Annual Report on Strategic Goods and Technologies Pursuant to Section 27 of the Export and Import Permits Act - 2024

Table of contents

1. Introduction
   1. Summary of key data
2. Canada’s policy on the export and brokering of military items
   1. Military goods and technology – “Group 2 and its Subset Group 9”
   2. Export and brokering permit assessment process
   3. Brokering controls
   4. Notes on the export of firearms
   5. International cooperation on military trade
3. Developments in 2024
   1. Policy reviews
   2. The Arms Trade Treaty and civil society engagement
   3. Improvements to NEXCOL application system
   4. Export Control List updates
   5. Other Control Lists: Area Control List, Automatic Firearms Country Control List and Brokering Control List
   6. Export and Import Permits Act enforcement
   7. Export and Import Permits Act litigations
   8. Permit denials
4. Military export and brokering statistics
   1. Data interpretation notes
   2. Exports to the United States of certain Group 2 items
   3. Brokering data
5. Service standard targets
6. Annexes
   1. Annex A:  Canada’s Area Control List (ACL)
   2. Annex B:  Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL)
   3. Annex C:  Canada’s international transfers (government to government transfers)
   4. Annex D:  United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
   5. Annex E:  International cooperation on military trade
   6. Annex F:  Index of destinations considered lower risk by Canada in 2024
   7. Annex G: 2024 exports of military goods and technology by destination and ECL item

List of tables and figures

• Table 1: 2024 – Total value of exports for military goods and technology by NATO and AFCCL destinations
• Table 2: 2024 – Export permits utilized and value of exports by region
• Table 3: 2024 – Canada’s top twelve non-U.S. destinations for military goods and technology by value
• Table 4: 2024 - Export permit denials of military, dual-use and strategic goods and technology
• Table 5: 2024 – Summary of export permit application status by ECL group
• Table 6: 2024 - Export value of military goods and technology to all non-U.S. destinations
• Table 7: 2024 - Top twelve non-U.S. destinations: utilized export permits for military goods & technology
• Table 8: 2024 - Number of utilized export permits for military goods & technology by destination
• Table 9: 2024 –Number of issued export permits for military goods & technology by destination
• Table 10: 2024 – Export value of military goods and technology by Export Control List item number and number of permits utilized
• Table 11: 2024 – Number of permits utilized and value exported for certain Group 2 goods and technology to the United States
• Table 12: 2024 – Group 9 exports to the United States by quantity
• Table 13: 2024 - Transactions reported under General Brokering Permit No. 1 (GBP-1) by destination
• Table 14: The Brokering Control List (BCL)
• Table 15: 2024 - Summary of brokering permits applications received in 2024
• Table 16: 2024 - Brokering permits issued by destination, value and ECL items
• Table 17: Export permit applications processed (2020-2024)
• Table 18: 2024 - Global Affairs Canada service standards for all military, dual-use and strategic export permit applications
• Figure 1: 2024 - Exports of military goods and technology by NATO and AFCCL destinations by value
• Figure 2: 2024 - Export value of (non-U.S. destined) military goods and technology – percentage by region
• Figure 3: 2024 – Number of utilized export permits for military goods and technology to non-U.S. destinations - percentage by region
• Figure 4: 2024 - Exports of military goods and technology by ECL item number and value

1. Introduction

The Annual Report on Strategic Goods and TechnologiesPursuant to Section 27 of the Export and Import Permits Act is tabled annually in the Parliament of Canada to promote transparency around Canadian exports of military items. The report provides information on the export of military goods and technology (including parts and components) as listed in Group 2 of the Export Control List (ECL) from Canada in a given calendar year. All references to “military goods and technology” also include parts and components except for explicit references to Group 9, which is a subset of Group 2 and only contains full-system conventional arms. Further to amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) in 2019, there is a legal requirement that the annual report be tabled in Parliament no later than May 31 of the subsequent calendar year. Prior to this, the report had been produced voluntarily since 1990. The last edition of this report covered 2023 and was tabled in Parliament on May 31, 2024.

