2021 Exports of Military Goods

Table of contents

• 1. Introduction
  • Summary of Key Data
• 2. Canada’s Policy on the Export and Brokering of Military Items
  • Military Goods and Technology – “Groups 2 and 9”
  • Export and Brokering Permit Assessment Process
  • Brokering Controls
  • Notes on the Export of Firearms
  • International Cooperation on Military Trade
• 3. Developments in 2021
  • Ongoing Implementation of a More Robust Risk Assessment Framework
  • COVID-19
  • Policy Reviews - Controlled Exports to Turkey
  • The Arms Trade Treaty and Civil Society Engagement
  • Export Control List Updates
  • Amendment to the Regulations Prescribing Certain Firearms as Prohibited
  • Export and Import Permits Act Offenses
  • Export and Import Permits Act Judicial Reviews
  • Permit Denials
• 4. Military Export and Brokering Statistics
  • Data Interpretation Notes
  • Exports to the United States of Certain Group 2 (Munitions List) Controlled Items
  • Brokering Data
• 5. Service Standard Target
• 6. Annexes
  • Annex A: Canada’s Area Control List (ACL)
  • Annex B: Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL)
  • Annex C: Canada’s International Transfers (Government to Government Transfers)
  • Annex D: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
  • Annex E: International Cooperation on Military Trade
  • Annex F: Index of Destinations Considered Lower-Risk in 2021
  • Annex G: 2021 Exports of Military Goods and Technology by Destination and ECL Item.

List of Tables and Charts

• Table 1: 2021 – Total Value of Exports for Military Goods and Technology by NATO and AFCCL Destinations
• Table 2: 2021 – Export Permits Utilized and Value of Exports by Region
• Table 3: 2021 – Canada’s Top Twelve Non-U.S. Destinations for Military Goods and Technology
• Table 4: 2021 - Export Permit Denials of Military, Dual-Use and Strategic Goods and Technology
• Table 5: 2021 – Summary of Export Permit Application Status by ECL Group
• Table 6: 2021 - Export Value of Military Goods and Technology to all non-U.S. Destinations
• Table 7: 2021 - Top Twelve Non-U.S. Destinations: Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods & Technology
• Table 8: 2021 - Number of Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods & Technology by Destination
• Table 9: 2021 –Number of Issued Export Permits for Military Goods & Technology by Destination
• Table 10: 2021 – Group 2 (Munitions List) of Canada’s ECL
• Table 11: 2021 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number
• Table 12: 2021 – Number of Permits Utilized and Value Exported for certain Group 2 (Munitions List) Controlled Goods and Technology to the United States
• Table 13: 2021 – Group 9 Commercial Exports to the United States by quantity
• Table 14: 2021 - Transactions Reported under General Brokering Permit GBP-1 by Destination
• Table 15: The Brokering Control List
• Table 16: 2021 - Summary of Brokering Permits Applications Received in 2021
• Table 17: 2021 - Brokering Permits Issued by Destination and ECL Items
• Table 18: Export Permit Applications Processed (2021-2019)
• Table 19: 2021 - Global Affairs Canada Service Standards for all Military, Dual-use and Strategic Export Permit Applications
• Table 20: 2021 – UNROCA: Actual Exports from Canada of Conventional Arms and SALW
• Chart 1: 2021 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by NATO and AFCCL Destinations by Value
• Chart 2: 2021 - Export Value of (non-U.S. destined) Military Goods and Technology – Percentage by Region
• Chart 3: 2021 – Number of Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods and Technology to non-U.S. Destinations - Percentage by Region
• Chart 4: 2021 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number and Value

1. Introduction

The Report on the Export of Military Goods is tabled annually in the Parliament of Canada to promote transparency around Canadian exports of military items. The report provides information on the export of military goods and technology from Canada in a given calendar year. Further to amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) in 2019, there is now a legal requirement that the annual report be tabled in Parliament prior to May 31 of the subsequent calendar year. Prior to this, the report had been produced voluntarily since 1990. The last edition of this report covered 2020 and was tabled in Parliament on May 31, 2021.

This was the second full year in which the Government implemented the robust risk assessment framework that was put in place in preparation for Canada’s accession to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), in September 2019. The Government of Canada has taken action to strengthen Canada’s export controls, which are among the most rigorous in the world and are in line with those of our principal allies and partners in the main export control regimes. A key priority of Canada’s foreign policy is the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end, the Government of Canada strives to ensure that, among other policy goals, such as supporting Canadian foreign and defence policies and legitimate trade, Canadian goods and technology are not used in a manner that is prejudicial to human rights, peace, security or stability.

The data in this report covers exports and brokering of goods and technology included in the Export Control List (ECL) that are designed for military purposes. Data for this report is assembled and verified against information received from Canadian industry. Information on how military items are defined for the purposes of export controls is provided in section 2 of this report.

Global Affairs Canada collects data on military exports to the United States for all ECL Group 9 goods and for ECL Group 2 items only if they require a permit to be exported to the United States. As of September 1, 2019, regulatory amendments enabled the collection of information on exports to the United States of full-system conventional arms, as defined in Article 2(1) of the ATT.

Information on Canadian exports of military goods is also captured in three other key reports: the Annual Report on the Administration of the Export and Import Permits Act, which is tabled in Parliament, and Canada’s submission to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and to the Arms Trade Treaty.

Global Affairs Canada welcomes suggestions on how to improve future editions of this report. To submit any suggestions, please contact the Export Controls Policy Division at Global Affairs Canada: expctrlpol@international.gc.ca.

Summary of Key Data

• For the 2021 calendar year, the value of Canadian exports of controlled military goods and technology to non-U.S. destinations amounted to approximately $2.731 billion, compared to a value of $1.966 billion in 2020 and $3.757 billion in 2019.
• Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the processing of export and brokering permit applications has been deemed a priority service and the department has reallocated resources to ensure the continuity of the permit application and assessment process.
• Service standards for the processing of permits were met 72% of the time in 2021 (compared to 77% in 2020 and 72% in 2019).
• The major share of exports by value ($2.220 billion or 81.28%) went to non-NATO countries that are included on Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL) (see Annex B for the list of AFCCL countries).
• Europe was the region in which the largest number of export permits were utilized (60%). The top five destinations by number of permits utilized were: The United Kingdom, Israel, Germany, France and Australia. Those five destinations accounted for approximately 50% of permits utilized. Europe was the region to which the most permits were issued in 2021.
• Saudi Arabia was the largest non-U.S. export destination, receiving approximately $1,746 billion in Canadian military exports (accounting for approximately 64% of the total value of non-U.S. military exports).
• Most of Canada’s military exports by value consisted of ground vehicles and their components, which accounted for 64% of all controlled military exports in 2021 ($1.749 billion).

