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Canadian International
Development Agency

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CIDA ✦ ACDI



Evaluation of CIDA's Honduras Program

2002-2010

Synthesis Report

September 2011

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Goberdhan Singh

Director General

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AECID	Spanish international development cooperation agency
AMHON	Honduran association of municipalities
AUCC	Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada
CABEI	Central American Bank for Economic Integration
CCM	Country Coordination Mechanism
CDPF	Country Development Programming Framework
CFOB	Chief Financial Officer Branch
CHF	Cooperative Housing Foundation
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COHDEFOR	Honduran forest development corporation Replaced by ICF Institute for forest conservation, protected areas and wildlife
COMVIDA	<i>Comunicación para la Vida</i> [communication for life]
COPECO	Standing committee on contingencies
CRC	Canadian Red Cross
CRH	Honduran Red Cross
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
EFA	Education For All
ESCASAL	Escuelas y Casas Saludables [healthy schools and homes]
FAHC	Honduras-Canada environment fund
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FHIS	Honduran social investment fund
GDP	Gross domestic product
GE	Gender equality (equality between women and men)
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GNP	Gross national product
GOC	Government of Canada
GoH	Government of Honduras
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (World Bank)
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IFI	International financial institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
ME	Ministry of Education
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OAG	Office of the Auditor General of Canada

ODA	Official development assistance
PAD	Project approval document
PD	Paris Declaration
PEDM	Strategic municipal development plan
PIP	Project implementation plan
PM	Pro-Mesas
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PSU	Program Support Unit
PWCB	Partnerships with Canadians Branch
RBM	Results-based management
SANAA	Independent national water and sanitation service
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SEPLAN	Secretariat of Planning and External Cooperation
SESAL	Secretariat of Health
SETCO	Technical and International Cooperation Secretariat
STD	Sexually transmitted diseases
TFP	Technical and financial partner
UNAT	Technical support unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO-PAHO	World Health Organization/ Pan American Health Organization

NOTE

Unless otherwise indicated, monetary values are expressed in Canadian dollars

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

Purpose of the Evaluation:

This evaluation was conducted to foster learning and contribute to program improvements. The evaluation also responds to the Government of Canada's (GOC) obligation (under the Federal *Accountability and Administrative Acts*) to evaluate all programs every five years. It is also consistent with the GOC's Evaluation Policy and the evaluation principles of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee.

Objective of the Evaluation:

The evaluation of CIDA's Honduras program has the following objectives:

- to report the results of CIDA's activities from 2002 to 2010;
- to analyze the overall performance of CIDA's activities in Honduras;
- to assess the performance of the various aid delivery mechanisms;
- to document lessons learned and offer recommendations to improve the program.

Scope of the Evaluation:

The evaluation covers a period of eight years. It reviews the country program's performance from 2002 to 2007 corresponding to the Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF) and during the interim period until 2010. The evaluation focuses on the country program's main areas of intervention and the crosscutting issues. During the evaluation period, Canadian disbursements of ODA to Honduras totalled \$134.5 million.

Honduras: Social Inequality and Political Instability

Internationally, Honduras ranks among low middle income countries (fifth in the Americas). It is characterized by a very vulnerable environment (mountainous country where the vegetation cover is deteriorating) and it is prone to natural disasters (hurricanes, drought, heavy rainfall). The country is marked by serious social and economic inequalities. More than 50 percent of people in rural areas live below the poverty line. The country's wealth is inequitably distributed. Less than 5 percent of the population holds more than 80 percent of the wealth. The political environment is unstable (a political crisis occurred in 2009). Public utilities are ineffective, particularly in rural areas. Population growth is fuelling youth unemployment, urban violence, and crime.

Vulnerability of Honduras:

After Hurricane Mitch in 1998, which caused 6,000 deaths and US\$4 billion in damage, lead donors (including Canada) formed a group (originally named the G-5, but now known as the G-16) to coordinate aid in Central America (including Honduras) to reduce environmental, social, and economic vulnerability (principles of the Stockholm Declaration). At the same time, Honduras announced a poverty reduction strategy (PRS) which qualified Honduras for forgiveness of a portion of its debt through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) (World Bank in 2005). The positive perception of investors at the start of the decade gradually declined, owing to delays in policy implementation and changes in government. In 2009, the President, Manuel Zelaya, was exiled. As a result of the political crisis, Honduras was suspended from the Organization of American States (OAS) and International financial institutions such as the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Central American Bank for Economic Integration, paused financial assistance. In general, bilateral donors, such as Canada, continued their support via multilateral partners and non-governmental organizations and for humanitarian assistance. During that period, Canada was very active in diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution. Since the peaceful election (November 2009) of a new president (Porfirio Lobo Sosa, with 55 percent of the vote), the situation has slowly returned to normal.

Canadian ODA in Honduras: A Country of Concentration.

Canadian bilateral cooperation has been active in Honduras for more than forty years. Since 2002, Honduras has been a country of focus and a priority for Canadian official development assistance (ODA). Canada is now the sixth largest donor, with disbursements just under \$24 million a year (all channels combined). Canada participates in most ODA forums in Honduras, where it is seen as a moderate and pragmatic partner. Early in the decade, CIDA adopted the CDPF 2002-2007, which reflected the objectives of the Stockholm Declaration and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) to reduce environmental, social, and economic vulnerability, and to improve governance.

During the review period, Canadian bilateral aid was first channelled through a pilot project (Pro-Mesas: \$40 million), then through an education Pooled Fund (\$20 million). The bilateral program also supported several responsive projects by Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral agencies. Many institutions in Honduras receive funding from Multilateral and from Partnerships with Canadians Branches.

When the CDPF 2002-2007 ended, there was a three-year “transition period” without an approved CDPF (approved early 2010). During that period, CIDA frequently changed direction on the thematic sectors, that country-of-concentration programs would work in. As reflected in the Report of the Auditor General of Canada 2009, Chapter 8, there were unclear requirements by the Agency over what was required for either a CDPF or a Country Program Strategy (CPS) until late 2009. This situation was particularly problematic for the program, as its overall strategy

was one of integration across sectors (Pro-Mesas) and programming decisions needed to be taken, given that the pipeline had to be filled following the end of Pro-Mesas, but program budget allocation was uncertain.

Evaluation Methodology:

This evaluation was completed in accordance with CIDA's methodological framework for evaluating country programs. The methodology includes eight criteria grouped under the following questions: a) What was achieved? i) Relevance, ii) effectiveness, iii) sustainability and iv) crosscutting themes b) How was it achieved? v) coherence, vi) efficiency, vii) management principles and viii) performance management.

Sample:

A sample was established, including sectoral and thematic projects, as well as various project implementation and cooperation mechanisms. The sample included 26 of 282 projects, representing more than 50 percent of bilateral disbursements and 30 percent of program disbursements. Note that only four bilateral projects disbursed more than \$5 million during the period covered; All other projects were smaller. All channels/sectors are represented.

Conduct of the Evaluation:

Started in 2009, the evaluation process had to be suspended because of the political crisis in Honduras. A mission to Honduras in April 2010 made it possible to validate the methodology developed beforehand. The work done in Canada, and the second mission in June and July 2010, helped to collect data (163 documents were consulted; 140 people were consulted in interviews and focus groups).

2. PROGRAM PERFORMANCE BY SECTOR AND BY THEME

Sustainable Management of Natural Resources: Highly satisfactory development results were achieved in natural resources management projects, thanks to the continuity of Canadian activities in this area, the use of tested development models, and the choice of partners with whom relationships were longstanding and mutually beneficial. Of the nine projects analyzed (all related to Pro-Mesas), seven were highly satisfactory, and only two were deemed to be of moderate and satisfactory in terms of their effectiveness.

Education: Strategic results were achieved, through the EFA Pooled Fund, university projects, and NGO activities, but there was a lack of synergy among these various activities. Positive and satisfactory results were achieved, but major challenges lie ahead for Honduras in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in education and sustainable results.

Health: Six out of the seven projects sampled had highly satisfactory results, particularly in terms of local services. Poor families, women, youth, and children were the main beneficiaries.

CIDA investments were successful in the fight against Chagas disease, a notorious scourge in Honduras. All these activities contributed to the MDGs.

Water and Sanitation: All of the three sampled projects in this sector have achieved or are achieving expected results. All help to reduce poverty by meeting a basic need: access to clean drinking water. All focus on water quality and on improving service to the poor.

Civil Society: Allocating a large share of CIDA's investments (Bilateral and Partnerships with Canadians Branch - PWCB) to civil-society capacity-building initiatives proved to be very useful and satisfactory. Honduran civil-society support projects helped to achieve catalytic results by building the capacities of grass-roots organizations to plan, monitor, and control decision-making processes related to allocating funds for the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS).

Gender Equality: The program's approach to gender equality proved satisfactory and relevant to Honduran needs and CIDA's strategy. The approach is also in line with regional initiatives that CIDA funds in Central America. Projects focusing on gender equality helped to implement this theme in public management, particularly with regard to the legal framework, implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy, and coordination among institutions. The most sustainable GE gains relate to reinforcing the participation of women in decision-making bodies, although gains in terms of GE integration in public institutions have remained low.

3. PROGRAM PERFORMANCE BASED ON EVALUATION CRITERIA

Relevance: All but two (satisfactory) of the projects in the sample were highly satisfactory in terms of their relevance to the needs of Hondurans. Dialogue occurred primarily at the local and regional level, in cooperation with decentralized institutions, continuing previously successful efforts. The program is closely aligned with the areas of intervention proposed in the 2002–2007 CDPF and the direction of the PRS.

Effectiveness: Overall, Canadian projects satisfactorily achieved expected results: (project sample: 13 highly satisfactory, 10 satisfactory and 3 moderately satisfactory). Canada's strategy was to position most of its projects at the decentralized level, to interact with local institutions, and to promote partnerships with experienced Canadian NGOs and effective multilateral agencies. This strategy was particularly well suited to the Honduran social and political environment of the past decade. The Education for All (EFA) program achieved less satisfactory results but made it possible to gain experience that will be useful to the program in the future. The evaluation shows that CIDA made an exceptional difference in two areas in Honduras: combating Chagas disease and preventing sexually transmitted diseases (STDs, especially HIV-AIDS) among Honduran youth. One of the expected results of the 2002–2007 CDPF – to make Honduras less environmentally vulnerable – was only partially achieved.

Sustainability: The sustainability of Canadian projects is satisfactory (project sample: 10 highly satisfactory, 11 satisfactory, 4 moderately satisfactory and 1 unsatisfactory). The following challenges affected this situation: 1) the overall weakness of Honduran public administrative institutions; 2) social and political instability; and 3) the financial dependence of the Government of Honduras (GoH) on foreign aid in social sectors, which are the main areas of investment in poverty reduction.

Canadian projects were successful in capacity building, particularly at the local and regional level, leaving behind significant human capital, a key factor in project sustainability, which is deemed satisfactory. Sustainability is one of CIDA's objectives, yet, for CIDA, planning and managing with five-year CDPFs, does not enable a stable environment to strategically focus on long term outcomes required for sustainable international development interventions.

Crosscutting Themes and Issues: It is difficult to conduct an overall assessment of the crosscutting themes criterion given the diversity of the situations according to each sector and theme (e.g. gender, governance/civil society, environment). However, they appear to be satisfactory. To report on them systematically, the program would have needed one or more crosscutting strategies along with performance measurement frameworks (note: those were not an Agency requirement until 2009). Governance, a key focus of Pro-Mesas, gradually became a secondary focus, particularly in regards to municipal associations (mancomunidades). The theme of support for civil society was also developed with great success, in consultation with other technical and financial partners (TFPs), and with relatively modest investments. The issue of equality between women and men was better supported than the other themes, by keeping a professional resource dedicated to this theme within the Program Support Unit (PSU). The absence of a program strategy for this theme was a barrier to constructive efforts.

Coherence: Program coherence is on average satisfactory. However, it varies depending on the sectors analyzed. The evaluators found that the most significant factor in project coherence was related to the Pro-Mesas approach to planning and design. However, three Pro-Mesas sub-projects were judged unsatisfactory due to low scores on internal coherence (funds were drastically reduced following the Program Audit in 2005). Moreover, 2002–2010 was not marked by strong cooperation among Canadian stakeholders. The significant presence of NGOs supported by PWCB along with other NGOs supported by the Bilateral program proved to be a challenge for coordination between Canadian partners. Bilateral relations with NGOs were significant in responsive projects. It is worth noting that CIDA's strong relations with implementing partners (responsive programming) is the main reason why the Program was able to continue programming during the political crisis. CIDA played an important role in coordinating donors in areas of strategic interest to CIDA efforts.

Efficiency: Efficiency in Canadian projects was, on average, satisfactory. The reorganization of Pro-Mesas (following the Honduras Program Audit in 2004) had an impact on CIDA's image locally. Bilateral disbursements declined to a low level, making program delivery mechanisms

more costly. Nevertheless, the qualified local staff had the ability to focus on "non-project" development results, technical/analytical inputs, stakeholder relationship management, coordination, and policy dialogue, along with Canadian staff.

Management Principles: Applying the principles of the Paris Declaration largely depends on the host country's political will and capacity. These conditions were not met, but the program was nevertheless able to achieve satisfactory performance by adopting a variety of approaches (mix of program and projects-based instruments) that were realistic and brought about change. To make progress on reducing poverty, Honduras depends as much on foreign aid as on effective domestic policies designed to improve public-sector financial management. Alignment experiments through complex administrative processes to mitigate risks (e.g. heavy procurement systems) were operationally less satisfactory (e.g. the EFA Pooled Fund or UNDP efforts in the case of Pro Mesas).

Performance Management / Monitoring and Evaluation: The CDPF 2002–2007 was not accompanied by a Performance Measurement Framework (PMF), which would have helped to monitor program results (PMFs were not an Agency requirement until 2009). At the project level, Pro-Mesas had a fairly advanced RBM system but it was not applied as systematically as expected. Implementing agencies made significant use of RBM. The program conducted few evaluations and follow-up studies. CIDA did not succeed in communicating and obtaining expected results from Honduras in terms of accountability, especially for the EFA Pooled fund. The Pro-Mesas pilot program, after the Program Audit, was downsized and drastically reorganized. The drawback of this decision is that CIDA missed an opportunity to learn from a completed pilot experience on a new and innovative aid effectiveness approach (development, management, and enabling results): a decentralized program. The program also did not have a risk management framework at the program level (though it had a Country Program Risk Assessment done in 2004; the framework was not an Agency requirement). Honduras was the first program to use the new "Risk Tools" developed by the Performance Management Division in 2007. It was updated twice in 2009 in preparation for the current CDPF.

4. PERFORMANCE BY DISBURSEMENT MECHANISM AND CHANNEL

Canadian ODA Delivered by the Pro-Mesas Mechanism: The Pro-Mesas project in Honduras was one of six pilot projects that formed part of the "Track 3B" initiative that CIDA's Executive Committee launched in October 2000 to strengthen aid effectiveness. It was designed from its inception to use policy dialogue as the base for building the program (through Mesas), oriented its investments according to the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), and ensured that sub-projects were meeting the needs of the poor in Honduras. It was designed to deliver multi-sector integrated small projects implemented through (and/or with) local organizations. However, in 2004, the Honduras Program Audit observed that Pro-Mesas required far more corporate support, and stricter project planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and control

procedures. From this perspective, Pro-Mesas had serious weaknesses that needed to be remedied. Thus, the audit recommended that the initial budget, for six sectoral projects, be decreased from \$30 million to \$20 million and the sectors of focus be reduced to two. Nevertheless, 48 sub-projects were implemented through Pro-Mesas. The results show that these projects were satisfactory. Pro-Mesas was the incubator for key projects currently operational. It helped to build bridges with civil society, and to make progress on the themes of gender equality and decentralization.

Program-based Approach to Education: In September 2002, Honduras submitted a proposal concerning Education for All 2003-2015. CIDA contributed to the Pooled Fund (second largest contributor). Positive results were achieved. In 2009, however, two nearly concomitant events negatively impacted it: 1) the 2009 joint audit of EFA program activities and 2) the political crisis occurred, which led donors to freeze their financial contribution to the Pooled Fund. During the political crisis, CIDA suspended disbursements for government-to-government projects (EFA). Thus, only half of the total planned disbursements (\$20 million for Canada) have been made to EFA.

The concentration of educational investments in the Pooled Fund limited CIDA's options to further the achievement of Honduran performance targets in basic education, particularly at the local and regional levels. The lessons learned have resulted in a mixed project-program strategy, ensuring more flexibility to achieve results.

Bilateral Responsive Projects: In view of the challenges in program delivery via Pro-Mesas and the EFA Pooled Fund, as well as the unstable political environment in Honduras, which was not very conducive to traditional Bilateral cooperation mechanisms, the Program used the responsive mechanism (a project-based approach) through partnerships with experienced Canadian NGOs or multilateral organizations already involved in sectors of focus. Overall, these projects were very successful. They largely enabled CIDA to achieve the objectives of the 2002–2007 CDPF.

Partnerships with Canadians and Bilateral Responsive Projects: This evaluation reviewed a few projects funded by Partnerships with Canadians Branch, as well as Bilateral responsive projects by Canadian governmental organizations. These projects made it possible to introduce important basic services for poor communities. The evaluators found that Canadian NGOs were very active in Honduras. The sample included a project that received a CIDA award for excellence (Plan International - AIDS). The Bilateral channel was also effectively used by other Canadian NGOs (Canadian Red Cross, CARE, and SOCODEVI).

Multilateral: Since only one multilateral project was part of the sample, the evaluation could not assess this delivery mechanism. Various projects (multi-bi), bilaterally funded but executed by multilateral organizations, appeared to have performed well.

5. LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons Learned for the Program

Effectiveness of work at the decentralized level: Work with decentralized organizations (local and regional) and local capacity building (human resources, equipment, and knowledge) were success factors.

Usefulness of project-based approach: This approach has the capacity to target specific results, is well defined geographically, directly serves targeted groups among the poor, and involves them in a participatory approach, and as such, is one of the success factors of the program.

Merits of investing in local monitoring: Local monitoring, by local professionals, was a factor in improving project performance, gaining in-depth knowledge of local issues, and developing relations based on trust that have favoured CIDA as a whole.

Need for CDPF continuity: Once the 2002-2007 CDPF ended, there was a three-year hiatus, caused by delays in approving a new Country CDPF. This break affected effective program implementation, particularly, having an approved direction for planning new initiatives.

Sustainability of results: Developing a long-term strategic vision of the sustainability of activities is one of the keys to achieving sustainable results from development initiatives. The long-term vision of programs/projects is typically limited to a five-year CDPF period, which is not sufficient.

Decentralized Bilateral delivery mechanism: Having a decentralized Bilateral delivery mechanism can be an important and effective tool in a country with an unstable social and political environment.

Use of multiple channels and mechanisms: In a country such as Honduras, where Bilateral cooperation faces many risks in the field, the use of diverse aid delivery channels and mechanisms (directive, program-based approach, responsive (NGOs), and multilateral agencies) at several levels (national, regional, and local), constitute a wise and appropriate approach.

Lessons Learned for CIDA

Applying the Paris Declaration and use of mixed modalities: The principles of the Paris Declaration and Accra Forum need to be applied with care, taking into consideration the local context. Country programs adopting an appropriate mix of aid delivery mechanisms appear to be more effective in terms of risk management and aid effectiveness, particularly in countries with significant governance issues.

In the case of a country like Honduras, where governance and public administrative capacity are weak, a thorough assessment of the risks associated with PBAs needs to be undertaken and care should be taken to ensure that the necessary conditions are met.

Cooperation among Canadian Stakeholders. Efforts were made in this direction, particularly through Pro-Mesas. However, CIDA did not promote enough cooperation among Canadian (especially non-bilateral) stakeholders at the program level and therefore CIDA did not achieve strategic and program leverage in areas where this might have been possible. CIDA could consider developing formal mechanisms to ensure cooperation among Canadian stakeholders (Bilateral and non-bilateral channels) to favour integration, synergy of activities funded by Canadian ODA. In addition, CIDA could devise ways of improving results-based management by providing guidance and tools for developing a “Country PMF” that would advance a whole-of-agency approach by integrating intermediate outcomes from all CIDA channels (Bilateral, PWCB, MGPPB) with clear accountability lines for the next CDPF period.

Use of local professionals. The Honduras Country Evaluation data recognized the added value of local professionals in providing knowledge, technical and country expertise that went well beyond supporting program logistics. Their contribution to developing strong relationships, based on trust, with local authorities was invaluable for policy dialogue and advancing the principles of aid effectiveness. CIDA could consider local professionals to be an integral part of program delivery.

