With reference to Vishinsky's draft Resolution on disarmament, it is thought here that his proposal should be regarded as propaganda, and that the Soviet draft might be dealt with by amendment rather than rejected outright.

2. The obvious defect in Vishinsky's proposal is the highly ambiguous provision for international control over the implementation of measures of disarmament, and the absence of any provision for international inspection. Experience in previous discussions in the United Nations has shown that such an ambiguous reference to "within the framework of the Security Council" inevitably raises the whole question of the veto, and it is evident that the veto might be used in the Security Council to limit the effectiveness of inspection.

3. The question of adequate preliminary international inspection is a matter of first importance in our view. In connection with Vishinsky's proposal that armed forces be reduced by one third, the Soviet delegation should be directly pressed, if possible by a spokesman for a group of delegations, to declare unequivocally whether the Soviet Union is prepared to open its borders to international observer teams which might establish, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the armed forces and armaments, both existing and potential, at the disposal of the Soviet Union in its own territories, as well as territories under its control.

4. Such an inspection is clearly a necessary prerequisite, if a sound basis for progressive general disarmament is to be established. Following such an inspection, which would of course be only the first of periodic and of unannounced inspections, a formula of disarmament must be found which would be related to the needs of general international peace and security. This is an entirely different approach from the one suggested by Vishinsky, that disarmament could be effective without adequate preliminary knowledge merely by the application of an arbitrary arithmetical formula.

5. However, before any assurance is demanded of the Soviet Union that it accept international inspections of its armed forces and armaments, the other Great Powers concerned must naturally be prepared to say that they would accept similar international inspection. We assume, therefore, that you would consult the delegations of the Western Powers, and particularly United States and United Kingdom, on this matter.

6. It might be appropriate also to point out that Canada, like most of the Allies in the recent war, substantially reduced its own armaments and armed forces upon the conclusion of hostilities. We had so acted in the hope that we might be able to place reliance for our own security on the undertakings to which all members of the United Nations had pledged themselves under the Charter, and on the machinery for the maintenance of international peace provided for in the Charter. No country therefore would welcome more sincerely progress towards effective measures of general disarmament than would Canada.

7. You might consider repeating our consistent position that we fully support effective measures for general disarmament, but not at the cost of insecurity for ourselves, or for other nations bent upon maintaining international peace and security on the basis of the principles and purposes of the Charter. It might perhaps be. pointed out that, if the factors contributing to the present state of tension and insecurity were objectively examined by the United Nations, it would be found that the principal aggravating causes are:

(a) the overwhelming superiority of armed forces maintained and deployed by the Soviet Union particularly in Europe,

(b) the failure of the Soviet Union to cooperate in the establishment of collective forces under the United Nations on the basis of Article 43 of the Charter.

(c) the failure of the Soviet Union to cooperate in the development of proposals. to establish international control of atomic energy and, the failure of the Soviet Union to respond to the majority view expressed in the Commission on Conventional Armaments that measures must be taken to strengthen the sense of security of nations before national armaments may be regulated or reduced.

8. Vishinsky has reiterated the Soviet Union's position regarding the prohibition of atomic weapons. The oversimplification of the Soviet argument in this resped will no doubt be exposed by statements such as the one made by General McNaughton on the Reports on the Atomic Energy Commission.

9. You may also wish to emphasize the importance which Canadian Delegations have always attached to the implementation of Article 43 which would enable nations to rely on measures other than their own armament for theft security and would provide one important criterion for the international regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

10. We realize that United States concurrence in the proposal set forth in paragraph 5 above, especially in regard to atomic bombs and installations, will be dependent on a realization by the United States that the pledge to accept effective international inspection will cost them nothing, since it is inconceivable that the Soviet Union will agree to make the pledge, or, if they make it, will agree to an international convention to implement the pledge. The Soviet disarmament resolution is pure propaganda and I do not see how we can counter it effectively unless we are prepared to meet the Soviet Union on their own ground.