For Under-Secretary
Repeat CCOS from Ottawa (OpImmediate) (Information).

Following is our draft record of the Meeting of Consultation between representatives of the Canadian and USA Governments held on Wednesday November 19.

The meeting which was held in the State Department under the Chairmanship of Mr. Robert Murphy, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, was attended by:

Mr. Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State; General Nathan Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Richard B. Wigglesworth, USA Ambassador to Canada; General H.B. Loper, Chairman, Military Liaison Committee, AEC; Mr. Livingstone Merchant, Assistant Secretary, European Affairs; Mr. J.N. Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the USA Government, and by Mr. N.A. Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. A.E. Ritchie, Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Canadian Embassy; General C. Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff; A/V/M M.M. Hendrick, Chairman, CJS(M); Mr. S.F. Rae, Minister, Canadian Embassy; Mr. P.E. Uren, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy for the Canadian Government.

2. The following USA officials were also present:
Mr. Woodbury Willoughby, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs; Brigadier General J.F. Whisenand, Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Raymond F. Courtney, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy; Mr. Larue R. Lutkins, Deputy Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, State Department; Mr. James P. Parker, Canadian Desk, State Department.

3. The agenda of the meeting consisted of 4 main items as follows:

1. Problems connected with acquisition and control of defensive nuclear weapons in Canada.

2. Problems connected with declaration by CINCNORAD of increased states of military readiness.

3. Other matters to be considered by Canada-USA Committee on Joint Defence.
   1. Future role of Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
   2. USA proposals for reactivation of Combined Policy Committee.
   3. Integration of Canada-USA defence production.
   4. Cost sharing arrangements with respect to immediate programmes in the Continental Air Defence field.
   5. Administrative arrangements for December meeting of Canada-USA Joint Committee on Defence.

4. The Far Eastern Situation. Mr. Herter opened the meeting at 10:30 a.m., welcoming the Canadian visitors, and then turned the Chairmanship over to Mr. Robert Murphy. Mr.  Herter remained for part of the discussion on item 1 of the agenda.

Problems Connected with the Acquisition and Control of Nuclear Weapons in Canada.

5. General Foulkes opened the discussion of this subject by referring to the various types of nuclear weapons which are required by the Canadian forces, including in particular the requirement for nuclear warheads for the Lacrosse guided missile for use by the Canadian Brigade in Germany and for Bomarc missiles for use by the RCAF. He also referred to the future need for air-to-air and anti-submarine nuclear weapons. He said that we were hopeful that procedures similar to those being worked out in NATO for storing nuclear weapons in Europe could be applied in North America. This, he thought, would have the important advantage of making it easier to explain USA-Canadian cooperation in this field to Canadians and to our NATO allies. If these procedures were adopted we could presumably enter into direct negotiations with SACEUR with regard to storage and custody of warheads for the Lacrosse in Europe. In North America CINCNORAD could hold the weapons in substantially the same fashion as SACEUR, with the exception of anti-submarine weapons which would be under the control of SACLANT. Ultimately there might be a requirement for anti-submarine weapons on the West Coast of Canada which might be assigned under the authority of CUSRPG, but this requirement was not so urgent as the other mentioned.

6. General Twining replied by saying that he foresaw no difficulties in devising procedures of the kind referred to by General Foulkes and that the USA Joint Chiefs were currently working on the problem. General Loper pointed out that the main difficulty in devising arrangements of this kind was to arrive at satisfactory conditions under which nuclear weapons might be released to operational forces. He thought that the rules for release in North America might well be different in detail from those which we might wish to apply in Europe. He referred in particular to the case in which a single man handles the weapon.