Support of pilot initiatives.

Pilot initiatives such as Pro-Mesas should be comprehensively managed as pilots to conclusion, necessitating that they are innovatively designed in terms of a) the necessary resources and the necessary time to complete the full cycle of the initiative and b) necessary authorities, monitoring, evaluation and reporting are in place and exercised. Doing so, will enable CIDA to capture the innovative elements of fully completed pilots. This is also an observation from the Honduras Country Program Audit (2006): “CIDA’s innovation initiatives need to be better supported at the corporate level and managed in a more structured and business-like manner”.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

The following recommendations are intended primarily for the Division responsible for the Honduras program.

R-1: Mix of modalities. CIDA’s Honduras program should maintain an approach that favours the use of different aid delivery channels and mechanisms for the current Country Strategy period. In Honduras, the project-based approach and investments with civil society have been successful particularly for local services to the community, local capacity building, and participation in development, thus applying many of the Paris Declaration and Accra Forum principles.

R-2: Cooperation among Canadian stakeholders. The Program should look at ways to enhance joint processes (e.g, workshops, taskforces, etc.) for advancing cooperation among Canadian stakeholders for the current CDPF period.

R-3: Use of local professionals. CIDA's Honduras program should continue to use the services of local professionals as a source of context-relevant technical expertise, to maintain corporate memory and strengthen its aid effectiveness. The program should also develop a regular and systematized (annually) process to capture the lessons learned by local professionals to enhance the program and the Agency knowledge base.

R-4: Managing non-projectized program activities. CIDA should consider regularizing and systematizing (e.g., annually) the planning of its non-program/project development assistance activities in the field (donor cooperation, policy dialogue, and so on), and produce equally frequent monitoring reports.

7. CORPORATE CONSIDERATIONS

In the course of the evaluation, three issues of a corporate nature, that would have a bearing on the effectiveness of the program, surfaced.

These are identified and acknowledged below as corporate considerations instead of recommendations, in recognition that the Agency is aware of them and measures have already been taken, or are in progress, to alleviate the constraints posed.

C1: Transparency and aid effectiveness. Freely sharing the full CDPF with partners and stakeholders would help to improve transparency and strengthen aid effectiveness. Country programs could benefit from enlarging the circle of actors involved in program-level discourse. Specifically, programs could be allowed to freely share the full CDPF both as a program design instrument (i.e. shared during the preparation stage to foster dialogue with partners and stakeholders) and as an implementing instrument once approved. This consideration is in line with the Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2009 (Chapter 8) report.

C-2: Cooperation among CIDA channels. CIDA could consider developing formal mechanisms that could be adopted by country programs to ensure cooperation among Bilateral and non-bilateral channels to favour integration, synergy of activities funded by Canadian ODA. In addition, CIDA could devise ways of improving results-based management by providing guidance and tools for developing a "Country PMF" that would advance a whole-of-agency approach by integrating intermediate outcomes from all CIDA channels (Bilateral, PWCB, MGPB) with clear accountability lines for the next CDPF period.

C-3: Guidance on non-projectized program activities. CIDA could consider devising guidance on planning and monitoring of Country/Regional Program's non-project development

assistance activities (e.g. donor cooperation and policy dialogue, and so on) and their outcomes.

The issue of consultations and sharing of documents with stakeholders has been addressed by the ODA Accountability Act, which makes consultations mandatory, and the Agency's transparency strategy, in progress, through which many of the essential documents, such as country strategies and programming frameworks (R/CDPFs) are being put on the Agency's web site.

The whole of Agency approach to programming in our countries of concentration and the issue of non-projectized program activities are being addressed by the new guidelines for CDPFs and their PMFs and the Directive programming. Also, the role of the country program director in the field as the "integrator" of programming from the non-bilateral channels should help.

C4: Learning from Pilot Programs. The recent experience of the Honduras program underlines the importance of continued corporate support and having a good monitoring and evaluation system in place when pilot initiatives are undertaken. When the audit was launched to address the concerns regarding certain aspects of the administration of the program, CIDA may have learned more and the program may have taken a different course if an evaluation had been undertaken.

1. INTRODUCTION: EVALUATION APPROACH and METHODOLOGY

Honduras: a longstanding partner of CIDA. CIDA has supported Honduras in its development efforts for more than forty years. Between 1969 and 2010, Canada contributed about \$490 million in development assistance to Honduras. Honduras is currently the largest bilateral program in Central America, with an average annual budget of approximately \$16.8 million during the 2002–2010 period. In 2002, Honduras was designated as a priority country for CIDA, then as a development-partner country by Canada’s international policy statement in 2005, and was confirmed as a country of focus in 2009. In 2000, Honduras was selected for the Track 3B program (called Pro-Mesas in Honduras), an innovative pilot program implemented in six countries to strengthen aid effectiveness. The Pro-Mesas initiative’s was to represent almost 75 percent of the bilateral program’s investments and was to be based on dialogue through consultation committees (mesas) between the Government of Honduras, donors and civil society. It was designed to be a decentralization experiment.

1.1 Evaluation issues and questions

A comparative approach that meets the needs of Canada and the DAC. This evaluation was conducted to foster learning and contribute to program improvements. It also responds to the obligation of Canadian federal institutions (including CIDA) to evaluate their programs every five years. The evaluation was completed using the program evaluation approach recommended by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC-OECD), to ensure results comparable with those of other donors, acting in line with the principles of the Paris Declaration. The evaluation objectives were as follows. (An abridged version of the terms of reference can be found in Appendix A).

- Report results achieved by CIDA’s activities through the Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF) from 2002 to 2007, followed by a transition period until 2010.
- Analyze the overall performance of CIDA’s activities in Honduras, using the following criteria: relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, crosscutting themes, coherence, efficiency, management principles, and performance management.
- Assess the performance of the various aid delivery mechanisms.
- Document and disseminate lessons learned from the Honduras Program, and make recommendations to improve the performance of CIDA’s current and future Honduras program strategy.

The evaluation aimed to answer two basic questions. Each question included four evaluation criteria in line with the DAC and Treasury Board Secretariat, and various evaluation sub-questions:

A) What was achieved?

- **Relevance:** To what extent do the objectives of the CDPF, and of programs/projects implemented during the period, reflect Canada's priorities and the needs of Honduras and the targeted beneficiaries?
- **Effectiveness:** Did the CIDA program achieve the expected results, especially in poverty reduction?
- **Sustainability:** Are the results achieved sustainable, or do they have good prospects for sustainability?
- **Integration of crosscutting themes:** Were the results achieved in relation to the crosscutting themes of the CDPF?

B) How was it achieved?

- **Coherence:** Internal and external coherence among Canadian and international actors and complementarity among the various delivery mechanisms.
- **Efficiency:** Cost-efficiency of results achieved in relation to resources (funding, expertise, timelines).
- **Management principles:** Application of the key principles of the Paris Declaration, including ownership, harmonization, and alignment.
- **Performance management, monitoring, and evaluation:** Methods and procedures put in place to evaluate CDPF performance, and the programs/projects implemented, including the application of results-based management principles, monitoring and evaluation, and mutual accountability

1.2 Methodology

CIDA's Generic Terms of Reference: For this exercise, the evaluators used the Generic Terms of References for Country Program Evaluation developed by CIDA's Evaluation Directorate. This method is based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of a representative sample of projects from the program, which were rated on the criteria (relevance, effectiveness, etc.) on a scale from 1 (highly unsatisfactory) to 5 (highly satisfactory). Results are then totalled to provide an overall rating. (See the cumulative table in Appendix C.) Furthermore, a "program level"

evaluation form was designed for overall evaluation, including non-project activities. At that level, the assessment uses the same evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, etc.) as for the projects, but is assessed against each criterion only in qualitative terms based on the nominal rating scale (highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, unsatisfactory, highly unsatisfactory).

Scoping mission to determine the sample and the data collection strategy: The evaluation team members briefly visited Honduras from April 26 to May 2, 2010 and identified local expertise.

Representative Sample: Appendix B shows the sample of projects selected for this exercise. The sample has the following characteristics:

- The total amount disbursed for the sample was \$40.8 million, representing 30 percent of the amount disbursed (all channels combined) to the country program for 2002-2010, and 54 percent of the bilateral program.
- In Appendix B, the sample is presented by sectors/themes, which were the units used to analyze and present the evaluation results. The sample includes 26 projects out of 282 projects: 17 Pro-Mesas sub-projects, Pooled Fund in education, 4 bilateral responsive projects (by Canadian NGOs or multilateral institutions), 2 PWCB projects, and a multilateral cooperation project. By their nature, Pro-Mesas projects were regarded as directive bilateral projects, since they originated from 6 bilateral projects initially approved by CIDA.

Evaluation: Key phases and deliverables

- Literature review. The literature review focused on four categories of documents: 1) basic reference documents, 2) documents pertaining to CIDA activities and interventions, 3) CIDA's investment database, 4) evaluation and monitoring reports, and 5) the Pro-Mesas database on an electronic medium. (See Appendix D for the List of Documents Reviewed, which includes only documents mentioned in this report.)
- Meetings in Canada. The evaluation team held numerous launch meetings at CIDA Headquarters (shared understanding of evaluation objectives, issues, and concerns). The team also held interviews and focus groups to collect data. (See Appendix E for the List of People Consulted.)
- Fact-finding trip to Honduras. The fact-finding visit in the field ran from June 12 to July 2, 2010. It involved the three Canadian evaluators and two Honduran consultants. They received technical expertise and logistical support from the Program Support Unit (PSU) staff. It resulted in individual interviews, focus groups (with donors, civil society

representatives, direct beneficiaries in the field), and site visits to projects. (See Appendix E.)

- Data analysis. Data analysis (163 documents consulted; 140 interviews/focus groups) and report writing took place from August to December 2010.
- Evaluation deliverables. In keeping with its terms of reference, the evaluation team produced 1) a workplan (with an evaluation matrix and interview protocols in Spanish), approved by CIDA; 2) a lengthy technical report (Vol. I: 108 pages, Vol. II: 169 pages, including the 26 evaluation data sheets), presenting detailed evaluation results, conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations; and 3) a draft synthesis report prepared in the format required by CIDA, including an executive summary.

1.3 Evaluation Challenges and Limitations

The country program evaluation information challenge: In this exercise, the evaluation team faced the following challenges and limitations:

- The evaluation process began in 2009 but had to be suspended, owing to the political crisis in Honduras. When the process resumed, an initial team member had to be replaced because he was no longer available. Meanwhile, CIDA improved and updated its Generic TORs for Country Program Evaluation (CPE). The changes affected the work being done, since the workplan was prepared before the update was issued. Changes were included to ensure conformity with the update TORs.
- The concept of a “country program” is somewhat vaguely defined, except with reference to the concept of a “bilateral program”. Information is difficult to obtain – particularly about other delivery mechanisms and channels. Financial information is also generally difficult to compile and process, owing to financial cycles, differences between the notions of “budget”, “disbursements” and “expenses”, different funding methods and the absence of results-based financial reports. Financial information does not lend itself to analyses of administrative ratios.
- The fact that the Program did not have a CDPF between 2007 and 2010 limits the usage of normative questions (e.g Relevance: how is the CDPF aligned to the PRS?). It should be noted that during that period “well defined and transparent planning process and formally approved and public plans” was absent. That issue was raised by the Auditor General of Canada (see the 2009 Report, Chapter 8).
- Finally, Pro-Mesas was a challenge for the evaluation, given its particular structure at Headquarters and in the field, which posed technical problems in defining “projects”. By its innovative/tentative design, it was composed of a large number of multi-sector integrated small sub-projects implemented through (and/or with) local organizations. In

addition, as a decentralized pilot experience, Pro-Mesas was initially both managed and monitored by CIDA. It was thus necessary to hold detailed, in-depth discussions with the various stakeholders to gain an understanding of the issues and retrieve document evidence that was for the most part archived in the PSU and Embassy offices in Honduras.

2. HONDURAS ENVIRONMENT

2.1 Political, Economic, Social, and Ecological Environment in Honduras

Honduras experienced significant turmoil preceding and during the 2002-2010 period covered by the evaluation.

Political environment: Hurricane Mitch struck in 1998 while the government of Carlos Roberto Flores (Liberal Party, 1998–2002) was in power. This period was marked by very close cooperation between donors and the GoH, and the adoption of the 2001–2015 Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS)¹. The following government (Ricardo Maduro, National Party, 2002–2006) did not significantly support PRS implementation mechanisms. In 2005, Honduras was assigned the status of a “heavily indebted poor country” (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, or HIPC). During this period, however, Honduras experienced a degree of stability, as well as economic and social progress. President Manuel Zelaya (Liberal Party, 2006-2009), who came to power in 2006, expressed a desire to continue implementing the PRS. Yet, there was limited progress in implementing the PRS during that period. The National Anti-Corruption Committee’s initiatives led to an improvement, based on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for Honduras, which rose from 1.8 in 1999 to 2.5 in 2009². However, the lack of sound regulatory frameworks and law enforcement systems adversely affected Honduran growth and development.

On June 28, 2009, President Manuel Zelaya was removed from power and expelled to Costa Rica, sending a shock wave throughout the Americas. The political crisis resulted in Honduras’ suspension from the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition, international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), paused financial assistance (concessional

¹ Note: The National Plan of Reconstruction was a key document which preceded the PRS. It was the reference for the PRSP.

² The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), ranks countries in terms of the degree to which business people and country analysts perceive corruption to exist among public officials and politicians. The Corruption Index is a 1 to 10 scale. In 2009 the highest score was 9.3 (Denmark) and the lowest 1.0 (Somalia). Honduras was ranked 129th of 180 countries surveyed.

and non-concessional loans). In general, bilateral donors, such as Canada, continued their support via multilateral partners and non-governmental organizations and for humanitarian assistance. During the crisis period, Canada was very active in diplomatic efforts towards a peaceful resolution.

Presidential and legislative elections were scheduled and held in Honduras. Hence, the planned elections (November 2009) took place and were deemed to be free and fair, and generally reflecting of the will of the people: Porfirio Lobo Sosa (National Party) was elected with a comfortable margin (55 percent of the vote). The new President took office on January 27, 2010. The dialogue with the international community was gradually restored. Canada was one of the first countries to normalize its bilateral relations with the government, including ODA, with its participation at the January 27, 2010 inauguration of the new President, Porfirio Lobo Sosa. Honduras was reinstated as a member of the OAS.

Economic environment: Hurricane Mitch (1998) resulted in 6,000 fatalities. At that time, Honduras had a population of six million. More than one third of its people were displaced. They became temporarily homeless and/or without a means of livelihood. The development of Honduras declined considerably as a result of damage and losses. Total economic losses were estimated at over US\$4 billion. The economic performance of Honduras subsequently benefited from favourable trade terms, strong growth in trade with its key partners (especially the United States), and the absence of any shocks to demand, other than higher fuel prices. Once again, however, rapid population growth hindered the progress of Honduras. The Honduran economy was still considerably affected by international trade, international aid (representing an average of 9 percent of gross national income from 1994 to 2003), and natural disasters (hurricanes and floods are frequent in this part of the world). The Honduran economy is becoming more diversified with the proliferation of “tax free zones” and natural resource exports.

The external debt of Honduras has decreased from 80 percent of the GDP to 26 percent in 2007. Remittances from Honduran expatriates (remesas) have also grown significantly (5.6 times the amount of official development assistance received in 2007). However, the recent political crisis, combined with the global recession, have reduced remittances from expatriates and slowed down international trade. This has resulted in a decline in economic activity. (The GDP was estimated to be down 0.3 percent in 2009). An upturn in growth was expected in 2010. However, the new government still faced a difficult situation. Sustainable restoration of macro-economic stability remained a priority, leading to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in October 2010.

Social environment: social disparity and endemic poverty. Honduras is a lower middle-income country with an average per-capita income of US\$1,800 (2008). According to the 2009 Human Development Report, Honduras ranked 112th out of 182 countries, ahead of Haiti, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Bolivia. Honduras is the fifth poorest country in Latin America and the Caribbean. From 2000 to 2007, 22.2 percent of the population lived on less than US\$1.25

per day and 34.8 percent on less than US\$2 per day (33 percent according to the multidimensional poverty index). There is a very high level of economic inequality among social classes: 10 percent of the wealthiest Hondurans receive 42 percent of income, while the poorest 10 percent receives only 1 percent of income. Honduras has one of the world's highest and increasing Gini coefficients (57.6 in 2007 compared to 51.5 in 1999 – indicating a growing income inequality). It also has one of the highest rates of population growth on the continent (about 2 percent). Poverty is felt mainly in rural areas, home to nearly 75 percent of the poor.

Achieving MDG targets: lagging behind the sub-region. Honduras continues to make modest progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MDG 4 (reduce child mortality) will likely be achieved in urban and periurban areas. MDG 2 (achieve universal primary education) and MDG 3 (promote gender equality and empower women) may also be achieved, if the GoH takes appropriate steps. Unfortunately, available information does not allow us to evaluate progress made on the other five MDGs. However, significant progress has been made in meeting certain MDG targets, notably with regard to infant malnutrition, equality between girls and boys in education, reduction of the incidence of malaria, Chagas, Leishmaniasis and better conditions with regard to safe drinking water and sanitation.

Ecological environment: vulnerability and rural poverty. In Honduras there is a strong correlation between poverty and environmental degradation. In fact, 50 percent of Hondurans live in rural areas and earn their livelihood and income from agricultural and forestry activities. Under population pressure, however, the poorest farmers are driven back to the steep areas of watersheds, where they destroy the forest cover by practising low-value subsistence farming (corn, beans) and/or animal husbandry.

Combined with the loss of forest cover, drought makes drinking water resources scarcer and increases the incidence of waterborne diseases. Inequitable distribution of land, insecure land tenure, confusion created by an ambiguous legal framework, and constant changes in forestry policy have also contributed to the degradation of forest cover. However, the sector's institutional framework has improved (partly with Canada's support). A new forestry law, enacted in September 2007, will facilitate sustainable agro-forestry development of watershed communities, and will likely have a positive impact on their living conditions and income. Conservation of the natural environment is thus necessary to contribute significantly to sustained poverty reduction.

2.2 Development Assistance Environment in Honduras

Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS): With the support of donors, the GoH has developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The first version was published in 2000. The *Estrategia para la Reducción de la Pobreza - PRS 2001–2015* was developed as part of an intensive process of consultation among the GoH, donors, and civil society. The strategy proposes policies, projects, programs, and complementary measures to reduce poverty in Honduras. The strategy paper's key policy directions are i) to reduce rural and urban poverty, ii) to build

governance and participatory democracy; iii) to strengthen the role of municipalities, communities, and NGOs, and to promote private-sector development; and iv) to introduce environmental protection measures, while seeking to reduce the impact of natural disasters. It is important to note that the document lacked a gender sensitive approach which made it difficult to orient investments and measure results related to reducing poverty among women and men (information not disaggregated by sex).

As of 2005, the PRS was gradually put on the backburner of Honduran policy. In 2010, as one of its first acts in power, the new government released a national development plan (2010–2038 Country Vision and 2010–2022 National Plan). It incorporates the principles of the PRS, while updating them based on the more specific development strategies envisaged by this government.

PRS implementation mechanisms: These included various mechanisms: i) the PRS Consultation Committee; ii) the tripartite sectoral tables; iii) decentralization and strategic municipal development plans; and iv) the monitoring and social audit process.

But coordination was ineffective among the various Honduran mechanisms and forums for dialogue. It was also ineffective among regional and local mechanisms and processes, partly due to a lack of political will on the part of successive governments. The PRS survived three changes of government (2001 to 2007). However, it never truly became government policy. Each government put its own spin on the strategy.

ODA in Honduras: variations and crisis of confidence. Donor assistance represented only 4 percent of gross national income in 2007. However, it respectively accounted for 70 percent and 90 percent of public investment in health and education. In 2009, Canada ranked ninth among all donors (World Bank, IDB and the EU being the largest donors) and sixth among bilateral donors. Table 1 below shows the disbursements of the lead bilateral donors to Honduras, including Canada, for 2002–2009.

