a timely way and through orderly and peaceful procedures so that the Alliance should not be weakened. In dealing with such problems, the members of NATO have undertaken by virtue of Article 1 of the Treaty "to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means". So far as disputes between members of NATO are concerned, as in the case of disputes between members of NATO and other governments, it is recommended that every effort be made to apply this undertaking to the settlement of disputes which now weaken the Alliance or which may threaten to do so in the future.

16. In the first instance, the parties to such differences or disputes should make every effort themselves to achieve settlements through direct discussions, and should invoke formal international machinery and procedures as a last resort, and only when these direct efforts have failed. The Canadian Government further recommends that NATO Governments which have not already done so should consider whether they can agree to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court without or with a minimum of reservations, in all justiciable disputes among themselves, subject to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. It is thought that such a provision for the settlement of judicial disputes between NATO members would contribute to the unity of the Alliance and would strengthen the links between NATO and the United Nations.

17. It is also suggested that members of the North Atlantic Community should investigate the possibility of setting up in advance additional machinery for peaceful settlement including conciliation, mediation and arbitration so that political or non-justiciable disputes which threaten to impair the unity of the Alliance would be subject to previously agreed and accepted general procedures of settlement. In this connection, the role of the Secretary- General in tasks of conciliation is of importance (See Part V, Question 3).

18. It is recognized that if the practice of consultation can be further developed, it should be possible for NATO countries to harmonize their policies, and thereby to reduce, if not to eliminate altogether, serious divergences in their policies; reliance on formal provisions for the settlement of disputes would to that extent decrease. On the other hand, even with the development of a closer sense of community, member countries must recognize that adequate provisions for the peaceful settlement of their disputes, to be employed when necessary, constitute one of the important requirements of a strong alliance.

(Question 5) Should NATO give more formal recognition to parliamentary associations and the Parliamentary Conference and what should be the relationship between the Council and these parliamentary groupings?

19. (Answer) The Canadian Government believes that closer contact between parliamentarians of the NATO countries through NATO Parliamentary Associations and occasional meetings can be an important means of increasing public understanding of NATO and widening the basis of its support.

20. The Canadian Government believes, however, that there is a danger in attempting to form prematurely any formal NATO Parliamentary Council. Unless there were a clear understanding that such a Council was purely advisory in character, it might attempt, with resulting confusion, to supervise and control the work of the executive agencies of NATO, the members of which are responsible to governments, and only in that sense to parliaments. There is also the risk that parliamentary meetings of this kind, purely advisory in character, may get into the habit of passing resolutions that cannot be implemented and may, therefore, weaken in the public mind the position of the NATO Council.

21. Both the above difficulties can, of course, be overcome, and in referring to them here it is not intended to minimize the value of occasional meetings of NATO Parliamentarians as an important means of assisting the development of the Atlantic Community.

22. The Canadian Government suggests the following steps to bring NATO Parliamentary Associations into closer relationship with the Council of NATO:

(a) That the Council instruct the Secretariat to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary meetings and to give all possible help with arrangements for such meetings.

(b) That Parliamentary meetings might be addressed by invited representatives of member governments, by the Secretary- General, by the Supreme Commanders, and perhaps by other senior military officers, followed in each case by a discussion period. In this way the parliamentarians would obtain a full report on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, which would provide them with the information on which to hold useful discussions.

(c) That while any Parliamentary meeting might submit a report of its discussions to the Council, for the present it should be discouraged from addressing resolutions to the Council.

PART II - ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

23. The Canadian replies to the economic questions take the form of a general statement although throughout this general statement there is a parenthetical reference to the essential part of the Canadian reply to each specific question. In addition, material referring to specific questions may be found in the following paragraphs of the attached statement:

(Question 1) Does your Government consider that closer cooperation between member countries of NATO within the specialized organizations to which they belong and the establishment of closer relations with such organizations, would represent the most suitable means for promoting greater unity in the economic field between member countries? (See paragraphs 26, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37).

(Question 2) In this connection, as regards the OEEC, does your Government consider the participation of the United States and Canada as merely "associated members", to be adequate? (See paragraphs 31 and 32).

(Question 3) Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. Does your Government think that the activities of other organizations, in particular the OEEC, is sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of NATO countries in this respect? To what extent does your Government consider that NATO could assist in the conciliation of economic conflicts arising between member countries? (See paragraphs 26, 27, 38, 39, 40.)

(Question 4) Does your Government feel that NATO may have some interest in developing public works for civilian use, as has been done in the military field? (See paragraph 28).

(Question 5) Does your Government consider that NATO should take an active part in the economic development of underdeveloped regions within the NATO area or would it be preferable that NATO should limit itself to the appraisal of the political importance for the Alliance of development programmes to this end? (See paragraphs 29, 34, 45, 46).

(Question 6(a)) Does your Government consider that NATO has a vital interest in promoting the economic development of underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area? If so, bearing in mind the non-universal character of NATO, what action in assisting under-developed countries does your Government consider can appropriately be carried on by NATO countries to achieve the necessary objectives and what coordination can be furnished within NATO? (See paragraphs 43, 44).