7. General Foulkes acknowledged this fact but emphasized that he had in mind following the NATO procedures only in a general way and that the actual details of custody with respect to North American air defence arrangements could be worked out with General Partridge. A general intergovernmental note of the kind which we had thought might be exchanged with the USA Government would include the following provisions: that custody should be vested in the USA Government until the weapons were released by the President; that Canada would be prepared to provide the storage facilities, including any special security arrangements which might be necessary; and finally, that precise operational details would be worked out with the operational commanders (CINCNORAD, SACLANT and SACEUR). General Foulkes said that the Canadian Government would probably wish to make some kind of announcement indicating [group corrupt] matter after it had been considered further by ministers in Paris and when the House of Commons reopened in January. Apart from this, however, there was no urgency about devising the specific details of control. Mr. Murphy and others on the USA side saw no difficulty in such an announcement, provided it was kept in general terms. The Canadian side indicated that they hoped it would be practicable to clear any such announcement in advance with the USA authorities.

8. Mr. Irwin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, pointed out that there was some danger in identifying the proposed Canada-USA procedure too closely with NATO arrangements, since later requirements might necessitate considerable divergence from NATO arrangements and there might be difficulty in achieving this if the NATO line had been followed too closely in the first place. Mr. Robertson and General Foulkes both emphasized that, in any public statement that might be made by the ministers, we had in mind only a general reference to NATO procedure which need not imply a complete parallel in details of operation. Mr. Robertson also referred to two aspects of this problem which he thought were of prime importance: first, that the Canadian Government would find it more acceptable to make special arrangements with the USA under the general umbrella of its NATO membership and secondly, that air defence technical problems in North America might very well be essentially different from those arising in Europe in connection with the question of storage of nuclear weapons. These were the two essential facets of the problem. The first could be met by a general statement referring to arrangements "substantially the same as those used in NATO" (this could be considered at the Ministerial Meeting) and the second by concurrent working out of detailed arrangements, peculiar to North America, directly with CINCNORAD and the other commanders.

9. Mr. Murphy and Governor Herter at this point re-emphasized the need to avoid what they referred to as "getting in a bind" by being tied too much to NATO in this matter. Mr. Robertson said that we had no intention either of taking a lead or of being laggard in this question as far as NATO was concerned, but rather wished to associate ourselves with similar developments in NATO in the general way to which both he and General Foulkes had previously referred. He concluded this part of the discussion by indicating that we would take the initiative in preparing a note along the lines referred to above.

10. General Foulkes then referred to the problem of salvage and safety in relation to SAC overflights of Canadian territory. He said that there had been a total of about 800 SAC flights over Canadian territory in the past year and that we were increasingly concerned about the lack of adequate salvage arrangements. He pointed out that he had the responsibility of certifying to the Canadian Government that adequate safety arrangements were in force. So long as SAC flights had been few in number, he had felt that the use of USA salvage facilities had been adequate. However, in the new situation of fairly frequent and numerous SAC flights, we were of the firm opinion that Canadian salvage facilities must be established. The increasing number of flights naturally increased the likelihood of accident on Canadian soil and in such an event we would, at the moment, be obliged to call for USA help with possible resulting political embarrassment. He said that satisfactory discussions on this subject had recently been held with the appropriate USA military authorities and the USAF had agreed to train Canadian teams, but it was not clear whether all the necessary information for dealing with SAC accidents would be available. He asked for reassurance in this matter.

11. General Loper said that the conclusion of a new bilateral agreement on the exchange of nuclear information would be necessary under the new act to meet our point fully as outlined by General Foulkes. He referred to an example of information on the safety factors of the MK 90 torpedo being withheld from Canada in the absence of such agreement. He said that while the probability of an accident, for which Canadians were not already being adequately trained, was, in his opinion, extremely remote, he understood the need for arrangements of the kind to which General Foulkes referred. He said that his office would, in the immediate future, take the initiative in drafting a new bilateral agreement on the exchange of nuclear information and that this should be ready sometime after March 10, since any new bilateral would require sixty days before Congress. It would be similar to the UK agreement but would not include design information. Subsequent additional training of Canadian teams would be necessary.

12. General Twining then made a specific reference to the relation between the subjects which had been already discussed and the storage of MB-1 nuclear weapons in Canada on behalf of the USA. General Foulkes said he thought we would be ready to go ahead with this as soon as we were in a position to say publicly that arrangements were also under way for the similar storage of nuclear weapons for Canadian use. He said that he understood from General Partridge that this would meet the USA requirements. General Twining confirmed this.