Table 1: Contributions by bilateral donors to Honduras 2002–2009 (US\$M)

MAJOR BILATERAL DONORS	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2002-09 Average
USA	97.25	70.11	112.08	88.38	84.1	71.1	96.33	128.76	93.51
Japan	94.85	31.99	31.34	103.47	138.01	20.76	40.86	41.72	62.88
Spain	36.36	57.61	54.00	95.02	44.31	110.82	117.56	58.43	71.76
Germany	13.41	17.14	26.14	24.01	13.74	26.15	32.17	15.85	21.08
Sweden	11.00	13.48	27.66	20.32	18.71	19.77	17.48	8.31	17.09
Canada	7.06	12.73	9.37	28.62	15.1	13.11	14.17	24.14	15.54

MAJOR BILATERAL DONORS	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2002-09 Average
Italy	4.67	7.78	19.62	23.51	17.08	4.58	6.10	4.48	10.98
Netherlands	8.85	6.45	16.11	16.32	1.07	0.41	1.15	0.75	6.39
France	3.91	1.18	21.30	4.51	34.76	1.55	1.42	1.42	8.76
Denmark	12.74	3.93	-0.02	10.91	3.68	3.61	2.52	2.74	5.01

Source: DAC, www.oecd.org/dac/stats

Note: This table is broadly coherent with CIDA financial records. However, our disbursement in FY 2004-05 was of 6 million which does not correspond to OECD-DAC 2005 figure. Hence, care must be taken in interpreting the reported data.

Mechanisms for coordination and policy dialogue between Technical and financial partners and the GoH: A formal group of donors was created in Honduras. Initially called the G-5 (Canada, USA, Sweden, Spain and Germany), it then developed into the G-12, and has now become the G-16. The G-16 is organized into three levels: 1) the ARG (ambassadors and representatives group), 2) the TMG (technical monitoring group), and 3) the donor sectoral tables, which bring together only the representatives of donors active in the sectors concerned. There are 10 sectoral tables. Canada participates in all of them: MERECE (Education sector table)/EFA Pooled Fund, Agro-forestry, Water and Sanitation, Health, Gender Equality, Harmonization and Governance, Security, Justice and Human Rights, Transparency and Good Government, Decentralization, and Aid Effectiveness. The new (2010) Honduran government has also established tripartite tables on Aid Effectiveness, and on Food Security and Nutrition (COTISAN). Canada also participates in both, and is chairing the latter. A select steering committee has been created, known as the Troika. Its members consist of the chairs for the current, preceding, and coming terms.

2.3 CIDA Programming in Honduras

CIDA's Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF)

The 2002–2007 CDPF: The 2002–2007 CDPF was developed to reflect the national priorities expressed by Honduras in the PRS and by the international community, as well as CIDA's desire to contribute to the development of Honduras. The CDPF is also based on more than 30 years of CIDA experience in implementing activities in Honduras. The CDPF sought to innovate in strengthening aid effectiveness by bringing it closer to local needs. The goal of the 2002–2007 CDPF was to support Honduras in its objective of reducing poverty, by means of the following three priorities:

- Sustainable management of natural resources

- Good governance: Decentralization and greater transparency
- Basic human needs: Reduced social vulnerability, and help to improve access to health care and education.

Governance was deemed one of the program's three priorities, as well as a crosscutting theme. The CDPF also attached particular importance to consultation among donors concerned, and to policy dialogue between them and the GoH. The Pro-Mesas initiative's absorption capacity was to represent almost 75 percent of the bilateral program's investments. The initiative was to be based on dialogue through consultation committees (mesas). Given the pervasive importance of the Pro-Mesas initiative throughout the period under review, a brief contextual summary is warranted.

Pro-Mesas: The Pro-Mesas program in Honduras is one of the six pilot projects in the Track 3B initiative launched by CIDA's Executive Committee in October 2000. The pilot projects had the following objectives: a) to highlight new ways of doing things, b) to innovate, and c) to model types of programs that would exist at CIDA in 2005. The approach proposed for Pro-Mesas focused on the use of tripartite sectoral consultation committees on the PRS as focal points for Canada's activities in Honduras. Canadian assistance would eventually support and strengthen these consultation committees, and these forums would decide which projects and activities Canada would support in Honduras. It was conceptually designed to move away from few large projects executed by Canadian implementing organizations to numerous multi-sector integrated small projects implemented through (and/or with) local organizations. Six areas of focus were identified: agriculture, forestry, environment, health, education, and, water and sanitation. Each area had a sectoral fund of \$5 million, to be disbursed over five years. Two other projects were affiliated with the program: 1) a Canadian technical advisor unit (TAU) and 2) a unit to learn lessons from the pilot project (IDRC responsibility). The local UNDP office's Business Unit was engaged to oversee (untied) procurement on the local or foreign market. One of the preparatory steps was to develop an investment strategy (December 2002) based on the adoption of a matrix organization and a multisectoral approach divided into five "initiatives": i) Honduran capacity building; ii) poverty reduction and sustainable development in the Olancho region; iii) poverty reduction and sustainable development in the northern coastal region; iv) activities in other regions; and v) development of learning systems to capture lessons from the Pro-Mesas pilot.

An overall audit of the Canada-Honduras cooperation program (not just Pro-Mesas) was ordered in 2004, and a moratorium was imposed on Pro-Mesas activities until April 2005. The audit's key findings were that Pro-Mesas required far more corporate support, and stricter project planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and control procedures needed to be implemented. One major observation was that the 6 projects of \$5 million each were managed in reality as a \$30 million dollar project (the subprojects did not respect sector lines as set up in the project approval documents), thereby exceeding the delegated authority (\$20 million) of the

Minister for approval. Thus, the main consequences of the audit recommendations were: 1) The initial Pro-Mesas budget, for six sectoral projects, was decreased from \$30 million to \$20 million and 2) The areas of focus were reduced to two. Health and water and sanitation (agriculture, forestry, the environment, and education were abolished). The budgets of the other program components (IDRC, and TAU) were not affected.

2007–2010 transition period: There was no new CDPF for 2007–2010. This period was marked by consultations and analyses in preparation for a new CDPF for Honduras. A review of the files demonstrates that as early as 2005, the programme prepared a lessons learned report, an education sector study and sector action plans towards the renewal of the CDPF. However, during that period, CIDA frequently changed direction on which (and how many) thematic sectors country-of-concentration programs would work in. For the Honduras Program that meant that only the health sector remained constant while education was on and off several times, and the natural resources and water and sanitation pieces were re-written repeatedly over three years (going through environment, integrated watershed management, private sector development and economic growth variants). In addition, in terms of planning instrument, there were unclear indications in the Agency over what was required for either a CDPF or a Country Program Strategy (CPS) until late 2009. This situation is also described in the Report of the Auditor General of Canada 2009, Chapter 8.

This situation was particularly problematic for a program whose overall strategy was one of integration across sectors (Pro-Mesas) and at a time when programming decisions needed to be taken given that the pipeline had to be filled following the end of Pro-Mesas and while total budget future allocation was uncertain. As a result, in 2008 the Program put forward and had an approved Country Program Strategy that had a focus in Private Sector Development rather than as it is now in the CDPF 2010-2015 “Food Security”; the reason being that Agency priorities were announced later in March 2009.

The 2010–2015 CDPF was formally approved early in 2010. The new CDPF targets two priority themes:

- *food security*, focused on improving sustainable rural agricultural production of small-scale producers, and nutrition;
- *children and youth*, with a focus on improving maternal and child health through the prevention of transmissible diseases (diarrhoea, Chagas and Leishmaniasis), improving quality and access to maternal, child and youth health services, and strengthening health systems; as well as strengthening the management and delivery of quality basic education.

Disbursements by sector and branch: Table 2 below shows the breakdown of CIDA disbursements to Honduras, from FY 2002–2003 to FY 2009–2010. Bilateral disbursements account for 73 percent of total disbursements.

Partnerships with Canadians Branch made a large percentage of disbursements (more than 28 percent of the total). However, some of these amounts are “imputed” to Honduras as part of regional or institutional programs. The figures in this table must be interpreted cautiously. Classifying investments by sector can cause confusion. In the case of the private sector, for example, investments are mainly in agriculture, rural development, and natural resource management. This table shows that close to 60 percent of Canadian disbursements of ODA were allocated to address basic human needs (social development: education and health). This was one of the program’s priorities. Finally, the governance share of investments is relatively low, given the directions of the CDPF, which made it a priority component.

Table 2: Sector Disbursements to Honduras by branch (2002/03-2009/10)

Sector	Americas	Partnership	Multilateral	Total by sector	%
Health	47.91	4.67	.35	52.93	39.4%
Education	20.06	3.89		23.95	17.8%
Subtotal: social development	67.97	8.56	.35	76.88	57.2%
Private sector	18.59	13.43	.10	32.12	23.9%
Governance	4.38	7.07	.00	11.45	8.5%
Environment	2.42	2.03		4.44	3.3%
Emergency	.96	.05	.68	1.69	1.3%
Peace and security		.15	.12	.26	0.2%
Other	3.90	3.71	.01	7.61	5.7%
Total by branch	98.21	34.99	1.26	134.46	100.0%
Number of projects	59	207	16	282	
%	73.0%	26.0%	0.9%	100.0%	

Source: Data provided by CIDA: SGDE-EDRMS #4830992 v4 Honduras_Program-Evaluation-Data.xlsx

The program’s main bilateral projects (2002/2003–2009/2010): decline of Pro-Mesas and increase in responsive bilateral projects. Table 3 below shows the bilateral projects with the highest disbursements during the period in question, as well as disbursements for the program as a whole. At the start of the period, Pro-Mesas dominated bilateral programming by the volume of its investments. In this report, Pro-Mesas has been analyzed as an ODA mechanism, rather than a “single project”. Investments in education (EFA) rank second. The other projects (MUNSALUD, PASOS I, II and III, REDI [Reduce Child & Maternal Malnutrition], WFP and UNICEF) are responsive projects funded by the bilateral program, and implemented by non-governmental and multilateral organizations.

Institutional funding provided by PWCB and Multilateral (most of the table’s “other projects”), will also be analyzed in the chapter on delivery channels and mechanisms for Canadian ODA.

Table 3: Annual disbursements for major projects 2002/03-2009/10 (\$M)

Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total	%
PRO-MESAS	4.67	5.82	3.52	6.55	4.18	2.79	0.66	0.14	28.33	21.1%
EFA - Education	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.10	5.81	0.03	2.12	4.16	12.22	9.1%
School Feeding / WFP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.00	3.60	7.60	5.7%
PASOS I,II,III / CARE	1.08	1.10	0.98	1.02	0.95	0.54	0.67	0.98	7.31	5.4%
REDI / WFP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.00	3.30	6.30	4.7%
MUNSAHUD / UNICEF	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	1.74	1.56	5.30	3.9%
Water-Sanitation / UNICEF	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	3.0%
Sub-Total	5.75	6.92	4.52	7.66	10.94	9.36	11.18	14.73	71.06	52.9%
Other projects	7.03	10.31	6.79	5.95	7.09	7.10	9.25	9.89	63.40	47.1%
TOTAL	12.78	17.23	11.30	13.61	18.03	16.46	20.44	24.61	134.46	100.0%
%	9.5%	12.8%	8.4%	10.1%	13.4%	12.2%	15.2%	18.3%	100.0%	

- Source: Data provided by CIDA: SGDE-EDRMS #4830992 v4 Honduras_Program-Evaluation-Data.xlsx
- PRO-MESAS includes the six sectoral projects, the Learning Systems project and a the Technical Advisor Unit.

3. MAIN RESULTS BY SECTOR AND BY THEME

3.1 Sustainable Management of Natural Resources

Accomplishments in the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources sector: overall highly satisfactory results. Sustainable management of natural resources projects are very relevant (all projects in the sample were highly satisfactory) as a result of continued Canadian intervention in this area, the application of tested development models, and the choice of partners for long and mutually productive relationships. The projects in this area have been effective in achieving development results. Out of the nine projects analyzed (all part of Pro-Mesas) assessed against the effectiveness criteria, four were deemed highly satisfactory, four were satisfactory and one had partial success. The sustainability of the results of the Pro-Mesas initiatives in natural resources management is, however, variable. It is highly satisfactory in the case of projects supporting national institutions, but moderately satisfactory to satisfactory for projects conducted with local partners. The integration of the GE dimension in these projects was variable. It is lacking in part of the projects, where more decisive action in this area would have been desirable. Governance was crosscutting in these projects. In most cases, this involves strengthening national or local institutions in order to achieve, under these projects, a more sustainable management of natural resources, one of the keys to reducing rural poverty in Honduras – which represents a winning strategy.

Examples of results in the area of natural resources management

- The institutional development support project (MAMUCA) helped to set up an inter-municipal organization. This decentralized organization has significant human and physical resources, thanks in large part to the project, and is continuing to provide guidance and leadership in the Atlántida department, where it acts with the support of donors (including Canada).
- The Rio San Juan basin management project was mostly carried out by MAMUCA. By focusing on water management, it obtained sustainable results in control and rational use of water, in the protection and development of forest resources, in improving health conditions (about 5,000 people), in reducing the environmental vulnerability of the upper drainage basins, and in creating jobs and economic growth
- The two management projects for the Tela and Tocoa drainage basins enabled the extension of the potable water service in these two cities and strengthened the municipal organizations in charge of water management and sanitation. Integrated management plans were achieved for the drainage basins whose upper portions were vulnerable, and the sanitary conditions of part of the rural population living in these basins were improved.

- The dairy industry support project in the MAMUCA intervention area helped to improve productivity and sanitary conditions (in about 75 dairy farms) and to implement procedures and norms for sanitary hygiene in four milk processing cottage units.
- The project to support the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (SERNA) provided the Ministry with the skills to develop and regularly update the necessary framework documents (Environmental Policy (2005), *Strategic Institutional Plans and Annual Operation Plans, Guides and Manuals*, etc.) in order to exercise its orientation and regulation role with respect to environmental protection and sustainable management of resources.
- The project to support SERNA'S Water Resources Branch made it possible to set up an interactive water and environmental information centre (CIIHA), used above all for college and academic training. The principles and directives of the Water Resources Integral Management Policy are widely recognized and applied, even though the Policy had not yet been enacted at the time of the evaluation.
- The Agenda *Forestal Hondureña* (AFH) is a forum for consensus-building in the forestry sector. The support project for this organization has enabled it to become a leader in the participatory preparation of the National Forestry Program (PRONAFOR), approved in 2005. This program is the framework document for forestry projects in the country. The AFH also supported the participatory and concerted preparation of the Forestry Act (2008) and continues to play the role of coordinator, leader and organizer in the forestry sector.
- The AFE/COHDEFOR institution-building project, which has since become the ICF (Institute of Forest Conservation and Development) enabled effective participation in the preparation of PRONAFOR and the elaboration of Forest Development Projects (PRODEFO). Today, the ICF is a key player in activities aimed at increasing economic, social and environmental benefits, and at ensuring sustainable management of the resource.

3.2 Education Sector

Accomplishments in the Education sector: “What was achieved” is overall satisfactory.

Canada has played an important role in the political dialogue with the government of Honduras, within the Pooled Fund, regarding management of the education program. However, external factors have considerably delayed the process for implementing the program and have limited the achievement of the performance targets. These factors are political changes in Honduras, weak institutional capacity of the Ministry of Education, burdensome program and management

structure imposed by donors (original 2003 MoU)³ such as the ill-aligned procurement procedures (Honduras system versus World Bank) and difficult labour relations, where Teachers unions have been very disruptive. The concentration of investments in education in the Pooled Fund has limited Canada's ability to play a decisive role in achieving Honduras' performance targets in basic education, in particular at the local and regional levels. This decision was, however, relevant and in line with the policies and priorities of Honduras, and with CIDA's priorities and strategic directions. Despite positive results, there remain significant challenges in achieving MDG2 targets. There is a long way to go to achieving sustainable results: the technical, institutional and financial capacity of the main partner, the *Ministry of Education*, remains weak despite efforts by the government of Honduras to implement the EFA program and the technical and financial support provided by Canada and other donors. Crosscutting issues have not been a priority in the design and implementation of the EFA program.

Examples of results in the area of education

- Pro-Mesas initiatives in the education sector have set up, at the Ministry of Education, technical and methodological tools to oversee the efficient management of the *Education For All* (EFA) program funds. These initiatives have also provided stakeholders with an institutional diagnosis by the Ministry.
- Canada's support for the EFA program Pooled Fund has helped to reinforce the Ministry of Education's ability to manage the program by creating an EFA unit and changing the structure of the *National Financial Administration System* (SIAFI) in order to achieve effective decentralization. Access of students to school and their retention have increased significantly in recent years, both at the preschool and primary level. A significant reduction has also been noted in the drop-out rate. However, major challenges remain in achieving the MDGs and sustainable results in the education sector in Honduras.
- The Social Vulnerability and Urban Management project has made it possible to set up a Master of Urban Management program within the Faculty of Latin American Post-Graduate Studies in Social Work (PLATS), at the National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH). Closely associated with the Association of Municipalities of Honduras (AMHON), the program trains professionals capable of reinforcing technical skills and

³ As stated by SIDA (2008) *How to Start Working with a Programme-Based Approach*: "In the *Honduras Education for All Programme*, for example, the procurement conditionalities are too complex for the ministry, and as a result the ministry has been unable to purchase school books for the children. When making demands, donors need to prioritise and exercise restraint." Note: Donors are working to update the MoU.

democratic governance at the municipal level, and in particular by introducing a new vision for urban development, according to which the citizen occupies a central place. The first group includes 11 graduates, including 7 women. There are currently about 15 employees in management positions within municipal administrations who are enrolled in the master's program. The project has also helped to establish a resource centre on issues of social vulnerability, city management and development, by focusing the country's efforts on the decentralization and strengthening of local institutions.

3.3 Health Sector

Accomplishments in the health sector: the best results – highly satisfactory. The seven projects from the health sample are all highly satisfactory relevant. They reflect an optimal application of the general (fight against poverty) and specific (in their area of health intervention) objectives pursued by Canada and Honduras, and all correspond to targets defined in the MDGs. The results achieved (immediate, intermediate and ultimate) by the projects in the sample are highly satisfactory (6 out of 7), particularly in terms of outreach services. Poor families, women, youth and children were the main beneficiaries. CIDA was successful in a little known area: the fight against Chagas disease, a well-known transmissible disease in Honduras. If we were to take into account only the ability of local stakeholders to take over the services – which the projects have greatly helped to develop – the sustainability of the projects could be high. However, dependence on funding, especially foreign, continues to be a limiting factor – like in other social services sectors. Health sector projects are, on average, highly satisfactory in matters of GE. They stand out thanks to opportune, well targeted information, education and communication (IEC) strategies able to generate changes in behaviour in favour of more egalitarian, respectful and responsible gender relationships.

Examples of results achieved in the Health Sector

- The Community Health project reached out to 6,000 poor homes in 34 remote communities. It had an effect on improving perinatal care for women and children. It set up an efficient system (database for measuring results) that was reproduced by the public health services afterwards. It formed a network of volunteer community workers in the base communities.
- The REDES project consolidated the model of the previous CRC project and reproduced it in 229 base communities in isolated regions. It benefitted more than 20,000 women and formed a large network of volunteer community health workers who know how to use the tools designed by WHO-PAHO.
- The MUNSALUD project extended the model – developed in the Pro-Mesas' *Support for Reproductive Health/UNICEF/UNFPA sub-project* – to 52 municipalities. It set up 50 COMVIDA committees (groups of young adolescents for responsible reproductive health) and 19 service centres (adapted for adolescents) in the public health centres.

- The HIV-AIDS program set up in Honduras by *Plan International* enjoyed vast nation-wide success. It provided training in good sexual health with respect for others to over 15,000 students and nearly 500 teachers in over 100 schools. Its educational material is distributed and used everywhere.
- Since 2002, the *Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria* supported five multi-year programs in Honduras (HIV/AIDS: 2, TB: 2 and Malaria: 1). The Fund has a highly developed performance evaluation system. Until 2007, indicators showed moderately satisfactory performance for Honduras. Measures were taken and the Fund now has a very high performance.
- The support project for *PN-Chagas (Pro-Mesas sub-project)* had the maximum score with respect to efficiency. This CIDA initiative supported national efforts. The program was able to eradicate one of the principal vectors of the disease that was infecting human households in the intervention areas (four departments). Carriers of this disease (youth and pregnant women) were systematically detected in these areas and treated. Blood banks were protected and medical staff trained. It is a remarkable success. As a result of this initiative, the disease is now better known and prevention programs are more effective.

3.4 Water and Sanitation Sector

Accomplishments in the Water and Sanitation Sector: “What was achieved” is overall highly satisfactory. The three projects sampled in this sector are characterized as highly satisfactory relevant. They correspond closely to Honduras’ objectives and are directly associated with achieving MDG7c objectives. All of the projects in this sector have produced the expected results (or are in the process of doing so), and all contribute to reducing poverty by meeting a basic need: access to drinking water. They focus on drinking water quality and improving services for underprivileged groups. The context of sustainability of small water supply systems in Honduras is complex. These projects have contributed to helping decentralized and community institutions (Juntas de Agua) deal with this challenge. A winning model to be used as a reference has been developed in the PASOS-II project. However, sector projects have quite diverse GE performance. What sets the PASOS-II project apart from the others is its GE strategy, which allows for very useful gender-specific information to be gathered. The environmental theme is better treated – in application of the integrated water management approach. It is important to note that although, PASOS-III was not included in the sample, it appears that the GE strategy and the above approach was successfully applied, providing a positive indicator of sustainability.