(Question 6(b)) Does your Government consider that the Statutes of existing and planned international financial agencies give them sufficient flexibility to enable them to operate suitably under present political conditions and to meet the requirements of the situation with which NATO is now confronted? (See paragraph 34).

(Question 7(a)) Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to counter and neutralize Soviet commercial practices which do not conform to the principles by which Western countries carry on their normal trade and financial relations with one another? (See paragraph 41).

(Question 7(b)) Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to meet the competition of the Soviet Bloc in the field of contracts for public works in politically sensitive areas? (See paragraph 44).

(Question 8) What suggestions can be derived from the experience in the economic field of other regional organizations with a view to the possible application of this experience to other geographical areas? (See paragraph 35, 45, 46).

(Question 9) Does your Government consider that it would be in the interests of the Alliance for the NATO countries to consult together when certain important questions are coming up for discussion in international economic bodies in which the Soviet Bloc is represented? (See paragraph 37).

(Question 10) Are there any other specific economic subjects or classes of subjects of general concern to NATO which are not now being adequately considered in other agencies and which might be discussed usefully in NATO? (See paragraphs 37, 41, 43).

24. (Answer) The Government of Canada attaches great importance to a strengthening of the economic foundations of the NATO alliance. To maintain an adequate defence position in the face of the continuing Soviet threat, the members of the alliance must contemplate devoting a large proportion of their resources to military purposes over a long pull. To be in a position to do so, while at the same time satisfying the legitimate claims of their populations for higher living standards, and providing for dynamic growth of their economic structures by setting aside adequate amounts for investment, it is essential that the output and productivity of the members of the alliance should be maintained at the highest possible levels; and that there should be sufficient flexibility to meet and successfully counter those aspects of the Soviet economic offensive which threaten to subvert the purposes of the alliance.

25. To accomplish the economic objectives set forth in the preceding paragraph, it will be necessary for the members of the NATO alliance to make use of all the means at their disposal: there is no simple line of approach, no simple change in the machinery or functions of NATO, which will increase the total amount of resources at the disposal of the members of the alliance. This will require the constant and continuing efforts of the individual members in the management of their own internal affairs, in their relations with each other both within the NATO organization and outside it, and in their relations with other international organizations. While in the opinion of the Government of Canada, NATO can play an important part in these matters, certain other international organizations more specifically organized for economic purposes, can, in carrying out their own functions, help the NATO countries (along with their other members) to strengthen their economies.

26. The importance of domestic economic policies in determining the level of output and productivity of the members of the alliance is basic. This is not to underestimate the important role played by the generous economic assistance made available to some of the members of the alliance by the United States or the contribution made by the International Bank, the I.M.F. and the O.E.E.C. But, without adequate internal policies, even this assistance would not have produced the results referred to.

27. The Annual Reviews carried out by NATO and the OEEC provide an opportunity to comment on the economic position and development of members. It is the view of the Canadian Government that these complementary reviews should be continued. Each organization pays attention to particular phases of economic matters and it would seem desirable to maintain this division of labour over this (or indeed any other) function now performed by the OEEC.

28. While NATO should have a proper concern for the internal economic position of its members and is directly concerned with the economic aspect of defence policy, it should not, in our opinion, act as an agency for formulating and carrying out trade or other economic policies on behalf of its members. Thus, the Canadian Government would not consider the arrangements which have been made for constructing certain military works of common interest as applicable to public works for civilian use (Question 4). Even in the case of military infrastructure it has been generally recognized that allowance should be made for any elements which were adaptable to civil use and which therefore had economic value for the host countries. Where more than one government has an interest in a particular civilian project, no doubt arrangements can be made between the Governments involved, as has happened, for example, between the United States and Canada in connection with part of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. It is difficult, however, to imagine a strictly civilian public works project which would be of direct interest and value to all or the bulk of the NATO countries. In the absence of projects of this type, there would not seem to be a parallel between civil public works in the NATO area and military works which have been carried out for the benefit and use of the armed forces of all NATO countries.

29. Nevertheless, it remains true that NATO as a whole has an evident interest in the economic development and progress of the individual members. The Annual Reviews provide an opportunity for each of the members of NATO to inform itself on conditions in the other NATO countries and on any difficulties which those countries may be experiencing. Undoubtedly (Question 5) the member governments would wish to discuss and consider sympathetically special economic difficulties brought to the Organization's attention by a member when the difficulties are an obstacle to that member playing its proper part in the coalition.

30. The Canadian Government wishes to emphasize the view that other international organizations can continue to play an important part in strengthening the economic position of NATO members and there would be no advantage to be derived from attempting to have NATO take over their functions.