Table 1: 2021 – Total Value of Exports for Military Goods and Technology by NATO and AFCCL Destinations^{Footnote 1}

Chart 1: 2021 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by NATO and AFCCL Destinations by value

Text version

• Non-NATO AFCCL Destinations – 81.28%
• NATO Destinations – 13.10%
• Other Destinations – 5.62%

Table 2: 2021 – Export Permits Utilized and Value of Exports by Region^{Footnote 2}

Table 3: 2021 – Canada’s Top Twelve Non-U.S. Destinations for Military Goods and Technology

Chart 2: 2021 - Export Value of (non-U.S. destined) Military Goods and Technology – Percentage by Region

Text version

• Middle East – 66%
• Europe – 16%
• Asia-Pacific – 15%
• Africa – 3%
• Americas – 0%

2. Canada’s Policy on the Export and Brokering of Military Items

As of September 2019, under the EIPA, the Minister of Foreign Affairs must deny exports and brokering permit applications for military goods and technology if there is a substantial risk that the items would undermine peace and security, or could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws, acts constituting an offence under international conventions relating to terrorism or organized crime, or serious acts of gender-based violence.

This objective is pursued primarily through Canada’s system of export and brokering controls, as governed by the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA). The EIPA requires Canadian individuals and companies that wish to export any items included on the Export Control List (ECL), or to broker any items included on the Brokering Control List (BCL), to obtain a permit issued by Global Affairs Canada.^{Footnote 4} The ECL includes military, dual-use, and strategic goods and technology, U.S.-origin goods and technology, and a limited number of items that are controlled for economic reasons, in accordance with Canada’s international trade agreements and obligations. More information on brokering controls and on the types of items controlled on the BCL is provided below.

Canada prohibits the export, sale, supply, or shipment of arms and related materiel to countries that are under United Nations Security Council arms embargos, through regulations under the United Nations Act. These embargoes also prohibit the provision of technical assistance, including by transferring technical data, in relation to the sale, supply, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related material. Canada also has autonomous sanctions in place in relation to certain countries through regulations under the Special Economic Measures Act, which prohibit certain activities, including the export of specific goods and technology to those countries, or to any person in those countries, and/or to listed individuals and entities subject to a full dealings ban. More information on Canada’s sanctions is available on the Canadian Sanctions website.

Furthermore, the EIPA also provides authority for an Area Control List (ACL), a list of countries to which the Governor-in-Council deems it necessary to control the export or transfer of any goods or technology, regardless of whether or not the items are included in the ECL. Currently, only North Korea is listed on the ACL. More information on the ACL can be found in Annex A.

The ECL is based principally on our participation in the major multilateral export control and non-proliferation regimes. Canada’s export and brokering controls are not meant to hinder international trade unnecessarily, but to regulate and impose restrictions in response to clear legislative and policy objectives. As outlined above, these objectives include ensuring that Canadian exports and brokering activities abroad are consistent with Canada’s foreign and defence policies, including respect for human rights and international peace and security.

Military Goods and Technology – “Groups 2 and 9”

The military goods and technology described in this report are those included in Group 2 (Munitions List), and in its subset Group 9 (Arms Trade Treaty Items), of the ECL.

Goods and technology listed in Group 2 are “specially designed or modified for military use.” These items include, among others, ground vehicles, firearms, ammunition and imaging equipment made specifically for military use. A full list of the categories of Group 2 items is included in Table 10.

Group 9 is a subset of Group 2 and includes the full-system conventional arms that are listed in Article 2(1) of the ATT, namely: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre artillery systems; military aircraft; military helicopters; military vessels and submarines; missiles and missile launchers; and small arms and light weapons when destined for police and/or military end-use. Group 9 items require a permit prior to export to all destinations, including the United States.

Other controlled items appearing elsewhere on the ECL (such as dual-use and nuclear items) are not featured in this report as they are not specially designed for military use.

Military goods and technology listed in Groups 2 and/or 9 of the ECL are typically exported for one or more of the following purposes:

• sales to military and, in some cases, police forces or other government agencies;
• sales of parts and components for the production of new goods;
• transfers between affiliates;
• return of military equipment to foreign customers following repair in Canada, and shipments of spare parts;
• sales to private individuals (particularly for firearms). ^{Footnote 5}

Export and Brokering Permit Assessment Process

Under the Export and Import Permits Act, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is legally required to take into account the assessment criteria referred to in Article 7 of the ATT in deciding whether to issue or deny export and brokering permit applications for “arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war” (i.e., military goods and technology controlled under Group 2 of the ECL). Specifically, the Minister is required to consider whether the goods or technology specified in the application:

• would contribute to peace and security or undermine it; and
• could be used to commit or facilitate
  • a serious violation of international humanitarian law,
  • a serious violation of international human rights law,
  • an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which Canada is a party,
  • an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which Canada is a party, or
  • serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

The legislation stipulates that the Minister cannot issue an export or brokering permit for “arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war” if, after taking into account available mitigating measures, he or she determines that there is a substantial risk that the proposed transaction would result in any of the negative consequences referred to in the ATT assessment criteria. For there to be a substantial risk, there should be a direct and foreseeable risk, based on compelling evidence, that the specific good or technology proposed for export or brokering would result in a negative consequence listed in the EIPA.

Additional objectives of Canada’s overall export and brokering controls regime include:

• ensuring that exports or brokering transactions do not pose a threat to Canada and its allies;
• preventing exports or brokering transactions that would be in violation of Canadian sanctions;
• ensuring that exports or brokering transactions do not contribute to the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction, or of their delivery systems; and
• mitigating the possibility of unauthorized transfer or diversion of the exported or brokered goods and technology.