This was the fifth full year in which Global Affairs Canada implemented the risk assessment framework that was put in place to align with Canada’s accession to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2019. Global Affairs Canada has taken action to strengthen Canada’s export controls, which are in line with those of our principal allies and partners in the main multilateral export control regimes. A key priority of Canada’s foreign policy is the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end, Global Affairs Canada strives to ensure that, among other policy goals, such as supporting Canadian foreign and defence policies and legitimate trade, Canadian goods and technology are not used in a manner that is prejudicial to human rights, peace, security or stability.

The data in this report covers exports and brokering of goods and technology (including parts and components) included in the ECL that are designed for military purposes, which are captured in Group 2, and its subset Group 9, of the ECL. Data for this report is compiled and verified against information received from Canadian industry. Information on how military items are defined for the purpose of export controls is provided in section 2 of this report.

Global Affairs Canada collects data on military exports to the United States for all ECL Group 9 goods and for ECL Group 2 items only if they require a permit to be exported to the United States. As of September 1, 2019, regulatory amendments enabled the collection of information on exports to the United States of full-system conventional arms, as defined in Article 2(1) of the ATT.

Information on Canadian exports of military goods is also captured in three other key reports: the Annual Report on the Administration of the Export and Import Permits Act, which is tabled in Parliament, and Canada’s submission to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and Canada’s report to the Arms Trade Treaty.

Global Affairs Canada welcomes suggestions on how to improve future editions of this report. To submit any suggestions, please contact the Export Controls Policy Division at Global Affairs Canada: expctrlpol@international.gc.ca.

Summary of key data

• For the 2024 calendar year, the value of Canadian exports of controlled military goods and technology to non-U.S. destinations amounted to approximately $2.504 billion, compared to a value of $2.143 billion in 2023 and $2.122 billion in 2022.
• Service standards for the processing of permits for military, dual-use, and strategic goods and technology were met 72% of the time in 2024 (compared to 79% in 2023 and 74% in 2022).
• Europe was the region for which the most permits were issued in 2024 (70%). The total number of permits issued in 2024 was 3,759, compared to 3,611 in 2023 and 3,656 in 2022.
• Europe was the region in which the largest number of export permits were utilized (68%). The top five worldwide destinations by number of permits utilized were (in alphabetical order): Australia, France, Germany, Israel, United Kingdom. Those five destinations accounted for approximately 55% of permits utilized.
• Most of Canada’s military exports by value consisted of ground vehicles and their components at $1.52 billion, accounting for 54.4% of all controlled military exports in 2024.
• Saudi Arabia was the largest non-U.S. export destination by value, receiving approximately $1.3 billion in Canadian military exports (accounting for approximately 51.7% of the total value of non-U.S. military exports) (compared to $904.6 million or 42% in 2023).
• Canada issued 28 permits for exports to Ukraine and 24 permits were utilized for a value of $172.7 million (3^rd top destination by value).
• Separately, a number of equipment donations were made in 2024 to Ukraine.
• Global Affairs Canada’s approach since January 8, 2024, has been to not issue permits and to suspend a limited number of export permits for military items destined for Israel. The information compiled in this report is consistent with the documents provided at the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE) in the previous Parliament.

Table 1: 2024 – Total value of non-U.S. exports for military goods and technology by NATO and AFCCL^{Footnote 1} destinations^{Footnote 2}

Figure 1: 2024 - Non-U.S. exports of military goods and technology by NATO and AFCCL destinations by value

Table 2: 2024 – Export permits utilized and value of exports by region^{Footnote 3}

Table 3: 2024 – Canada’s top twelve non-U.S. destinations for military goods and technology by value

Figure 2: 2024 - Export value of (non-U.S. destined) military goods and technology – percentage by region

2. Canada’s policy on the export and brokering of military items  

Under the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA), the Minister must deny exports and brokering permit applications for military goods and technology if there is a substantial risk that the items would undermine peace and security, or could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws, acts constituting an offence under international conventions relating to terrorism or organized crime, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

Primarily through Canada’s system of export and brokering controls, as governed by the EIPA, Canada ensures that the export of military goods and technology is conducted lawfully and in a manner consistent with foreign and defence policies and security interests. The EIPA requires Canadian individuals and companies that wish to export any items included on the Export Control List (ECL), or to broker any items included on the Brokering Control List (BCL), to obtain a permit issued by Global Affairs Canada.^{Footnote 8} The ECL includes military, dual-use, and strategic goods and technology, U.S.-origin goods and technology, and a limited number of items that are controlled for economic reasons, in accordance with Canada’s international trade agreements and obligations. More information on brokering controls and on the types of items controlled on the BCL is provided below.

