Canada and the World: A History

1957 - 1968: Turbulent Times

• Dief the Chief
• Britain and the Commonwealth
• Immigration
• Diefenbaker and the Yanks
• Pearson in Power
• Trade and Culture
• Peacekeeping
• France and Quebec

Dief the Chief

In June 1957, the unthinkable happened. The Liberal government, in power continuously since 1935, was defeated by the populist prophet from the prairies, John Diefenbaker. The Liberal downfall came in two stages. A minority Conservative government was elected in 1957, followed by a Conservative sweep of historic proportions in 1958. Power now lay in the hands of a man who, though a brilliant campaigner, found governing difficult.

Diefenbaker ran into problems on several fronts, but foreign policy, especially relations with the United States, was his particular nemesis. An indecisive and suspicious man, the Chief, as he was known to his followers, came to power just as the conditions that had made possible Canada's "golden age" of diplomacy were on the wane. At home, the national consensus on foreign policy evaporated as concern about nuclear weapons and the U.S. role in Canada mounted. Abroad, Europe's recovery from the ravages of the Second World War was almost complete, thus reducing Canada's relative prominence on the international stage.

Diefenbaker was ill-equipped to face these challenges. He distrusted the bureaucrats at External Affairs, whom he contemptuously dismissed as "Pearsonalities" loyal to the previous regime. Diefenbaker himself had little experience with foreign relations, but brought to office an intense loyalty to Britain combined with a mistrust and dislike of things American. At the same time he was staunchly anti-communist and consequently a supporter of American Cold War policy. A man of contradictions indeed.

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Britain and the Commonwealth

Immediately upon taking office, Diefenbaker flew to London for a prime ministers' conference. He received a warm welcome in Britain, where his sharp criticism of the St. Laurent government's policy during the Suez crisis was greatly appreciated. Perhaps carried away by this welcome, he announced, without consulting anyone, that his government would divert 15 percent of Canada's trade from the United States to Britain.

Canadian officials were aghast. This was one promise that was simply impossible to keep, because British trade with Canada had been declining for years, in large part because most British goods were not suited to the Canadian market. The government quickly backed away from the Prime Minister's rash announcement, but it was not an auspicious beginning for the new administration.

Diefenbaker's fondness for Britain did not mean automatic support for every British policy, especially when Canadian interests were at stake. For that reason, Ottawa vehemently opposed Britain's attempt in 1960 to join the European Common Market, which would place Commonwealth trade preferences in jeopardy. As well as adversely affecting Canadian trade, the issue had emotional overtones. In effect, the mother country was turning her back on her children.

Diefenbaker, who was both emotional about Commonwealth ties and fearful of Canada's being pushed even more tightly into the American embrace, openly attacked the British government at the 1962 prime ministers' conference, where he was supported by the other delegates. The crisis was solved the next year when France vetoed the British application. It was clear, though, that the British government was not going to let Commonwealth ties hamper its ability to pursue what it considered Britain's best interests. Commonwealth sentimentalists like Diefenbaker found that hard to swallow.

Diefenbaker's major triumph on the world stage also came in the Commonwealth context and concerned another sensitive issue, the racist regime of apartheid in South Africa. As a staunch supporter of human rights, Diefenbaker was repulsed by apartheid, but he did not want to see South Africa leave the Commonwealth. However, as he well knew, the Commonwealth was quickly becoming a multiracial body as former colonies in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean became independent. In 1960, when it decided to become a republic, South Africa had to reapply for membership in the Commonwealth.

Britain thought that South Africa's application should be approved automatically, but Canadian officials worried that this would split the Commonwealth along racial lines and destroy the modern Commonwealth. At first, Diefenbaker wavered. But at the 1961 Commonwealth conference, when it became clear that South Africa was intransigent about apartheid, he threw his support behind the African and Asian members, the only white leader to do so. As a result South Africa withdrew its application, bitterly blaming Diefenbaker for the result. However, the Chief's stand was widely praised in Canada and abroad as being the right thing to do.