31. It is the opinion of the Canadian Government that, in its present form, the OEEC plays a dual role of great value in the Atlantic Community (Question 2). In the first place, it is basically and essentially European although it is also intended to assist progress towards a broader multilateral trading system. It facilitates, through its many boards and committees, an exchange of information and a consideration of policies over the whole area of European production, trade, and finance. While some of its members can reach closer and more binding arrangements amongst themselves in particular economic fields, e.g. the European Coal and Steel Community, the OEEC facilitates the type of European economic cooperation and integration that is practicable for most European countries in most fields. At the same time, through its associate memberships, this essentially European body embraces the whole of the Atlantic Community. Through its continuous operations and intimate atmosphere, it contributes materially to the elimination of economic conflict and the encouragement of economic collaboration amongst the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. In this regard, it may be desirable to supplement the work of OEEC, from time to time, by economic discussions in the North Atlantic Council as indicated below. It may also be desirable to strengthen the participation of the United States and Canada in the work of OEEC, even if the nature of their association remains unchanged.

32. If the members of OEEC decided, on some future occasion, to invite Canada and the United States to become full members, the Government of Canada would consider such an invitation very seriously and sympathetically. At this stage, however, it seems desirable to observe that, with Canada and the United States as full members, the OEEC would cease to be an essentially European body, and that some of the momentum and drive towards cooperation amongst Europeans might be diverted into other channels and other bodies. Further, there are certain actions of the OEEC, of a regional character, which Canada can accept as an associate member but to which, as a full member, it might be difficult to give the formal agreement that would be required under basic rules of unanimity. Presumably the United States would be in a somewhat similar position.

33. It is the view of the Canadian Government that the economies of the NATO countries will be strengthened by steady progress towards the broadest possible system of multilateral trade and freer payments, for such a system involves the most productive and economic use of the resources available to the free world. In this system it should prove easier to avoid debilitating economic policies within the NATO Alliance and to minimize friction in the relations between members of the Alliance and other countries, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the Soviet economic offensive. For these reasons, the Canadian Government is convinced that the economic strength of the members of the Alliance will be enhanced by the increasingly effective application of the GATT and Fund principles.

34. The Canadian Government is a member of all the various specialized agencies of the United Nations and attaches great importance to their work. With improvements which may be introduced from time to time to meet changing circumstances, these organizations are capable of contributing substantially in their special fields to the creation of the kinds of conditions which the NATO countries have an interest in bringing about within the NATO area and throughout the world. The Canadian Government would not propose any alterations (question 6(b)) in the statutes of such bodies as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank, which have shown a considerable capacity to adapt themselves to the requirements of the situation but would hope for the maximum participation in them by NATO members. It is worth recalling that of the $2,500 million loaned by the International Bank since its inception, nearly $1,100 million has gone to members of NATO, and a further $675 million to associated monetary areas, and of the $1,200 million of Fund resources made available, $600 million has gone to NATO countries and a further $160 million to associated monetary areas. It may be expected that the newly created International Finance Corporation will also operate in a sufficiently flexible manner to enable it to function effectively in its field.

35. By playing an active role in these organizations the members of NATO individually can probably make a more constructive contribution to the solution of the wide range of problems with which these agencies are concerned than would be possible on any other and more limited basis. Questions relating to trade, finance, health, food, and communications are not primarily of a regional character. The unity of the members of NATO would not seem to require exclusively NATO arrangements for dealing with these subjects. The more fully the NATO countries are able to discharge their responsibilities as members of the broad international community the more healthy and durable will be their own association.

36. The Canadian Government considers that it would be proper and useful for NATO countries occasionally to publicize the constructive role which they are playing in the specialized agencies of the United Nations. It might be well for other countries and for the citizens of our countries to realize just how much the NATO countries are doing to promote economic cooperation through the established agencies. It would not, however, seem appropriate for NATO itself to enter into any formal relations with the individual specialized organizations (Question 1).

37. Turning finally to the functions which NATO itself might appropriately carry out in the economic field there are, in the opinion of the Canadian Government certain important functions for which the Organization is well qualified. Reference has already been made to the legitimate interest of NATO in the economic position and development of its members, and to the opportunity afforded by the Annual Review in this connection. It may also be recalled that the Government of Canada took initiative in NATO in December 1955 to suggest that the Council discuss from time to time matters of general economic policy, particularly insofar as the policies followed by one member of the alliance may have adverse effects on the economic position of others. It would not be anticipated that such discussions in NATO would normally give rise to specific recommendations for action, but they would serve the useful purpose of leading to greater awareness of the impact of one country's policy in some particular respect of the economic strength of its allies, and might in this way have a real influence on policy. Such discussions might also have a bearing on the views which the individual members of the alliance expressed in other international bodies. It would seem desirable (Question 9) to leave it to the discretion of individual NATO Governments or the Secretary-General to determine whether, in addition to any consultations which may be taking place formally or informally elsewhere, it would be advantageous in particular cases to have some consultation in NATO before important economic questions are discussed in other international bodies, including those where the Soviets are represented. The way should certainly be left open for such consultations if any country or the Secretary General sees merit in them in relation to particular issues.