Canada prohibits the export, sale, supply, or shipment of arms and related materiel to countries that are under United Nations Security Council arms embargos, through regulations under the United Nations Act. These embargoes also prohibit the provision of technical assistance, including by transferring technical data, in relation to the sale, supply, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related material. Canada also has autonomous sanctions in place in relation to certain countries through regulations under the Special Economic Measures Act, which prohibit certain activities, including the export of specific goods and technology to those countries, or to any person in those countries, and/or to listed individuals and entities subject to a full dealings ban. More information on Canada’s sanctions is available on the Canadian Sanctions website.

Furthermore, the EIPA also provides authority for an Area Control List (ACL), a list of countries to which the Governor-in-Council deems it necessary to control the export or transfer of any goods or technology, regardless of whether or not the items are included in the ECL. Currently, only North Korea is listed on the ACL. More information on the ACL can be found in Annex A.

The ECL is based principally on our participation in the major multilateral export control and non-proliferation regimes. Canada’s export and brokering controls are not meant to hinder international trade unnecessarily, but to regulate and impose restrictions in response to clear legislative and policy objectives as outlined above.

Military goods and technology – “Group 2 and its subset Group 9”

The military goods and technology described in this report are those included in Group 2, and in its subset Group 9 (Arms Trade Treaty Items), of the ECL.

Goods and technology listed in Group 2 are “specially designed or modified for military use.” These items include, among others, ground vehicles, aircrafts, firearms, ammunition, imaging equipment made specifically for military use, fire control related alerting and warning equipment, software, technology, and parts and components thereof.

Group 9 is a subset of Group 2 and includes the full-system conventional arms that are listed in Article 2(1) of the ATT, namely: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre artillery systems; military aircraft; military helicopters; military vessels and submarines; missiles and missile launchers; and small arms and light weapons when destined for police and/or military end-use. Group 9 items require a permit prior to export to all destinations, including the United States.

Other controlled items appearing elsewhere on the ECL (such as dual-use and other strategic items) are not generally featured in this report as they are not specially designed for military use^{Footnote 9}.

Military goods and technology listed in Groups 2 and/or 9 of the ECL are typically exported for one or more of the following purposes:

• sales to military and, in some cases, police forces or other government agencies;
• sales of parts and components to support supply chains for the production of new goods;
• transfers between affiliates;
• return of military equipment to foreign customers following repair in Canada, and shipments of spare parts;
• sales to private individuals (particularly for firearms).^{Footnote 10}

Export and brokering permit assessment process 

Under the EIPA, the Minister is legally required to take into account the assessment criteria referred to in Article 7 of the ATT in deciding whether to issue or deny export and brokering permit applications for “arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war” (i.e., military goods and technology controlled under Group 2 of the ECL). Specifically, the Minister is required to consider whether the goods or technology specified in the application:

• would contribute to peace and security or undermine it; and
• could be used to commit or facilitate
  • a serious violation of international humanitarian law,
  • a serious violation of international human rights law,
  • an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which Canada is a party,
  • an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which Canada is a party, or
  • serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

The EIPA stipulates that the Minister cannot issue an export or brokering permit for “arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war” if, after taking into account available mitigating measures, the Minister determines that there is a substantial risk that the proposed transaction would result in any of the negative consequences referred to in the EIPA assessment criteria. Substantial risk is not defined under the EIPA but based on the practice of other States Parties to the ATT and relevant Canadian and international jurisprudence, the department’s position is that it requires a direct and foreseeable risk that the specific good or technology proposed for export or brokering would result in one or more of the negative consequences listed in the EIPA.

Additional objectives of Canada’s overall export and brokering controls regime include:

• ensuring that exports or brokering transactions do not pose a threat to Canada and its allies;
• preventing exports or brokering transactions that would be in violation of economic sanctions established by Canada or the United Nations;
• ensuring that exports or brokering transactions do not contribute to the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction, or of their delivery systems; and
• mitigating the possibility of unauthorized transfer or diversion of the exported or brokered goods and technology.