All applications to export or broker goods or technology are carefully reviewed against the criteria listed above through wide-ranging consultations with geographic, human rights, international security and defence industry experts at Global Affairs Canada (including at Canada’s overseas diplomatic missions), the Department of National Defence, and, as necessary, other government departments and agencies. Every export and brokering permit application is also closely scrutinized to ensure that they align with Canada’s foreign and defence policies and security interests.

To guide this consultation process, Global Affairs Canada developed an enhanced risk assessment framework for the review of permit applications, laying out the different elements to be considered, the relevant government experts to be consulted, and parameters for the identification of risks. Any concerns raised through this process are then closely evaluated, including whether a substantial risk exists with respect to any of the ATT criteria.

A key consideration in the review of each application is the end-use and end-user of the item. Careful attention is paid to end-use documentation in an effort to ensure that the export or brokering transaction is intended for a legitimate end-user and will not be diverted to ends that would threaten the security of Canada or its allies or would result in a negative consequence referred to in the ATT assessment criteria. Where a substantial risk is identified with respect to any of the ATT criteria, mitigating measures, such as additional end-use assurances, post-shipment controls, or transparency provisions between Canada and the government of the destination country, must be sought. A permit can only be issued if the mitigating measure reduces the risk to less than “substantial”.

Brokering Controls

Article 10 of the ATT requires State Parties to take measures to regulate the brokering of arms taking place under their jurisdiction. Canada’s brokering controls have been in effect since September 1, 2019, and apply to persons and organizations in Canada, as well as to Canadians abroad (Canadian citizens, permanent residents, and organizations).

Brokering is defined in the EIPA as “arranging or negotiating a transaction that relates to the movement of goods or technology included in a Brokering Control List from a foreign country to another foreign country.” The Brokering Control List, which comprises all items for which a permit is required prior to engaging in a brokering transaction, includes full-system conventional arms (as defined in Group 9 of the ECL), all items listed in Group 2 of the ECL, as well as any ECL item – including dual-use items – that are likely destined to a weapons of mass destruction end-use.

Throughout 2021, Global Affairs Canada provided on-demand support to businesses that requested assistance in understanding Canada’s brokering controls. The department also availed itself of opportunities to proactively share information about Canada’s brokering controls with industry and to meet with civil society organizations that expressed an interest in the issue.

For more information about these controls, please consult the brokering regulations online. Global Affairs Canada welcomes feedback from stakeholders and is open to considering additional measures to further streamline and improve the ongoing implementation of Canada’s brokering controls.

Notes on the Export of Firearms

In terms of the quantity of permits issued, most firearms exports from Canada are intended for sporting or other recreational use and not for military purposes. In addition to the assessment criteria mentioned previously, permit applications for firearms are carefully assessed for the risk that items may be diverted to the illegal arms trade or used to fuel local or regional violence. Canadian diplomatic missions and other sources may provide information about the destination country’s firearms control laws, procedures and enforcement practices, and are often called upon to validate import permits and licences, end-user assurances, and consignee information prior to the issuance of a permit.

Prohibited firearms and components thereof may only be exported to countries listed on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL) and then only to consignees that are government entities or are authorized by government entities.^{Footnote 6} The full list of countries on the AFCCL is found in Annex B.

International Cooperation on Military Trade

Multilateral action is an important means of promoting international peace and security. Canada supports and participates in a range of arms control, export control, and non-proliferation activities, working closely with partners who share our objectives. Canada participates in the following export control bodies and initiatives: the Arms Trade Treaty, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Further information on these multilateral forums can be found in Annexes D and E.

3. Developments in 2021

Ongoing Implementation of a Robust Risk Assessment Framework

The year 2021 was the second full year of implementation of a more robust risk assessment framework for the review of export and brokering permit applications. This assessment framework was put in place to strengthen the rigour and transparency of export controls when Canada acceded to the ATT in September 2019. Ensuring that every ATT risk criterion that is enshrined in the EIPA has been assessed, has had an impact on the time required to process applications leading to delays in the processing of certain applications. As such, and while applying the same level of rigour required by Canada’s domestic and international legal obligations, the department is working to facilitate a more transparent, timely, and predicable export controls system for Canadian exporters. Improvement in service delivery would help support the economic recovery of the defence industry, which prior to the pandemic contributed close to $6.2 billion in GDP and 60,000 jobs to the Canadian economy while providing the Canadian Armed Forces with the equipment necessary to meet its operational needs.

COVID-19

Global cooperation on pandemics is critical to ensuring the health and safety of people around the world. Global Affairs Canada has not implemented any new export restrictions under the Export and Import Permits Act in response to COVID-19 at this time.

Throughout the pandemic, the processing of export and brokering permit applications has been deemed a priority service and the department has reallocated resources to ensure the continuity of the permit application and assessment process.

In 2021, for the second year in a row there were circa 1,500 fewer export permit applications for military, dual-use, and strategic goods or technology received when compared to 2019 (pre-pandemic).

Policy Reviews - Controlled Exports to Turkey

On April 12, 2021, Global Affairs Canada published the findings of a review it conducted, in consultation with the Department of National Defence, of all suspended and valid export permits and pending export permit applications for military goods and technology destined to Turkey. Following the review, 29 export permits to Turkey that had been suspended in the fall of 2020 were cancelled. As of December 31, 2021, the Notice to Exporters No. 992 regarding Exports of items listed on the Export Control List to Turkey remained in effect, with a presumptive denial policy in place for Group 2 (military) exports to Turkey.

The Arms Trade Treaty and Civil Society Engagement

In the second full year as a State Party, Canada continued to engage vigorously in the ATT in spite of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Throughout the year, Canada supported the work of the Treaty by participating in its Working Groups, in particular the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Canada also actively participated in the Working Group Meetings as well as Seventh Conference of States Parties (CSP7). At CSP7, Canada shared information on how it implements the Treaty, including by sharing information on the permits denied using the ATT assessment criteria. This information was welcomed by international civil society.

Through a decision taken at the Sixth Conference of States Parties CSP6, Canada became a member of the Voluntary Trust Fund Selection Committee (VTFSC) for a two-year mandate. The VTF is a basket fund that supports the national implementation of the Treaty by other States Parties, and the VTFSC is the body of States Parties that oversees it. In its first year as member, Canada supported the evaluation of strong projects that will advance Treaty implementation and compliance in some States Parties and support universalisation with Signatory States and other states.