38. It is obviously of great importance to the strength and cohesion of the alliance that its members should avoid serious conflicts in their international economic policies (Question 3). The prospects of keeping to a minimum such conflicts among NATO members or between them and other friendly countries would clearly be greatest as the members of NATO approach most closely to a freely and efficiently functioning system of non-discriminatory trade and payments over as wide an area as possible. Equally, it is essential that any exceptional measures to promote exports or to dispose of surpluses should show a real regard for the interests of other countries, and should be designed to avoid interference with their normal commercial activities, and, in particular, not to create opportunities of which the Soviets can take advantage to the detriment of NATO.

39. If policies for one reason or another deviate from these general objectives, member countries should appreciate that almost inevitably the likelihood of friction in relations among them will be increase thereby. Economic conflict and political and defence cooperation are not easy to reconcile.

40. Despite the best efforts of the members of NATO, serious conflicts in economic policies may arise. In that event, the members should be prepared to deal with such problems in the appropriate manner and in the most suitable place. Often the GATT or Fund may be found to be the most effective instrument, or in other instances the OEEC. Occasionally it may be desirable for such matters to be raised in NATO itself, a possibility which was recognized in the memorandum already mentioned which the Canadian Delegation submitted to the Council in December, 1955. Whatever the appropriate mechanism (and that can probably best be determined by the countries involved in the particular case) the countries concerned in NATO should be willing to consult together when such conflicts occur or appear imminent.

41. The recent shift of Soviet emphasis to economic activity in its attempt to increase its influence among uncommitted countries is clearly a matter of great concern to NATO. NATO can play an important role in collecting and analyzing information regarding such activities and should act as a forum for the discussion of their significance, so that NATO governments may take appropriate action if any action is required (Question 7(a)). The Canadian Government feels that NATO should concern itself with any Soviet commercial activities which might affect the security of individual NATO members, or endanger the economic position or political independence of underdeveloped countries in whose welfare NATO has a substantial interest. The Exchange of information within NATO concerning such practices should bring to light cases on which all or some of the NATO members would think it desirable to consult. Arrangements already exist, of course, for regular consultations among NATO countries on Soviet purchases of strategic materials from sources within the area covered by the membership of COCOM and CHICOM. In connection with other aspects of Soviet economic activities the exchange of information should give rise to rapid and effective action by countries most directly interested and consultation in any case where concerted action seemed appropriate. While there may be cases in which it would be prudent for interested NATO countries to go out of their way in order to compete with the Soviet bloc (for example, in making purchases or sales at special prices or lending on exceptional terms), NATO countries should not allow such Soviet moves to disorganize generally the existing Western arrangements for purchasing and marketing goods or making loans.

42. In connection with trade or financial agreements with Soviet bloc countries, the Canadian Government assumes that NATO countries would ensure so far as possible that those agreements incorporate principles similar to those governing normal trade and commercial relations among Western countries.

43. The members of NATO individually and collectively have an interest in the improvement of living standards and the maintenance of political stability in many of the under developed areas of the world. (Question 6(a)). The recent tendency of the Soviet bloc to engage in activities in this field is undoubtedly disturbing, even though in some instances Soviet aid to and trade with the underdeveloped countries may serve the purposes of NATO by strengthening the economies of those countries. In the view of the Canadian Government it would be desirable for NATO members to consult about these Soviet activities and their significance in order that they might take account of them in connection with their aid programmes and trade relations. It would not, however, appear to be appropriate or helpful for NATO itself to become involved in the provision of aid or the working out of trade arrangements with the underdeveloped regions. Moreover the Canadian Government would not consider it wise to have the direction of general aid or trade programmes distorted unduly by Soviet manoeuvres. The main emphasis should continue to be on strengthening the economies and the political and social structures of the underdeveloped countries. In general it would seem best that such aid as the individual NATO countries are able to make available should be supplied bilaterally or under international arrangements which are acceptable to the underdeveloped countries concerned, and which are capable of ensuring any coordination which may be necessary for the efficient execution of such aid programmes.

44. For similar reasons, the Canadian Government would consider (Question 7(b)) that the appropriate response to competition by the Soviet bloc in the field of contracts for public works in politically sensitive areas would depend on the facts of the particular case. It would not seem possible to generalize concerning all public works in such areas or even concerning particular types of public works.

45. It is not desirable that the aid which NATO countries give to underdeveloped countries in other parts of the world should appear to be politically motivated, which will inevitably be the case if such aid has a NATO label on it. One of the main reasons that the aid given under the Colombo Plan has been particularly effective and acceptable has been the absence of any evidence of political coloration (Question 8). There have, indeed, been other reasons as well, in particular

(a) the fact that its membership comprises all of the countries in the region covered by the Plan;

(b) the existence of reasonably efficient administrations in several of the key countries in the region;

(c) its reliance on direct contacts between countries which have a good deal of confidence in one another and which in many cases are joined together in other associations;

(d) the voluntary character of the general consultations which take place annually concerning aid and development programmes.