13. Mr. Merchant, referring to the earlier part of the discussion, then asked whether the intergovernmental agreement to which General Foulkes had referred, on transfer and custody of nuclear weapons, would be arrived at first, or whether he envisaged concurrent agreement on this exchange of notes and on the technical details to be worked out between appropriate commanders. General Foulkes assured him that the general cover agreement could be concluded in advance of the technical agreement and that we would be prepared to go ahead with storage of the MB-1 in Canada without waiting for agreement on the technical annexes. Mr. Irwin asked whether we envisaged an agreement covering both defensive weapons and strategic offensive nuclear weapons (at Goose Bay). Mr.  Robertson pointed out that we would have more difficulty in the matter of components for strategic offensive weapons and thought that this problem might be deferred pending satisfactory arrangements in the other categories.

14. Mr. Murphy then referred to the XYZ procedures and asked whether they were, in our opinion, satisfactory. General Foulkes said he thought that the wiser procedure was too cumbersome and was due for overhaul. He thought that in future SAC should submit its requirements to the Canadian Government on a programme basis for three or six months and that clearances for individual flights should then be made on a service to service basis. Mr. Murphy, General Twining and General Loper all expressed satisfaction with this proposal and General Twining promised to make a suggestion to the Canadian authorities along these lines in due course.

15. General Twining then referred briefly to MB-1 overflights and inquired as to our view on this matter. General Foulkes pointed out that the agreement on this subject runs until July 1959 and before that time the position would have to be reviewed as a separate item. In this connection we understood that CINCNORAD had some new proposals. The USA authorities would be making further proposals to us concerning MB-1 overflights before the expiry date.

Problems Connected with Declaration by CINCNORAD of Increased States of Military Readiness

16. General Foulkes opened the discussion of this subject by referring to the recent crises in the Mideast and the Far East which had highlighted the necessity for a clearer interpretation of the terms of reference of CINCNORAD in regard to his authority to declare increased states of combat readiness. He referred to the terms of reference of CINCNORAD and pointed out that CINCNORAD is authorized to "specify the condition of combat readiness, to include states of alert, to be maintained by all forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available including command forces, while under the operational control of CINCNORAD." He said there appeared to be three main aspects to this problem: first, that CINCNORAD should have authority to alert his forces on his own initiative for training purposes; second, that he should have authority to alert his command on his own initiative if the number of unidentified aircraft indicated the need; and third, in a period of increasing tension, the Chiefs of Staff were in the best position to advise CINCNORAD on the declaration of an alert because they were in a better position to obtain political advice and had at their disposal a greater volume of processed strategic intelligence.

17. We had therefore come to the conclusion that it would be necessary for the Chiefs of Staff of the USA and Canada to communicate to CINCNORAD an agreed interpretation of his instructions with regard to the declaration of alerts arising in the third category listed above. We recommended that the instructions should follow the lines that General Foulkes had suggested above. Mr. Irwin pointed out the difference between an alert and an increase in the state of combat readiness and stated that this was a matter which was under study in the USA Defence Department. He thought that the formula suggested by General Foulkes might turn out to be too inflexible and that therefore all that could be safely said at present was that the matter was under study. General Twining emphasized that the USA Joint Chiefs always wished to be consulted in connection with states of alert, if only because of the cost involved, even in increased states of operational readiness. In general, General Twining appeared to be favourably disposed towards General Foulkes' proposals, although his attitude was somewhat modified by the remarks of Mr. Irwin. There appeared to be general agreement, however, that CINCNORAD's responsibilities in this matter should be clarified.

18. General Foulkes also referred to the question of the deployment of SAC aircraft to refuelling bases in Canada in the event of increasing tension. This he thought was far more serious than the question of alerting NORAD because of the possible Soviet reaction to such deployment. He thought that the Soviets might very well estimate that the forward deployment of SAC aircraft was the fore-runner of a deliberate pre-emptive strike against the USSR, and that therefore such deployments could seriously increase the danger of miscalculation. He believed that it was absolutely essential that there should be consultation prior to the deployment of SAC aircraft. General Twining undertook to study this problem and make appropriate recommendations.