In addition, Canada supported initiatives that strengthen general implementation of the ATT. For instance, in 2021, Canada has partnered with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to support its Gender and Disarmament Programme, through the provision of $CAD 300,000 to UNIDIR over the next three years. The expected outcomes for this partnership include improving current practices related to gender analysis and the use of gender-disaggregated data in conventional arms control and disarmament processes, and developing a more diversified group of actors supporting the integrations of gender considerations into arms control and disarmament policy and practice, including weapons and ammunition management.

In addition, Canada continued its discussions with international partners within the ATT with a view to strengthen international compliance with the Treaty. Those discussions focused on learning about various measures to address the issue of diversion in accordance with Article 11 of the Treaty. Outside the context of the ATT, Global Affairs Canada also engaged regularly with international partners and civil society stakeholders to share information, benchmark best practices and discuss ways to increase the rigour and transparency of Canada’s export controls.

Export Control List Updates

On June 3, 2021, the Government of Canada finalized the regulatory process to amend the Export Control List to incorporate the 2020 commitments made at the four key multilateral export control regimes (The Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement). This amendment served to add, clarify and remove controls over specific items as agreed upon in the various regimes. The “December 2020” edition of the Guide to Canada’s Export Control List came into effect on July 23, 2021, incorporating the regime commitments made up until December 31, 2020.

To streamline the internal to government approval process through which the annual updates to the multilateral export control lists are implemented in Canada, this amendment also incorporated the Guide to Canada’s Export Control List in the Export Control List regulation "as amended from time to time" (an ambulatory incorporation by reference). Moving forward any updates to the Guide that are made to align it with the control lists of four multilateral export control regimes will enter into force 30-days after the publication of the updated Guide by Global Affairs Canada. As a result, no amendment to the Export Control List regulation will be required and the existing notification process will remain the same, whereby exporters will continue to be given a 30-day period to familiarize themselves with the updates to the controls published in the Guide. This new process will considerably shorten the time from agreement to domestic implementation. Updates to the Guide that are made for any other reason, including the development of unilateral controls, would still require a regulatory amendment.

Amendment to the Regulations Prescribing Certain Firearms as Prohibited

Further to the May 1, 2020 amendment to the Regulations Prescribing Certain Firearms and Other Weapons, Components and Parts of Weapons, Accessories, Cartridge Magazines, Ammunition and Projectiles as Prohibited, Restricted or Non-Restricted, approximately 1,500 models of firearms and their variants were reclassified as prohibited. As of that date these newly prohibited firearms may now only be exported to destinations that are listed on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL). The continued impact of this change in 2021 was an increased number of permit applications as well as detentions at the border.

Export and Import Permits Act Offenses

There were no convictions for offences under the EIPA during the 2021 calendar year.

Export and Import Permits Act Judicial Reviews

There was one ongoing judicial review in relation to Group 2 export permits during the 2021 calendar year.

Daniel Turp v. Minister of Foreign Affairs (3^rd Judicial Review)

On October 10, 2019, Mr. Turp commenced a third application for judicial review against the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ purported failure to cancel all existing permits for the export of Light Armoured Vehicles to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On March 15, 2021, the Federal Court issued a notice of status review to Mr. Turp due to his failure to move the case forward for more than a year and a half. From that date, Mr. Turp had 15 days to explain to the Court why his application should not be dismissed for delay, which he did in writing on March 29, 2021. However, in a decision rendered on October 12, 2021, the Federal Court found that Mr. Turp had failed to provide a compelling justification for his 1.5-year delay in moving the case forward. Accordingly, the Federal Court dismissed Mr. Turp’s third application for judicial review, which means this litigation is now over.

Permit Denials

In 2021, 15 applications for permits to export military, dual-use, and strategic goods or technology were denied. Since 2016, when the report began to include information on permit applications denied, there have typically been less than 10 denials per year, except for 2020 where there were 58 denials.

Six applications to export dual-use items to China were denied for reasons pertaining to Canada’s foreign and defence policy. Two applications to export prohibited firearms and their corresponding parts and components was denied as the destination countries were not listed on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL) at the time the application was submitted. A Group 2 permit to Libya was denied because there was a substantial risk that the proposed Group 2 export would have resulted in one of the negative consequences of the ATT assessment criteria as outlined in section 7.4 of the EIPA., while another six permits for Group 2 were denied to Turkey as being inconsistent with Canada’s foreign and defence policy interests.

Table 4 includes information on applications that were denied in 2021, including those that were submitted prior to January 1, 2021.

It is important to note that each year, a number of permit applications are withdrawn at the request of the exporter if the applicant becomes aware, or is otherwise informed, of commercial, political or other types of risk that may affect their application and decides not to proceed further with the export. For the number of export permit applications withdrawn in 2021 please see Table 5.

Table 4: 2021 - Export Permit Denials of Military, Dual-Use and Strategic Goods and Technology^{Footnote 7}

Standard denial language is:

• Denial consistent with Canada’s foreign policy and defence interests.
• Destination is not included on the AFCCL
• Denial consistent with Canada’s obligations under the ATT.*

4. Military Export and Brokering Statistics

The data contained in this report are obtained from permit utilization reporting, which exporters must provide to Global Affairs Canada consistent with the conditions listed on export permits for military goods and technology. The data displayed below includes the country of destination, the ECL item under which the export is controlled, and the value in Canadian dollars.

Further details related to export transactions (for example, names of exporting companies, values of individual contracts and transactions, and details of the specific technologies being exported) are protected due to the commercially confidential nature of such information.

Export controls apply to all foreign destinations. However, due to Canada’s close and long-standing military cooperation with the United States, including the 1956 Defence Production Sharing Agreement that underpins the integrated nature of North America’s defence industry, Canada and the United States have reciprocal arrangements to ensure permit-free/licence-free movement of most military items between our two countries. For Canada, this has meant permit exemptions for most Group 2 exports destined to the United States. Consequently, Global Affairs Canada collects data for exports of Group 9 goods and a small sub-set of goods for which individual permits are required, such as prohibited firearms, related parts and ammunition, and select items controlled under ECL number 2-4 (see Tables 12 and 13).