Examples of results achieved in the Water and Sanitation Sector

- PASOS-II has reached out to 16,000 people in 35 communities in northern Honduras, and has increased access to drinking water services in this rural area from 69.8% to 95%, and to sanitation services from 75% to 94.5%. It has reduced by 7% the diarrhea-related mortality rate in children under 5.
- The UNICEF project supports (through SANAA and SESAL) the development of capacities (water quality control, chlorine bank) of municipalities in five departments. By working together with NGOs, its IEC program has enabled the implementation of ESCASAL committees in 53 base communities and four periurban zones, reaching 9,700 homes. It has provided emergency equipment to COPECO to put in place a strategy reaching 16,000 families and risk reduction plans for five vulnerable municipalities. It has rehabilitated the Tocoa water distribution system (45,000 inhabitants) and provided equipment (latrines) for nine camps.
- The Rio Telica project has rehabilitated 17 water systems and built 264 household latrines in 19 communities of three municipalities in the Olancho department. It achieved one of its impact-related objectives (access to drinking water increased by 42%) and seems to have partially achieved the objective regarding proper household hygiene practices. The project made it possible to install six hydrochlorizers and train members of 17 *Juntas del Agua* on good water management practices.

3.5 Civil Society and Gender Equality

Accomplishments of Civil Society interventions: satisfactory results Allocating a large portion of Canadian investments (bilateral and PWCB) to initiatives designed to strengthen civil society's capabilities proved to be highly satisfactory in terms of their relevance. Projects supporting Honduras civil society helped to achieve valuable results by strengthening the competencies of local organizations in planning and control of decision-making processes for the allocation of funds for the PRS. However, the benefits remain dependent on the desire of the GoH to involve civil society in the development, implementation and monitoring of its policies. Both sector-wide projects (especially in the natural resources and health sectors) bringing base community groups together and civil society reinforcement projects have proven to be excellent vehicles for promoting the integration of crosscutting themes, such as governance, GE and the environment.

Examples of results with respect to civil society

- In three years, the ACI-SRP multi-donor Fund has granted \$4.5 m to support Honduran civil society organizations (including more than \$1 m from CIDA through Pro-Mesas). The Fund has supported 70 civil society organizations in their work involving information, participation and policy ideas on reducing poverty.
- The project to support the Juticalpa municipality has made it possible to reinforce several municipal management components. It has made it possible to achieve concrete results, such as the implementation of the *Women's Office*, the creation of a *Centre for Women who are Victims of Domestic Violence*, and the implementation of a *Home-care Centre* for youths from dysfunctional families. The project also achieved important results through the creation of a unit in charge of the environment within the municipality.

Accomplishments of Gender Equality interventions: “What was achieved” is on average satisfactory. GE projects have helped to include this theme in public management, in particular with respect to the legal framework, implementation of PRS and inter-institutional coordination. They have also contributed to strengthening institutions and NGO awareness on this theme. The most sustainable GE gains relate to reinforcing the participation of women in decision-making bodies, although gains in terms of GE integration in public institutions have remained low. The GE strategy, and a large part of the funding allocated to this theme, has focused on strengthening GE in government institutions. The results achieved correspond to the GE results anticipated by CIDA in Honduras. A large number of these positive outcomes comes from Pro-Mesas. It served the purpose of an ‘incubator’ or bridging projects (below \$500K but allowed next step to larger projects that were in planning), which specifically reduced GE gaps and were strategic for Honduras. These GE efforts have contributed to policy reforms in favour of women. While funds may have been limited, the impact was significant and is still relevant today.

Examples of results with respect to gender equality⁴

- Pro-Mesas projects have helped to raise awareness about the GE situation in Honduras through academic and professional institutions.
- Awareness has been raised and reinforced among the government and civil society institutions involved in the theme of violence against women (876 people at the Public Prosecution Office, national police, judiciary and civil society organizations).

⁴ Some results appear to be outputs but in fact are GE outcomes resulting from mobilisation, advocacy and awareness activities and outputs where institutions and organizations are now investing in building GE capacity and implementing GE sensitive policies. These are not ultimate GE results but necessary precursors to the GE benefits that reflect a difference in the lives of women.

- National and local institutions have been equipped and trained to promote GE (including the theme of violence against women).
- National organizations have increased their ability to develop and implement crosscutting GE policies.
- GE importance has increased within the sectoral table in agriculture and forestry.
- Specific GE policies have been introduced within government institutions for rural development (SAG, SERNA, INAM). GE actions have reinforced Canada's position with respect to government institutions, such as UNAT, and within international cooperation;
- Eight municipalities have municipal development plans that include actions for implementing the *National Women's Policy*; four municipalities have operational plans on this topic.

4. MAIN FINDINGS BASED ON THE EVALUATION CRITERIA

Overview of the project level and of the program level. Table 4 below provides an overview of the results of the evaluation performed by the evaluators for all rated projects in the sample against each of the eight criteria interpreted according to the grid defined for project review.

Table 4: Summary of the evaluation results by criteria and– project level

Projects by Sector	NR	ED	HE	WS	GE	CS
Number of projects	9	2	7	3	3	2
% of total \$44,770,645 expenses	9.1%	28.2%	36.2%	23.0%	0.7%	2.8%

Sector Scores by Evaluation Criteria ⁵	NR	ED	HE	WS	GE	CS	Average
1. Relevance	4.8	4.8	5.0	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.6
2. Effectiveness	4.1	2.9	4.3	4.3	3.8	4.3	3.9

⁵ Evaluation code: 4.1-5.0: Highly satisfactory / 3.1-4.0: Satisfactory / 2.1-3.0 Moderately Satisfactory / 1.1-2.0: Unsatisfactory / 0.1-1.0: Very unsatisfactory / 0: No evaluation or not applicable.

Sector Scores by Evaluation Criteria ⁵	NR	ED	HE	WS	GE	CS	Average
3. Sustainability	4.1	2.8	4.0	4.1	2.8	3.7	3.4
4. Crosscutting themes	4.5	2.7	4.6	3.4	3.2	4.0	3.6
5. Coherence	3.3	3.9	4.4	4.3	3.9	4.4	4.2
6. Efficiency	4.2	2.9	4.2	3.8	3.3	4.3	3.7
7. Management principles	4.6	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.7	4.2	3.7
8. Performance management	3.4	3.4	4.1	3.7	3.2	3.6	3.6

NR: Natural Resources; ED: Education; HE; Health; WS: Water and Sanitation; GE: Gender Equality; CS: Civil Society

Table 5 below provides an overview of the results of the evaluation performed by the evaluators at program level against each criterion in qualitative terms based on the nominal rating scale (highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, unsatisfactory, highly unsatisfactory).

Note: The reader may observe that the ratings between Table 4, at the project level and in Table 5 at the overall program level are different. The reason for such difference is that the Program level involves non-project aspects and thus “represents more than the sum of the projects”. For example, the lower rating regarding the criteria of sustainability is due to the fact that the country has faced serious governance challenges that have significantly affected the courses of action of the program, while specific projects undertaken at local levels have done rather well. Under the coherence criteria, the lack of capacity of the GOH to lead donor coordination has affected the rating, while the coordination of local actors within specific projects have functioned rather well. The efficiency criteria at the program level is indeterminate given that sub-criteria are not convergent. On the one hand, the pilot initiative was designed with a large technical assistance component which was drastically reduced following the 2004 Audit. On the other hand, this component enabled CIDA to play a stronger role in terms of coordination, policy dialogue and stakeholder relationship management.

Finally, while performance measurement frameworks were frequently used at project level, at program level, the 2002-2007 CDPF did not have such performance tool. It was not an Agency requirement at the time.

Table 5: Summary of the evaluation results by criteria – program level

Evaluation Criteria	PROGRAM LEVEL
1. Relevance	highly satisfactory

Evaluation Criteria	PROGRAM LEVEL
2. Effectiveness	satisfactory
3. Sustainability	moderately satisfactory
4. Crosscutting themes	Satisfactory
5. Coherence	satisfactory
6. Efficiency	Indeterminate
7. Management principles	moderately satisfactory
8. Performance management	moderately satisfactory

4.1 Relevance

Project level: overall highly satisfactory project relevance. The overall evaluation of the relevance of the projects from the sample is very high (4.6). In all sectors/pillars, the evaluators noticed that the projects were in line with the CIDA and Honduran priorities, and, in particular, with those of the PRS.

- **Natural Resources Management:** Continuity of Canadian interventions in this area, application of tested development models, choice of partners for long and mutually productive relationships.
- **Education:** Support for the Education Program through the Pooled Fund, in application of the (Paris Declaration (PD) principles and directly in line with Honduran policies and priorities, and strategic CIDA priorities and directions.
- **Health:** Optimal application of general (fight against poverty) and specific (in their area of health intervention) objectives pursued by Canada and Honduras. Close correspondence with the targets defined in MDG 4, 5 and 6.
- **Water and Sanitation:** Close correspondence with the objectives of both countries and directly in line with MDG7c.
- **Governance/Civil Society:** Acknowledgement of the importance of the role of civil society in the democratic development of Honduras and of citizen participation in development.
- **Gender Equality:** Proper response in relation to the needs of the country, application of CIDA's general strategy and continuation of regional initiatives supported by CIDA in Central America.

Program level: highly satisfactory relevance. The Canadian strategy of positioning most of its projects at the decentralized level, of interacting with local institutions and of promoting partnership with experienced Canadian NGOs and efficient multi-lateral agencies has been particularly well adapted to the Honduran socio-political context that has marked the decade. It has enabled Canada to remain present among underprivileged populations, to provide effective responses to their needs, despite the vagaries of the federal government's policies, and to reduce the risks of poor management. The decision to take part in the sector-wide education support program (EFA) has made it possible to gain experience that will be used to inform future PBA approaches that may be undertaken by the Program. It should be noted that documented evidence could not be found of ex-ante opportunity/risk studies done prior to engage Canada into the EFA investment in Honduras. The decision to make major changes (as the result of the Country Program Audit) to the way the Pro-Mesas pilot experience was implemented greatly reduced the relevance and value of the Track 3B innovative pilot experience. It hindered CIDA to capture the learning and real lessons (development, management, enabling results) about a decentralized program. This knowledge would have been timely now that CIDA is moving into a decentralization process.

4.2 Effectiveness

Project level: overall satisfactory effectiveness (3.9). Projects with the best performance are those carried out at the local or regional level, with participatory approaches and which have targeted results closely related to beneficiaries' needs. The least efficient sectors/pillars were education and GE. However care must be taken in interpreting data given the small sample of these later sectors. The Education For All (EFA) program posted results below the expected levels due to a weak institutional partner, complex management structure, unstable political context, and difficult labour relations.

- **Natural Resources Management:** highly satisfactory performance of the projects in the sample (all part of Pro-Mesas) in achieving development results – except in two cases: satisfactory and moderately satisfactory performance.
- **Education:** Despite achieving strategic results, performance is moderately satisfactory (2.7) in achieving the targets. Good performance in university cooperation projects and NGO interventions in the sector, but lack of focus in these interventions. Persistence of major challenges in achieving MDG2 targets.
- **Health:** High project performance (immediate, intermediate and ultimate). Significant usefulness in terms of outreach services to primary beneficiaries: poor families, women, youth and children. Success in a little known area – fight against Chagas disease and in STD prevention (especially HIV/AIDS) among young people.

- **Water and Sanitation:** Satisfactory delivery of expected products (or underway for recent projects). Emphasis on water quality and on improving services for underprivileged groups. Direct and important effects on public health (reduction in cases of mortality due to diarrhea among children).
- **Governance/Civil Society:** Achievement of valuable results by strengthening basic competencies of organizations in planning, follow-up and control of decision-making processes related to the allocation of funds for the PRS.
- **Gender Equality.** Satisfactory project performance (3.8). Contribution to the development of the GE theme in public management (statutory framework), PRS implementation, and institutional coordination. Institutional strengthening and NGO awareness of this theme.

Program level: 2002-2007 CDPF objectives partially achieved, but satisfactory

effectiveness. Given the value of the investments by CIDA in Honduras, one cannot claim that Canada made a real difference alone in the progress of the major poverty indicators nation-wide (see table on social indicators in Appendix F). However, it has certainly made a difference (with respect to its investments) in the sectors where it has chosen its targets properly. In fact, the evaluation observed that, in the social sectors (health, education, water and sanitation), the results actually achieved in the projects were well aligned with the MDGs (MDG2 – primary education; MDG4 and 5 – Children’s Health, Maternal Health; MDG6 Combat AIDS and Diseases Transmitted by Vectors, and MDG7c – Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitary Services).

The evaluation shows that CIDA has made a difference in two specific areas in Honduras: the fight against Chagas disease and the prevention of STDs among young people. Even if it cannot be quantitatively estimated, qualitatively, one can easily argue that CIDA effectively contributed to reducing poverty in Honduras within the scope of the investments extended.

The priority given to governance (which should have been, in principle, addressed as a sector) has become instead a crosscutting pillar. This was a healthy change because, if dealt with head-on, the governance sector would probably have led to a fruitless political dialogue with the GoH, given the country’s political inconstancy. In view of this, had the Pro-Mesas approach been maintained, CIDA might have had enabling results on the “mancomunidades” (municipal associations), and on the municipalities with which it had established relationships of trust (e.g., MAMUCA and MANMO).

4.3 Sustainability

Project level: overall lowest sample score (3.4) in the sustainability criterion, but satisfactory. The sustainability of Canadian projects is a challenge, despite satisfactory short-term results. There are many explanations for this. On the one hand, there is a general

weakness among Honduras' public administration institutions, whether at the central or regional level. Socio-political inconstancy, the related staff turnover, and the lack of austerity in management are persisting causes. Financial dependence on foreign aid in social sectors (main areas being investment in the fight against poverty) remains.

Decentralization plans, action plans, sector-wide strategies, etc., are generally valid on paper, but are not implemented (or are only partially implemented). However, Canadian projects, (in particular those funded through PWCB where most projects include a phase out plan), have worked successfully on capacity building (especially at the local and regional level), which leads to a significant human capital over the medium and long term – a key factor in sustainability. This benefit, which has been noted in many projects, explains why the rating given by the evaluators is not lower. However, in the medium term, the shortcomings of the Honduran context come to the forefront (staff turnover, lack of motivation, insufficient budget, poor management, corruption) and sustainability is therefore affected.

- **Natural Resources Management:** Variable sustainability. High in projects supporting national institutions, but more moderate in projects carried out with local partners.
- **Education:** Sustainability far from being realized. Weakness (technical, institutional and financial capacity) of the primary partner (Ministry of Education), despite efforts by the government and technical and financial partners (TFPs). Sustainability was also limited due to external factors such as complex management structure imposed by donors and difficult labour relations.
- **Health:** Projects under bilateral and multilateral programming funding had good technical capacity for management of services by local partners, but high dependence on foreign funding: limiting factor and unresolved issue.
- **Water and Sanitation:** The sustainability of small waterworks in Honduras is a complex issue involving several factors (decentralization, community participation, service costs, and local management. A winning model to be used as a reference has been developed in a project supported by CIDA (PASOS-II)).
- **Governance/Civil Society:** Actions to strengthen Honduran civil society capacities, both through support from Canadian partner NGOs and by direct funding to local organizations, appears (evidence based on a small sample) to have helped to consolidate Honduran civil society so as to enable it to play a strategic role in the country's development. The benefits remain, however, dependent on the desire of the Government of Honduras to involve civil society in the development, implementation and follow-up of its policies.
- **Gender Equality.** The most sustainable GE gains relate to reinforcing the participation of women in decision-making bodies, although gains in terms of GE integration in public institutions have remained low. The lack of continuity, both with respect to Canadian and

GoH commitment to GE, has limited the scope of the gains made within the framework of Pro-Mesas initiatives.

Program level: a moderately satisfactory result under the sustainability criterion. Although sustainability is an objective it pursues, CIDA strategy was limited to a five-year (CDPF 2002-2007 followed by a three-year transition) period that, according to the Auditor General of Canada (see the 2009 Report), should be longer. When sustainability is defined as “Maintenance of benefits resulting from a development activity after a major development assistance activity is completed” and one assesses aid dependency at program level, this criteria cannot be scored higher than moderately satisfactory.

However, it is important to take into consideration the acute contextual difficulties encountered by the Honduras Program as summarised in section 2.3. Therefore, if one would examine sustainability of the Program in terms of maintaining CIDA’s investment during frequent political changes (five governments over the period) including a political crisis, the score would be highly satisfactory. In particular, one should take note of the Program’s effort in promoting and supporting the transition of the overall aid relationship between Honduras and donors from a rudimentary coordination to substantive policy dialogue through the G-16 on key development issues and explicit consideration of country strategies and priorities in all key CIDA programming decisions. Finally, during the crisis period, there were significant non-project related efforts (i.e. policy dialogue and ‘diplomatic contribution’ during the political crisis) to maintain the operations.

Unfortunately, to be consistent with the general definition of sustainability, the score remains moderately satisfactory clearly due to factors over which the Program has had very little control.

4.4 Crosscutting Themes

Project level: on average, satisfactory result (3.7). It is difficult to conduct an overall assessment of the crosscutting themes criterion given the diversity of the situations according to each sector and theme. On the one hand, it contains several elements (GE, environment, governance) that often do not all apply to the projects, or whose results cannot be merged into a common rating. On the other hand, crosscutting themes sometimes turn into intervention sectors, as is the case with the Honduras program (direct GE, environment and civil society support projects). Finally, the governance crosscutting pillar is intrinsic to the sustainability criterion (results provided by a local institution).

Apart from these conceptual considerations, the evaluators noticed that the crosscutting pillar that could be effectively applied to almost all projects of the sample was the GE pillar. The general score granted to it is satisfactory (3.6). Only the health sector, and certain projects in other sectors where specific GE efforts were made, achieved a highly satisfactory score. EFA Pooled Fund was less satisfactory in this respect.

- **Natural Resources Management:** Variable integration of the GE dimension: low in three projects of the sample. High integration of the governance theme.
- **Education:** Crosscutting themes were not a priority in the design and implementation of the EFA program. They were taken more into account in NGO projects funded by the CPB.
- **Health:** Highly satisfactory projects in terms of GE. Timely, well targeted (including men and boys) information, education and communication (IEC) strategies capable of generating behavioural changes in order to promote more egalitarian gender relationships. The environment theme approached in a satisfactory manner, where applicable.
- **Water and Sanitation:** Quite variable GE performance. One project (PASOS-II) stands out due to the quality of its GE strategy. The environment theme was treated using a holistic approach to water management.
- **Governance/Civil Society:** Base projects proved to be excellent vehicles for encouraging the integration of crosscutting themes, such as governance, gender equality and the environment.
- **Gender Equality:** The GE theme was part of the governance pillar (strengthening of federal institutions in GE matters). There was variable integration of crosscutting themes (other than GE). Environment: support for the participation of women in infrastructure development decision-making bodies.

Program level: satisfactory result in the crosscutting theme criterion. It is difficult to assess crosscutting themes at the program level. In order to achieve good results at this level (and report them systematically), the program must have one or more crosscutting strategies accompanied by Performance Measurement Frameworks (PMF), That is, to include crosscutting themes within the PMF. This was not the case in the Honduras program. Pro-Mesas did indeed try to advance on this level, in particular with respect to governance (decentralization) and GE. When the program was suspended, the governance theme was gradually set aside at a time when the program was gathering very interesting results from it, especially with the “*mancomunidades*” (municipal associations).

The civil society support theme was also developed with great success, together with other technical and financial partners, and for relatively low investments. Finally, during the Pro-Mesas period and after the cessation of this program, CIDA maintained a professional GE resource at the PSU. The absence of a strategy in the program in this matter limited its achievements. Finally, the Honduras-Canada Environment Fund – despite its scope – remained a marginal element of the program, treated as if it were not a component of it. This fund could have had far greater performance and given significant visibility to CIDA in the field. In brief, the Honduras program had no cross-cutting strategy (note: this was a requirement in the Agency

until 2009) for reporting, encouraging, benefitting from and better emphasizing the results it achieved in these areas.