19. In connection with the discussion on consultations in periods of increased tension, Mr. Robertson observed that in such circumstances, State Department and External Affairs should also be in close touch. Mr. Murphy agreed.

20. Before concluding the discussion of this item, General Loper intervened to point out, in connection with item 1, that under the law there was no restriction on the release of non-nuclear items to Canada, such as check-out kits. He thought that the new bilateral agreement to which he had previously referred should provide specifically for the transfer of such non-nuclear items to Canada, since these would be essential for the training and preparation of Canadian crews, as well as dealing with other aspects of USA-Canada cooperation in the atomic energy field.

Other Matters to be Considered by the Canada-USA Committee on Joint Defence

(a) The Future Role of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence

21. Mr. Robertson opened the discussion of this subject by referring to the historical importance of the PJBD's role in the coordination of USA-Canadian defence and said that he thought it was important to ensure that we continue to assign to PJBD a role in keeping with its demonstrated value. He said that possibly we might work toward the idea of assigning topics of the kind discussed at this particular meeting of consultation for consideration by the PJBD in support of future ministerial committee meetings. By so doing the Meetings of Consultation could return to their original role which he regarded as being to perform a kind of watch function, surveying the various critical areas and situations in the world which were becoming of increasing concern to Canada. Mr. Murphy indicated the great value which the USA placed on the continuing work of the Board.

22. General Foulkes pointed out that the PJBD had been formed when there was no such thing as a Joint Staff either in Washington or London. Many of the problems which were originally assigned to the PJBD were currently resolved by direct consultation between the chairmen of the respective Joint Staffs, or between the Joint Staffs themselves. He said that the Canadian Joint Staff as such was not represented on the PJBD and that some re-arrangement of its membership and terms of reference was obviously necessary. He agreed that the original purpose of the Meetings of Consultation (i.e., the examination of "hot spots" in the current world situation) was an important one and it was desirable that it should be reverted to when adequate alternative arrangements existed for dealing with other matters. General Twining said that on the USA side the PJBD military membership was in fact responsible to the USA Joint Staff so that the problem which General Foulkes had outlined might be uniquely Canadian. Mr. Murphy suggested that it would be useful for the two chairmen of PJBD to attend the Ministerial Meeting in Paris. There was general agreement that this suggestion should be followed up.

(b) USA Proposals for the Reactivation of the Combined Policy Committee

23. Mr. Robertson said that the working arrangements established at the end of last year for the coordination on a tripartite basis of research and development had proved to be very useful and that he assumed that the revival of the CPC was primarily to provide an umbrella and a stimulus for this.¹⁹⁷ It was his expectation that the Canadian authorities would welcome the proposals to revive the CPC, and he hoped this matter would be settled in Paris if not before. In view of current developments in France, he wondered whether the USA might be concerned about the relationship of that country to the CPC and whether any thought was being given to casting the net wider.

24. Mr. Irwin said that Mr.  Robertson's point of concern was politically valid but in their minds the security aspects so outweighed the political, especially in relation to nuclear affairs, that it was unlikely that cooperation in this field could be broadened. Mr. Murphy said that he thought the political risk of criticism from our other NATO partners was one that we were obliged to take, in view of these security considerations. He did not, however, anticipate any objections from General de Gaulle. Mr.  Rae noted that the reactivation of the CPC did not create new machinery and that the position was that we were in effect continuing an agency which had been in operation for some years.

25. There followed some discussion of the question of publicity concerning the CPC. Mr. Merchant and Mr. Murphy both made it clear that the USA was anxious to avoid any publicity in connection with the CPC, while at the same time recognizing that we would have to deal with press reports as they arose.