Data on Canadian military exports may be available from other sources such as Statistics Canada. These figures are derived from data collected by the Canada Border Services Agency based on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (HS), and may include non-military goods such as: commercial computers; civil-certified aircraft; guns and ammunition designed exclusively for industrial uses, such as the lighting of gas flares at oil wells; or other civilian equipment. Since there is no direct correlation between the commodity codes used by Statistics Canada and the ECL numbers, and because each source uses different methods of data collection, a meaningful comparison of the information from these sources is not possible.

An internationally accepted standard for statistics on worldwide military trade is the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) (see Annex D). The Register quantifies the number of complete weapon systems permanently exported and does not include parts, components or the wide assortment of non-lethal support systems (such as radar equipment, simulators and software designed for military use) that make up a significant component of Canada’s military exports. Since 1991, Canada has consistently submitted annual voluntary reports to UNROCA. As in 2021, in 2022, Canada will submit to the ATT Secretariat the same public report on the export and import of full-system conventional arms recently listed under Group 9 in order to meet its reporting obligations under the ATT.

Global Affairs Canada also produces an Annual Report to Parliament on the Administration of the Export and Import Permits Act, which is also a statutory requirement under the EIPA. This report provides an overview of permit data and service standards, which includes Group 2 permits and is also available at: Export and Import Controls Permits Act (EIPA).

Data Interpretation Notes

The following data interpretation notes apply:

1. Procurement contracts awarded by governments may have very high values and extended delivery schedules; a single contract may account for a large share of total military exports in a given year or over multiple years. Major changes in totals from one year to another may be explained by the beginning or end of a small number of high-value contracts.
2. Other than Table 9 and Tables 12, 13, and 20, the data presented does not include information on exports of military goods and technology to the United States. Data on permit applications for exports to the United States is included in Tables 5, 18, and 19.
3. The ECL item numbers used are explained with illustrative examples. Detailed descriptions of all strategic goods and technology controlled under the EIPA, can be found in “A Guide to Canada’s Export Control List”, which is available at Export Controls.
4. Readers will notice that some of the totals vary between tables. For instance, Table 6 reports annual values of total exports of military goods and technology by destination country, whereas Annex G breaks down the value of exports to individual countries according to the ECL item number. However, the total of exports by ECL item number to an individual country calculated from Annex G may be greater than the total value of exports to that destination reported in Table 6. This is because goods or technology included in a single export permit may be classified under multiple ECL item numbers. Table 11, Chart 4, and Annex G therefore, contain some double-counting, which inflates the value of total exports.
5. Table 10 references transfers of “technology” controlled under item 2-22 of the ECL. Transfers of this nature often cannot be easily quantified. For this reason, “lots” rather than unit quantities are commonly used where technology may be transferred via intangible means (such as through meetings or emails). The “value” assigned to such technology transfers is determined by exporter in their reporting and may explain some low-value exports to certain destinations. The inclusion of such data within this report is consistent with past practice.
6. A multi-destination permit (or MDP) allows exports to multiple countries under a single permit. Group 2 MDPs only allow exports to like-minded countries that are members of the export control regimes to which Canada is party, and that have an effective system of export controls. MDPs are offered to exporters who have an exporting history with Global Affairs Canada. These exporters have implemented defined due diligence processes and procedures when planning, marketing and shipping ECL items to foreign clients to ensure a reasonable level of assurance that goods or technology will not be exported to unauthorized or illegitimate end-uses or end-users. The values exported under MDPs are included in all the tables reporting the total value of military exports. However, Tables 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, along with Chart 3, do not include the number of MDPs utilized per destination as a single permit can cover exports to multiple destinations.
7. The number of Group 2 permits issued in 2021 (reported in Table 5 as 3211) does not equal the number of Group 2 permits utilized in 2021 (reported in Table 8 as 1990) because a single permit issued in any given year can be valid for up to a period up to five years and be exported against during any of the years in which it is valid.
8. Exporters are not required to submit permit utilization reports to Global Affairs Canada for Group 2 exports where no value is being transferred. Examples include exports where goods were sent to Canada for warranty repair, and are being returned to the original owner; exports where goods were sent to Canada for testing, demonstration or trials, and are being returned; the return to foreign owners of controlled goods borrowed or leased by a Canadian company (e.g., deactivated automatic firearms used as movie props); exports of faulty or discrepant material; or exports of goods for destructive testing. Exports of such nature are omitted from this report.

Table 5: 2021 – Summary of Export Permit Application Status by ECL Groups^{Footnote 9}

Notes for Table 5

Submitted Applications: Table 5 includes data on all export permit application submitted between January 1 and December 31, 2021. It does not include information on applications that were submitted prior to 2021 (or those that were submitted on December 31, 2021 and not received on January 1, 2022) nor does it include information on export permit amendment requests. Items in an export permit application may be assessed under more than one ECL Group. To avoid counting the same application twice, applications containing more than one ECL assessment have been assigned to a single Group based on the following order of precedence: 9, 2, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 5. Therefore, an application containing both a Group 9 assessment and a Group 2 assessment will appear once in the Group 9 row and an application containing both a Group 6 and a Group 5 assessment will only appear in the Group 6 row. The status of all export permit applications reflected in the table is accurate as of December 31, 2021.

Issued: Means a permit has been approved and issued in 2021. If a permit was issued in 2021 and is subsequently cancelled, it is only counted once in the cancelled or suspended column.

Denied: Means a permit that was denied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, either directly by the Minister or by departmental officials further to policy direction received from the Minister. This occurs in fewer than 1% of cases annually and is generally for reasons related to Canada’s obligations under the ATT or Canada’s foreign and defence policies, as provided in the criteria for controlling the export of military, dual use and strategic goods outlined above. Information on denials is also reported in Table 5. Please note that Table 4 includes information on applications that were denied in 2021 including those that were submitted prior to January 1, 2020. Table 5 includes information on applications that were submitted in 2021 that had been denied up to December 31, 2021. The variance between Tables 4 and 5 is due to the fact that Table 4 includes applications that were submitted prior to 2021.

Returned without action: A permit application is returned without action by Global Affairs Canada if it is administratively incomplete, or if there is inconsistent information. An applicant that still wishes to pursue the export would be required to submit a new permit application.