All applications to export or broker goods or technology are carefully reviewed against the criteria listed above, as well as against potential risk associated with genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes. The internal review process may also include wide-ranging consultations with geographic, human rights, international security and defence industry experts at Global Affairs Canada (including at Canada’s overseas diplomatic missions), the Department of National Defence, and, as necessary, other government departments and agencies.  Every export and brokering permit application is also closely scrutinized to ensure that they align with Canada’s foreign and defence policies and security interests.

To guide this consultation process, Global Affairs Canada has an enhanced risk assessment framework for the review of permit applications, which identifies the different elements to be considered, the relevant government experts to be consulted, and parameters for the identification of risks. Any concerns raised through this process are then closely evaluated, including whether a substantial risk exists with respect to any of the EIPA criteria.

An essential part in the review of each application is the end-use and end-user verification of the item. Careful attention is paid to end-use assurance documents in an effort to ensure that the export or brokering transaction is intended for a legitimate end-use and will not be diverted to ends that would threaten the security of Canada or its allies or would result in a negative consequence referred to in the EIPA assessment criteria. Where a substantial risk is identified with respect to any of the EIPA criteria, mitigating measures may be considered. These measures may include: additional end-use assurance documents, post-shipment measures, or transparency provisions between Canada and the government of the destination country. If a substantial risk has been determined, a permit can only be issued if the mitigating measure reduces the risk to less than “substantial.” If mitigating measures would not reduce the level of risk below that threshold, the application must be denied.

Global Affairs Canada officials keep abreast of developments in countries around the world, and monitor export control issues raised by numerous sources, including other Government of Canada departments and agencies, such as intelligence agencies, as well as partner countries, international organizations, civil society and the media. If any new information warrants it, including if the end-use and end-user assurances are not observed, the Minister possesses the authority under the EIPA to suspend or cancel permits. This new information is also taken into account in the risk assessment of future permit applications.

Brokering controls

Article 10 of the ATT requires State Parties to take measures to regulate the brokering of arms taking place under their jurisdiction. Canada’s brokering controls have been in effect since September 1, 2019, and apply to persons and organizations in Canada, as well as to Canadians abroad (Canadian citizens, permanent residents, and organizations). Brokering is defined in the EIPA as “arranging or negotiating a transaction that relates to the movement of goods or technology included in a Brokering Control List from a foreign country to another foreign country.” The Brokering Control List, which comprises all items for which a permit is required prior to engaging in a brokering transaction, includes full-system conventional arms (as defined in Group 9 of the ECL), all items listed in Group 2 of the ECL, as well as any ECL item – including dual-use items – that are likely destined to a weapons of mass destruction end-use.

For more information about these controls, please consult the brokering regulations. Global Affairs Canada welcomes feedback from stakeholders and is open to considering additional measures to further streamline and improve the ongoing implementation of Canada’s brokering controls.

Notes on the export of firearms

In addition to the assessment criteria mentioned previously, permit applications for firearms are assessed for the risk that items may be diverted to the illegal arms trade or used to fuel local or regional violence. Canadian diplomatic missions and other sources provide information about the destination country’s firearms control laws, procedures and enforcement practices, and are often called upon to validate import permits and licences, end-use assurance documents, and consignee information prior to the issuance of a permit.

Prohibited firearms and components thereof may only be exported to countries listed on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL) and then only to consignees that are government entities or are authorized by government entities.^{Footnote 11} These exports must be authorized by a permit issued by the Minister. Each export permit application is assessed on a case-by-case basis.

The full list of countries on the AFCCL is found in Annex B.

International cooperation on military trade

Multilateral action is an important means of promoting international peace and security. Canada supports and participates in a range of arms control, export control, and non-proliferation activities, working closely with partners who share our objectives. Canada participates in the following export control bodies and initiatives: the Arms Trade Treaty, the United Nations Programme of Action on small arms and its International Tracing Instrument, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapon Acquisition (CITAAC), the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Further information on these multilateral forums can be found in Annexes D and E.

