No decision was taken at the Nato heads of government meeting about the timing of replies to the letters sent by Mr. Bulganin; the Nato Council will however discuss the Bulganin letters in its meeting of January 8. If you agree, I should like to provide our Nato delegation before then with a general indication of the character and tone of the reply we are likely to make and with some of the points we may include. I propose, therefore, to set forth in this memorandum the suggestions which have been drawn up as a result of discussions within the Department. If you approve of these proposals we shall make them available to our Nato delegation and other interested missions as a basis for discussion.

2. General Principles — We should place emphasis on the declaration and communiqué²⁰of the Nato meeting since these constitute the latest expression of common views and were formulated after the arrival of the Bulganin letters. There are, however, a sufficient number of aspects which relate to the Canadian situation and experience to enable us to prepare a reply which is not simply a facsimile of other replies that will be made. I think our letter should contain a large measure of purely Canadian content.

3. On the broader issues which affect the main negotiating position of the West, particularly on disarmament, it would not be appropriate for Canada to imply that it was initiating negotiations unilaterally. However, there would, I feel, be no harm in displaying a certain amount of Canadian initiative to the extent of showing a readiness to obtain by means of diplomatic discussions here and in Moscow clarification and amplification of some of the proposals Bulganin has made. We could discuss this point in the Nato Council ahead of time and indicate that we hope as much contact as possible will be established with the Russians by member countries through diplomatic channels for the purpose of securing further information on the proposals and of evaluating Soviet intentions. It is particularly important to determine what degree of flexibility or concession the Russians are willing to display. We think it is desirable, however, that the positions taken in any discussions of disarmament which individual countries may have with the Russians, should have as a basis the agreed Western proposals, and the degree of flexibility shown should be that contained in the Nato communiqué.

4. If ultimately Nato countries feel that a more flexible approach towards the Russians should be adopted in the light of information derived from our combined contacts with them, we should indicate our views privately to our allies for the purpose of determining what measure of agreement can be reached. If Nato countries were to support any such modified view, the U.S. representatives would have to be principally involved. If progress were made, the stage might be reached where the Nato Council would wish to ask U.S. representatives to talk to the Russians and report back to the Council. Meanwhile we feel that Canada should avoid giving the impression that it would be ready to carry on individual negotiations with the USSR lest this make it appear that opinion within the alliance is divided. Any action Canada takes towards achieving a more flexible approach should be aimed in the first instance at influencing U.S. authorities rather than at establishing any special relationship with the Russians in this field.

5. It was apparent at the recent NATO Ministerial Meeting that while most governments felt that a gesture should be made to public opinion by offering a meeting with the Russians at Foreign Minister level, only the Scandinavian countries and ourselves were convinced that a more flexible approach might be advisable at this stage. There could therefore be no assurance that we would receive support from our Allies for a more flexible approach. There is however some indication that the United States may eventually be disposed to adopt a more flexible attitude to disarmament. Their proposal at the recent NATO meeting for the establishment of a Technical Group to advise on problems of arms control arising out of new technical developments would seem to indicate that some new approach on disarmament may be envisaged. We have not, however, any real evidence of United States intentions with regard to this new body.

6. Assuming that the NATO Council was in accord with these ideas, conversations might be held from time to time between our Ambassador in Moscow and Mr. Gromyko and between yourself and the Soviet Ambassador here on some of these matters of common concern. I am thinking in particular of the Soviet suggestion for cessation of nuclear tests and for establishment of a zone in central Europe, free of nuclear weapons.²¹ These are complicated problems and ones which are of great importance to our allies and ourselves. We would not commit ourselves in any final way and we would, of course, keep our Nato friends fully informed. But if contact is to be established with the USSR and tension reduced, bilateral discussions are necessary. In our reply, therefore, I think we could show a readiness to obtain amplification of these two suggestions. This would be in conformity with the willingness expressed in the Nato Declaration to examine any proposal from whatever source for general or partial disarmament.

7. Specific Nato Topics — While not going out of our way to speak for the major powers we should, I think, have a general passage in our reply on Nato with particular reference to the heads of government meeting.

8. Mr. Wilgress has suggested in a telegram† that our reply should expand upon the general line of the Nato communiqué. We would like to see some slight progress made beyond the communiqué — and bilateral discussions may make this possible — but in general we agree that where Bulganin dealt with Nato or touched on matters of interest to all, the Nato communiqué should be taken as a guide.