4.5 Coherence

Project level: overall highly satisfactory (4.2), but variable depending on the sector. The evaluators noticed that the major factor for project coherence is in fact associated with the Pro-Mesas approach to planning and design. This approach was based on an in-depth knowledge of the issues in the sectors, the establishment of relationships of trust with local partners, a systematic search for optimal integration in the country's development policies, and joint action with international partners who share this vision (like minded). The withdrawal of Pro-Mesas from the key sector defined in the 2002-2007 CDPF (protection against the ecological vulnerability that formed the keystone of the Pro-Mesas Investment Plan) weakened coherence, especially in the natural resources sector. However, a coordination and joint action approach was maintained in the other sectors. It persisted, in part, in the local institutional culture of CIDA through the contribution of local professionals.

- **Natural Resources Management.** The initial excellent coherence developed in the Pro-Mesas investment strategy (targeted multi-sector approach on the geographical level) was deeply affected by CIDA's decision to redirect the program (disappearance of the agriculture, forestry and environment sectors). As a result, 3 projects out of 9 in the sample, had an unsatisfactory coherence (due to very low internal coherence scores). However, it had satisfactory coordination with other donor organizations and even highly satisfactory in certain cases.
- **Education:** Good desire of CIDA for coherence (with the GoH and the TFPs) through its participation in the education Pooled Fund. Low complementarity between the different CIDA mechanisms for delivering aid for projects in the education sector (i.e. no other bilateral projects along the EFA Pooled Fund project; only few PWCB projects with partial involvement in the sector).
- **Health:** High project coherence (use of models previously successfully tried, Pro-Mesas planning methodology based on knowledge, decentralization and make or buy), good integration in the external environment (national policies, other donors).
- **Water and Sanitation:** Satisfactory projects with respect to coherence (good resource allocation, in-depth knowledge of areas of intervention, prior positive experiences of executing agencies and relationship of trust with a well-motivated common local partner: SANAA).
- **Governance/Civil Society:** High coherence of Pro-mesas civil society reinforcement projects. No evidence of coherence or coordination between the initiatives of the Canadian NGOs and the Bilateral initiatives.

- **Gender Equality.** Pro-Mesas projects coherent with GoH, TFP and NGO objectives on the theme of GE. Little coherence as concerns the integration of the GE issue in Canadian programming. Little continuity within the GoH in favour of GE promotion.

Program level: satisfactory result on the coherence criterion. Canada played an important role with respect to donor coordination. Apart from the education sector, the inter-donor issue tables are used more for exchanging information than tools for development and common approaches. They are, nonetheless, very useful, and Canada has acquired the image of a moderate, pragmatic donor focused on searching for acceptable solutions. As for coordination with the GoH, it appears to have been moderately satisfactory and variable throughout the period. It is important to note that during the political crisis, Canada played a significant role, being very active in diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution. This was above ordinary and elevated Canada's presence and resulted in Canada being viewed as a trusted partner with the Government of Honduras and among donors.

The launch of Pro-Mesas, which came about following donor enthusiasm for the PRS, gave rise to many expectations from GoH authorities: CIDA was seen as a model. Successive changes within the GoH slowed down the pace and revealed a weakness (which was known to be significant): weak Honduran institutional leadership regarding relationships with international partners. This situation then affected the confidence of international partners, who often preferred to use parallel channels to manage donor funds. With the decline of Pro-Mesas, Canadian policy dialogue with the Cooperation Secretariat (SETCO) lost its main purpose especially considering that from 2007 the Program was navigating without an approved Strategy and was experiencing a difficult context as described in section 2.3. On the sector-wide level, dialogue did, however, continue with the Education Pooled Fund, where relations were stormy: CIDA always tried to be helpful and moderate. Policy dialogue was more successful in the area of health, where Canada is seen as a major partner in the fight against Chagas disease and other diseases transmissible by vectors.

The evaluation noted that the CIDA program team developed good working relationships and significant coordination with Canadian non-governmental organizations with respect to projects funded through bilateral channels. However, given the importance and role played by nongovernmental organisations in the delivery of the program, there have been missed opportunities to strengthen coherence at the program level. There was no formal dialogue on the more strategic issues. Furthermore, the absence of a strategy or action plan as concerns coordination and policy dialogue makes it difficult to assess performance.

4.6 Efficiency

Project level: on average, satisfactory efficiency (3.7). Relatively variable performance was observed in projects and sectors. Projects managed by executing agencies, or by local or specialized institutions, tend to have better results than those managed by central institutions, or

by parallel management systems. This is particularly the case with EFA Pooled Fund and the case of Pro-Mesas. As part of Pro-Mesas' project delivery mechanism, a contract of up to \$3 million was awarded to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to provide procurement and financial management services. The inefficiency of that procurement/financial management system – noted by all observers – had a negative impact on the implementation of many sub-projects. As a general rule, the Honduras Program Audit (2004) noted and the evaluators confirmed, a lack of simple, standardized, comparable, easily accessible financial information (budgetary monitoring, administrative ratios, assets, and operating expenditures) that would have resulted in better informed decisions on the costs and benefits of Canadian investments in sub-projects.

- **Natural resources management:** Management efficiency was deemed satisfactory overall. Two projects were deemed less satisfactory (change in design and delays in contracts and procurement).
- **Education:** Donors made major investments in the Education for All (EFA) program. Poor management efficiency was revealed through monitoring and evaluation. Transaction costs were high (Financial resources were difficult to manage. Significant human resources were allocated to program monitoring/evaluation, coordination, and policy dialogue.)
- **Health:** On average, highly satisfactory efficiency was achieved by using local human resources. Financial management was generally satisfactory. The complexity of the Pro-Mesas management system was a major constraint. It increased the duration and costs of transactions for beneficiaries and for the manager. However, it did not have too much of a negative impact on the good results achieved by projects.
- **Water and sanitation:** Management was satisfactory overall, except for the very small Pro-Mesas project, which was affected by the dysfunction of this program's management system (deadlines were not met).
- **Governance/Civil society:** The projects in the sample had a good cost-efficiency ratio. It was not possible to determine the cost-efficiency ratio of the other civil-society capacity-building initiatives. (Activities were too varied and scattered throughout Honduras.)
- **Gender equality:** There was a strong initial impetus toward integrating GE in all Pro-Mesas initiatives. (There were two GE specialists and a deep commitment to achieve results.) For lack of adoption of the GE strategy (Pro-Mesas 2002), of headquarters support and of continuity in commitment made, GE investments did not have the desired effects.

At the inception of Pro-Mesas, a large part of the field support resources were designed to support the Pro-Mesas program, which had five Canadian technical specialists, and five to seven local specialists, in addition to UNDP's procurement/financial management services provided under contract.

As stated in the Honduras Program Audit there was the lack of clear guidance at the Agency level in regards to how the Pro-Mesas pilot could operate. On April 14, 2005, this program's budget was reduced from \$30 million to \$20 million, and the program was allowed to continue to completion. This major investment appears not to have generated as many results as could have been expected (i.e. efficient) given the reduced envelope. However, one cannot extrapolate that all administrative overhead (program staff in HQ and the field, the PSU and the Technical Advisor Unit) was dedicated only to support project delivery. Along with the modifications to Pro-Mesas came a dramatic shift in staff functions, and especially, over the last few years, to focus on "non-project" development results through coordination, policy dialogue and stakeholder relationship management. Direct project management responsibilities now comprise a very minor part PSU staff.

As a last element, Pro-Mesas being truncated/modified had a direct impact on the original intent of CIDA's investment in the Learning Systems project. IDRC could no longer entirely fulfill the project's goal of systematizing the lessons learned from the Pro-Mesas pilot experience.

Table 6: Budgets and Expenses for Program Support Projects

Number	Name	Start	Total budget (M\$)	Expenses as at March 31, 2010 (\$M)
A031491001	PRO-MESAS / Technical Advisor Unit	01-01-2002	5.00	4.64
A031490001	CIDA Office	02-01-2002	4.65	4.60
A031493001	Learning Systems / IDRC	04-02-2002	4.93	4.93
A033234001	PSU Honduras 2007-2012	30-03-2007	4.71	2.16
A033757PRE	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Fund	01-06-2007	0.12	0.06
A034681001	Technical Advisor Unit	01-02-2009	2.21	0.10
TOTAL			21.62	16.49

Source: Database provided by CIDA's Evaluation Directorate / December 2010 (Initial information provided by the CFOB)

The Honduras PSU and Embassy is staffed with qualified personnel and has a well-established infrastructure that can handle a high workload. Local professionals are a key factor in knowledge acquisition and remain the program's true corporate memory.

Program level: indeterminate efficiency. It is difficult to judge the program's efficiency as such; because available financial information and administrative costs do not lend themselves well to this type of exercise to perform comparison with other donors (accounting practices

differs in terms of aid budget versus operation and maintenance budget between donors). On the other hand, the very notion of a program is variably defined. For projects, it covers disbursements by all channels, resulting in a relatively high total. For management costs, however, the data focus is mainly on the bilateral program. Data could not be collected to compare efficiency with other donors (benchmarking) or program cost-benefit ratios. Therefore, efficiency at Program level could not be measured given insufficient evidence.

4.7 Management Principles

Project level: Application of aid effectiveness principles - overall satisfactory result (3.7).

For this criterion, CIDA's performance is particularly difficult to assess. The main condition for successfully applying these principles is the existence of a stable, strong, and engaged national counterpart. Despite good intentions, this has not been the case in Honduras over the past decade. The meagre success of EFA Pooled Fund is a good example. However, the evaluators have observed that, in this unfavourable environment, the project-based approach still achieved good results, especially in ownership by local institutions, alignment with Honduran policies, and consultation with other international partners.

CIDA constantly sought to develop favourable conditions for applying the Paris Declaration (PD) and is recognized for doing so. We must give credit to the Pro-Mesas program that was unquestionably applying the PD before it was written, an approach that was highly appreciated by the Honduran partners.

Two PD principles were not applied. The environment was not conducive to using the GoH's procurement mechanisms in projects. The risks were too high, and CIDA did well to be cautious in this regard. Projects also were not outstanding in terms of mutual accountability as for example the Bi-National committee – CIDA and the GoH – that jointly reviewed Pro-Mesas proposals.

- **Natural resources management:** Aid effectiveness principles (ownership, alignment, and harmonization) were properly applied, due to Pro-Mesas' operating procedures.
- **Education:** PD principles were very well applied in EFA Pooled Fund, but did not always achieve results in practice.
- **Health:** The context was not conducive to applying the PD principles. (There was a lack of leadership from SESAL.) There was a coordination between projects in their respective fields and were aligned to Honduran priorities. Resources were managed by executing agencies working in parallel to government structures: This was a risk-mitigating factor.
- **Water and sanitation:** Projects in this sector were all implemented by executing agencies. Positive influence on aid coordination and local-institution ownership. Resources were controlled by accountable executing agencies: a proper risk mitigation measure.

- **Governance/Civil society:** ACI-SRP Fund: This was a good example of extending the PD principles to the civil-society environment.
- **Gender equality:** Major efforts were made to ensure that the PD principles were applied through the intersectoral consultation committee (MIG), but few results were achieved, due to a lack of continuity, political will, and resources.

Program level: moderately satisfactory result. The criterion of applying the PD principles may distort the program evaluation. If aid did not meet this criterion, it would immediately be deemed less effective in a program that chooses not to apply all or some of these principles. The case of Honduras clearly explains the difficulty. In this case, bilateral program managers tried to apply these principles as well as they could. The Pro-Mesas program was a forerunner of the application of the PD principles. The program lost much of its original intent when the GoH changed and the tripartite sectoral consultation committees were abandoned. EFA Pooled Fund was implemented with great caution and cooperation among donors and the GoH, but results were nevertheless moderately satisfactory.

Canada's contribution was temporarily suspended in these two initiatives (on different grounds and at different periods), leaving the bilateral program with few options. The application of the PD is an ideal whose main ingredients continue to be political will and the host country's capacities. If these conditions are not met, then hybrid approaches (program-projects) must be considered. They are less dogmatic, more realistic, and better agents of change. This was the position of Honduras program managers, who should be congratulated for their prudence. Finally, CIDA was restricted in its efforts to communicate with Honduras about accountability or about the program's narrative and financial results especially since 2007.

4.8 Performance Management/Monitoring and Evaluation

Project level: overall satisfactory performance (3.4). This score is explained by some weaknesses in using results-based management (RBM) tools, especially monitoring and evaluation. Pro-Mesas had a fairly advanced system with RBM (except financial reporting) but it has not been applied as systematically as expected. Implementing agencies made significant use of RBM. Finally, it should be noted that the performance of projects has greatly benefited from the contribution of local professionals from the PSU and Embassy (planning, monitoring) contributing undeniably to knowledge acquisition of CIDA.

- **Natural resources management:** Performance management was generally satisfactory, except for risk management, which was not given much consideration.
- **Education:** Necessary knowledge and tools were provided to MoE for monitoring and evaluation (results framework, indicators, baseline, and so on) to apply RBM in the EFA Pool Fund. However, RBM was not applied in reports produced. PWCB-funded educational NGOs showed good mastery and application of RBM.

- **Health:** Good use was made of RBM. Risks were adequately managed and high quality monitoring done by local advisors.
- **Water and sanitation:** Variable use of RBM and the risk management framework. Local monitoring, by a competent and stable local advisor, was of good quality.
- **Governance and Civil society:** NGOs showed little mastery or application of the RBM approach. Project monitoring focused more on administration and finance than on results.
- **Gender equality:** Absence of mechanisms to ensure the integration of GE in the planning and monitoring of sectoral initiatives in terms of outcomes, performance indicators and risk analysis. CIDA did not systematize its GE activities. Apart from the PSU GE Specialist, there were no specific resources to monitor and evaluate GE results.

Program level: moderately satisfactory performance management. The 2002-2007 CDPF did not have a Results-based Program Performance Measurement Framework. This makes results difficult to monitor and evaluate. What is more, there was no new CDPF for 2007–2010. Therefore, a normative performance management assessment at Program level is impossible. Judged against the best standards CIDA's application of RBM was moderately satisfactory in this regard. One has to give credit to the program to have maintained the operation in the absence of such tools. However, it is important to note that Program PMF has been an Agency requirement only since 2009. The recently approved CDPF 2010-2015 does have a PMF.

During the period, the program performed few project evaluations. These exercises led to a second phase of the evaluated projects, which applied the lessons learned. These highly relevant lessons (some led to proven intervention models) were learned mainly from bilateral responsive projects implemented by Canadian NGOs or multilateral agencies. However, there are no mechanisms to capitalize on these experiences at the broader Agency level.

Apart from a joint evaluation of the education Pooled Fund, CIDA did not take part in any joint evaluation exercises with other donors. CIDA also did not participate in evaluation exercises formally involving the GoH. This was criticized a number of times during interviews. CIDA invested a great deal in Pro-Mesas studies, evaluations, and consulting services (both Canadian and local). Despite all of this, CIDA does not seem to have had any mechanism in place to learn lessons from this pilot, expressly designed as an experimental program to explore new ways to strengthen aid effectiveness, in particular through decentralization.

At the inception of the 2002-2007 CDPF, the program prepared a grounded investment strategy for Pro-Mesas that was based on a situational analysis (*Zona de Atlántida and Olancho*) along sectors priorities. It also prepared various documents (*lineamientos* or guidelines) during the Pro-Mesas implementation. Between 2006 and 2010, the programme prepared a lessons learned report, an education sector study and sector action plans towards the renewal of the CDPF.

The program did not have a risk management framework at the program level (although a Country Program Risk Assessment was done in 2004) along with the 2002-2007 CDPF (it was not an Agency requirement). Honduras was the first program to use the new “Risk Tools” developed by the Performance Management Division in 2007. It was updated twice in 2009 in preparation for the new CDPF. It is worth noting that one of these updates was done just before the political crisis that was not foreseen. Nevertheless, the question remains whether these have been truly useful in an environment where adjusting as the context changes seemed to be the only option. Faced with many risks, CIDA adopted a flexible strategy with several aid delivery channels and operated on several levels. That strategy avoided interruptions due to major crises with the central government, made it possible to develop alliances in all sectors, and provided Canada with a good basis for policy dialogue.

5. KEY FINDINGS BY DELIVERY MECHANISM

5.1 Delivery Mechanisms and Channels of Canadian ODA

The following pages contain the key findings of the analysis of CIDA’s various delivery channels and mechanisms in Honduras. In order of importance, we will discuss bilateral mechanisms (Pro-Mesas, program-based approach, project-based approach), Partnerships with Canadians (PWCB-funded projects and the bilateral responsive mechanism), and multilateral mechanisms (multi-bi and institutional support).

Table 7: Evaluation results by delivery mechanism/channel

Project Overview	Responsive Multilateral	Responsive Partnership	General and sector budget support & pooled funds	Directive projects	Responsive projects
Number of projects	2	1	1	17	5
Project Expenses as a % of total expenses (\$=44,770,645)	12.7%	7.8%	24.5%	21.1%	33.9%

Evaluation Criteria ⁶	Responsive Multilateral	Responsive Partnership	General and sector budget support & pooled funds	Directive projects	Responsive projects	Average
1. Relevance	5.0	4.4	5.0	4.7	4.8	4.8
2. Effectiveness	3.8	4.1	2.7	4.1	4.4	3.8
3. Sustainability	3.8	3.8	2.7	3.7	4.1	3.6
4. Crosscutting Themes	4.6	4.2	2.6	4.2	4.0	3.9
5 Coherence	4.5	4.0	4.0	3.7	4.3	4.1
6 Efficiency	4.5	4.3	2.7	3.9	4.1	3.9
7. Management Principles	3.6	3.2	4.2	4.2	3.0	3.6
8. Performance Management	4.2	3.8	3.3	3.4	4.1	3.8

5.1.1 Canadian ODA Delivered by the Pro-Mesas Mechanism

Pro-Mesas: hard landing in an innovative pilot project. As explained in section 2.3, the Pro-Mesas program was launched as a Track 3B initiative program in 2002. However, in 2004, with the Honduras Program Audit a moratorium was imposed on Pro-Mesas activities until April 2005. Thereafter, the initial Pro-Mesas budget was decreased from \$30 million to \$20 million. The areas of focus were reduced to two: Health and, water and sanitation (agriculture, forestry, the environment, and education were dropped).

As a result of these measures, Canadian and Honduran members of the Pro-Mesas team found themselves lacking motivation. Field partners also raised issues and concerns about the stability of CIDA's program.

Pro-Mesas: a small-scale mechanism that produced good results. The program thus resumed with a smaller budget and a narrower scope. The program still represented an average of about 43 percent of the program's overall expenditures in the two years that preceded the moratorium, but disbursements then significantly declined. Nevertheless, 48 "sub-projects" were implemented through Pro-Mesas with disbursements of a total of \$18.7 million, an average of \$390,300 for each project. Two projects were closely associated with the Pro-Mesas with total

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- ⁶ Evaluation code: 4.1-5.0: Highly satisfactory / 3.1-4.0: Satisfactory / 2.1-3.0 Moderately Satisfactory / 1.1-2.0: Unsatisfactory / 0.1-1.0: Very unsatisfactory / 0: No evaluation or not applicable.

disbursements of \$9.61 million: the Technical Advisor Unit (TAU) and Learning Systems (IDRC). Table 8 below shows the distribution of disbursements for “initially approved projects.”

Table 8: Canadian ODA in Honduras 2002-2007 / Pro-Mesas Mechanism

PRO-MESAS Projects	Initial Budget (\$M)	Total Expenditures (\$M)	Variance *
1. Pro-Mesas Environment	5.00	2.11	42.2%
2. Pro-Mesas Forestry	5.00	2.32	46.3%
3. Pro-Mesas Agriculture	5.00	1.47	29.4%
4. Pro-Mesas Education	5.00	3.12	62.4%
5. Pro-Mesas Health	5.00	5.10	102.0%
6. Pro-Mesas Water and Sanitation	5.00	4.62	92.3%
Pro-Mesas total (six sectors)	30.00	18.73	62.4%

PRO-MESAS related Projects	Initial Budget (\$M)	Total Expenditures (\$M)	Variance*
7. Technical Advisor Unit	5.00	4.66	93.1%
8. Learning Systems/IDRC	5.00	4.95	98.9%
Pro-Mesas related total	10.00	9.61	94.8%

Pro-Mesas sub-projects represent all of the program’s “bilateral directive projects” for the period evaluated. They also made up 64.5 percent of our sample, including all those reviewed in the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources sector. The results show that these projects were, on average, highly satisfactory. (See the Results Tables in Appendix C for the 17 Pro-Mesas projects.)