3. Developments in 2024

Policy reviews

Russia and Belarus

Throughout 2024, Global Affairs Canada maintained its presumptive denial policy on the export and brokering of any controlled goods and technology to Russia, as well as its suspension on the issuance of new permits to Belarus as set out respectively in Notice to Exporters and Brokers No. 1071 and Notice to Exporters and Brokers No. 1033. In addition to export controls, Canada also imposed sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. More information on Canada’s sanctions is available on the Canadian Sanctions website.

Türkiye

Since 2021, Canada and Türkiye have been engaged in a regular dialogue on export controls with a view to build mutual confidence and greater cooperation. During the course of this dialogue, Global Affairs Canada has re-established a clear understanding of the requirements of Canada’s export control regime, and Türkiye has committed to inform Canada of its intent to re-export or transfer any military, dual-use, and strategic goods or technology exported from Canada to a third-party when destined for a Turkish military or a government end-user.  As a result, and as of January 29, 2024, the presumptive denial policy for applications to export military items from Canada to Türkiye is no longer in place, as indicated in the Notice to Exporters No. 1108.

Israel

Global Affairs Canada’s approach since January 8, 2024, has been to not issue permits and to suspend a limited number of export permits for military items destined for Israel. These suspensions allow for further review into whether the authorized items could be used in the ongoing conflict in a manner inconsistent with Canada’s foreign policy objectives. 

The Arms Trade Treaty and civil society engagement

In its fifth full year as a State Party, Canada continued its engagement at the ATT. Throughout the year, Canada supported the work of the Treaty by participating in its Working Groups, in particular the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Canada also actively participated in the Tenth Conference of States Parties (CSP10). Furthermore, Canada continued its discussions with international partners within the ATT with a view to strengthen international compliance with the Treaty.

In its fourth year as a member of the Voluntary Trust Fund Selection Committee (VTFSC), Canada supported the evaluation of strong projects that will advance Treaty implementation and compliance in some States Parties and support universalization with Signatory States and other states. At CSP10 Canada renewed its membership on the VTFSC for another two-year mandate to CSP12.

Canada has committed $225,000 (2023-2025) to support the ATT Secretariat’s Sponsorship Programme to help strengthen the universalization and national implementation of the ATT, by enabling the participation of eligible States in the Conference of States Parties (CSP) and in informal preparatory meetings to facilitate CSP deliberations and outcomes. In 2023, Canada initiated a two-year, $742,085 project with the Small Arms Survey aiming to advance the universalization and national implementation of the ATT in the Indo-Pacific region by engaging with key actors and states in the region to help identify challenges and opportunities with ATT compliance. Canada also sponsored the launch of Control Arms’ 2024 ATT Monitor Report (PDF, 9MB, 32 pages) and provided funding for an e-learning module developed by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).

Canada places strong importance on the gender elements of the ATT, and takes an active role in reiterating and reinforcing the need for the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in the ATT context. To this end, Canada supported initiatives that strengthen the implementation of the ATT. For instance, Canada partnered with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to support its Gender and Disarmament Programme, through the provision of $300,000 to UNIDIR for a three-year period (2021-2024). In 2022, Canada initiated funding to HALO Trust for $250,000 (2022-2025) to help address the significant gender imbalance in the field of weapons and ammunition management (WAM) by providing technical training to women. At CSP10, Canada worked closely with Mexico and the Small Arms Survey to advance a Joint Statement on Gender Mainstreaming (delivered by Mexico), which was supported by 44 States Parties (and the EU), and was adopted as a Working Paper (PDF, 0.16 MB, 4 pages).

Outside the context of the ATT, Global Affairs Canada also engaged regularly with international partners and civil society stakeholders to share information, benchmark best practices and discuss ways to increase the rigour and transparency of Canada’s export controls. 

Improvements to NEXCOL application system

Further incremental improvements were made to the New Export Controls Online system (NEXCOL), the web-based system through which exporters submit applications for export, brokering, and import permits and certificates, as well as request amendments. In-line with Government of Canada objectives towards Digital Transformation, improvements are made in regular intervals.  