Withdrawn: Permit applications may be withdrawn either at the request of the exporter or if the exporter is advised by Global Affairs Canada that a permit is not required. An exporter may decide to withdraw their application if the permit is no longer required because the commercial contract has fallen through, if a change to the contract requires them to resubmit the information under a separate application, or if the exporter becomes aware of political, commercial, or other types of risk that may affect their application and decides not to pursue the export. An application may also be withdrawn if the goods or technology proposed for export are not controlled, if the items are controlled but a permit is not required for their export to the United States, or if a General Export Permit applies. All of these situations are captured in the category of withdrawn permits. In 2021, a total of 269 applications were withdrawn because an individual export permit was not required. The remaining 147 withdrawals were at the request of the applicant.

Cancelled or Suspended: An export permit that has been issued may be cancelled for administrative reasons (e.g., at the request of the applicant as the permit is no longer required, or due to an error on the permit requiring replacement by a new permit), or for policy reasons at the direction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. An export permit that has been cancelled is no longer valid for the export of goods or technology. An issued export permit can be suspended for policy reasons and reinstated later.

Under Review: Includes applications submitted in 2021 that as of December 31, 2021 were not completely processed or were otherwise under review.

Table 6: 2021 - Export Value of Military Goods and Technology to all non-U.S. Destinations

Chart 3: 2021 – Number of Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods and Technology to non-U.S. Destinations - Percentage by Region^{Footnote 11}

Text version

• Europe – 60%
• Asia-Pacific – 18%
• Middle East – 16%
• Americas – 4%
• Africa – 2%

Table 7: 2021 - Top Twelve Non-U.S. Destinations: Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods &Technology

Table 8: 2021 - Number of Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods & Technology by Destination^{Footnote 12}

Table 9: 2021 –Number of Issued Export Permits for Military Goods & Technology by Destination

Table 10: 2021 – Group 2 (Munitions List) of Canada’s ECL

Table 11: 2021 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number^{Footnote 14}

Chart 4: 2021 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number and Value^{Footnote 15} (Without ECL Items 2-6 and 2-10: “Ground vehicles and components” and “Aircraft and components”) ^{Footnote 16}

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Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number and Value for Chart 4

ECL Number	Total Value	Percent of Permits Utilized
2-1	$46,115,805.82	6.92%
2-2	$66,732,710.24	10.02%
2-3	$6,018,710.18	0.90%
2-4	$10,215,594.30	1.53%
2-5	$54,705,857.66	8.21%
2-7	$5,197,613.44	0.80%
2-8	$535,009.00	0.10%
2-9	$26,652,668.14	4.00%
2-11	$81,249,107.68	12.2%
2-13	$25,104,372.95	3.80%
2-14	$31,711,544.83	4.76%
2-15	$141,344,408.27	21.22%
2-16	$2,974,294.98	0.44%
2-17	$4,653,134.50	0.71%
2-18	$37,683,496.67	5.65%
2-21	$69,872,339.43	10.49%
2-22	$55,134,778.63	8.27%

Exports to the United States of Certain Group 2 (Munitions List) Controlled Items

Global Affairs Canada collects data on military exports to the United States for all Group 9 goods and for Group 2 items only if they require a permit to be exported to the United States.

Within Group 2 of the ECL, export permits are required to the United States in the following circumstances:

• All exports of prohibited firearms controlled under item 2-1 (e.g. automatic weapons) or 2-2 (e.g. weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7mm) of the ECL must be authorized in advance with an export permit. Details on the application process can be found in the Export and Brokering Controls Handbook at Export and Brokering Controls Handbook
• Any ammunition controlled under item 2-3 of the ECL that is destined for end-use by police or military agencies. Permits are not required for the export of sporting ammunition.
• Goods controlled under item 2-4.a (e.g. bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles etc.) of the ECL.

In 2021, 82 export permits were utilized for the export to the United States of goods controlled under Group 2 (Munitions List) of the ECL. See Table 12 for more detailed information.

Goods exported from Canada to the United States are thereafter subject to the United States export controls regardless of whether a Canadian export permit was required. Goods exported from Canada through the United States to a third country (i.e. transit/transshipment) require a Canadian export permit for the third country when they leave Canada.

Permits are also required for the export to the United States of certain goods controlled under other ECL Groups, including all items in Group 3 (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation List), all items in Group 4 (the Nuclear-related Dual-Use List), most items in Group 5 (Miscellaneous Goods and Technology), and certain items in Group 6 (the Missile Technology Control Regime List) and Group 7 (the Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation List).

Table 12: 2021 – Number of Permits Utilized and Value Exported for certain Group 2 (Munitions List) Controlled Goods and Technology to the United States

Table 13: 2021 – Group 9 Commercial Exports to the United States by quantity

Brokering Data

Table 14: 2021 - Transactions Reported under GBP-1 by Destination

Once a broker has informed Global Affairs Canada of their intention to use the expedited General Brokering Permit 1 (GBP-1) during the course of a given calendar year, utilization reports (including nil reports) are required. This table reflects the total value related to brokering activities that took place in 2021. As some brokering activities may span multiple years, the total dollar value of the items related to the brokering activity may appear in Table 14 for multiple years. Therefore, brokering activities reported in this year’s table may have not necessarily resulted in transfers taking place this year.

Table 15: The Brokering Control List

Table 16: 2021 - Summary of Brokering Permits Applications Received

Table 16 contains data on the status of brokering permit applications submitted between January 1 and December 31, 2021. Their status is accurate on March 29, 2022.

Table 17: 2021 - Brokering Permits Issued by Destination and ECL Items

Table 17 includes data on the brokering permits issued in 2021. All brokering permits issued in 2021 were for ECL Group 2 items, therefore all items are controlled under BCL 1(a). Some individual brokering permits may include multiple destinations and origin countries. Due to this fact, the value for one brokered item may be duplicated in multiple rows.

5. Service Standard Target

As stated in the Export and Brokering Controls Handbook, the processing time for applications for export permits to low-risk destinations that contain all required supporting documentation is 10 working days, and for complete applications for export permits to other destinations the processing time is 40 working days. The performance target for achieving this standard is set at 90 percent. For a list of destinations considered low-risk please refer to Annex F.