A rapid ex-post analysis of the Pro-Mesas contribution in terms of conceptual orientation leads us to reflect on two very positive elements: 1) The fact that Pro-Mesas was designed from its inception on the basis of policy dialogue (through Mesas) oriented on the PRS making its sub-project choices closer to the needs of the poor in Honduras. 2) The fact that Pro-Mesas was designed to deliver multi-sector integrated small projects implemented through (and/or with) local organizations along element 1) made it a kind of a successful “incubator”.

Pro-Mesas was an incubator for current major projects (COCHALE, MUNSALUD, ACI-SRP, EFA Pooled Fund, recent projects in food security and sustainable management of natural

resources). Pro-Mesas also made it possible to build bridges with civil society, and to progress on the theme of gender equality and decentralization.

It is striking to note the strong continuity in the program since the Pro-Mesas era, followed by the interim 2007-2010 period into the new CDPF 2010-2015. One cannot clearly disentangle if this is the result of the “incubator” or the quality of the policy dialogue closely oriented to needs of the poor in Honduras but the result remains the same: In many respects, Pro-Mesas was a flexible mechanism, useful for Canada’s cooperation in an unstable country, such as Honduras during the past decade.

The decision to suspend Pro-Mesas at the end of the start-up phase had a major negative impact, since Pro-Mesas had an intervention strategy that was well suited to Honduras: gradual efforts at decentralized levels that were well targeted geographically, synergy among initiatives, and capacity building. As a result of this decision, many of these initiatives ceased, especially all initiatives in the forestry, agriculture and environment sectors, which were one of the main areas of focus of the 2002–2007 CDPF to make the Honduran environment less vulnerable.

The learning system project, entrusted to the IDRC, could not produce anymore the initially expected results. When the moratorium was lifted, the IDRC team had to refocus its activities to make the best of the remaining funds. This allowed the achievement of several positive results in terms of knowledge acquisition (eradication of Chagas disease, fight against HIV/AIDS) and local capacity building (such as MAMUCA), training in conflict resolution, gender analysis, and analysis of social systems.

5.1.2 Canadian ODA Delivered by the Bilateral Responsive Project Mechanism

Experienced and active partners. The bilateral program used the responsive “project-based approach” through partnerships with experienced Canadian NGOs or multilateral organizations already involved in sectoral priorities. Many of these projects are included in the sample (especially in the health and water/sanitation sectors) and have been very successful. These projects have greatly helped to achieve the objectives of the 2002–2007 CDPF. Bilateral responsive projects have thus been a particularly effective way of channelling ODA. They generally share the common characteristic of providing local services to the poorest, thus giving CIDA the human face it seeks. The project-based approach is also a way to mitigate risks and optimize Canadian investments. It has emerged mainly as an alternative solution to meet the program’s disbursement needs, rather than as a solid partnership involving stakeholders in civil society. The conclusions of the Accra Forum on Aid Effectiveness, and the implementation of the *Paris Declaration*, expressed the desire for such a partnership.

5.1.3 Canadian ODA Delivered by the Pooled Fund Mechanism

Program-based approach in education: In September 2002, Honduras submitted a proposal regarding Education For All (EFA-FTI 2003-2015).

Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) programs focus on the following results: 1) strengthening the effectiveness of the education system, 2) improving the quality of education, 3) improving access to preschool education, 4) strengthening the quality of special education, 5) improving intercultural bilingual education and rural education networks, and 6) building institutional capacities.

According to the Fiduciary Statement in support of EFA in Honduras, international technical and financial partners (TFPs) could provide funding in different ways. CIDA chose to contribute to a Pooled Fund, to channel its contribution into this program. In addition to CIDA, four other agencies invested in the Pooled Fund: Swedish cooperation⁷, Spanish cooperation, the German Development Bank, and the European Union. Canada played an important role in policy dialogue with the Government of Honduras through the Pooled Fund. Positive results were achieved in managing the education program.

Two nearly concomitant events, first the 2009 joint audit of EFA program activities and second, the political crisis, led donors to freeze their financial contribution to the Pooled Fund. During the political crisis, CIDA suspended disbursements for government-to-government projects (e.g., EFA), and did not request approval for any planned projects that provided direct support to the Honduran government. Hence, only half of planned disbursements have been made. The Ministry of Education’s ownership of EFA program implementation approaches and procedures is very low. As for the Ministry of Education’s financial capacity to maintain results, it still totally depends on foreign aid. As seen in Table 9 below, Canada is the second largest donor to the EFA program, after Spanish cooperation. Given the delays in implementing the program, only half of Canada’s funding (\$20 million) has been disbursed since 2006 (an initial payment of \$5 million in 2006, and another \$5 million in 2009).

Table 9: Canadian ODA in Honduras 2001–2009 / Pooled Fund (US\$ 000)

Agency	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total	%
AECI (Spain)	5,938	6,825	6,390		19,152	43.7%
CIDA (Canada)	5,000			5,000	10,000	22.8%
KFW (Germany)		3,500	6,255		9,755	22.3%
SIDA (Sweden)	2,808				2,808	6.4%
EU (European Union)		1,049	1,046		2,095	4.8%
Total	13,747	11,375	13,693	5,002	43,809	100.0%

Source: Information provided by the PSU education specialist

⁷ Sweden has redefined its countries of focus and no longer provides ODA to Honduras.

This experience has shown that channelling investments in education through the Pooled Fund limited Canada’s capacity to play a determining role in achieving Honduran performance targets in basic education, especially at the local and regional levels. The lessons learned have helped to adopt a mixed, project-program strategy, ensuring greater flexibility in terms of means implemented to achieve results.

5.2 Canadian ODA Delivered by Partnerships with Canadians

Canadian NGOs in Honduras: an important presence in services to the poor. In 2010, PWCB took stock of the NGOs and civil-society organizations active in Honduras, based on CIDA’s institutional funding (multi-year programs or projects in 2001–2009). The study shows that 27 organizations were active in Honduras. Their agreements with CIDA ranged in duration from 3 to 10 years, for an estimated total investment of \$27.4 million. Canadian NGOs were scattered throughout Honduras and were present in most departments. Several NGOs were active in more than one area of intervention. NGOs were distributed as follows by area of intervention (**Error! Reference source not found.**, below, shows how these investments were distributed):

The food security, agriculture, and environment sector totals \$8,518,405 million. Eight (8) CSOs implemented 10 projects/programs. The largest CSOs (over \$1 million) were CUSO/VSO, SUCO, and MCCC.

The community development sector totaled \$8.1 million. Ten (10) CSOs implemented 12 projects/programs. The largest CSOs (over \$1 million) were Oxfam Québec, Development and Peace, and the BC Law Court Education Society.

The cooperatives sector totaled \$4.9 million. Three NGOs (CCA, CESO, and SOCODEVI) implemented three programs.

The health sector totals \$3.2 million. Three NGOs (Canada World Youth, World Without Borders, and CSI) implemented three projects/programs. The higher education sector totaled \$3 million. ACCC, AUCC, and INRS implemented four initiatives.

Table 10: Canadian ODA in Honduras 2001–2009 / Canadian Partnership Channel

Higher Education	Amount (\$ 000)	%
Association of Canadian Community Colleges	1,548	5.6
Institut national de la recherche scientifique	1,500	5.5

Health	Amount (\$ 000)	%
Canada World Youth	2,802	10.2
World Without Borders	391	1.4
Collaboration Santé Internationale	107	0.4

Food security, agriculture, environment	Amount (\$ 000)	%
CUSO volunteer sending	4,335	15.8
Solidarité Union Coopération	1,195	4.4
USC Canada	1,088	4.0
Horizon of Friendship	770	2.8
Mennonite Central Committee Canada	502	1.8
Falls Brook Centre	420	1.5
Care Canada	177	0.6
Samaritan's Purse	31	0.1

Coop	Amount (\$000)	%
Society for Int'l Development	2,467	9.0
Canadian Cooperative Association	1,296	4.7
Canadian Executive Service Organization	1,134	4.1

Community Development	Amount (\$ 000)	%
Oxfam Québec	2,781	10.1
Development and Peace	1,518	5.5
BC Law Courts Education Society	1,099	4.0
Jules and Paul-Émile Léger Foundation	825	3.0
Canadian Rotary Collaboration for Int'l Dev.	517	1.9
YMCA Canada	347	1.3

Community Development	Amount (\$ 000)	%
Co-development Canada	253	0.9
World Neighbours	180	0.7
CAUSE Canada	90	0.3
SOCODEVI/CECI consortium	90	0.3
Total	27,463	100.0

Canadian NGOs: key program partners despite a lack of coordination. The evaluation noted that Canadian NGOs were active throughout Honduras and, from the small sample reviewed, appeared to be effective. The NGO sector assessment was completed with document review and discussions with staff at PWCB given that a large part of interventions in Honduras were done through large multi-sector/multi-country Programs managed through PWCB. One project in the sample (Plan International - Canada / HIV/AIDS program) obtained one of the highest scores. This project even received a CIDA award for excellence. Through the responsive mechanism of contribution agreements, the bilateral channel also made good use of other successful Canadian NGOs, such as the Canadian Red Cross and Care, and continues to do so under the new CDPF (SOCODEVI, for example). The evaluation also noted that the Canadian bilateral program had no formal mechanism (sectoral or inter-sectoral) to coordinate Canadian stakeholders (or multilateral partners) that received funding from PWCB, or were direct partners in delivering the bilateral program.

Plan International: HIV/AIDS Prevention in Honduras

This project was carried out over three years (2002–2005), with a budget of \$1.7 million. Its purpose was to help check the spread of HIV/AIDS among children and adolescents (under 18) in seven high-risk areas of Honduras.

Its goals were: 1) to implement IEC programs for youth; 2) to involve adults in community-based activities to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS and sexual abuse; 3) to ensure the full participation of women and girls in action programs; 4) to make condoms more widely available (while respecting cultural values) to youth in over 100 high-risk communities. The project operated mainly through “healthy schools” (*Escuelas saludables*) in cooperation with the Ministry of Education (SEDUC) and partner community committees.

The project distinguished itself by adopting an approach based on children’s rights (including participation in advocacy activities) and a gender equality strategy focused on valuing girls and involving boys in harmonious and respectful gender relations. The project worked closely with UNICEF, WHO-PAHO, and other stakeholders to implement the PENSIDA-II 2002–2006 project. The project produced an impressive amount of communication and education

material (pamphlets, books, comic strips, songs, radio shows, videos, and so on) for Honduran children and adolescents on the theme of HIV/AIDS and responsible sexual relations. The project received an award for excellence from CIDA in 2004.

5.3 Canadian ODA Delivered by Multilateral Cooperation

Multilateral Cooperation: The evaluation is unable to generalize about the multilateral delivery channel, since the sample included only one project that was funded this way. That said, the project received an excellent score. Moreover, the bilateral channel was supported by numerous initiatives implemented by multilateral organizations (multi-bi) that proved to be excellent investments. The following table shows Canada’s main ODA investments in institutional funding of multilateral organizations in Honduras during the period. These data should be viewed with caution, as they are based on a calculation of the country distribution of an organization’s institutional funding. This funding is generally provided in the form of a “multi-year grant”. Since these organizations are active in several regions of the world and cover several sectors, it is difficult to distribute Canadian funding by country/sector. Country program managers have limited information on the results associated with this funding, apart from what they can collect directly in the field.

Our sample included one such “project” (Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria), which obtained the highest score. CIDA (multilateral) funding of these organizations, in response to special requests (generally emergency and humanitarian assistance situations), should be added to this table. Over the years, there have been several cases of such funding in Honduras. Finally, this evaluation found that, with several multilateral organizations (UNICEF, WFP, UNFPA), this funding produces very effective partnerships that the bilateral program has also used successfully (responsive projects). Some of these projects (such as UNICEF/UNFPA - MUNSALUD) were included in our sample and obtained highly satisfactory scores. We should note that these organizations operate under special agreements with the GoH, a beneficiary and a member of these organizations. For the most part, however, these organizations have their own independent field project management systems. With some exceptions, they contribute little direct budget support.

Table 11: Canadian ODA in Honduras 2001–2009 / Multilateral Channel

Organizations	Amount (\$ 000)	%
World Food Programme	336	1.9%
Regional development banks	7,023	39.1%
UNDP	1,223	6.8%
UNICEF	633	3.5%
UNFPA	898	5.0%

Organizations	Amount (\$ 000)	%
IFAD	1,306	7.3%
Global Environment Facility	838	4.7%
WHO/PAHO	202	1.1%
Other UN	1,137	6.3%
Global Fund (AIDS, TB, Malaria)	3,935	21.9%
Other organizations and technical cooperation	418	2.3%
Total	17,949	100.0%

- Source: CIDA Information System 2011-01-31
- Excludes the re-evaluation of investments in IFIs for 2008–2009

Multilateral cooperation in Honduras: an activity that complements the Canadian program. In Honduras, the evaluation found that the programs of multilateral organizations complement Canada’s program. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) offer programs to help with government reform and to fund reconstruction projects: roads, bridges, pipelines, and other infrastructures (schools and clinics). The IDB also funds medium- and long-term projects, especially in environmental management and disaster prevention, to mitigate the effects of natural disasters. For its part, the World Bank plays a key role in the debt reduction program or the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative. The two organizations are also actively involved in the water/sanitation, health, and education sectors. United Nations agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF, are also key stakeholders in Honduras. After Hurricane Mitch, the WFP supported food programs for those still living in shelters and people working on reconstruction projects. UNICEF is active in a vast municipal project to help children. UNESCO funds projects in the areas of natural resources, education, and culture. For its part, the UNDP funds projects associated with water supply and sanitation services, as well as watershed management. The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) restores health services, water supply and sanitation services, and health education. It also supports a natural disaster monitoring and response system.

6. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusions

Canada has made a significant contribution to poverty reduction in the areas where it invested, despite important contextual difficulties. Even if it cannot be quantitatively estimated,

qualitatively, CIDA effectively contributed to reducing poverty in Honduras within the scope of the investments extended.

Bilateral program managers were cautious and well advised to use mostly the project-based approach, which showed to be more efficient and effective in the Honduran environment. It appears that the Program, originally driven by its flagship pilot project – Pro-Mesas – was successful on three fronts:

- a) designed on the basis of policy dialogue (through Mesas and a strong Canadian-Honduran technical team) oriented at national level by the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), the program was able to engage and improve discussions with various Ministries (along sectors), civil society and the donor community;
- b) implemented through (and/or with) NGOs, local organizations and multilateral partners, in decentralized zones, it was able to deliver integrated (multi-sector) projects that were highly relevant to the multifaceted realities of the field at rural/municipal levels;
- c) planned with small and medium scale projects, it served the role of incubator, definitively contributing to the present Program Portfolio.

The evaluation also showed that, given Honduran constraints, projects were satisfactorily managed and satisfactorily in line with the new aid paradigm. However, the education Pooled Fund required a lot of energy for results that were below expectations, and a lower than expected level of disbursement.

Data does not permit to determine a clear cause-effect relationship between the Pro-Mesas initiative and its offspring and, the orientation that the program is pursuing in its CDPF 2010-2015. Yet, a rapid ex-post analysis of the program portfolio shows a clear continuity – despite the 2007-2010 period – in the key sectors that were most effective. For example:

- from the Natural-resources management / agriculture / forestry / water-sanitation / watershed management into a strong *Food Security program* (Sustainable Agricultural Production and Food Nutrition);
- from strategic interventions in the transmissible disease sector such as Chagas into a *Children and Youth (Health) program* where CIDA will continue its joint efforts with other donors to assist the Ministry of Health to combat poverty-linked preventable vector born diseases.

6.2 Program Results – What was achieved?

Program achievements: satisfactory results under the circumstances. CIDA in Honduras alone is too small-scale to claim to make a significant difference in progress on key poverty

indicators throughout Honduras. All CIDA projects responded to the needs of Hondurans, in cooperation with decentralized institutions and in continuity with previous successful experiences. The program was closely in line with the directions of the PRS. Canadian projects achieved expected results to a satisfactory degree. Specifically, the majority (14 out of 26) of the projects in the sample were highly satisfactory and none was unsatisfactory. Canada's strategy was particularly well suited to the environment. It involved positioning most of its projects at the decentralized level, cooperating with local institutions, and promoting partnership with experienced Canadian NGOs and effective multilateral agencies.

The general weakness of Honduran public institutions, social and political instability, and financial dependence on foreign aid (the main source of social-sector funding) resulted in a lack of sustainability of Canadian projects. These are areas in which the Program has little control. However, Canadian projects were successfully involved in capacity building, especially at the local and regional level. Capacity building is a key factor in sustainability and is one of the objectives of CIDA. However, CIDA, planning and managing on a five-year CDPF, does not enable an environment to strategically focus on long term outcomes required for international development interventions as recommended by the Auditor General of Canada - 2009 Report, Chapter 8. Furthermore, as stated in the latter report

“The absence of a well defined and transparent planning process and formally approved and public plans impedes communications with donors and recipient governments, leaving them unclear about the Agency's direction and long term commitment in individual countries and regions”. (Report of the Auditor General of Canada 2009, Chapter 8, p.18).

This situation was operationally difficult during the 2007-2010 transition period given the program did not have an approved CDPF until early 2010 and was then allowed to share its content only to “trusted partners”.

To report crosscutting results, the program would have had to have strategies in this regard, accompanied by performance measurement frameworks. Governance gradually became a theme of secondary importance. The redefinition of the program also affected support for civil society, initially developed with great success. The theme of gender equality received better support, partially as a result of the PSU's professional resources. The lack of a program strategy on this theme hindered achievement of results. Given that the CDPF 2010-2015 includes a gender strategy and a PMF that incorporates crosscutting outcomes, this conclusion will not be included as a recommendation.

6.3 Program Management Performance – How was it achieved?

Management was less satisfactory from a program perspective. Program coherence is satisfactory. However, it varies depending on the sectors analyzed. The evaluators found that

the most significant factor in project coherence was related to the Pro-Mesas approach to planning and design. Yet, the significant presence of NGOs supported by PWCB along with other NGOs supported by the bilateral program proved to be a challenge for coordination between Canadian partners. This latter challenge also points to internal coherence issues between Branches (bilateral, PWCB, MGPB) at CIDA where clearer corporate guidance would be required to ensure cooperation among Canadian stakeholders. As per external coherence with other donors, one should note the Program's effort in promoting and supporting the transition of the overall aid relationship between Honduras and donors from a rudimentary coordination to substantive policy dialogue through initially a G-5 (Canada, USA, Sweden, Spain and Germany), then G-12 and now G-16 on key development issues and explicit consideration of country strategies and priorities in all key CIDA programming decisions.

The efficiency in Canadian projects was satisfactory. However, the reorganization of Pro-Mesas (following the Honduras Program Audit in 2005) had an impact on CIDA's image locally. Bilateral disbursements declined to a low level, making program delivery mechanisms more costly. Nevertheless, along with Canadian staff, the qualified local staff had the ability to focus also on "non-project" development results, technical/analytical inputs, stakeholder relationship management, coordination, and policy dialogue.

The principles of the Paris Declaration remain an ideal whose key ingredients are political will and host-country capacities. If these conditions are not met, hybrid approaches must be adopted (programs and projects). This was done given that these conditions were not met. The program was able to achieve a satisfactory level of performance by adopting a variety of approaches (program-projects) that were realistic and able to bring about change. Honduras depends as much on foreign aid as on effective domestic policies designed to improve public-sector financial management. Alignment experiments through complex administrative processes to mitigate risks (e.g. heavy procurement systems) were operationally less satisfactory (EFA Pooled Fund, or the UNDP in the case of Pro-Mesas).

Performance management was applied mainly in project monitoring. It also benefited from the contribution of local professionals from the PSU (planning, monitoring) that were a factor contributing undeniably to knowledge acquisition by CIDA. However, few resources were invested in project evaluation and program monitoring generally. As with other country programs at CIDA, the Honduras CDPF 2002–2007 was not combined with a Performance Measurement Framework (not an Agency requirement before 2009), which would have helped monitoring results at program level. The program also did not have a risk management in the framework at program level (despite a Country Program Risk Assessment done in 2004). The question remains whether this would have been truly useful in an environment where adjusting as the context changes seems to be the only option. Faced with many risks, CIDA adopted a flexible strategy with several aid delivery channels and operated on several levels. That strategy avoided interruptions in the event of major crises with the central government, made it possible to develop alliances in all sectors, and provided Canada with a good basis for policy dialogue. In

particular, it is worth noting that CIDA's strong relations with implementing partners (responsive programming) is a main reason why the Program was able to continue programming during the political crisis. Given that the CDPF 2010-2015 encompasses a PMF and that the Program developed a country risk profile in 2007, which was updated twice since, this will not be included as a recommendation.