46. The most important factor, however, has probably been the fact that the assistance offered is not only without any political strings attached, but felt by the recipient nations to be so. United Nations programmes (including those being carried out by the International Bank and other specialized agencies) have this characteristic to a greater degree than most other arrangements. The preliminary views of the Canadian Government on the proposals for establishing a special aid fund under the United Nations have been made known in its answer to the U.N. Secretary-General's Questionnaire. This matter will, of course, be discussed further in various United Nations bodies over the next few months. The Canadian Government assumes that all members of NATO will be examining seriously the functions which such a fund under the United Nations might be able to perform in assisting the underdeveloped countries to achieve economic and political viability and in facilitating the coordination of bilateral aid activities.

PART III - CULTURAL QUESTIONS

Increased cooperation in the cultural field might serve to strengthen relations between NATO countries, provide a larger measure of public support for NATO and encourage the feeling of belonging to an Atlantic Community.

General Comment

47. Since the NATO Alliance rests on certain common cultural foundations, much can be done to strengthen it through coordinated activities in the cultural field. Experience has shown, however, that in cultural relations, ideas quickly tend to outstrip resources. The aim therefore is to make the most effective use of our resources, and to concentrate on selected and coordinated major projects which command general support in fields not already covered by other organizations. In particular, as the line of cleavage along which the Atlantic community might most easily be split is that which separates Europe from North America, the Community's cultural activities should be strongly trans- Atlantic in character. Should, however, North American members of the Community be unable to participate in any particular activity, this should not inhibit the European members from acting to strengthen their own cultural relationships within the broader Atlantic framework.

48. In keeping with the principle of conservation and concentration of resources, a system of priorities for various projects should be agreed upon, having regard to their value to the well-being of the Community, their cost, and the need to avoid duplication of effort.

(Question 1a) Does your Government consider that these aims will be served by setting up a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies?

49. (Answer) In the opinion of the Canadian Government this is a project deserving serious and careful examination. It will undoubtedly be valuable from the point of view of the future of the Atlantic Community to conduct fundamental research and studies of the various aspects of the Atlantic Community, including those factors which unite and those which divide its members. No doubt many views will be expressed as to the most effective ways and means of carrying out such a project, and the Canadian Government is willing to participate with others, and with the assistance of a panel of educationalists, in further exploration of the possibilities of this project.

(Question 1b) Does your Government consider that these aims will be served by setting up a civilian version of the NATO Defence College in which short courses on political, economic, social and cultural problems of the Atlantic Community would be given to those in the position to influence public opinion, such as teachers, journalists, etc.?

50. (Answer) If proposals of the kind referred to in the previous question are to be examined thoroughly, the project in question 1(b) should be dealt with in the same study. In this connection, consideration might be given to broadening the basis of the NATO Defence College by having more civilian students, and by adjusting the curriculum. Possibly the College might be used to hold short seminars for the purposes indicated when the normal courses are not in session.

(Question 2) Does your Government consider that NATO should encourage cooperation between youth movements in NATO countries, bearing in mind the coordination of youth activities in communist countries? Should the Council discuss youth cooperation problems?

51. (Answer) Canadian youth movements are voluntary in character. While it might be possible to include NATO in the field of interest of existing youth movements in Canada, the possibilities of international cooperation on a NATO basis are a matter for the organizations themselves, and arrangements would be made directly between the organizations concerned.

(Question 3) Does your Government consider that NATO should undertake the coordination of measures to increase the recruitment and training on a long-term basis of scientists, technicians and specialists, bearing in mind the developments in these fields in communist countries?

52. (Answer) The solution of this problem is directly related to the economic and military potential of NATO members including their ability to provide technical assistance to the under-developed countries in other parts of the world. This being so, it is of sufficient importance to warrant the organization's direct concern.

53. The Canadian Government therefore believes that the scope of the problem and the area of possible NATO cooperation should be precisely defined, taking into account studies already made in this field, and with the advice of highly qualified and representative experts. On the basis of such an examination, NATO Governments would then be in a position to determine what action on a NATO basis is practicable and should be undertaken.

(Question 4) What educational activities, if any, should be undertaken by NATO to strengthen the ties of the Atlantic Community, which are not already carried out by existing International Organizations such as UNESCO?

54. (Answer) The question of NATO educational activities is partly covered by our comments under questions 1 and 2. Insofar as the objective is to increase knowledge and mutual understanding between the citizens of member countries, member governments should consider what further step might be practicable to facilitate and encourage travel by and communication between the peoples of the North Atlantic area. This might well include the development of effective arrangements for bilateral exchanges of visits of students and other selected individuals.

(Question 5) Would your Government favour the exchange of service personnel individually or in groups for the purpose of familiarising themselves with conditions in other member countries and for the promotion of goodwill?

55. (Answer) The Canadian Government supports in principle any initiative which may assist in promoting better understanding and goodwill between service personnel of member governments. It is with this objective in mind that it has encouraged the members of Canadian forces stationed in Europe to take advantage of their regular leave periods to travel to the various NATO countries, and to learn about the people who form part of the Atlantic Community. The Canadian Government is of the view, however, that such exchanges of visits on the part of service personnel, except when part of regular training programmes, are better left to individual initiative. The Canadian Government believes nonetheless that even outside the scope of official programmes of exchange of visits, ways and means remain available to national authorities to encourage individual travelling by service personnel, by impressing upon them the educational and other advantages of such travelling, and by assisting them, through information and other advisory services, in planning their visits.

