Reference your despatch S1662 of April 20th and your teletypes EX926 of April 27† and 934 and 944 of April 30th.† Possibility of the admission of Greece and Turkey in NATO.

1. At our weekly meeting with Raynor at the State Department, the Departmental views set out in your despatch under reference were given to him on an informal and confidential basis. We emphasized the point that while we were aware that interdepartmental thinking in Washington was now crystallizing in favour of the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, it was hoped by those who had been considering the matter in Ottawa that full consideration would be given to the pos­sible alternative courses of action, bearing in mind the weight of the arguments which could be brought to bear against extending NATO membership. Stress was also placed on the point made in your 944 that these confidential Canadian views should not be attributed to Canada in any conversations with Greek or Turkish authorities.

2. Raynor said that this indication of our departmental thinking would be most helpful to the State Department. Commenting on the four alternative methods for dealing with the security problem in the Eastern Mediterranean, outlined in para­graph 4 of your despatch 1662, he observed that alternative (b) (i.e., the conclusion of a Mediterranean Pact without the participation of the United States) had not been seriously considered, since such a suggestion would not command any support in Turkey or Greece at the present time. The main alternatives, in one form or another, to the extension of NATO membership, which had been considered were:

(a) The conclusion of a Mediterranean Pact; and

(b) United States guarantee or assurance of military aid to Greece and Turkey by declaration of the United States Government.

3. As to the various forms which a Mediterranean Pact might take, there was agreement among United States officials that the membership would at least have to include the United States, the United Kingdom and France, as well as Greece and Turkey. Consideration had also been given to the inclusion of Italy. Egypt and Spain were mentioned as marginal cases.

4. As to the possibility of giving Greece and Turkey a greater assurance of secur­ity through a new declaration, Raynor said that the considerations outlined in your subparagraphs (c) and (d) had been fully borne in mind. In particular it was recog­nized that a more specific commitment by the United States Government to come to the aid of Greece and Turkey, if the latter are attacked, would have to be an essential feature of any new guarantee by declaration, with or without the participa­tion of other governments.

5. Raynor was also interested in the view expressed in your despatch that "ad hoc arrangements for the defence of the Middle East could be based more effectively on the foundations which have already been laid than on an altogether new arrange­ment such as an extension of NATO responsibilities in the area". He observed that the points made in paragraph 5 of your despatch have also been taken into account in the examination of the problem in Washington.

6. He concluded his comments by saying that he would see that our thinking would be brought immediately to the attention of the interdepartmental group working on the problem. The question had not yet been considered at a Ministerial level, but it was hoped to submit a memorandum to the Secretary of State shortly. He mentioned that the Office for European Affairs had stressed throughout the dis­cussion the opposition which would probably be encountered among existing NATO members to the suggestion that Greece and Turkey should be admitted, and observed that the Scandinavian members particularly were known to be opposed.

7. He said that the State Department would let us know before decisions were taken on this matter in Washington, and at least before the question was brought up in NATO.