The program conducted few evaluations and follow-up studies. The Pro-Mesas pilot program, after the Program Audit, was downsized and drastically reorganized. The drawback of this decision is that CIDA missed an opportunity to learn from a completed pilot experience on a new aid effectiveness approach (development, management, enabling results): a decentralized program. This knowledge would have been timely now that CIDA moves into a decentralization process.

6.4 Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned for the Program

Effectiveness of work at the decentralized level: Work with decentralized organizations (local and regional) and local capacity building (human resources, equipment, and expertise) was a success factor in Canadian projects/initiatives.

Usefulness of a project-based approach. The use of a project-based approach, which allows targeting specific, geographically well-defined results, and directly serving target groups among the poor, by including them in a participatory approach – was also a success factor, in terms of both results and efficiency. Large-scale initiatives, planned with central administrative services, were less satisfactory in terms of results and efficiency. The project-based approach promoted innovation and the application of several principles of the Paris Declaration, especially ownership and alignment. In the case of a country like Honduras, where governance and public administrative capacity are weak, a thorough assessment of the risks associated with PBAs needs to be undertaken and care should be taken that the necessary conditions are met.

The merits of investing in local monitoring. Local monitoring, by local professionals, helped to improve project performance, to gain in-depth knowledge of local issues, and to develop relationships of trust that favoured CIDA as a whole.

Need CDPF for continuity. Once the 2002-2007 CDPF ended, there was a three-year hiatus, caused by delays in approving a new Country CDPF. This break affected effective program implementation, particularly having an approved direction for planning new initiatives.

Sustainability of results. Developing a long-term strategic vision of the sustainability of activities is one of the keys to achieving sustainable results from development initiatives. The long-term vision of programs/projects is typically limited to a five-year period which is not

sufficient. Analyzing favourable conditions for phasing out aid, and ensuring effective local ownership, is not a program management tool.

The need for crosscutting program strategies. The absence of crosscutting program strategies – especially for gender equality and inclusion of civil society – was not a success factor. In principle, governance should have been treated as a sector. Instead, it became a crosscutting theme, found in all Pro-Mesas projects and in most other projects. This was a useful shift since, if addressed head-on, the governance sector would probably have led to unproductive policy dialogue with the GoH, given the country's political instability.

Decentralized bilateral delivery mechanism. The existence of a bilateral decentralized aid delivery mechanism is an important and effective tool in a country with an unstable social and political environment. In this regard, we should learn lessons from Pro-Mesas about development, management, and enabling results, to see how they can be applied.

Caution in applying the Paris Declaration in relation to PBAs. The principles of the Paris Declaration were cautiously applied, and aid delivery channels were diversified, especially concerning management aspects. These were risk-mitigating strategies. These strategies should be systematically applied, for example, by conducting an annual risk analysis and including the results of such an exercise in policy dialogue to better secure Canada's ODA investments.

Lessons Learned for CIDA

Use of multiple channels as a risk-mitigating factor. One of the lessons of the past decade is bilateral cooperation, which when faced with multiple risks in the field, used diverse aid delivery channels (directive, responsive (NGOs), program-based approach, multilateral agency), and acted on several levels (national, regional, and local). Bilateral cooperation mechanisms provide flexibility, which can avoid breaks or interruptions of programming in the event of a major crisis. The strategy employed by the Honduras program made it possible to develop alliances in all sectors and provided a good basis for Canadian policy dialogue. Bilateral cooperation is thus seen as country-to-country cooperation, involving many stakeholders, rather than solely cooperation between central governments, which makes aid more susceptible to political circumstances. With good coordination, this strategy (multiple channels, multiple levels) could be made systemic as a program-level risk-mitigating factor.

Caution in applying the Paris Declaration and use of mixed modalities: The principles of the Paris Declaration and Accra Forum need to be applied with caution. Country programs adopting an appropriate mix of aid delivery mechanisms appear to be more effective in terms of risk management and aid effectiveness, particularly in countries with significant governance issues, than engaging in program-based approaches (PBAs) in less than ideal conditions, while working first to improve the pre-conditions for moving ahead with PBAs.

Cooperation among Canadian Stakeholders. Efforts were made in this direction, particularly through Pro-Mesas. However, CIDA did not sufficiently promote cooperation among program level Canadian (especially non-bilateral) stakeholders and therefore CIDA did not achieve strategic and program leverage in areas where this might have been possible. CIDA could consider developing formal mechanisms to ensure cooperation among Canadian stakeholders (bilateral and non-bilateral channels) to favour integration, and synergy of activities funded by Canadian ODA. In addition, CIDA could devise ways of improving results-based management by providing guidance and tools for developing a “Country PMF” that would advance a whole-of-agency approach by integrating intermediate outcomes from all CIDA channels (bilateral, PWCB, MGFB) with clear accountability lines for the next CDPF period.

Use of local professionals. The Honduras Country Evaluation data recognized the added value of local professionals in providing knowledge, technical and country expertise that went well beyond supporting program logistics. Their contribution to developing strong relationships based on trust with local authorities was invaluable for policy dialogue and advancing the principles of aid effectiveness. CIDA could consider local professionals to be an integral part of the embassy and PSU (and future configurations) for program delivery.

Support of pilot initiatives. Pilot initiatives such as Pro-Mesas should be comprehensively managed as pilots; including that they are innovatively designed in terms of a) the necessary resources and the necessary time to complete the full cycle of the initiative and b) appropriate authorities, monitoring, evaluation and reporting are exercised. Doing so, will enable CIDA to capture the innovative elements of fully completed pilots. This is also an observation from the Honduras Country Program Audit (2006): “CIDA’s innovation initiatives need to be better supported at the corporate level and managed in a more structured and business-like manner”.

6.5 Recommendations

The following recommendations are aimed mainly at CIDA’s Honduras program managers.

R-1: Continue to use a mix of channels and modalities. CIDA’s Honduras program should maintain an approach that favours the use of different aid delivery channels and mechanisms for the current Country Strategy period. In Honduras, the project-based approach and investments with civil society have been successful particularly for local services to the community, local capacity building, and participation in development, thus applying many of the Paris Declaration and Accra Forum principles.

R-2: Cooperation among Canadian stakeholders. The Program should look at ways to enhance joint processes (e.g., workshops, taskforces, etc.) for advancing cooperation among Canadian stakeholders for the current CDPF period.

R-3: Use of local professionals. CIDA’s Honduras program should continue to use the services of local professionals as a source of context-relevant technical expertise, to maintain

corporate memory and strengthen its aid effectiveness. The program should also develop a regular and systematized (annually) process to capture the lessons learned by local professionals to enhance the program and the Agency knowledge base.

R-4: Managing non-projectized program activities. CIDA should consider regularizing and systematizing (e.g., annually) the planning of its non-program/project development assistance activities in the field (donor cooperation, policy dialogue, and so on), and produce equally frequent monitoring reports.

6.6 Corporate Consideration

In the course of the evaluation, three issues of a corporate nature, that would have a bearing on the effectiveness of the program, surfaced.

These are identified and acknowledged below as corporate considerations instead of recommendations, in recognition that the Agency is aware of them and measures have already been taken, or are in progress, to alleviate the constraints posed.

C1: Transparency and aid effectiveness. Freely sharing the full CDPF with partners and stakeholders would help to improve transparency and strengthen aid effectiveness. Country programs could benefit from enlarging the circle of actors involved in program-level discourse. Specifically, programs could be allowed to freely share the full CDPF both as a program design instrument (i.e. shared during the preparation stage to foster dialogue with partners and stakeholders) and as an implementing instrument once approved. This consideration is in line with the Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2009 (Chapter 8) report.

C-2: Cooperation among CIDA channels. CIDA could consider developing formal mechanisms that could be adopted by country programs to ensure cooperation among Bilateral and non-bilateral channels to favour integration, synergy of activities funded by Canadian ODA. In addition, CIDA could devise ways of improving results-based management by providing guidance and tools for developing a “Country PMF” that would advance a whole-of-agency approach by integrating intermediate outcomes from all CIDA channels (Bilateral, PWCB, MGPB) with clear accountability lines for the next CDPF period.

C-3: Guidance on non-projectized program activities. CIDA could consider devising guidance on planning and monitoring of Country/Regional Program’s non-project development assistance activities (e.g. donor cooperation and policy dialogue, and so on) and their outcomes.

The issue of consultations and sharing of documents with stakeholders has been addressed by the ODA Accountability Act, which makes consultations mandatory, and the Agency’s transparency strategy, in progress, through which many of the essential documents, such as

country strategies and programming frameworks (R/CDPFs) are being put on the Agency's web site.

The whole of Agency approach to programming in our countries of concentration and the issue of non-projectized program activities are being addressed by the new guidelines for CDPFs and their PMFs and for Directive programming. Also, the role of the country program director in the field as the "integrator" of programming from the non-bilateral channels should help.

C4: Learning from Pilot Programs. The recent experience of the Honduras program underlines the importance of continued corporate support and having a good monitoring and evaluation system in place when pilot initiatives are undertaken. When the audit was launched to address the concerns regarding certain aspects of the administration of the program, CIDA may have learned more and the program may have taken a different course if an evaluation had been undertaken.

APPENDIX A: Summary - Terms of Reference

Context

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is subject to the *Federal Accountability Act*, which requires government institutions to evaluate their programs every five years. These terms of reference for evaluating CIDA's Honduras program are designed to meet that requirement.

1. Objectives of the Evaluation of CIDA's Honduras Program

To report on the results achieved by CIDA's activities during the Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF) (2003–2007) and the subsequent transition period until 2010.

To analyze the overall performance of CIDA's activities in Honduras;

To evaluate the performance of the various delivery mechanisms, to document and share lessons learned, and to make recommendations.

2. Scope of the Evaluation:

The evaluation will cover a period of eight years and will thus review the program's performance and results from 2002-2003 to 2009-2010. Emphasis will be placed on the program's key areas of intervention and on the CDPF's crosscutting themes.

3. Development of CIDA's Cooperation in Honduras

Canada has had a bilateral cooperation program in Honduras for over 30 years. Honduras has been a country of focus and a priority for Canadian ODA since 2002. Canada currently ranks sixth among donors, with disbursements totalling just under \$20 million a year (all channels combined).

4. Evaluation Approach

The evaluation will report on the overall performance of CIDA's Honduras program (2002–2010). The evaluation will also analyze the efficiency, effectiveness, and performance of the various mechanisms used.

The following delivery mechanisms will be reviewed: i) directive bilateral projects, ii) responsive bilateral projects, iii) Pooled Fund, iv) multilateral projects, v) responsive partnership projects, and vi) counterpart funds.

The evaluation team will analyze how these mechanisms contribute to programs and some projects, and how they may complement each other.

5. Key Evaluation Criteria and Issues

CIDA adopted the key standard issues that OECD/DAC recommends for program evaluation. The evaluation will answer two questions advocated by CIDA's Evaluation Directorate.

5.1 What has been achieved?

Relevance: Measures how the development activity's objectives correspond to Honduran needs, donor policies, and overall priorities.

Effectiveness: Measures how the development activity's objectives have been achieved, or are being achieved, based on their relative importance (materiality).

Sustainability: Maintenance of benefits resulting from a development activity after a major development assistance activity is completed.

Crosscutting themes: Degree to which the program integrates and considers crosscutting themes (gender equality, the environment, and governance).

5.2 How were the expected results achieved?

Coherence: Coherence of development activities in the context of donor coordination (external coherence); coordination among CIDA's various delivery mechanisms (internal coherence).

Efficiency: Measures how resources (funds, expertise, time, and so on) are economically translated into results.

Management principles: Degree of compliance with the principles of local ownership, alignment, and harmonization, as defined in the Paris Declaration.

Performance management: Management strategy focused on immediate, intermediate, and ultimate outcomes, including monitoring and evaluation functions carried out by CIDA or jointly; analysis of mechanisms and tools for mutual accountability.

5.3 Program and project considerations:

The evaluation will be based on information gathered from projects and programs. The project sample will be from CIDA's various areas of intervention.

6. Evaluation Methods

6.1 Common approach and joint effort:

Program evaluation will be managed in consultation with stakeholders.

6.2 Sample:

The sample of projects must represent a large enough portion of the overall program. The sample will include sectoral and thematic projects, as well as the various delivery and cooperation mechanisms.

6.3 Data collection:

Secondary sources of information will essentially be used.

Literature review: CIDA program documentation, international studies, and other documents addressing strategic issues relating to Honduras.

Interviews: A series of interviews with key Canadian, Honduran, and international stakeholders.

Field visits: A number of visits will be made to the sites of key projects in each sector or area of activity.

Round tables: A series of round tables will be held to encourage discussion with all stakeholders.

7. Evaluation Management

The evaluation managers, from the Evaluation Directorate of CIDA's Strategic Policy and Performance Branch, will be responsible for the process. They will work closely with:

country program management and staff at Headquarters and in the field;

representatives of the Government of Honduras, generally those who deal more with CIDA through official channels with the Canadian Embassy.

A team of professionals will be recruited, based on the specific program profile. The team will comprise i) a senior consultant, ii) two specialists in the program's key priority sectors, and iii) two local consultants to round out the team. Competencies associated with gender equality, governance, and the environment may be associated with sectoral expertise.

8. Schedule of Activities

The Honduras program evaluation process should cover a period of 10 to 12 months. (Note that the coup d'état of 2009 had an impact on the initial schedule.)

9. Deliverables

Consultants will prepare a work plan and a detailed technical report.

Evaluation Directorate will prepare a summary report with the cooperation of the senior consultant.

The summary report will be submitted to CIDA's Evaluation Committee for approval. This report will then be published on CIDA's website.

10. Budget:

The CIDA Honduras program evaluation will cost about \$235,000.

APPENDIX B: List of Projects from the Sample by Sector

SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES (NR)

Number	Project Title	Start	End	Budget (\$000)	Disbursed (\$000)	Branch	Status	Partner	Mechanism
PM-3-130	Management of the Rio San Juan basin	10/2004	3/2008	900	731	Amer.	T	MAMUC A	B1
PM-3-100	MAMUCA Planning and Management	10/2003	10/2005	580	571	Amer.	T	MAMUC A	B1
PM-3-310a	Management. of the Banaderos y Lancetilla (Tela) basins	10/2006	10/2007	300	272	Amer.	T	ESNACI FOR	B1
PM-3-310b	Management. of 2 watersheds, Tocoa region	10/2006	12/2007	666	660	Amer.	T	Mun. de Tocoa	B1
PM-1-620a	Health safety: traditional dairy products	05/2006	08/2007	167	165	Amer.	T	AGAA	B1
PM-1-711	Institutional strengthening at SERNA	10/2003	10/2007	425	425	Amer.	T	SERNA	B1
PM-1-720	Support for SERNA water resource management	03/2008	09/2008	294	294	Amer.	T	SERNA	B1
PM-1-510	Support for the Honduran Forest Agenda	06/2003	05/2005	375	375	Amer.	T	AFH	B1
PM-1-531	Support in reorganizing AFE/COHDEFOR	08/2003	07/2005	250	229	Amer.	T	AFE/COHDEFOR	B1

EDUCATION (ED)

Number	Project Title	Start	End	Budget (\$000)	Disbursed (\$000)	Branch	Status	Partner	Mechanism
A-032111	Education For All (EFA)	01/2004	06/2009	20,000	10,000	Amer.	C	SE	B4
S-062665	Social vulnerability and urban management	02/2003	06/2010	1,500	1,500	CPB	T	AUCC /UNAH	P1

HEALTH (HE)

Number	Project Title	Start	End	Budget (\$000)	Disbursed (\$000)	Branch	Status	Partner	Mechanism
A-031014	Community health	01//2001	09/2006	2,483	2,077	Amer.	T	CRC	B2
A-033018	REDES	09/2005	09/2011	5,000	791	Amer.	C	CRC	B2
A-033692	Municipal services, Adolescent health	04/2007	03/2011	10,000	2,000	Amer.	C	UNICEF	B2
S-061826	Plan International (reproductive health)	07/2002	06/2005	1,696	1,696	CPB	T	Internatio nal Plan	P1
M-10846	Global Fund (AIDS, TB, and Malaria)	01/2002	03/2007	5,166	5,166	Multi.	T	SESAL/C HF	M1
PM-2/4- 120a	Support for the Honduran Chagas program	02/2004	06/2008	3,483	2,100	Amer.	T	SESAL	B1
PM-3- 211/212	Support for reproductive health/UNICEF/UNFPA	03/2005	06/2007	945	931	Amer.	T	UNICEF/ UNFPA	B1

WATER AND SANITATION (WS)

Number	Project Title	Start	End	Budget (\$000)	Disburse. (\$000)	Branch	Status	Partner	Mechanism
A-021274	PASOS II Water and Sanitation	09/2001	06/2006	4,942	4,942	Amer.	T	CARE CANADA	B2
A-033966	UNICEF Water and Sanitation	02/2008	03/2011	4,000	4,000	Amer.	C	UNICEF	B2
PM-2-230	Telica River watershed	01/2005	10/2008	425	421	Amer.	T	SANAA	B1

GOVERNANCE/CIVIL SOCIETY (CS)

Number	Project Title	Start	End	Budget (\$000)	Disburse. (\$000)	Branch	Status	Partner	Mechanism
PM-1-320	Support for civil society / Poverty reduction strategy	07/2005	07/2007	1,000	1,000	Amer.	T	Trocaire	B1
PM-2 -230	Strengthening of the Municipality of Juticalpa	05/2006	10/2008	152	152	Amer.	T	Juticalpa	B1

GENDER EQUALITY (GE)

Number	Project Title	Start	End	Budget (\$000)	Disburse. (\$000)	Branch	Status	Partner	Mechanism
PM-1-913	Strengthening of GE studies	07/2003	03/2005	80	77	Amer.	T	UPNFM	B1
PM-1-914	Strengthening of the "Fiscalia" / Min. of Security	07/2003	10/2004	106	106	Amer.	T	Public sector	B1

Number	Project Title	Start	End	Budget (\$000)	Disburse . (\$000)	Branch	Status	Partner	Mechanism
PM-1-911	Strengthening of GE / Min. of Security	09/2003	03/2005	112	90	Amer.	T	Public sector	B1
TOTAL				65,174	40,920				

- TOTAL: 26 PROJECTS / B1 (Bilateral directive) = 17 out of 48 (Pro-Mesas projects) / B2 (Bilateral responsive)= 5 out of 8 / B4 (Bilateral PBA)= 1 out of 1 / M1 (Multilateral)= 1 out of 13 / P1 (PWCB)= 2 out of 27

APPENDIX C: Detailed Results of the Evaluation

Table 12: Detailed Evaluation Results by Project / Sectors and Focuses⁸

NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (NR)	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
PM-3-130: Management of the Rio San Juan basin	5.0	4.3	4.3	4.8	3.0	4.3	5.0	3.7
PM-3-100: MAMUCA Planning and Management	5.0	4.7	4.3	4.8	3.0	5.0	5.0	4.3
PM-3-310a : Management of the <i>Banaderos y Lancetilla</i> (Tela) watersheds	4.3	2.7	2.7	3.4	2.0	3.0	4.3	2.7
PM-3-310b: Management of 2 watersheds, Tocoa region	4.3	3.3	3.3	3.6	2.0	3.5	4.3	2.7
PM-1-620a: Health safety: traditional dairy products	4.7	4.0	3.7	4.5	2.0	4.0	4.3	3.3
PM-1-711: Institutional strengthening at SERNA	5.0	4.0	4.3	4.8	4.5	4.3	4.3	3.0
PM-1-720: Support for SERNA water resources management	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.3	3.0
PM-1-510: Support for the Honduran Forest Agenda	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	4.7	5.0	4.0
PM-1-531: Support in reorganizing AFE/COHDEFOR	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	5.0	5.0	4.0
Average	4.8	4.1	4.1	4.5	3.3	4.2	4.6	3.4

⁸ Evaluation code: 4.1-5.0: Highly satisfactory / 3.1-4.0: Satisfactory / 2.1-3.0 Moderately Satisfactory / 1.1-2.0: Unsatisfactory / 0.1-1.0: Very unsatisfactory / 0: No evaluation or not applicable.