(Question 6) Which of the possible programmes under Questions 1, 2, 3, 4 should in the judgment of your Government be financed:

(a) under a commonly finance programme;

(b) on a joint user basis;

(c) singly by member governments?

56. (Answer) It is not possible to comment specifically on methods of financing any of the projects discussed above until they have been worked out in greater detail. The Canadian Government would naturally be willing to examine the need for common or international financing in connection with acceptable projects where this method seemed appropriate.

PART IV - INFORMATION QUESTIONS

Increased cooperation in the information field particularly under the conditions of competitive co-existence and the new Soviet policies, might serve to increase support for NATO of a well-informed public opinion and thus increase the unity of the Alliance.

General Comment

57. In addition to the informational tasks to be considered in keeping NATO members better informed of the organization's activities, attention should also be paid to the tasks of explaining and reporting on NATO activities in non-NATO countries, including those which regard themselves as "uncommitted", and in programmes directed to the peoples of the Soviet and satellite states. The following replies suggest the extent to which this might be done.

(Question 1) Does your Government consider that the Information Service should concentrate on purely factual information about NATO?

58. (Answer) Nothing in the Information Service's terms of reference should preclude it from preparing, on demand, special studies on matters of common interest but not necessarily about NATO. This would be justified, for example, where the experience and information available to the combined membership would be of appreciably more value to such studies than that of any single member. There have been occasions when it would have been convenient to have had a NATO publication (e.g., on conditions in the Soviet Union) which could have been distributed inside Canada in response to requests. The Information Service should deal exclusively in factual information, but it should not necessarily be confined to information about NATO. Its activities in other fields, however, should be governed by the requirements of the member states. (See also Answer 2(c) below.)

(Question 2) Does your Government consider the necessity of a better coordination of efforts in the information field to deal with the Soviet initiatives in the propaganda field?

59. (Answer) There are four areas to be considered under this heading:

(a) Activities within the NATO area;

(b) Activities within countries closely associated with NATO Powers;

(c) Activities in the "uncommitted" countries;

(d) Activities directed toward the Soviet bloc.

60. Under (a) it is obvious that arrangements for distribution of NATO information within the territories of member states should conform to the wishes of the country concerned. Some governments will doubtless wish to retain the exclusive responsibility for distributing NATO information within their own territories. In those member states where the government itself does not wish to be too active in the NATO information field, consideration might be given to the idea that representatives of other NATO members in such countries might include a proportion of NATO information in their normal information service.

61. Regardless of the manner in which information is distributed within the NATO area, there is obviously a great advantage in coordinating activities. It would, therefore, seem appropriate for the NATO Secretariat to suggest common approaches for the treatment of NATO problems and, in addition to providing factual material about NATO, it might, on request, provide some degree of coordination in counter-Communist propaganda for domestic purposes. Under (b), similar principles might be developed in cooperation with friendly non-NATO governments for improving understanding of NATO purposes.

62. Under (c), there are indications of increasing mistrust of NATO among the peoples of the "uncommitted" nations. NATO should consider what steps could be taken to present its case in a more favourable light among the uncommitted countries, and particularly in the Middle East. For example, the NATO Secretariat might prepare a paper for the guidance of the diplomatic missions of NATO countries in the uncommitted countries. The various NATO governments might then, on the basis of this paper, instruct their missions in these countries to try to remove any mistaken impressions about NATO which may have developed. Specifically, the representatives of NATO countries might be instructed:

(i) To explain to government officials, journalists and others with whom they come in contact, the aims and achievements of NATO, and continue to keep them informed of developments within the Alliance;

(ii) To attempt to disseminate factual information about NATO as appropriate to the general public by means of public speeches and interviews, joint film showings, distribution of publications, and the regular provision of material to newspapers and radio stations on developments within NATO.

63. In addition, the NATO Information Service might consider preparing pamphlets and other information material specifically for use in the "uncommitted" countries. (See answer to Question 1 above.)

64. Under (d), the coordination of radio broadcasting and the exchange of experience relating to the distribution of information in Soviet and satellite countries might be a function of the Information Committee comparable to the present exchange of information which takes place on the subject of contacts with Soviet and satellite countries. As a form of political consultation it would be useful and appropriate for member states to exchange views on the lines that might be adopted by their international broadcasting services on issues of common importance. As a minimum, member states should be prepared to inform NATO of the general lines their broadcasts have followed in order that flat contradictions might be noted and possibly avoided in future broadcasts.

(Question 3) Does your Government consider that reciprocal visits of professional groups such as teachers, journalists, etc. should be extended?

