Volume #16 - 1039.|
JAPON: TRAITÉ DE PAIX
Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures|
au haut commissaire au Royaume Uni
le 22 avril 1950|
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE AT MEETING OF
Dear Mr. Wilgress,
Commonwealth representatives at the Colombo Conference agreed to a suggestion by Mr. Bevin that a Commonwealth Working Party, under the direction of High Commissioners, should meet in London at a convenient date to seek to coordinate Commonwealth views on the substance of a peace treaty with Japan. May 1st has been set as the date for commencement of the meetings and Cabinet approval has been given to Canadian participation. I should like to take this opportunity to make some observations on the Canadian attitude to the Japanese Peace Treaty for the guidance of yourself and Mr. Collins at the meetings.
2. Mr. Collins has been associated with the work of the Far Eastern Commission ever since it was established. In addition, he attended the Canberra Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty in August of 1947. He has had an opportunity to discuss the subject recently with departmental officers in Ottawa and will be provided with documentation for use in the detailed discussions which are to take place.
3. Our understanding of the purpose of these meetings is that they should provide an opportunity for a free exchange of views at the official level in order to determine the area of agreement which may exist at this level on the major issues involved in the achievement of a Japanese peace settlement. We did not consider ourselves in a position at this stage to place before Cabinet for approval specific recommendations regarding the attitude Canada should adopt toward the Japanese peace settlement, since we do not know as yet the firm views of other interested governments, especially those of the United States. We think it necessary to have a clear indication of the United States stand before final consideration is given to any of the important issues. We would hope that the United States would avoid setting out hard and fast requirements which leave no room for discussion. It is equally important that the Working Party should not reach conclusions so firm that they could not later be modified in the light of the United States proposals. We would regard the formulation of recommendations to governments by the Working Party as inconsistent with the principles discussed above.
4. It is most important that the other Commonwealth representatives should understand our attitude and I trust you will take an early opportunity to indicate our position. You will appreciate that the Canadian attitude towards the main issues of the peace settlement must take into account the views of the United States Government. There are important gaps in our knowledge of these views. It is for this reason that no commitments on policy can be made at London. The primary role played by the United States in the Occupation of Japan and the responsibility which the United States will bear in any final settlement two facts generally recognized by all the Commonwealth governments make it only reasonable that we should delay reaching any final decision on the issues involved in a Japanese Peace Treaty until we have had an opportunity to give full consideration to the overall desires of the United States concerning Japan and the peace settlement.
5. The other Commonwealth delegations will no doubt, in varying degrees, wish to avoid creating the impression that a Commonwealth panel is being formed at London. We would regard it as most unfortunate if the impression were given that there was a "Commonwealth view". It should be clearly understood that no Commonwealth government can speak for any other government or group of governments. If the procedural basis for a Japanese peace conference is to be that suggested in the United States proposal of July 1947, that is a two thirds majority vote on matters of substance, the effect would be to give the Commonwealth governments the power of veto in the conference. It would be most undesirable for Commonwealth governments to prejudice their relations with the United States by allowing the impression to become current that they were planning to take advantage of their potential veto in the conference.
6. In relations with the press it should be emphasized that the meetings are only for a confidential exchange of views and that no policy commitments will result from them. It is equally important that the press should not get the impression that a corporate Commonwealth view is being formed. You might ask the Information Officer on your staff to watch the press coverage being given the meetings. If it becomes apparent that a wrong impression is being gained by the press, you should take whatever steps you consider necessary to correct that impression. I think it would be useful if the purpose of these meetings were made clear in a communiqué issued after the opening sessions.
7. Our experience as a result of the Colombo Conference would lead us to suggest that periodic telegrams should be sent to the Department reporting on significant points raised in the discussions.
8. Subject to the limitations noted in the foregoing paragraphs, it has been possible in the light of our participation in other conferences in which the Japanese Peace Treaty has been discussed, to indicate in our drafting of the documentation which Mr. Collins will take to London, the main principles of our tentative policies on some of the more important issues. These have been summarized below:
(a) Procedure We would give continued support to the United States proposal of July 11, 1947, that all member nations of the Far Eastern Commission should participate in drafting of a Peace Treaty with decisions to be taken by a two thirds majority vote and with no veto involved. Canada would welcome the participation of the U.S.S.R. and China but believes consideration might be given to going ahead without them if they demand the veto power as a basis for participation. Canada would welcome discussion of the views of other governments as to how permanent a settlement with Japan can be achieved without the participation of these two interested powers. I indicated at Colombo our support for any request made by Ceylon for a seat at the Japanese Peace Conference. There is no doubt that we would also support any claim put forward by Indonesia. We would think membership in the Far Eastern Commission should be sought by these two countries as a preliminary step in the achievement of their aims. Ceylon might be encouraged during the meetings in London to request membership in that organization.
(b) Security Aims Canada's interests are:
(1) To prevent the re emergence of an aggressive Japan, either alone or in alliance with other hostile powers.
