
July 1, 1867, marked the birth of a new country, the Dominion of Canada, formed from the union of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the united province of Canada (Canada East and Canada West, which became Quebec and Ontario). The country that came into being on that date, however, was an anomaly -- part country, part colony, still very much a part of the British Empire. Independent in domestic matters, Canada deferred to the motherland in the conduct of international relations. In fact Canada's constitution, the British North America Act, said nothing about such matters except to affirm Canada's duty, "as Part of the British Empire", to fulfil the obligations incurred under treaties between the Empire and foreign countries (Section 132). The conduct of diplomacy was to be left in the experienced hands of British statesmen.
Yet the potential for growth was there, inspiring the vision of the first prime minister, John A. Macdonald. Speaking in 1865 about the country he was helping to found, Macdonald foresaw an evolutionary process that would see Canada's relationship with Britain become "a healthy and cordial alliance. Instead of looking upon us as a merely dependent colony, England will have in us a friendly nation, a subordinate but still a powerful people to stand by her in North America in peace or in war."
The Canada of Sir John A. Macdonald did not live in isolation. How could it, when Canada was part of a worldwide Empire and shared a border with the United States? Although Confederation resulted from a complex series of domestic issues, external factors provided a momentum that helped bring the process to fruition. Fear of the United States was paramount. The Civil War that tore the United States apart between 1861 and 1865 left the Americans with a powerful, battle-hardened army that could be turned against Canada if American grievances against Britain and Canada were not settled.
Although Britain remained neutral during the Civil War, Confederate envoys seemed to operate with London's assistance. In 1861, for example, two Southern agents were removed from a British ship in international waters by the Northern navy, nearly precipitating an Anglo-American war. Confederate agents also operated in Canada, creating friction along the border. The worst incident involved a raid into Vermont from a base in Quebec and the subsequent release of the perpetrators by a Montreal judge, who considered them belligerents over whom he had no jurisdiction.
As well, the Americans were determined to make Britain pay for the damage inflicted by Confederate ships built in British ports. Northern anger was also aroused by the presence in Canada of Union deserters and draft dodgers, a sore point that would recur 100 years later during the war in Vietnam. Raids into Canada from American territory by the Fenian Brotherhood, Irish Americans who sought to bring about Irish freedom from Britain by striking at Canada, further inflamed relations between the United States and Britain.
Only in unity did the British North American colonies have any chance to protect themselves against the American behemoth. The British government also had a motive of its own in encouraging the colonies to unite. Once they were more or less able to stand on their own feet, Britain could withdraw its garrison, leaving the responsibility for the defence of Canada squarely on Canadian shoulders and wallets. The settlement of outstanding differences with the Americans would be a boon to the British taxpayer.
After two attempts to settle their differences failed, the British and American governments agreed in 1870 to appoint a Joint High Commission with five members from each side to meet in Washington. The Commission's negotiations eventually resulted in the Treaty of Washington of 1871. Macdonald was one of the British delegates, a recognition by the British of Canada's right to play a role in negotiations that largely concerned her. The Governor General, Lord Monck, saw this as an important step for Canada, even though, as one of the five-member British delegation, Macdonald would be practising "diplomacy in leading strings." Nevertheless, "the man who has created a 'Dominion' is to be trusted with the care of its external interests." It was, in fact, a no-win situation for the Prime Minister.