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Immigration

Diefenbaker also displayed his progressive credentials in the area of immigration. Canadian policy had long discriminated against racial minorities. Such an approach could no longer be upheld, especially after Diefenbaker brought in the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960. The government reduced bars to most types of immigration on racial and ethnic grounds, making the skills of immigrants and family reunification the major criteria for admission. For the first time, Canada began to accept larger numbers of Asian and black immigrants. From this point on, Canada would increasingly become a multiracial, multicultural society.

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Diefenbaker and the Yanks

Although Canadian-American relations reached their nadir under Diefenbaker, they started easily enough. One of the government's first acts was to sign the North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD). Like the issue of trade diversion, this hasty decision reflected Diefenbaker's inexperience. He allowed himself to be pushed into quick approval by the Canadian military, without pausing to think through the implications involved in the continentalization of air defence.

The government also cancelled the program to build the Avro Arrow fighter plane, which has since become a nationalist cause célèbre. It was, in fact, the right decision -- though it could have been handled better -- since Canada could not afford the expense of building the plane when there was no prospect of sales to other countries. However, it meant that Canadian air defence would now rely on Bomarc surface-to-air missiles, which worked only when equipped with nuclear warheads. This decision sowed the seeds of the government's downfall.

Diefenbaker got along well with President Dwight Eisenhower, whom he admired and respected, and who in turn treated the touchy Canadian with courtesy and respect. The exact opposite was true of relations with John F. Kennedy, young, charismatic and aggressive in pursuit of American interests. The two leaders had little in common, and quickly grew to detest each other. Diefenbaker resented Kennedy's urging Canada to join the Organization of American States during a presidential visit to Ottawa in 1961, particularly his mention of it in his address to Parliament after Diefenbaker had already turned him down.

The Americans carelessly left behind a briefing memo that spoke of pushing Canada in certain areas. This angered Diefenbaker, who did not return the document but instead kept it for possible future use against Kennedy. Although Diefenbaker never used the memorandum in public, the White House was outraged at this appalling breach of courtesy and diplomatic protocol.

The difficulties were not only on the personal level; there were also substantial differences over policy. American attempts to prevent American subsidiaries in Canada from trading with communist China and Castro's Cuba, which were off-limits to American companies, were a prime example. This attempt to impose U.S. law extraterritorially was deeply resented. Canadadid not share the American obsession with Cuba, believing that the U.S. embargo of Cuba, followed by a failed invasion attempt in 1961 -- the Bay of Pigs fiasco -- would only strengthen the Castro regime and drive it into the arms of the Soviet Union.

Cuba was the cause of more critical disagreement between Canada and the United States. The world never came closer to nuclear war than it did in 1962, following the discovery of Soviet missile sites in Cuba. Canada received only a few hours' warning of the American response, which was to institute a naval blockade of Cuba. The Canadian government delayed placing Canadian air forces in NORAD on highest alert as the Americans had done, and refused to send the fleet to sea for anti-submarine purposes. Instead Diefenbaker infuriated the Americans by casting doubt on the American charges and suggesting that the United Nations provide an objective assessment of the missile sites.

Faced with Diefenbaker's intransigence in such a crisis, others acted. Defence Minister Douglas Harkness secretly placed Canada's NORAD forces on full alert, while the navy commander on the east coast sent his ships to sea on his own authority. The world held its breath until the Soviets and Americans reached a peaceable settlement of the crisis. But the damage to the government was extensive. Not only were the Americans enraged, but public opinion in Canada was appalled when the government's reluctance to co-operate in such a dangerous situation became known.

The fallout from the Cuban missile crisis now combined with Diefenbaker's dithering over the arming of the Bomarcs with nuclear warheads to destroy the government. The Prime Minister had effectively agreed to accept the warheads in 1958 when he accepted the Bomarc missiles, and other defence obligations had appeared to confirm this interpretation of his stance.