All export permit applications for military items, regardless of the country of destination, are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the ATT assessment criteria. However, applications for export permits to non-low-risk countries are subject to a more comprehensive assessment process, based on a risk assessment of the items being exported, the consignee country, and the intended end-use and end-user. These assessments are conducted through intra- and inter-departmental consultations to evaluate the risks and implications of the proposed exports with respect to the mandatory ATT assessment criteria, as well as considerations related to Canada’s foreign and defence policy and national security. Various Canadian government departments and agencies, including multiple divisions within Global Affairs Canada and Canada’s network of missions abroad, are involved in the consultation process.

When determining if an application has been processed within the allotted service standard, the department takes into consideration whether the application has been submitted with all of the required documentation. The processing time calculation only begins the moment a complete application has been received and no further clarification or supporting documents are required from the exporter. Applications that are withdrawn, returned without action, or denied are also counted towards the service standard. The data below, which is accurate as of December 31, 2021, captures export permit applications that were submitted in 2021. However, it does not include those applications that were submitted in 2021, but that had not been fully processed as of December 31, 2021.

More information on service standards can be found in the Export and Brokering Controls Handbook.

Please note that service standards are not legal requirements. Rather, service standards are an indication of performance targets that permit applicants can expect under normal circumstances.

Table 18: Export Permit Applications Processed (2021-2019)^{Footnote 20}

Table 19: 2021 - Global Affairs Canada Service Standards for all Military, Dual-use and Strategic Export Permit Applications

6. Annexes

Annex A: Canada’s Area Control List (ACL)

The export or transfer of any goods or technology (including technical data, technical assistance and information necessary for the development, production or use of a good) to countries on the ACL is controlled and must be authorized by an export permit issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the authority of the EIPA. Export permits are normally issued only for those goods and technology that respond to humanitarian needs or circumstances, or for the personal belongings of an individual relocating to a country listed on the ACL.

As of December 31, 2021, the ACL was comprised of one country: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), which was added on July 13, 2010.

Guidance on exports to North Korea is published in Notice to Exporters No. 172, which is available at: Export Controls to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Annex B: Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL)

Further to sections 4.1 and 7(2) of the EIPA, certain prohibited firearms, weapons, or devices, and components and parts thereof, that are included on the Export Control List, may be exported only to destinations on the AFCCL and only to consignees that are government or authorized by government. These must be approved by an export permit issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the authority of the EIPA.

The following goods and their components and parts, as defined in section 4.1 of the EIPA and subsection 84(1) of the Criminal Code, are subject to the AFCCL, when these items are also included on the Export Control List:

• an automatic firearm, whether or not it has been altered to discharge only one projectile with one pressure of the trigger;
• any firearm that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited firearm;
• any weapon, other than a firearm, that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited weapon;
• any component or part of a weapon, or any accessory for use with a weapon, that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited device;
• a cartridge magazine that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited device.

At the time of publication, the AFCCL was comprised of the following countries:

1. Albania
2. Australia
3. Austria
4. Belgium
5. Botswana
6. Bulgaria
7. Chile
8. Colombia
9. Croatia
10. Czech Republic
11. Denmark
12. Estonia
13. Finland
14. France
15. Germany
16. Greece
17. Hungary
18. Iceland
19. Ireland
20. Israel
21. Italy
22. Japan
23. Kuwait
24. Latvia
25. Lithuania
26. Luxembourg
27. Netherlands
28. New Zealand
29. Norway
30. Peru
31. Poland
32. Portugal
33. Romania
34. Saudi Arabia
35. Slovakia
36. Slovenia
37. Spain
38. Sweden
39. Switzerland
40. Turkey
41. United Kingdom
42. United States
43. Ukraine
44. Korea, Republic of

The AFCCL can be found at: Automatic Firearms Country Control List

Annex C: Canada’s International Transfers (Government to Government Transfers)

From time to time, the Government of Canada will provide surplus military equipment to foreign governments through sale or donation. When determining sales and donations to foreign governments, the Government of Canada considers a number of factors, including the nature of the goods, the country of origin, the applicable controls relating to its distribution and the applicable Government of Canada policies.

Records pertaining to these types of transfers are kept by the Department of National Defence. If applicable, this information is also publicly reported in Canada’s submission to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).

Canada’s international government-to-government transfers in 2021 were:

• USA: 42 RIM-66 Standard Missile 2 were donated to the United States Navy
• Netherlands: 5 C8 Rifles were donated to the Dutch Ministry of Defence

More information on the sale and donation of surplus equipment is available at:

Surplus military materiel.

Annex D: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)

Canada continues to actively promote greater transparency in the trade of conventional arms. In 1991, Canada was a founding contributor to UNROCA, which is an international, voluntary transparency mechanism under which Member States of the United Nations supply information to the Register on imports and exports of seven categories of conventional arms.

The Register is updated annually and makes a significant contribution to transparency, confidence-building and enhanced global security. Since the inception of the Register, more than 90 countries on average have made annual submissions to it; of these, about 70 have done so consistently, including Canada. As a result, the Register has become an important and authoritative source of information. The Register tracks data on the following seven categories of conventional arms: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. These same categories have been incorporated into the ECL through the creation of Group 9, which will facilitate reporting on exports of these items to both UNROCA and the ATT Secretariat.

Canada is also one of a growing number of countries that voluntarily submit data to the Register on military holdings and on procurement through national production. In addition, Canada is one of several Member States that voluntarily supplies information on imports and exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) to the Register as part of their annual report. This information goes beyond the voluntary minimum currently recommended by the UN.

Further information on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is available online at: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

Actual Exports from Canada of Conventional Arms and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in 2021

The following table represents actual exports of conventional arms and SALW as defined by UNROCA reporting best practices, from Canada, during the 2021 calendar year, against export permits issued by Global Affairs Canada, for military, security or police end-use in the destination country.

Editions of this report and reports to UNROCA prior to 2016 listed total quantities of conventional arms and SALW that were authorized for export under permits issued in the course of the reporting year. This practice (i.e., reporting the “maximum allowable exports under issued permits”) was not optimal, as it does not allow for the tracking of actual, versus potential, transfers of conventional arms and SALW. Since 2016, Canada reports actual exports/transfers of reportable conventional arms and SALW that occurred during the reporting year.

