Volume #25 - 2.|
RELATIONS AVEC LES ÉTAT-UNIS
VISITE DU PREMIER MINISTRE À WASHINGTON, LE 16 OCTOBRE 1957
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet|
le 19 septembre 1957|
REPORT BY PRIME MINISTER
1. The Prime Minister said his stay in Washington had been an interesting and useful one. The Queen's visit appeared to be successful, but the arrangements in Ottawa were patently quite superior to those made for her U.S. trip, a fact which had not escaped the notice of the Royal Household.
He had discussed a number of important matters with the President and with the Secretary of State. Several of those to whom he had spoken referred in warm terms to the manner in which Canadian Ministers attending the Joint Canada-U.S. Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs had conducted their side of the discussions.10 The Secretary of Commerce had apologized for the remark "we fixed 'em," which had been attributed to him in the press as he was emerging from one of the meetings.
The situation in the Middle East was very serious and was causing considerable concern in Washington as elsewhere. Syria had proposed inscription of a resolution on the U.N. General Assembly agenda11 alleging aggressive acts by Turkey, as well as by other Western nations, to bring about changes in Syria by force, and proposing the establishment of a fact finding committee. At first, the U.S. Secretary of State had been opposed to such an investigation, then he had changed his mind. The U.K. Foreign Secretary claimed that the terms of reference of the committee were not wide enough and that the concentration of Russian troops in Bulgaria and along the northern border of Turkey should come within the investigation's ambit. Eventually, the Syrian resolution had been inscribed. Questions had also arisen as to whether the committee should be established under the auspices of the General Assembly or the Security Council, and as to its membership. At the moment it would appear that India, Sweden, and Japan would be selected.
The West had underestimated the strength of Arab nationalism. The cement holding the Arabs together was the existence of Israel. The U.S. had hoped to gain some support for its Middle East policy from Saudi Arabia and Iraq but they were just as strongly against direct or indirect interventions in the Middle East, by any country associated with the free world, as were other Arab nations.
2. Mr. Diefenbaker said he had also spoken to the President about the decision to integrate the operational control of Canadian and continental U.S. air defence forces in peacetime,12 and had informed him of the criticism in Canada of the government's agreement to this plan. Mr. Eisenhower had been sympathetic. He had said that, depending on consultation with his advisers, he would be prepared to let it be known that whoever was in command at Air Defence Command in Colorado Springs when the first evidence of war occurred should communicate with the President and the Prime Minister, or their duly constituted representatives, before ordering action. The Minister of National Defence should get in touch with the U.S. authorities as to the kind of announcement that would be made in this connection13. Not much more than this could be done, but it would confirm the authority of the civil power over the military.
On disposals of agricultural surpluses, the President said he was most anxious to remove causes of division between Canada and the U.S. Now, Mr. Eisenhower said the U.S. at least knew quite clearly what Canadians did not want and this would be a useful guide to him and his government in formulating their policies.
3. Mr. Diefenbaker said there was no limit to Mr. Eisenhower's congeniality and friendliness. Their talks had been helpful and he hoped that from these and earlier representations Canada's position was more clearly understood and that our interests would be better protected.
4. The Cabinet noted with approval the report of the Prime Minister on his discussions in Washington with the President and other U.S. officials, and agreed that the Minister of National Defence communicate with the U.S. authorities as to a joint announcement to be made respecting civilian control over the initiation of operations under the integrated Canadian and U.S. air defence commands.
10Voir/See Document 138.
11Voir chapitre II, 4e partie./See Chapter II, Part 4.
12Voir la 4e partie, section A de ce chapitre./See Part 4, Section A of this chapter.
13Voir/See Document 24.