By 1960, however, the government was hopelessly divided over the issue. Harkness led those who urged that Canada must meet its commitments, while External Affairs Minister Howard Green, a staunch advocate of nuclear disarmament, bitterly opposed the presence of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. Caught in between, Diefenbaker could not make a decision. He was hampered by the results of the 1962 election, which had reduced the government's huge majority to a minority position.

Pressure on the government mounted. U.S. General Lauris Norstad, who had just retired as supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), told a news conference in Ottawa that the government was reneging on its obligations. Lester Pearson, now leader of the opposition, reversed the Liberal stand against nuclear weapons, vowing first to fulfil Canada's commitments and then to negotiate with the Americans to get rid of the nuclear weapons.

As Diefenbaker continued to dither, the U.S. State Department released a statement virtually calling him a liar. Both the Canadian military and the American ambassador in Ottawa lobbied against the government, briefing the media on their point of view. With his government disintegrating around him under the pressure, Diefenbaker lost a crucial vote of confidence in Parliament on February 5, 1963. The 1963 election campaign was on.

And an extraordinary one it was. The governing Conservative Party, in total disarray, should have suffered an overwhelming defeat. However, Diefenbaker ran a blatantly anti-American campaign reminiscent of 1911, using the full range of his impressive campaigning skills to pull a moral victory from the jaws of overwhelming defeat by holding the Liberals to yet another minority government.

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Pearson in Power

The Americans were pleased by the outcome; Canadian policy was now in the experienced hands of the former foreign minister and diplomat, Mike Pearson. The new prime minister moved quickly to repair the ruptured relationship, holding a cordial meeting with Kennedy and proceeding with plans to arm the Bomarcs. However, this did not mean an end to difficulties between the two neighbours.

Pearson's minister of finance was Walter Gordon, who had been horrified by the extent of American control of the Canadian economy in the 1950s. Now, at last, he was in a position to do something about it. His first budget in June 1963 contained some modest measures to reduce foreign (American) investment in Canada. Because these harmed the interests of non-resident shareholders in Canadian companies, American business people and politicians voiced vehement disapproval. So too did the Canadian business community. Gordon had to backtrack as rapidly as Diefenbaker had done over trade diversion.

Shortly afterwards, the United States brought in restrictions on foreign borrowing as a means of dealing with their own economic problems. Ironically, since such a drastic reduction in the flow of American capital to Canada would devastate the Canadian economy, Gordon had to go to Washington to plead for an exemption for Canada, which was granted. Both episodes underlined Canada's economic dependence on the United States.

The next big issue of contention was the war in Vietnam. The United States had solidly supported South Vietnam against the communist North since 1954, but during the 1960s it became more deeply embroiled in this impossible quagmire. For its part, Canada had been active in Southeast Asia since 1954, when it was appointed to the International Control Commission (ICC) for Vietnam. Meant to supervise a non-existent peace, the ICC performed a thankless task. It was particularly galling for Canadians who served on the ICC, because of the blatantly pro-communist bias of Poland and the similar, though more subtle, attitude of India, the other members of the Commission.

Most Canadian delegates reacted by increasingly taking the side of South Vietnam in disputes. In the spring of 1964, Ottawa agreed to allow the United States to use the senior Canadian representative on the Commission, Blair Seaborn, to inform North Vietnam of the dangers of provoking Washington and the benefits of a negotiated peace. Seaborn's mission was a failure because neither Washington nor Hanoi was ready to talk.

In early 1965, the war was expanded with the start of an extensive U.S. bombing campaign. As the war escalated, Pearson became increasingly doubtful of the wisdom of U.S. policy. In April 1965, he called for a halt in air strikes against North Vietnam while speaking in Philadelphia. U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had succeeded the assassinated Kennedy in 1963, was infuriated, not only by the content of the speech but by the fact that it had been delivered in the United States. At a subsequent meeting, he berated Pearson mercilessly, at one point grabbing him by the lapel, to the consternation of the Canadian ambassador in Washington, who witnessed this extraordinary scene.