Table 20: 2021 – UNROCA: Actual Exports from Canada of Conventional Arms and SALW

ACV: Armoured Combat Vehicle (full systems only)

UCAV: Combat aircraft and unmanned combat aerial vehicles

MML: Missiles and missile launchers

LCAs: Large-Calibre Artillery Systems (guns, howitzers, and artillery pieces with a calibre of 75 mm and above).

LMG: Light Machine Gun (full automatic firearm up to 12.7 mm / .50 calibre)

HMG: Heavy Machine Gun (full automatic firearm over 12.7 mm / .50 calibre)

HH/UB GL: Hand-Held/Under-Barrel Grenade Launcher

NOTES:

1. All bolt-action and semi-automatic rifles are reported under “Rifles & Carbines”. Full-automatic firearms that are not submachine guns and that do not fall into the Light Machine Gun or Heavy Machine Gun category are reported under “Assault Rifles”.

2. For illustrative examples of ECL items listed under Group 2 (Munitions List) see Table 10. Please note that as only full systems are reported to UNROCA, the values presented in Annex G (which reports all exports, including parts and components) may not correspond to the unit items exported, as reported in this chart.

3. Firearms designed for riot control that discharge 37mm non-lethal rounds

Revised 2019 UNROCA: Actual Exports from Canada of Conventional Arms and SALW

This revised report has been submitted by Canada to the United Nations in Spring 2022 to provide a complete data set. The original 2019 report was produced in the early days of the pandemic when access to the full data set was not possible due to the first lockdown.

Annex E: International Cooperation on Military Trade

The major multilateral export control and non-proliferation regimes in which Canada participates are described below. Participating governments negotiate common control lists of goods and technology that are implemented by all, in accordance with national legislation. Each participating government makes its own licensing decisions in accordance with applicable domestic law. These lists evolve in response to changing international and technological circumstances. Updates and amendments are made on a periodic basis.

Wassenaar Arrangement - Export Control List Groups 1 and 2

Most items have been included on the ECL because of Canada’s commitments to international partners that participate in multilateral export control regimes or because of Canada’s obligations as a signatory to international agreements that seek to control and monitor the movement of sensitive goods and technology.

The control regime that deals with the military and dual-use goods and technology covered in Group 1 (Dual-Use List) and Group 2 (Munitions List) of the ECL is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, founded in 1996. The Wassenaar Arrangement defines its objectives as:

“to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations.”

Through national policies, the Participating States seek to ensure that transfers of items covered by the common control lists do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that have the potential to undermine regional and global security and stability. Participating States also commit to take every precaution to ensure that such goods and technology are not diverted to illegitimate end-uses.

More information about the Wassenaar Arrangement and its 42 Participating States is available at Wassenaar Arrangement.

Nuclear Suppliers Group - Export Control List Groups 3 and 4

Canada has a long-standing nuclear non-proliferation policy that is designed, among other objectives, to ensure that Canada’s nuclear exports are not used for any nuclear weapon purposes or their development. As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that came into force in 1970, Canada will not provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production, of special fissionable material, to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

In the late 1970s, a group of nuclear supplier countries, including Canada, agreed on a set of guidelines for nuclear transfers to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State for peaceful purposes. These became known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines. In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group established a list of nuclear-related dual-use goods and technology that could make a major contribution to a nuclear explosive activity or a non-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

ECL Group 3 includes items that are nuclear-specific. ECL Group 4 includes nuclear-related dual-use items, i.e. items that are used in non-nuclear applications but that could also be used in a nuclear explosive activity or a non-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

More information about the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its 48 Members is available at Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Missile Technology Control Regime - Export Control List Group 6

The Missile Technology Control Regime was established in 1987 to address concerns about the proliferation of systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, namely, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. ECL Group 6 includes items agreed upon by the Partners of the Missile Technology Control Regime that are used in, or could be used in, the proliferation of systems capable of delivering chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

More information about the Missile Technology Control Regime and its 35 Members is available at Missile Technology Control Regime.

Australia Group - Export Control List Group 7

The Australia Group was established in 1985 with the objective of preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The participants (national governments) in the Australia Group have developed common export controls on chemical substances and biological agents and related items that could be used in the production of chemical and biological weapons.

More information about the Australia Group, including its 43 Members, is available at Australia Group.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - Export Control List Group 7

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was established in 1997 when the Chemical Weapons Convention came into force. The goal of the Member States is to achieve a world that is free of chemical weapons and of the threat of their use, and in which cooperation in chemistry for peaceful purposes for all is fostered. The ECL contains chemicals and precursors that are controlled under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Some of the Chemical Weapons Convention chemicals and precursors are also controlled by the Australia Group.

More information about the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its 193 Member States is available at Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Arms Trade Treaty - Export Control List Group 9

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2013 to establish international norms for the conventional arms trade. Unregulated and irresponsible arms transfers intensify and prolong conflict, lead to regional instability, facilitate human rights abuses on a massive scale, and hinder social and economic development. The ATT promotes responsibility, transparency and accountability in the global arms trade. Canada became a State Party to the ATT on September 17, 2019.

More information about the Arms Trade Treaty and its 110 States Parties is available at Arms Trade Treaty.

Annex F: Index of Destinations Considered Lower-Risk in 2021

Most export permit applications to the following destinations are considered low-risk and are thus subject to an expedited assessment processes. As previously mentioned, the service standard for applications to these destinations is typically 10 working days, as opposed to 40 working days for all other destinations. All export permit applications for military items, regardless of their country of destination, are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the previously mentioned assessment criteria, including the ATT criteria. The countries listed below are also considered low-risk within the context of Canada’s brokering controls. Controlled transactions brokered to any of these destinations are covered under General Brokering Permit No. 1.

• Australia
• Austria
• Belgium
• Czech Republic
• Denmark
• Estonia
• Finland
• France
• Germany
• Greece
• Hungary
• Iceland
• Ireland
• Italy
• Japan
• Latvia
• Lithuania
• Luxembourg
• Netherlands
• New Zealand
• Norway
• Poland
• Portugal
• Republic of Korea
• Slovakia
• Slovenia
• Spain
• Sweden
• Switzerland
• United Kingdom
• United States

Annex G: 2021 Exports of Military Goods and Technology by Destination and ECL Item