65. (Answer) (See Part III, Question 4 above concerning exchange of professional groups.) Visits of publicists have been extremely valuable both from the national and from the Community viewpoint. There is, however, a saturation point and, in Canada, the organizations whose cooperation is necessary for success would probably not be able to deal with more than two tours a year.

(Question 4) Does your Government consider that cooperation between the NATO Information Service and national information agencies, governmental as well as private, should be improved?

66. (Answer) Inside Canada the Government gives the material provided by NATO Information Service possibly slightly preferred treatment over material provided by its own service. So far as the Canadian Government has the facilities for distributing information, it will continue to see that all information received is put to the best use. Replies to other questions might suggest fields to which this cooperation might be extended. We would, for example, be prepared to keep NATO informed of the general lines of the political broadcasts of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service. Some useful purpose might be served if the NATO Information Service or the Political Division were kept informed of what national information services were doing in areas of interest to the organization as a whole.

(Question 5) Considering the importance of the impact on public opinion of extending political consultation in NATO, has your government any suggestion on how far to go in keeping the public informed of activities in this field?

67. (Answer) It would be unwise to assume that NATO members will be able to engage in serious political consultations on sensitive issues, and simultaneously make informational capital out of these consultations without diminishing their value. The greatest value of NATO consultation will be lost if privacy cannot be assured when sensitive matters are under discussion. Information activities centering about political consultation cannot be divorced from the substance of such consultations, and if the substance is regarded as of prime importance, it must be recognized that the dissemination of information about this activity must inevitably inhibit the candid exchange of views. It is important to recognize that just as there are occasions when the widest possible publicity is called for, there are also occasions when it is vitally important that no information should be given out. The public might be informed at appropriate times and in general terms of what is being talked about, and when a collective view is reached, it should be made known; but details of discussions and the viewpoint of any particular member should not be revealed. When basic decisions are taken, the public should be as fully informed as possible.

Conclusions

68. It is abundantly clear that different member states have different attitudes toward NATO's information activities. There is some reason to believe that the Information Service's terms of reference reflect the most restrictive of the views held of its activities. Without presuming that any member should be expected to change its attitude in this regard, we consider that the Information Service should have the authority and the funds to enable it to respond to any reasonable demand made on it by NATO members. Obviously the cost of providing any particular service will have to be examined in the light of its usefulness to the Community as a whole, and the number of members likely to avail themselves of the service.

69. If the Information Service and the Political Division were to be allowed to operate on this basis it would involve activity in the following fields:

(a) Information about NATO as an organization and about its activities as an entity;

(b) Information about member states, interpreting each to its fellow members and, possibly, to the world at large;

(c) Information about conditions in countries outside but of concern to NATO; in "uncommitted" countries; and in the Soviet and satellite countries;

(d) Coordination of national information service activities relating to (a), (b) and (c) above.

The results of these activities would be available to member states in appropriate forms for use on request. A minimum guarantee of use would, of course, have to be given by interested members before the provision of such services could be justified.

70. The material provided could be used in the following ways:

(a) Within the NATO area:

(i) NATO Information Service, if expressly requested by a member state, might undertake direct distribution;

(ii) Each national information service could continue to distribute material within its own territories, as at present;

(iii) Missions of member states might undertake to include some of the material as a part of their own information service within the territories of other members.

(b) In non-NATO countries (including Soviet and satellite) as appropriate:

(i) The material provided might be used as a means of coordinating the approach of NATO members in information activities directed toward the various non-NATO countries and groupings;

(ii) It might be distributed by NATO members as a part of their own information services in these countries.

71. Each member state would, of course, have to decide for itself the extent to which it would be willing to participate. NATO might provide the material - if sufficient interest is displayed - and arrange coordination and provide advice on tactics to be employed in any particular area.

PART V - ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

(Question 1) What specific changes in procedure or organizational arrangements would your Government recommend to ensure closer and more effective consultation in the Council to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community?

72. (Answer) The Canadian Government makes a distinction between the procedural and organizational arrangements within the Organization. On the organizational level, the Government considers that the present machinery is adequate to ensure closer and more effective consultation in order to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community. The Canadian Government considers that the various bodies within the Organization which have been established to assist the Council to discharge its obligations, including planning committees and working groups, are adequate to handle any matter which might require detailed study, provided sufficient flexibility is maintained in their terms of reference. The efficiency of the Council and the smooth handling of the preparatory work required might well, in fact, be impaired if there were to be an excessive proliferation of such subsidiary organs within the Organization.

73. The Canadian Government considers, however, that certain modifications in the present procedure for meetings of the Council would be conducive to a more effective consultation and should thus improve cooperation in non-military fields.

74. The practice of holding two regular meetings during the year, one attended by Defence, Finance and Foreign Ministers, and the other by Foreign Ministers to examine political problems in general seems to have proved satisfactory; in the view of the Canadian Government, however, this represent a minimum, and Foreign Ministers should endeavour to participate more frequently in regular Council meetings on an informal basis whenever their other duties permit them to do so. Not all Foreign Ministers need attend such informal meetings at the same time, but a more constant exchange of personal views between NATO Foreign Ministers would strengthen political consultation. This would seem particularly desirable when difficult and delicate problems arise involving conflicts of interest and views between members of the Alliance.