Alarmed that Johnson's decision to send U.S. ground troops to Vietnam might lead to a wider war in Asia, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, decided to make an independent approach to the North by sending Chester Ronning, Canada's leading China expert, as an emissary. The Americans were not pleased, because they had their own secret lines of communication to the North. Ronning's two missions accomplished nothing.

Through 1966 and 1967, the government became more critical of the United States, reflecting both Pearson's own convictions and the growing anti-war sentiment of Canadian public opinion. Although Canada continued to urge the United States to negotiate, the government was really in no position to be self-righteous. Opposition to the war did not prevent Canada from selling billions of dollars' worth of war material to the United States. For anti-war protesters in Canada, there was more than a whiff of hypocrisy to Canadian policy.

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Trade and Culture

Pearson's government enjoyed much better trade relations with the United States, leading in 1965 to the conclusion of the Auto Pact. Since the late 1950s, Canada's car and truck industry had been in trouble, contributing to a mounting trade deficit in automobiles and automotive parts. Pearson tried to redress the balance with a series of tax incentives, but when these were opposed by the United States, he sought a negotiated solution as long as it met Ottawa's desire for a greater share of the Canadian market. The United States agreed.

By negotiating what amounted to a form of free trade in the auto sector with the United States, Canada turned that deficit into a small surplus by 1968, and a remarkable $22 billion surplus by 1993. The agreement furthered the continentalization of the auto industry, but that was not thought important in an industry already dominated by the big three American automakers: General Motors, Ford and Chrysler.

Throughout the 1960s, Canada's economic dependence on the United States continued to grow. By 1967, American exports to Canada totalled nearly $8 billion. The next largest source of Canadian imports, the United Kingdom, provided only $619 million, a derisory amount by comparison. Likewise, Canada sent just over $7 billion worth of goods to the United States, and only $1.2 billion to Britain, its next largest market. These figures reveal how illusory Diefenbaker's pledge to divert Canada's trade away from the United States and to the United Kingdom had been. Finally, 81 percent of foreign investment in Canada was American.

The creation of the Canada Council had resulted in a flourishing of the arts in Canada, particularly in theatre, dance, classical music and literature. Even so, American popular culture continued to predominate, especially on television screens. Canada had little success in producing entertainment shows, but the Canadian public did show a large appetite for news and information programming, an area in which Canadians came to excel.

The same was true of magazines, an area in which the Canadian government acted to level the playing field for the domestic industry. In 1965, Walter Gordon ended tax deductions for Canadians who advertised in non-Canadian magazines and newspapers, with the exception of Time and Reader's Digest. The government was reluctant to attack these two magazines, because they employed large numbers of Canadians in their local offices and they were very influential in Washington. Gordon admitted that had Ottawa included Time and Reader's Digest, he could not have successfully negotiated the Auto Pact.

Nevertheless, Gordon was attacked for this compromise by Canadian nationalists. As early as 1957 the American ambassador in Ottawa had predicted a shriller tone to Canadian rhetoric under the Diefenbaker government; the following year he informed Washington of the presence of a "strident, almost truculent nationalism" in Canada.

After the role the Americans had played in his fall from power, Diefenbaker became a rallying point for anti-Americanism. The war in Vietnam, race riots in American cities and political assassinations all combined to tarnish the image of the United States. As many as 100,000 American war resisters poured across the border; their presence strengthened anti-American sentiment in Canada.

For the first time, a majority of Canadians expressed concern about American domination of the economy. An opinion poll in 1967 showed that two thirds of Canadians wanted the government to do something to roll back the level of foreign investment. Almost as many wanted Canada to show more independence in dealing with the United States. Easier said than done.