Britain's overriding aim in the negotiations was to restore good relations with the Americans, even if it meant sacrificing Canadian concerns. Macdonald could push Canadian interests only so far; he could not break off the talks even if he wanted to. Canada's prime concern was its inshore fisheries, which had been opened to the Americans under the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, but closed again when that treaty was abrogated 10 years later.
The Americans were furious when Canada proceeded to arrest non-compliant American fishermen. President Grant referred to Canada as a "semi-independent but irresponsible power" and Macdonald hoped to trade access to the fisheries for a renewed reciprocity agreement. The Americans stood firm, granting Canada only the right to sell fish duty free in the United States; they also refused any compensation for the Fenian raids launched from their territory. Macdonald was not happy with these terms but had no choice but to accept them. It was a salutary reminder that, as long as Canada was not in complete control of her foreign relations, Britain's interests would ultimately prevail.
Nevertheless, the restoration of good relations with the Americans was as much in Canada's interest as in Britain's. Macdonald knew this and used this argument to defend the Treaty of Washington in Parliament a year later, stating that he could not push Canada's own interests to the point where "we would risk and destroy for ever all hope of a peaceful solution of the difficulty between two great nations." The Treaty removed the risk of a war that the British knew they could not win and by the end of 1871, no British forces remained in Canada except at the naval base in Halifax. More important, it ushered in an era of peace during which Canadians could concentrate on consolidating the new nation so that, in Macdonald's words, "the gristle could harden into bone."
Rivalry with the United States also meant that Canada must move quickly to reach her natural boundaries in the west and in the north before the Americans could fill the vacuum. The Hudson's Bay Company had agreed in 1869 to sell the vast territory of Rupert's Land to the new dominion, but the actual transfer had been delayed by the outbreak of the Red River Rebellion. There were those on both sides of the border who sought unsuccessfully to use the Métis resistance to the transaction to bring about annexation of the western lands to the United States. With the admission of Manitoba as a province in 1870 and British Columbia in 1871, Canada now stretched, as her motto boasts, "from sea to sea."

The consolidation of Canada meant an emphasis on such basics as peopling this vast, new country and expanding wealth through trade. Mundane matters, perhaps, but necessary; high diplomacy could be left to the British. Nevertheless, the government soon found that even such a prosaic agenda required the beginnings of a system of Canadian representation abroad, most notably in the mother country. All correspondence between Ottawa and London passed through the Governor General, who was described as "the human link in the imperial chain."
But the Governor General was in the final analysis a British official, and Macdonald quickly decided that he needed an independent voice in London to work on Canada's behalf. He found that voice in Sir John Rose, his former minister of finance, who had gone into the banking industry in London in 1869.
Rose's position was informal; he was a "gentleman . . . with whom Her Majesty's Government may properly communicate on Canadian affairs." Much of his work arose from the government's financial requirements.

He was also responsible for promoting emigration, discreetly lobbying British politicians and officials, and reporting on matters of interest to Ottawa. Reporting directly to Macdonald, he helped enhance the Prime Minister's emerging role as the dominant figure in foreign relations. The relationship was carried on by Macdonald's successor, the Liberal Alexander Mackenzie, who named Rose Canada's financial commissioner in London.

On his return to power in 1878, Macdonald sought to expand Rose's duties and establish the office of financial commissioner on a more formal basis. Macdonald wanted to appoint a "resident minister" in London, which he saw as "a very important step towards asserting the importance of the Dominion of Canada as a portion of Her Majesty's Empire." The British accepted the office but objected to the title, which implied a quasi-diplomatic status. Instead, the position of Canadian High commissioner was created in 1880, and Sir Alexander Galt, yet another former finance minister, was appointed. In 1882, the Government of Quebec appointed an agent general in Paris, Hector Fabre. The federal government quickly named him its representative also, with the title of commissioner general, to be responsible for matters of emigration and trade. This curious arrangement lasted until 1911 when Fabre's successor, Philippe Roy, dropped the provincial appointment. Apparently neither the original decision about shared representation nor its later reversal was controversial.

It is not surprising that early steps to expand Canada's role internationally were closely associated with economic considerations. Trade was the lifeblood of Canada and was of the greatest importance to Canadian governments because it so directly affected the economic well-being of the country and of the voters. Alexander Galt, even before his appointment as high commissioner, was sent to Europe by Macdonald to attempt to negotiate commercial agreements with Spain and France but was unsuccessful. His successor, Charles Tupper, did succeed in 1893 in concluding a tariff agreement with France. Technically the accord was between France and Britain and was signed by both Tupper and the British ambassador in Paris; however, it was negotiated by Tupper alone, and it represented an important advance in Canada's conduct of her own international affairs.