(2) To ensure the external and domestic security of Japan,
(a) in order to deny Japan's trained manpower and industrial resources to Communist control, and
(b) in order to permit the growth of democratic ideas.
(3) To gain the voluntary cooperation of Japan with the Western allies in the problems of peace as well as in the event of war.
Canada recognizes the prime responsibility of the United States in this regard and believes it would be inadvisable to press the United States Government to take any action which it might regard as imprudent.
(c) Economic Provisions Provided that our basic security aims are met, we would think it unwise to impose restrictive economic clauses in the peace treaty. Our aim is to allow Japan to achieve a viable economy. This would assist in relieving the depressed economic conditions in the Pacific and Southeast Asian areas. Any improvements which can be made in the economic health of the area would make Communist penetration more difficult. This general approach should not blind us to the commercial malpractices of the Japanese in the past and consideration should be given to methods by which Japan could be brought to adhere to the generally accepted standards of commercial behaviour. The early restoration of normal trading relations between Japan and the rest of the world is desirable, consistent with our security requirements.
(d) Territorial Provisions It would be difficult to challenge the territorial transfers agreed upon in the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration, although Japan must surrender its rights in these territories in the Peace Treaty. The United States Trusteeship presently exercised in the former Japanese Mandated Islands might possibly be extended to cover the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands and Marcus Island. Tsushima and Goto Islands, because of their close historical and administrative ties with Japan, might safely be returned to Japanese control. Difficulties, however, may arise in specifying the return of sovereignty in such cases as Korea, Formosa and the Kwantung Leased Territory. Provision will also have to be made for Japanese renunciation of any rights in the Japanese Mandated Islands presently under United States Trusteeship. We would welcome discussion on the importance of possible Russian concessions to Japan in the territorial field.
(e) Political and General Provisions Japan should be called on to guarantee protection of the fundamental human rights and freedoms. Consideration should be given to measures which might be taken to ensure that the Japanese would recognize the obligation to grant the minimum civilized standards of treatment to aliens in Japan. Possibly the Treaty should bind her, for a specified period, to carry out the important directives and reforms introduced by the Occupation, e.g. land reform, sentences of war criminals, dissolution of nationalistic and militaristic societies, purge of undesirable individuals from public life, dissolution of ZaiÉtatsu, etc.
(f) Enforcement of Treaty Provisions It is difficult to envisage any machinery which could be effective without being unwieldy. In addition, if China and Russia were to sign the Peace Treaty they would probably be eligible for a seat on any control body which was set up in the Treaty. It would be undesirable in our view to give them such an opportunity to interfere in Japanese affairs. In the light of our non participation in the Occupation to date it is debatable whether we would be prepared to make the military and financial commitments which might be called for in any elaborate machinery proposed. It would be useful, however, to consider the possible use in Japan's case of our export control regulations. This might be done in conjunction with other interested countries on the model of similar action taken with regard to Eastern Europe.
(g) Reparations and War Claims It is apparent that for all practical purposes reparations from Japan's internal industrial assets are a dead issue. A recommendation is before Cabinet for the liquidation of Japanese assets in Canada. A Royal Commission on War Claims has been suggested in the memorandum to Cabinet. If the method of settlement involving a general pooling of enemy assets with settlement to Canadians from that pool no matter where loss abroad was suffered is accepted then Japanese external assets (e.g. in Switzerland and Thailand) would be of interest to us for inclusion in the general pool. Care should be taken that no provision in the treaty would preclude this method of settlement. Our experience with the Inter Allied Reparations Agency and its distribution of German assets has been satisfactory and some similar arrangements for the disposition of Japanese external assets would, seem reasonable.
(h) Fishing The protection of our West Coast fishing interests is of primary concern. An United States suggestion concerning the negotiation of an immediate treaty with the Japanese whereby they would agree not to fish within 150 miles of United States or Canadian territory has been examined recently. It is possible that the United States may retract this proposal, since it is at variance with the public stand taken by the United States in the Potsdam Declaration with regard to the granting of freedom of access to the raw materials of the world to Japan and other countries. The Peace Treaty might contain provisions binding Japan to observe all international agreements on the conservation of fish and sea mammals and possibly national conservation regulations governing fishing in littoral waters. In this manner it may be possible to curb the pre war practices of her fishermen which, if continued, would lead to the serious depletion of the salmon and halibut resources of the North Pacific.
9. As one of the main purposes of the meeting is an exchange of ideas, we will be looking forward to receiving a full report on the views expressed in London. In addition to covering the meeting itself, it will be appreciated if the report contains recommendations for changes and revisions in the departmental documentation in case it proves possible to use it as the basis for drafting instructions for the Canadian delegation at a general peace conference for Japan.
10. I trust that you will find the meeting both interesting and valuable from your point of view and from that of the Canadian Government.
21 Non retrouvé./Not located.