75. The Canadian Government is further inclined to give favourable consideration to the suggestion that Ministerial meetings of the Council may not necessarily be held in Paris. Public opinion in NATO countries will probably benefit from having Ministerial meetings held from time to time in the respective member countries. There should not be too rigid a plan for deciding on the venue of such meetings, but if they are to be held away from the Headquarters, regard should be given to appropriate geographic distribution. One possibility to be explored is to take advantage of the presence of Foreign Ministers in New York for the opening of the U.N. General Assembly to have an extra Ministerial meeting of the Council.

76. As regards the time devoted to Ministerial meetings, it is the opinion of the Canadian Government that it is essential that enough time is made available to ensure a thorough and beneficial examination of the problems on the agenda not only in the Council but also in informal and private consultation between Ministers. This involves not only setting aside much more time than has been the case in the past for such meetings, but also having governments pay more attention to the preparatory work on the problems to be discussed.

77. While member governments should be encouraged to send as their permanent representatives to NATO individuals as fully qualified as possible to speak for them, it may be useful also if senior officials from their home offices were sent some time in advance of regular Ministerial sessions to assist in this preparatory work. Senior experts might also be sent to aid in consultations on special subjects. The task of the Council might also be facilitated if member governments were to develop the habit of circulating position papers outlining their views on current issues. (Question 2) To what extent does your Government consider that experts could be used more either on a permanent or ad hoc basis, to assist the Council in the process of political consultations?

78. (Answer) The Canadian Government views with favour the assistance on an ad hoc basis which experts could render the Council in the process of political consultation. Governments should be encouraged to send their experts most familiar with their thinking on any given problem under discussion in the Council to assist their Permanent Representatives and to consult with their counterparts. Such arrangements should be kept flexible and under the continuing control of the Council.

(Question 3) To what extent should the Secretary-General play an active role in the field of political consultation, and to what particular types of problems should such a role extend?

79. (Answer) The Canadian Government believes that the Secretary-General should play an active role in political consultation. In addition to helping the Council to arrive at a consensus on political problems, the discussion of which may be initiated by member governments, the Secretary-General should feel free to propose matters for discussion which in his judgment may substantially affect the unity or effectiveness of the Alliance. However, it is recognized that in order to enable the Secretary- General to fulfil such a function, he should be kept fully informed on the thinking of member governments on questions of common concern to the Alliance. This information should be transmitted by member governments to the Secretary- General through their permanent delegations, where possible in advance of Council discussions.

80. The Secretary-General, through periodic visits to member governments, as well as through contact with Permanent Representatives, is in a unique position to help in any situation where informal consultations would lead to greater understanding among member governments, and contribute to the unity of the Alliance. In addition to the authority to raise any matter of common concern for discussion in the Council, therefore, the Secretary- General should not be precluded from taking the initiative in offering and providing in such instances whatever informal good offices might appear to him to be conducive to the conciliation of divergent interests between member governments.

81. To facilitate this role in political consultation, it is our view that the Secretary- General should act as chairman of the Council (rather than as Vice- Chairman as at present). The Council might thus derive an advantage through being able to make the fullest possible use of the Secretary- General's continuing and special knowledge and experience in NATO affairs.

(Question 4) In view of the economic responsibilities of NATO, and those in prospect, what organizational changes, if any, does your Government consider are required to discharge them?

82. (Answer) The Canadian Government believes that no basic structural changes in the organization of NATO are required to deal with the present and foreseeable future economic responsibilities of NATO. Given the necessary flexibility, existing NATO bodies, including committees and working groups, should be able to initiate whatever action or study is requested by the Council. As circumstances warrant, ad hoc groups of experts could be set up within the established bodies and consultants drawn from outside the Organization as their services are needed. While Canada shares the view that NATO should not assume responsibilities now discharged by OEEC or other international economic agencies, it is considered that member countries should make full use of the facilities provided by other international agencies in the economic field in an effort to avoid friction through conflicting economic policies which would affect the interests of the North Atlantic Community.

(Question 5) Does your Government consider that greater use should be made of NATO machinery for the circulation on a NATO- wide basis of "basic position material" by individual governments (e.g. texts of agreements, basic statements of position, etc.)?

83. (Answer) The Canadian Government is of the view that it would be in the general interest of the Alliance for member governments to make available for background information "basic position material" which would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any particular member country on an issue which is its special concern, but which affects as well to varying extents other members of NATO. Such material, within the limits of domestic security restrictions, might be circulated through the respective permanent delegations to other delegations and to the Secretary- General.

(Question 6) The suggestion has been made that a closer relationship might be established between NATO and the United Nations, possibly establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization in the terms of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. What are the views of your Government on this question?

84. (Answer) The Canadian Government considers that NATO is an organization whose purposes are wholly consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and that, for the present, there is no need to take formal action to establish the position of NATO as a regional organization in terms of Chapter VIII of the Charter.