Tupper in fact served as a "roving ambassador" for Macdonald, attending several international conferences on Canada's behalf, though not with full diplomatic status. On one occasion he delighted in openly disagreeing with the British position, informing Macdonald that he "felt some pride that Canada took her place on an equal footing with all the other Powers."
Trade matters were given an even higher priority in 1892 with the creation of the Department of Trade and Commerce. The new department's first minister, Mackenzie Bowell, undertook a trade promotion mission to Australia the next year, leading to the appointment in 1894 of the first full-time trade commissioner, John Short Larke, who was sent to Sydney.
Even Macdonald's famous National Policy, which seems at first glance a measure of domestic concern, was also a foreign policy statement. The policy combined a comprehensive system of tariffs with the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway to stimulate Canadian manufacturing industries, settle the west and inaugurate a system of east-west trade. By increasing tariffs on manufactured imports, in order to protect Canada's fledgling industrial sector, Macdonald was also responding to the protectionist policies of the United States and defying the free trade dogmas of Britain.
The Americans had rebuffed Macdonald's attempt to negotiate a reciprocity or free trade agreement during the Washington Treaty discussions; the successor Liberal government of Alexander Mackenzie had also fruitlessly sought such an agreement. Now Macdonald was determined to repay the Americans "in their own coin." The tariff wall induced many American companies to establish branch plants in Canada to avoid the duties, increasing American involvement in the Canadian economy.
Welcomed at the time, the extent of American ownership of Canadian industry would become a significant issue a century later. Although aimed at the United States, the National Policy was a tribute to the republic's success. Only by emulating the Americans and creating a strong, industrial economy could Canada compete with them and ensure the new nation's survival.
Another important goal of the government's policy was to stem the flow of Canadians to the United States. The "brain drain" has been, and continues to be, a significant concern. In this earlier period, however, it was more of a "brawn drain." Maritimers found work in the New England states, whose factories also drew large numbers of Francophones. Emigration from Quebec was a sensitive topic, and some commentators denounced the migrants as "deserters, cowards, loafers, and delinquents." Ontarians took up land in the American Midwest or found work in booming Chicago.
In all, more than a million Canadians sought the greener fields of the republic to the south between 1870 and the turn of the century, so that nearly half a million more people left Canada than arrived as immigrants in this period. This was particularly worrying when Canada had her own western territory to populate. Justifying the National Policy in Parliament, Macdonald complained that "we have no manufacturers here [and] our working people have all gone off to the U.S. . . . adding to the strength, to the power and to the wealth of a foreign nation instead of adding to ours."
The success of the National Policy has been a matter of extended historical debate. It certainly did not end the yearnings of those who believed Canada would never achieve the same level of prosperity as the Americans on her own. Macdonald's last years in office were plagued by two movements, commercial union and unrestricted reciprocity.
Commercial union meant the establishment of a common market between Canada and the United States and the maintenance of a common tariff against everyone else, Britain included. While the movement drew advocates on both sides of the border, it also aroused strong opposition in Canada. There was fear that a commercial union would inevitably lead to political union and the end of Canada as a separate country. All those who favoured the connection with Britain were aghast. Commercial union would be a very hard sell indeed.