Among the intellectual classes a more radical agenda was put forward. This would see Canada virtually declare neutrality by withdrawing from NATO and NORAD, recognize the People's Republic of China as the true government of that country and openly condemn American policy in Vietnam. The government had to take such criticisms into account, while realistically determining how far Canada could go in acting against American interests. No one could doubt Gordon's nationalist credentials, but even he did not dare to take on American media giants like Time and Reader's Digest. There were real limits to Canada's ability to act independently.

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Peacekeeping

Both the Diefenbaker and Pearson governments continued to pursue the peacekeeping duties that Canada had taken up during the Suez Crisis. Canada's ability to play an important and constructive, as well as independent, role in the world struck a popular chord with Canadians. This was never better demonstrated than in 1960, when the Congo dissolved into chaos upon obtaining its independence from Belgium. United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold sought a Canadian contribution to the UN force being sent there, citing the need for bilingual personnel.

The Canadian military, faced with decreasing resources, suggested that only a few aircraft and staff officers could be spared, and the government agreed. When this contribution was denounced as "meagre" in newspaper editorials across the country, the government was forced to give in to the clamour and provide 500 troops for the Congo force. Canada remained involved until the force was withdrawn in 1964.

A very serious crisis erupted in 1964 when two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, almost went to war over the island of Cyprus, where Greek and Turkish Cypriots clashed. Paul Martin was instrumental in putting together a UN force to which Canada contributed a battalion of infantry. Although the UN kept the two sides apart it could not bring about a settlement, with the result that Canadian troops remained on Cyprus for 20 years.

In the Middle East, where Canada had played a role in the UN force in Egypt since its inception, peacekeeping proved a more tricky affair. By 1967, not only were Israel and Egypt no closer to peace, they were on the verge of another war. In May, Egyptian President Nasser ordered the UN force out of Egypt. A weak UN Secretary-General, U Thant, agreed. No sooner had UN troops left than war broke out between Egypt and Israel. Despite this setback, Pearson remained committed to peacekeeping. Although it was a frustrating and sometimes dangerous business, with the status quo often the best that could be achieved, it was vital work that Canada did well.

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France and Quebec

For Pearson, keeping the peace at home proved almost as difficult. In 1960, Jean Lesage's provincial Liberal Party defeated the more conservative Union Nationale, unleashing a wave of modernization in Quebec. The "Quiet Revolution" that followed marked the determination of Quebecers to control their own affairs, and even, for some, to seek independence from Canada. This had implications on the international stage, particularly after French President Charles de Gaulle began to take an active interest in Quebec. In 1961, Quebec opened an office in Paris.

The federal government was concerned at Quebec's international moves but did not want to provoke a confrontation. Instead, it tried to accommodate Quebec's demands for a closer and more independent relationship with France. In 1964, Ottawa negotiated an umbrella agreement with Paris that would allow Quebec City and Paris to sign co-operative agreements. In 1965, Quebec and France signed an agreement on cultural co-operation.

However, it became impossible to avoid confrontation as de Gaulle increasingly meddled in Canada's affairs, snubbing federal ministers and officials but treating visitors from the Quebec government with pomp and protocol, and encouraging Quebec to act independently. France refused to send a top-level representative to either the funeral of Governor General Georges Vanier, who as Canadian ambassador had stood by France during the darkest days of the Second World War, or to the 50th anniversary celebrations of the battle of Vimy Ridge, which symbolized Canada's contribution in the First World War.

The climax came during de Gaulle's visit to Quebec in 1967, when he ended his speech in Montreal with the words "Vive le Québec libre," a clear signal of support for Quebec separatism. English Canadians were outraged; Pearson coldly responded that Canadians did not need to be liberated, prompting de Gaulle to cancel a planned visit to Ottawa. The General returned home, leaving Canada-France relations in ruins.

National unity was now perhaps more firmly fixed on the political agenda in Canada than it had been since the 1930s. The unity file brought new challenges and opportunities for Canadian diplomacy that Pearson, who announced his decision to retire in December 1967, happily left to his successor, Pierre Elliott Trudeau.