EDUCATION (ED)	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
A-032111: Education For All (EFA) (weighting: 8)	5.0	2.7	2.7	2.6	4.0	2.7	4.2	3.3
S-062665: Social vulnerability and urban Management. (weighting: 2)	3.8	4.0	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.8	3.3	3.5
Average	4.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	3.9	2.9	4.0	3.4

GENDER EQUALITY (GE)	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
PM-1-913: Strengthening of GE studies	5.0	5.0	2.3	3.2	4.3	3.7	3.5	3.5
PM-1-914: Strengthening of “Fiscalia” / Min. of Security	4.2	3.0	2.0	2.4	4.0	2.3	3.7	2.5
PM-1-911: Strengthening of GE at the Min. of Security	4.0	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.5
Average	4.4	3.8	2.8	3.2	3.9	3.3	3.7	3.2

HEALTH (HE)	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
A-031014: Community health	5.0	4.2	3.1	3.5	3.7	3.5	2.3	3.9
A-033018: REDES	5.0	4.5	3.9	4.5	4.2	4.0	2.5	4.7
A-033692: Municipal services, Adolescent health	5.0	4.3	4.0	5.0	4.7	4.3	3.2	4.1
S-061826: Plan International (reproductive health)	5.0	4.2	4.3	5.0	4.7	4.7	3.1	4.0
M-10846: Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria	5.0	3.8	3.8	4.6	4.5	4.5	3.6	4.2

HEALTH (HE)	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
PM-2/4-120a: Support for the Honduran Chagas program	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.3	4.8	4.2	3.5	4.6
PM-3-211/212: Support for reproductive health/UNICEF/UNFPA	5.0	4.3	3.9	5.0	4.4	4.0	3.2	3.1
Average	5.0	4.3	4.0	4.6	4.4	4.2	3.0	4.1

WATER AND SANITATION (WS)	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
A-021274: PASOS II Water and Sanitation	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.3	4.7	4.6	3.3	4.4
A-033966: UNICEF Water and Sanitation	4.5	4.0	4.4	2.8	4.3	4.3	4.0	3.3
PM-2-230: Development of the Telica River watershed	4.5	4.1	3.0	3.3	3.8	2.6	3.3	3.4
Average	4.6	4.3	4.1	3.4	4.3	3.8	3.5	3.7

CIVIL SOCIETY (CS)	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustain-ability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
PM-1-320: Support for civil society in implementing the PRS	4.5	4.0	3.2	4.0	4.3	4.0	3.8	3.0
PM-2 – 230: Support in strengthening the municipality of Juticalpa	4.5	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3
Average	4.5	4.3	3.7	4.0	4.4	4.3	4.2	3.6

- * See the *Information Sheets* for the 26 projects and for the “program level” in the *Technical Report*
- ** Results in the education sector were weighted by the factors that appear between parentheses with respect to the projects.

Table 13: Detailed Evaluation Results by Project / ODA Mechanisms and Channels

Directed Bilateral Programs⁹

Sector	Project Number and Name	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
NR	PM-3-130: Management of the Rio San Juan basin	5.0	4.3	4.3	4.8	3.0	4.3	5.0	3.7
NR	PM-3-100: MAMUCA Planning and Management	5.0	4.7	4.3	4.8	3.0	5.0	5.0	4.3
NR	PM-3-310a: Management of the Banaderos y Lancetilla (Tela) watersheds	4.3	2.7	2.7	3.4	2.0	3.0	4.3	2.7
NR	PM-3-310b: Management of 2 watersheds, Tocoa region	4.3	3.3	3.3	3.6	2.0	3.5	4.3	2.7
NR	PM-1-620a: Health safety: traditional dairy products	4.7	4.0	3.7	4.5	2.0	4.0	4.3	3.3
NR	PM-1-711: Institutional strengthening at SERNA	5.0	4.0	4.3	4.8	4.5	4.3	4.3	3.0
NR	PM-1-720: Support for SERNA water resources management	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.3	3.0
NR	PM-1-510: Support for the Honduran Forest Agenda	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	4.7	5.0	4.0
NR	PM-1-531: Support in reorganizing AFE/COHDEFOR	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	5.0	5.0	4.0
HE	PM-2/4-120a: Support for the Honduran Chagas program	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.3	4.8	4.2	3.5	4.6

⁹ Evaluation code: 4.1-5.0: Highly satisfactory / 3.1-4.0: Satisfactory / 2.1-3.0: Moderately Satisfactory / 1.1-2.0: Unsatisfactory / 0.1-1.0: Very unsatisfactory / 0: No evaluation or not applicable

Sector	Project Number and Name	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
HE	PM-3-211/212: Support for reproductive health/ UNICEF/UNFPA	5.0	4.3	3.9	5.0	4.4	4.0	3.2	3.1
WS	PM-2-230: Development of the Telica River watershed	4.5	4.1	3.0	3.3	3.8	2.6	3.3	3.4
CS	PM-1-320: Support for civil society in implementing the PRS	4.5	4.0	3.2	4.0	4.3	4.0	3.8	3.0
CS	PM-2 – 230: Support in strengthening the municipality of Juticalpa	4.5	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3
GE	PM-1-913: Strengthening of GE studies at the university level	5.0	5.0	2.3	3.2	4.3	3.7	3.5	3.5
GE	PM-1-914: Strengthening of Fiscalia / Ministry of Security	4.2	3.0	2.0	2.4	4.0	2.3	3.7	2.5
GE	PM-1-911: Strengthening of GE / Ministry of Security	4.0	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.5
Average		4.7	4.1	3.7	4.2	3.7	3.9	4.2	3.4

Responsive Bilateral Programs

Sector	Project Number and Name	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
HE	A-031014: Community health	5.0	4.2	3.1	3.5	3.7	3.5	2.3	3.9
HE	A-033018: REDES	5.0	4.5	3.9	4.5	4.2	4.0	2.5	4.7
HE	A-033692: Municipal services, Adolescent health	5.0	4.3	4.0	5.0	4.7	4.3	3.2	4.1
WS	A-021274: PASOS II Water and Sanitation	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.3	4.7	4.6	3.3	4.4
WS	A-033966: UNICEF Water and Sanitation	4.5	4.0	4.4	2.8	4.3	4.3	4.0	3.3
Average		4.8	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.3	4.1	3.0	4.1

Bilateral Programs – Sector-wide program-based approach

Sector	Project Number and Name	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
ED	A-032111: Education For All (EFA) **	5.0	2.7	2.7	2.6	4.0	2.7	4.2	3.3

Responsive Multilateral Programs

Sector	Project Number and Name	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
HE	M-10846: Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria	5.0	3.8	3.8	4.6	4.5	4.5	3.6	4.2

Responsive Partnership Programs

Sector	Project Number and Name	Relevance (HS)	Effectiveness (S)	Sustainability (MS)	Crosscutting Themes (S)	Coherence (S)	Efficiency (MS)	Management Principles (S)	Performance Management (MS)
ED	S-062665: Social vulnerability and urban management **	3.8	4.0	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.8	3.3	3.5
HE	S-061826: Plan International (reproductive health component)	5.0	4.2	4.3	5.0	4.7	4.7	3.1	4.0
Average		4.4	4.1	3.8	4.2	4.0	4.3	3.2	3.8

- See the Information Sheets for the 26 projects and for the “program level” in the Technical Report
- ** Results in the education sector were weighted by the factors that appear between parentheses with respect to the project..

APPENDIX D: List of Documents Consulted

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APPENDIX E: List of People Met

CIDA Headquarters

Christian Alix, Environment Specialist
Véronique Barnes, Development Officer
Rémy Beaulieu, Evaluation Manager
Carmen Drouin, Environment Specialist, former member of the Pro-Mesas team
Josée Fluet, Former Head of Aid in Tegucigalpa
Réal Lavergne, Aid Effectiveness and Country Programs Unit, Canadian Partnership
Susan Learoyd, Aid Effectiveness and Country Programs Unit, Canadian Partnership
Camille Pomerleau, Specialist in Agriculture, Former Coordinator of the Pro-Mesas team
Stephen Potter, Former member of the Pro-Mesas team
Franck Schneider, Environment Specialist, Former member of the Pro-Mesas team
Michael von Schonberg, Former Consultant in Aid Effectiveness at the PSU
Reid Sirrs, Former Head of Aid in Tegucigalpa
Pierre J. Tremblay, Evaluation Manager
Jacqueline Wood, Aid Effectiveness and Country Programs Unit, Canadian Partnership
Daniel Arsenault, Head of Aid
Athos Barahona, Education and Governance Specialist, PSU
Elmer Mauricio Cruz García, Rural Development Consultant, PSU
Lucia Frick, Director, PSU
Daniel Gagnon, Regional Rural Development Consultant, PSU
Marlon Gómez, Water and Sanitation Specialist, PSU
Maritza Guillén, GE Specialist, PSU
Willow Minaker, Second Secretary (Development), Canadian Embassy
Martha Ochoa, Reproductive Health Specialist, PSU
Ana Posas, Consultant, PSU
José A. Quan, Development Agent, Canadian Embassy
Dr. Carlos Alberto Rodríguez Colindres, Health Specialist, PSU
Héctor R. Santos, Development Officer, Canadian Embassy

Government of Honduras

Lic. Flores, CIIHA, SERNA
Lidia Fromm, SEPLAN
Flora Melilla, SEPLAN
Julio Raudales, Deputy Minister, SEPLAN
Kenneth Rivera, Director, CIIHA, SERNA
Leslie Sánchez, SEPLAN
Lesly Saravia, SERNA

Brenda Soto, CIIHA, SERNA
Sara Patricia Sagastume Rice, Minister of Public Security
Mirian Yanet Domínguez Murillo, Office of Common Crimes, Ministry of Public Security
Loany Patricia Alvarado Sorto, Office of the Special Attorney for Women, Ministry of Public Security
Sulma Selenia Reyes Amaya, GE Unit Officer, Ministry of Public Security

Various, Canada

Bénédicte Bucio, Former member of the IDRC field team
Denis Buteau, Forest Engineer, Former member of the Pro-Mesas team
Simon Carter, Program Director, IDRC (telephone interview)
Anne-Marie Séguin, Project Coordinator, Urban Management and Social Vulnerability

Donors

Claudia Aguilar, Technical Advisor, GTZ
Reina Aguilar, Education Consultant and PSU Education Consultant, Spanish Cooperation (AECDI)
Temby Caprio, Coordinator, Basic Quality Education Support Program (EFA-FTI Plan) (PROEFA), GTZ
Dr. Kathrin Gütschow, Education Consultant for Guatemala and Honduras, KFW
Mirian Leiva and Telma Ramos, Education Quality, Governance and Institutional Reinforcement Project, World Bank
Jan Robberts, Education Consultant, Cooperation Director, SIDA
Adalid Romero, Former Director, Modernization in Education Project and Former Technical Advisor in Education, World Bank
Ned Van Steenwyk, Education Consultant, USAID
Ann Strodberg, Former Coordination Director, SIDA

Sustainable Management of Natural Resources Sector

Ing. Ricardo Arias, Former Minister, SAG
Arnaldo Bueso H., National Programming Director, CARE Central America
Juan Carlos Castaldi, Consultant
Juan José Ferrando, Coordinator, Environment Unit, UNDP
Ing. Manuel Hernández, Former Consultant of the Pro-Mesas team, Former Director of ESNACIFOR, National Evaluation Team Member
Silvia de Izaguirre, Formerly from SETCO (Director of Policies and Strategies)
Lic. Fausto Laso, AFH
Karen Mejía, CARE Central America
Mario Pavón, AECI, Former Consultation of the Pro-Mesas team
Juan Blas Zapata, Coordinator, AFH

Carlos Zelaya, FAO

Education Sector

Carlos Ávila Molina, Former Minister of Education and President of the Jose Cecilio del Valle University

Marlon Brevé Reyes, Former Minister of Education and Dean of UNITEC

Omar Palacios, Former Consultant to the Minister of Education

Cynthia Cardona de Lobo, General Coordinator, EFA Plan, Coordination Unit of the EFA Plan

Daysi Coello, Coordination Unit, EFA Plan

Isabel Cristina Matute, Coordination Unit, EFA Plan

Wilmer Turcios Padilla, Coordination Unit, EFA Plan

Karen Chávez, Coordination Unit, EFA Plan

Elisabeth Urbina, Former Coordinator of the project “Strengthening of GE studies in a university environment”, National Pedagogical University (UPNFM)

Ana Corina Hernández, Coordinator, Urban Management and Social Vulnerability Project, UNAH

Erika Zambrano Irias, Administrator, Urban Management and Social Vulnerability Project, UNAH

Norma Suazo de Sierra, National Director, Child Fund and Coordinator of COMCORDE

Patricia Betancourt, Childhood Christian Fund (CCF)

Josefina Gamero, FEREMA Foundation

Anthony Nolan, Coordinator, Scholarship Program, PLAN International

Daniel Molina, Consultant, Violence Prevention, PLAN International

Gender Equality (GE) Sector

Rosibel Gómez, INAM

Ana Valverde, UNIFEM

Elisabeth Urbina, Former Coordinator of the project “Reinforcement of the ES studies in a university environment,” National Pedagogical University (UPNFM)

María Teresa Henríquez, Municipal Women’s Office (OMM), Municipality of Juticalpa

Reina Margarita Ávila, Women’s Care Centre (CAIM)

Gilda Rivera, Coordinator, Women’s Rights Centre - CDM

Ana María Ferrera, Coordinator, Women’s Studies Centre CEM-H

Civil Society Sector

Sally O’Neill, ACI-SRP Fund, TROCAIRE

René Frenken, ACI-SRP Fund, TROCAIRE

Mabel Hernández, ACI-SRP Fund, TROCAIRE

Ana María Ferrera, Coordinator, Women’s Studies Centre - Honduras (CEM-H)

Suyapa Martínez, Project Officer, Women’s Studies Centre - Honduras (CEM-H)

Rigoberto Duarte, Representative, FECORAH
Cinthia Bonilla Rodríguez, Development Officer, FECORAH
José Inés Gómez García, Development Officer, FECORAH
Marvin Gómez Cerna, Representative, FIPAH
Omar Gallardo, Project Officer, FIPAH
Fredis Francisco Osorto Aguilera, Development Officer, *Asociación San José Obrero*
[association of Saint Joseph the Worker] (Choluteca)
Carlos Hernández, Representative of ASONOG
Concepción Aguilar, Representative of ASONOG
Melba Reyes Gómez, Coordinator, CESADE-H
María del Carmen Castro, Representative, CESADEH
Cecilia Sanchez, Program Coordinator, CUSO/VSO
David Lumbí, Representative, SUCO-Canada
Dominique Besner, Representative, SOCODEVI
Elaine Hernández, Coordinator, Canada Red Cross
Eleonora Vásquez, Representative, Baha'i Association
Rosibel Martínez Salgado, Representative, *Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes* [Young Men's
Christian Association] – YMCA - Honduras

Health Sector

Arnoni, Michael , Senior Development Officer /CIDA/ Honduras Program (Canada)
Minaker, Willow, Second Secretary / CIDA Cooperation / Embassy
Watanabe, Sakiko Program Officer, Health Sector/ JICA
Garido, Neyde Gloria Health Systems and Services / WHO-PAHO
Discussion group, CÉSAR table / Donor issue table / health sector /10 representatives of the
TFPs
Rodriguez, Dr. Carlos, Health Evaluator / PSU
Ochoa, Martha, Health Evaluator / PSU
Hernández, Elaine Delegate / Canada Red Cross
Alvarado, Maria Elisa General Manager/ Honduran Red Cross
Durón, Joel, National Coordinator / Honduran Red Cross
Amendola, Luis, Coordinator / REDES Project / Honduran Red Cross
Discussion group, 7 people Local project coordinator, social facilitators, other local personnel /
Santa Bárbara / REDES Office
Discussion group, 20 people community facilitators, project volunteers, beneficiaries in the
community/ Trinidad/Barandillales
Alvarado, Dra. Sobeida, *Clinica de Atención Integral al Adolescente* [comprehensive care clinic
for adolescents] /Choloma / Clinic
Discussion group, 18 people Regional Coordinator, Local Coordinator, facilitators, COMVIDA
members / Choloma / COMVIDA
Zúñiga Espinal, Héctor, Communication Officer /UNICEF

Clavijo, Hernando, Representative / UNFPA
Nolan, Anthony, Sponsorship Manager / International Plan
Valladares, Lizie, Project Coordinator / International Plan
Funes, Milton, Director / CHF
Zúñiga , Dr. Concepción, PN-Chagas Program Head/ GoH/SESAL
Discussion group, 6 people Dr. Ofelia Martínez and staff in charge of the Olancho department health programs/Chagas project partner/ SESAL/Olancho/Juticalpa (discussion group report by Mesquita Diacuy, 9 pp.)
Pavón Castro, Dr. Adán, Program Manager, PN-Chagas / SESAL/Santa Bárbara
Discussion group, 25 people, community head, community facilitators, beneficiaries of the PN-Chagas program/ Zacapa/San Antonio de Chuchopeque

Water and Sanitation Sector

Orange, Nevin, Senior Development Officer /CIDA/ Honduras program (Canada)
Gómez Mass, Marlon, Water and sanitation evaluator / PSU
Miranda, Ligia, Director, RAS-HON
Ribera, Javier, Director, SANAA
Bueso, Arnaldo, CARE INTERNATIONAL, Project Manager
Discussion group, 12 people Regional Coordinator of SANAA (Juan E. Cardona), professional staff of SANAA/ Olancho / Juticalpa (discussion group report by Mesquita Diacuy, 13 pp.)
Discussion group, 7 people, representative(s) of *Junta del Agua* [water board] and beneficiaries/ Community of Boquín / Salamá / Olancho (discussion group report by Mesquita Diacuy, 6 pp.)
Discussion group, 10 people, representative(s) of *Junta del Agua* [water board] / Community of Talgua / Salamá /Olancho (discussion group report by Mesquita Diacuy, 6 pp.)

APPENDIX F: Honduras in Brief – Statistical Data

SELECTION OF GENERAL INDICATORS	2000 *	2009 *
Population (in millions)	6.1	7.4
Population growth rate	2.1%	2.0%
Fertility rate (number of births per woman)	4.0	3.3
Rural population (% of the population)	54.3%	51.2%
Population under 15 years of age	42.1%	36.5%
Seats held by women in national parliaments (MDG3)	9%	23%
Human development index (HDI) / Rank	0.655 (113)	0.732 (112)
Differential classification / Per-capita GDP versus HDI (+/- no. of ranks)	-19	7
Life expectancy at birth (no. of years)	69.6	72
Debt service (in % of exports)	8%	2%
Trade (in % of GNP)	120.4%	137%

SELECTION OF INDICATORS / POVERTY	2000 *	2009 *
Gini coefficient	51.5	57.7
Population beneath the Honduran poverty line (% of inhab.)	50.0%	50.7%
Population living on less than US\$1.25/day (in % of inhab.) - MDG1	14.0%	18.0%
Labour force employment rate (15 years and +) - MDG1	63.0%	56.0%

SELECTION OF INDICATORS / POVERTY	2000 *	2009 *
Youth employment rate (15-24 years) - MDG1	54.0%	43.0%
Prevalence of malnutrition (under-five) - MDG1	13.0%	9.0%
GDP per capita (current US\$)	1,141	1,918
Net ODA per capita (in current US\$)	72	77
Income share of the lowest 20% of the population	3.3%	2%

SELECTION OF INDICATORS / NATURAL RESOURCES	2000 *	2009 *
Forest cover (in % of the Honduran territory) - MDG7	48.5%	38.7%
Agricultural land base (% of land area)	26.2%	28.0%
Food production index (1999-2001=100)	101	148
Value added of agriculture (in % of GNP)	16%	12%

SELECTION OF INDICATORS / HEALTH SECTOR	2000 *	2009 *
Child mortality rate (per 1,000 births) - MDG4	33	25
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 births) - MDG4	40	30
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 births) - MDG5	160	110
Adolescent fertility rate (15-19 years/per 1,000 births) - MDG5	109	90
Prevalence of HIV/AIDS (% of the pop.) MDG6	0.9%	0.7%
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000) - MDG6	116	58

SELECTION OF INDICATORS / EDUCATION	2000 *	2009 *
Net school attendance rate - primary (in % of school-age children) - MDG2	84.0%	90.0%
Primary school completion rate (in % of age group) – MDG2	82.0%	88.0%
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	80.0%	84.0%
School attendance among girls - primary (as % of boys) - MDG3	92.0%	97.0%
Teacher-pupil ratio – primary	34	33

SELECTION OF INDICATORS / WATER AND SANITATION	2000 *	2009 *
Under-five mortality rate caused by diarrhoea (estimated**)	18.2%	12.6%
Access to better quality of drinking water (urban/ estimated) - MDG7	68.0%	78.0%
Access to better quality of drinking water (rural/ estimated) - MDG7	29.0%	55.0%
Access to improved sanitation facilities (urban/estimated) - MDG7	68.0%	78.0%

- Or indicator available from the closest year with a maximum gap of two years.
- **Sources:** UNDP - Human Development Report: 2000 and 2009; WORLD BANK: Development Report: 2000 and 2010; World Bank: World Development Indicators Database 2010 / Millennium Development Goals