(c) Integration of Canada-USA Defence Production

(d) Cost Sharing Arrangements with Respect to Immediate Programmes in the Continental Air Defence Field

26. These two items were considered together. Mr. Robertson emphasized the importance of this whole subject to the Canadian Government and noted that, in view of the various specialized meetings which were being held, we could anticipate an interim report in this field for the Ministerial Meeting. Mr.  Irwin said that the Committee of Assistant Secretaries appeared to be progressing in its work. Mr.  Ritchie seconded this, stating that the atmosphere at the meeting on the previous day had been good and although the results remained to be seen the prospects were promising. He said that, although it was too early to anticipate the kind of discussion which might take place in Paris, it was to be hoped that there might be some fairly concrete results by that time. One problem relating to this whole question which appeared to him to be particularly important was the Buy American legislation. This, he understood, was up for review and we were hopeful that this review would result in a liberalization, at least with respect to Canada. Mr. Irwin agreed that the review of this legislation was vital to the whole problem.

27. General Foulkes said that arms were now getting so complicated and expensive that the Canadians were being priced out of the field. We need so few of any given item of equipment that the cost of production per unit was almost prohibitive. It was therefore essential that we should get into production of components and joint weapons.

28. Mr. Robertson added that the problem was broader than that of cost alone. There were many other aspects, including our capital investment in defence industry, our investment in specialized staff, the number of Canadians employed in defence industries and the desirability of the best possible utilization of North American resources.

29. General Foulkes said that under a production sharing system a Canadian industry would be able to contribute much more in hardware to continental defence than it could working independently. Mr.  Murphy agreed that it was essential that we make the best possible use of our resources for defence. He said that he suspected that per capita defence production in the Soviet bloc was very much better than it was in the West.

30. General Foulkes said that part of the difficulty in cost sharing and production sharing was that the best scheme for cost sharing was sometimes the opposite from a desirable scheme for production sharing. For example, in cost sharing it would probably be logical for the Canadians to provide buildings and fixed installations. This would, of course, leave the production of equipment to the USA which would be contrary to the concept of production sharing.

31. Mr. Irwin said that the Defense Department was fully conscious of our problem and was earnestly studying it. Mr. Murphy confirmed this and asked General Twining to give a brief account of the procurement problems facing the USA services. General Twining said that the three USA services had originally been instructed to proceed on individual research and development lines but costs were now such that it was necessary to be highly selective in sharing research, development and production between the services. This problem, he thought, was essentially the same as that between Canada and the USA. He said that up to now the USA Joint Chiefs had not been greatly involved with the USA-Canadian aspect of this problem, but henceforth he would take a greater interest in it. Both Mr. Robertson and General Foulkes emphasized that anything he could do to hasten progress would be greatly appreciated.

(e) Administrative Arrangement for the December Meeting to the Canada-USA Joint Committee on Defence

32. There was a brief discussion of the political difficulties associated with any publicity for this meeting. Mr. Merchant said that the USA Government was anxious that there should be no public release in Paris. He suggested that the Canadian ministers might announce the Paris meeting on their return to Ottawa. Mr. Robertson said that he thought this might meet the position.

FAR EASTERN SITUATION

33. Consideration of this item was preceded by a briefing given by a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Directorate of Intelligence of the USA Joint Staff. The briefing was primarily concerned with detailed order of battle information for the various countries of the Far East. It appeared that, in general, these countries, with the exception of the GRC, North Vietnam and Communist China, possessed armed forces insufficient to do very much more than maintain internal security, although it was estimated that South Vietnam could withstand an attack from North Vietnam for a period of about five weeks. The military build-up in Japan was described as disappointing, largely as a result of the political difficulties facing the government in connection with defence.

34. The briefing officer traced the history of the Government of the Republic of China in familiar terms. He mentioned that daily overflights of mainland China by Nationalist Aircraft had been virtually daily occurrences since the retreat of the GRC to Taiwan. He described the garrison on the Chinmens as consisting of 6 infantry divisions, 1 tank battalion and 1 artillery group. There were 23,000 GRC troops on the Matsus and the GRC had a total of 600,000 personnel in its armed forces. He said that while the USA Government had restrained the GRC from direct attacks on the mainland, it had permitted counter-battery fire and coastal air patrols.