9. I do not think it will be worthwhile to take up all the points raised by Bulganin in this field but in setting forth the Canadian point of view we can touch on some of them and also follow the lead given by the Prime Minister on television of refuting any Soviet implication that the organization has aggressive intentions. Thus in this general section on Nato, we could deal with the following points from the Bulganin letter:

- Necessity for creating confidence between states. (para. 1)

- Nato is preparing for war. (para. 2-4)

- Local wars will grow into large conflicts. (para. 6)

- Relationship of Nato to other military alliances. (paras. 7-8)

- Interdependence of Nato countries. (para. 9)

- Nato countries stir up military hysteria. (paras. 10-12)

- Suggested non-aggression agreement between Nato and Warsaw Pact. (para. 20)

10. We do not propose that any of the above subjects should be dealt with in great detail. We should rather go beyond the individual arguments of Bulganin and take the opportunity of setting forth our own point of view. While taking the Nato communiqué into account, this can perhaps be based on the relevant main points of your speech in the House of November 26, the Prime Minister's report to Parliament on December 21 and his television talk on December 22.

11. Canadian Items — In making our reply, I think we would do well to pick out those elements of the Bulganin letter which either relate to Canadian matters or come within fields in which Canada has a paramount interest. We can uphold the principles of Nato and not fail to refute charges where necessary, but at the same time devote major attention to those subjects which have a direct bearing on Canadian policies or which have significance for Canada as a middle power. Thus, following the general section, I think we should deal with specific points as follows:

1. Stationing of U.S. Nuclear Weapons on Canadian Soil (para. 5) — We can assert the right of Canada to take measures of self-defence, pointing out that this comes within the provisions of the United Nations Charter. We could point out that whatever defence measures Canada takes whether alone or in concert with its allies, our actions result from a conviction that such measures are necessary. We could reaffirm here that we hope the stage will be reached where international confidence is such that defence measures of various kinds and in all countries will be lessened. It might then be desirable to indicate the kind of possible alternative arrangements which might afford an acceptable substitute for the military preparations in question. Emphasis could be given to the Prime Minister's statement about our readiness, in the context of the disarmament agreement, to open all or part of Canada on a basis of reciprocity to aerial and ground inspection in order to provide reassurance against surprise attack. The general trend of such remarks might be that if suitable safeguards could be agreed there would be a different situation which could hardly fail to affect the course of the discussions on defence now afoot. The purpose of such an approach would of course be to take advantage of whatever diplomatic and political pressures are created by Nato discussions of defence arrangements which would be unwelcome to the Soviet Union. We should bear in mind that when the decisions have been reached and are in process of being implemented this pressure may cease to exist or will at least have taken a form less susceptible of exploitation.
2. Non-Interference in Middle East (para. 21) — The Bulganin letter proposes that in order to normalize the situation in the Near and Middle East, the USSR and the three Western great powers should voluntarily assume the obligations of non-interference in the affairs of the countries of the region and of the avoidance of the use of force in settling its problems. The Canadian reply might draw attention to the positive contribution that Canada is making to stability and peace in the Middle East through its participation in the United Nations Emergency Force. The hope might be expressed that no power, including the Soviet Union, would take any step which would interfere with the important duties UNEF is performing with such a gratifying measure of success.
3. Disarmament — Bulganin suggests that efforts be made to achieve step by step progress and proposes that as a first step the U.S.A., U.K. and U.S.S.R. agree not to use nuclear weapons and not to have further nuclear tests after January 1 for two or three years. (paras. 17-18). Although our answer to this point will have to be coordinated with the U.S.A. and the U.K., we can appropriately express Canadian views on the basis of the major role we have played in the disarmament discussions. It might be useful to welcome the agreement of the Soviet Union that a step by step solution of disarmament should be sought while expressing reservations about the exact steps proposed by the Soviet Union. In connection with the proposed obligation not to use nuclear weapons it might be pertinent to recall the acceptance at an earlier stage by the Soviet Union of the principle that such an obligation should be conditional and should permit the use of nuclear weapons for purposes of defence against aggression. The reply might then go on to suggest that when the Soviet Union is prepared to resume disarmament negotiations it might be profitable to pursue this question further. With respect to nuclear tests we should bear in mind the reports we have received concerning the possibility of a change in United States policy. We might convey the thought that such changes are by no means excluded as far as Canada is concerned since we are not conducting and have no plans for conducting tests. At the same time we should give support perhaps in a somewhat equivocal way to the proposals of August 29.²² I do not think that we can proceed very far towards abandoning any of those proposals publicly until our major allies come closer to accepting the thesis that as a package they are becoming politically untenable. However, by referring to your remarks about the flexibility of these proposals and perhaps to some of the recent remarks of the Prime Minister, it may be possible to convey the appropriate impression.
4. Maintenance of Status Quo — Bulganin says that any attempts to alter the status quo by force or to impose territorial changes would have catastrophic consequences. We could assert that Canada has no intention of joining in any efforts to impose territorial changes or to alter the status quo by force. In turn we would welcome assurances from the Russians that they are prepared to refrain from maintaining the status quo by force in Eastern Europe. Bulganin has asked the Prime Minister to have the courage to face the facts. The appeal could be made to him equally to have the courage to face the facts as seen by the Government of Canada and by the Western community. It could be pointed out that if co-existence and recognition of the status quo are to have any real meaning, they must entail not only recognition of the existence of two different systems but consistent non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and a common assumption of responsibility in deeds as well as words for the maintenance of peace.
5. Nuclear-Free Zone (para. 19) — Bulganin has proposed that a central zone of Europe, including the two Germanys, Poland and Czechoslovakia, be kept free of nuclear weapons. Assuming that the proposal could be set in a proper political perspective, we could go so far as to say that we did not consider that it should be rejected, unless and until careful study had shown it to be unworkable. One of the principle factors in assessing the practicability of a nuclear-free zone would be the question of control. (This attitude parallels the answer you approved on December 23 for publication in Le Monde).