Casting about for a platform that would finally oust the Old Chieftain, Macdonald, from office, the Liberal opposition flirted with the concept but rejected it in favour of the less fearsome-sounding unrestricted reciprocity. This arrangement would allow complete free trade between the two countries but permit each to maintain its own tariff structure against others. Limited reciprocity in itself had long been desired by both Liberals and Conservatives.
Macdonald, who favoured a limited reciprocity agreement covering natural products only, had tried in 1871 and again in 1888 to reach an agreement with the United States but to no avail. In 1890 the Harrison Administration raised U.S. tariffs to new heights. Secretary of State James G. Blaine, who saw Canada as a competitor, believed that by refusing anything less than commercial union, the Americans would force Canada eventually to seek admission to the United States. By refusing his overtures, however, Blaine handed the wily Macdonald a potent election issue.
Wrapping himself in the Union Jack, Macdonald denounced the Liberal platform as "veiled treason" that would only lead to Canada's annexation to the United States. Or, as one Conservative newspaper put it, "shall the Union Jack droop and the British lion cower while the eagle screams and the stars and stripes wave triumphantly from Alaska to the Gulf of Mexico?" The electorate agreed, giving a stunning victory to "the Old Man, the Old Flag, the Old Policy." The Conservatives were returned in 1891 with an increased share of the popular vote despite their 13 years in office.
Canada was also drawn into international issues through her membership in the British Empire. However, Macdonald was determined not to become officially involved in the numerous colonial wars that were a feature of running a worldwide empire. The most significant such occurrence in this period was the Sudan crisis of 1884-85, which saw British hero General Charles Gordon surrounded in Khartoum by rebelling tribesmen.
A relief expedition was sent under the command of Lord Wolseley, who had commanded the expedition to the Red River in 1870, following the Métis opposition to Canada's takeover of their territory. Wolseley had been impressed by the work of Canadian voyageurs during this expedition and now wanted a contingent of them to help him through the cataracts of the Nile. Macdonald did not object, since the contingent was raised and paid for by Britain. However, on reaching Khartoum Wolseley found that the town had been overrun and Gordon killed.

A wave of imperial emotion ran through Britain, one to which Canadians were not immune. Offers of service poured into Ottawa. Macdonald was again willing to allow the British to raise and finance any further Canadian contingent, but was placed in an awkward position when the colony of New South Wales offered Britain an official contingent. Sir Charles Tupper enthusiastically championed a similar offer by Canada, but at that Macdonald drew the line, creating an important precedent. "Why should we waste money and men in this wretched business?" the Prime Minister responded. "[N]ow that Gordon is gone the motive of aiding in the rescue of our Countryman is gone with him. Our men and money would therefore be sacrificed to get [British Prime Minister W.E.] Gladstone and Co. out of the hole they have plunged themselves into by their own imbecillity [sic]."
Future prime ministers would follow this approach; Canada should not be dragged into minor imperial skirmishes. A major war involving Britain would be another matter entirely.
Macdonald reiterated this approach in connection with the 1887 Colonial Conference on the occasion of Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee. The conference was a fairly informal affair that did not require the presence of prime ministers, and Macdonald did not attend since Parliament was in session. Canada was represented by Sandford Fleming and Sir Alexander Campbell, who were not even members of Cabinet. On the important issue of defence they were forbidden to make any commitment because of the government's resolve to stay out of wars that did not concern Canada directly. The most significant aspect of the conference was that it was a harbinger of the future: the modern Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings, held biennially, are the direct descendants of this first, modest effort.
The next conference was exceptional: it was called by Canada and held in Ottawa in 1894 specifically to discuss Canadian trade with the Pacific colonies. The British, who were not consulted, were not amused, particularly when the conference called for some form of imperial preference (they got their revenge by refusing to acknowledge it as an official conference).
The Colonial Secretary, the Marquess of Ripon, decided that it was time to put a check on these upstart colonists before they went even farther. He made it clear that the colonies should not contemplate making their own treaties independently of the British government since that would "give them an international status as separate and Sovereign States, and would be equivalent to breaking up the Empire." The colonies were subordinate to Britain and would remain so. But Ripon did not speak for the future; he, and the government he served in, would soon be out of office.

Canada in 1896 was still a new country, barely 30 years old. Yet in that brief time, a continent-wide nation had been established and the country had taken its first hesitant steps onto the world stage. Already it was clear that relations with the United States would be crucial to Canada's future and the allure of the great republic would continue to beckon.
Yet Canadians did not identify themselves only in negative terms as "not Americans." Canadians, after all, were British subjects, members of the greatest empire the world had yet seen. Canadian officials were determined to play an independent role within that empire but without becoming involved in every minor fracas that Britain engaged in. That, too, would remain a major theme in Canadian foreign policy. Yet the emotional attachment to Britain felt by English Canadians was not shared in French Canada. The maintenance of unity at home would soon become a key factor in determining what policy Canada followed abroad.