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Volume #16 - 569. | |
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CHAPITRE V ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD | |
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5E PARTIE REUNION DU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD, NEW YORK, 15 26 SEPTEMBRE 1950 | |
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569. |
PCO |
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Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet | |
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Top SECRET |
Ottawa,
le 11 septembre 1950 |
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NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL; MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15TH | |
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9. The Secretary of State for External Affairs reported that the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council would begin on September 15th. The President of the United States had just announced69 that this country would propose that forces in being in western Europe be increased to meet the initial shock of any attack. The United States would agree to increase their army in Europe by from five to ten divisions and to have an American appointed as Commander in Chief of the western European army immediately. Mr. Truman had said that this action would be contingent upon other members of the North Atlantic alliance making a similar effort. It would be extremely difficult for Canada to take any parallel action with respect to land forces. On the basis of recent plans for accelerated defence programmes and for assistance in the arming of other North Atlantic countries, a good account of the Canadian position could be given. It could be pointed out that Canada was a relatively small country, geographically removed from the European theatre. Attention could be directed to the decision to despatch troops to Korea and to the importance of maintaining Canadian production of supplies. Limited Canadian manpower could not be used for all purposes at once. It was for consideration whether reference should be made, in this context, to the despatch of a Canadian air squadron to Europe for training purposes. 10. The Prime Minister said that, in considering the U.S. proposal and possible requests for parallel action by other countries, it was of paramount importance to keep in mind the need of keeping public opinion behind any Canadian action. Thus far, there had been general support for all the steps taken but it was important that no division of opinion should be created by attempting to do too much too quickly. With regard to the squadron of aircraft to be despatched for training, it was not desirable that there should be any implication that was comparable, in any way, to the despatch of U.S. ground forces in Europe. The understanding was that the squadron was to be sent for training in the United Kingdom and not for duty. Despatch for duty would require a Government declaration and communication of the decision to the House of Commons within ten days. 11. Mr. Pearson said that the Council would probably give consideration to the arming of Western Germany. It appeared probable that there would be agreement on re arming but only on the basis that German units should form a part of a western European army. Presumably Canada should support this policy. There might also be a proposal for re organization of the North Atlantic Treaty military machinery along more effective lines. There might be a suggestion that Canada join the Standing Group but this might raise difficulties unless the group were increased from three to five or seven. The addition of Canada to the present group might raise assumptions as to possible Canadian action that would not be desirable. On the civil side of the North Atlantic Organization, it appeared that the French government might recommend the establishment of a North Atlantic "cabinet". There would undoubtedly be substantial opposition to such a proposal. 12. The Cabinet, after discussion, noted the report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs concerning matters to be considered at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council and agreed that the position of the Canadian Government be expressed along the lines indicated in the discussion. 69Voir/See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman 1950, Document 242, p. 626. | |
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