35. Since the resumption of large scale artillery attacks against the Chinmens, the USA Government had authorized 347 million dollars in additional military aid to the GRC. This aid would include, 145 high-performance fighters; (F86's and F100's); 16 C119 transports; 130 landing craft; 3 LSTs; 2 LSMs; 20,000 cargo chutes; 8 BARCs (capacity 60 tons or 200 troops); 12-8 howitzers; 89-155 mm howitzers; 92-105 mm howitzers; 66 M41 tanks; 155 sidewinder adapter kits; 380 Sidewinders; 55,000 M-1 rifles; 48 tractors; 1 Nike battalion.

36. In response to a question from General Foulkes, General Twining referred to his recent conversation with the Chief of the Chinese Nationalist Ground Forces. As he proceeded with his account of this conversation it was not entirely clear whether he was stating his own opinions or those of the Chinese Commander, but he gave the general impression that he was substantially in agreement with the Commander's views. It was estimated that the Chinese Communists had believed that they could take over control of the Chinmens solely as a result of artillery fire. They had over-estimated their capabilities in this regard and in spite of a maximum artillery effort their attempt had been a failure. This had been a great shock to them. It was now clear that they could not take the islands if the Chinese Nationalists decided to defend them resolutely. General Twining said that the Chinese Communists had had MIG 19s in the area but had not used them. There was no evidence of a Chinese air-to-air guided missile comparable to the Sidewinder and it was remarkable that no Chinese-made shells had been found. The Chinese Communists had used mostly Russian shells and some American. Chinese Nationalist counter-battery fire with 8" howitzers had been good and the supply of the Chinmens was no longer a problem since additional USA advice and equipment had been provided.

37. In response to a specific question, General Twining confirmed his previous statement that the Chinese Communist artillery effort against the Chinmens had been the maximum of which they were capable. He added that the Chinese Nationalists had not foreseen the Communist attacks although they had some intelligence warning. It was estimated that faulty Communist intelligence about declining morale in the GRC may have encouraged the Communists in their attempt against the Chinmens.

38. In response to a question from Mr. Robertson, Mr. Murphy said he believed there had been a definite change in the Chinese Communist attitude toward military action against the Chinmens [SIC] they were now in the process of examining the grounds for the reverse they had suffered. As an indication of this change he cited the dismissal of the Chinese Communist Chief of the Army Staff. He said there had been no change in the Chinese Communist attitude on the Warsaw talks but he estimated that they were not sure about their next step and a noticeable change might be some months in appearing. He thought Chinese Communist confusion was quite clear from a reading of the Chinese Communist Defence Minister's speeches. Shelling on alternate days, he added was a peculiar and novel refinement of aggression.

39. Mr. Robertson asked Mr. Murphy whether he thought the Chinese Communists might respond to a proposal to reduce the size of the Chinese Nationalist garrison on the Chinmens. Mr. Murphy replied that he thought they would not. The Chinese Communist position was that the struggle between the GRC and the People's Government was an internal matter, not subject to negotiations with the USA. Mr. Lutkins (Far East Division) confirmed that although the idea of a reduction in the size of the garrison had been introduced in the Warsaw talks, the Chinese Communists had rebuffed the suggestion.

40. General Twining said that the Chinese Nationalists had been continuously advised since 1955 that the maintenance of such a large garrison on the Chinmens was nonsensical. In response to a further question, General Twining said that the Chinese Communist logistical situation was not good, that their air fields were dependent on one railway which crossed a number of highly vulnerable, wooden bridges and these could be easily destroyed. In a brief discussion of the Soviet attitude towards the Taiwan situation, General Twining said that he considered that the Russians had authorized the Chinese Communists to see what they could do with artillery bombardment alone, but to go no farther. He was convinced the USSR was anxious to avoid a major battle in the area.

41. There was some discussion of the possibility of the attack on the Chinmens having been initiated in order to divert attention from the Mideast. Mr. Murphy agreed that this was one possible explanation, or contributory factor, in the situation.

42. Mr. Murphy concluded the discussion by saying that the effect on USA allies in the area of the success of GRC and USA policies had been very salutary.

¹⁹⁷Voir/See Volume 24, Document 599.