12. Canadian-Soviet Relations (25-33) — Mr. Bulganin suggests that Canada can make an important contribution towards achieving agreement on the proposals made by the Soviet government and he welcomes your statement of December 3 in the External Affairs Committee²³ about the importance of reducing tensions. He says Canada could play a particularly important role in the field of atomic developments. I think we should be careful not to imply in our answer that Canada is willing to take on any special role in achieving the settlement of some of the problems that beset relations between the major powers. We could merely say that we have noted Bulganin's remarks about the role of Canada in world affairs and that we intend to continue to play whatever role in the United Nations and within Nato we consider is best suited to the achievement of peace and security.

13. Mr. Bulganin states that the U.S.S.R. wishes to develop more extensive ties with Canada. He says that increased trade without "artificial" restrictions would establish good will and that a reciprocal visit of a trade mission would be welcome. He adds that co-operation in science and culture should be encouraged and he expresses the hope that a spirit of good neighbourliness will prevail between Canada and the U.S.S.R.

14. In our reply I think we could agree to the principle of good neighbourliness and assure him that we will continue to examine the possibilities of co-operation in all fields. We could agree to give attention to trade possibilities (and perhaps say that we will give consideration to his suggestion that a Canadian trade mission go to the U.S.S.R.) but it would probably be well to ignore at this stage his reference to "artificial" restrictions by which he means the strategic controls on trade with the Soviet bloc which have been maintained by Nato and other countries since the Korean conflict.²⁴ We can mention the increase that has taken place in contacts and exchanges in various fields and we can agree that these should be encouraged. The Prime Minister might wish to make a reference to the contribution to goodwill made by the Russian hockey team which visited Canada at the beginning of the winter and to welcome the possibility of a reciprocal visit.

15. We can point out that it has been a matter of some concern to us that freedom of movement is not permitted to persons who wish to leave the U.S.S.R. and join relatives here as permanent residents. We can say that the granting of permission to such persons to leave the U.S.S.R. as well as the granting of exit permits to any Canadian citizens who are in the U.S.S.R. would be a good sign of the willingness of the U.S.S.R. to demonstrate the spirit of co-operation which it wishes to achieve in Canadian-Soviet relations.²⁵

J. L[éger]

¹⁹Pour le texte de la lettre du 13 décembre 1957 de Nicolaï Boulganine au premier ministre Diefenbaker, voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, Affaires extérieures, vol. 10, n^o 2, février 1958, pp. 39 à 42.
For the text of the December 13, 1957 letter from Nicolai Bulganin to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, see Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2, February 1958, p. 39-42.

²⁰Voir Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord, Textes des communiqués finals, 1949-1974, Bruxelles: Service de l'information OTAN, s.d., pp. 113 à 122.
See North Atlantic Council, Texts of Final Communiqués, 1949-1974, Brussels: NATO Information Service, n.d., pp. 108-120.

²¹Le 2 octobre 1957, Adam Rapacki, ministre des Affaires étrangères polonais, a présenté un plan à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies demandant l'établissement d'une zone dénucléarisée en Europe centrale comprenant la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie, l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et l'Allemagne de l'Est.
On October 2, 1957, Adam Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, presented a plan to the United Nations General Assembly calling for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe comprising Poland, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, and East Germany.

²²Voir/See Volume 24, Document 117.

²³Voir Canada, Chambre des Communes, Comité permanent des Affaires extérieures, Procès-verbaux et témoignages, N^o 1, mardi, le 3 décembre 1957 (Ottawa: Imprimeur de la Reine, 1957) pp. 8 à 15.
See Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 1, Tuesday, December 3, 1957 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), pp. 8-15.

²⁴Voir/See Document 505.

²⁵Note marginale:/Marginal note:
I like this as a general & tentative & searching approach! S.E. S[mith]