Improvements made to the NEXCOL system in 2024 include the digitization of permit utilization reporting, incorporation of an in-application communication tool between applicants and permit officers, and the addition of new functionality that simplifies inputting data into the system for applicants. These improvements help reduce the administrative burden on businesses and result in the export permit application process being completely paperless.

The department also remains committed to continually improving our national trade controls systems by enhancing the user experience through innovation, and in-application functionality in regular intervals.

Export Control List updates

Further to a streamlining amendment to the Export Control List (ECL) on June 3, 2021, commitments made at the four key multilateral export control regimes (the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement) are automatically incorporated into Canadian regulations 30 days after publication of an updated Guide to Canada’s Export Control List by Global Affairs Canada, as opposed to via a regulatory amendment.

Publication of the January 2024 edition of the Guide to Canada’s Export Control List occurred on April 2, 2024, providing industry with 30 days to familiarize themselves with the new controls that came into effect on May 2, 2024. The amendments added, clarified and removed controls over specific items as agreed in the various regimes up to January 1, 2024.

In addition to the commitments made at the four key multilateral export control regimes, on May 31, 2024,  the ECL was amended to add new controls under Item 5506 of the ECL with respect to quantum computing and advanced semiconductors (SOR/2024-112). These controls came into force on July 20, 2024. More information can be found in Notice to exporters No. 1129 – Amendment to the Export Control List: Quantum computing and advanced semiconductors and at the Canada Gazette.

On December 21, 2024, Global Affairs Canada launched public consultations on the potential addition of additional controls under Item 5506 related to semiconductor manufacturing, quantum computing, temperature coating, and metal additive manufacturing machines (advanced 3D printers) technologies. This proposal was approved on March 7, 2025 (SOR/2025-89). These controls came into force on April 25, 2025. More information on this amendment will be provided in Canada’s 2025 Annual Report on Strategic Goods and Technologies Pursuant to Section 27 of the Export and Import Permits Act.

Other control lists: Area Control List, Automatic Firearms Country Control List and Brokering Control List

There were no amendments to the Area Control List (ACL), Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL) or Brokering Control List (BCL) in 2024.

On November 4, 2024, Global Affairs Canada launched public consultations on the potential additions of Montenegro and Brazil to the AFCCL. This proposal was approved and came into force on February 26, 2025 (SOR/2025-41). More information on this amendment will be provided in Canada’s 2025 Annual Report on Strategic Goods and Technologies Pursuant to Section 27 of the Export and Import Permits Act.

Inclusion of a country on the AFCCL allows Canadian residents to apply for permits to export prohibited firearms, weapons and devices to that destination. Each application is assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Export and Import Permits Act enforcement

There were no convictions for offences under the EIPA during the 2024 calendar year. Further information on compliance and enforcement can be found in the Annual Report on Strategic Goods and Technologies Pursuant to Section 27 of the Export and Import Permits Act.

Export and Import Permits Act litigations

Hammam Farah et al v. Minister of Foreign Affairs et al. 

One judicial review, filed on March 5, 2024, challenges export or brokering permits issued for military goods and technology destined to Israel issued on or after October 9, 2023, or prior to that date but that remain valid.

This is the first judicial review related to military exports in which directly affected companies/permit holders have been added as Respondents.

This judicial review was ongoing as of December 31, 2024.

Hany El Batnigi and Tamer Jarada v. Attorney General of Canada

An action was filed, in November 2024, in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice alleging that Canada failed to take all reasonable measures to prevent genocide by Israel against the Palestinian people of Gaza, and alleging that Canada violated both international and domestic legal obligations by issuing permits under the Export and Import Permits Act authorizing the export of arms to Israel.

Permit denials

Table 4 includes information on applications for military, dual-use, and strategic goods or technology that were denied in 2024 (regardless of the year the application was submitted). There was a total of 3 denials, of which there was 1 denial for military items.^{Footnote 12}

Table 4: 2024 - Export permit denials of military, dual-use and strategic goods and technology^{Footnote 13}

The number of the denials is dependent on the nature of applications for which a decision is rendered in the given calendar year.

It is important to note that each year, a number of permit applications are withdrawn at the request of the exporter if they become aware, or are otherwise informed, of commercial, political or other types of risk that may affect their application and decide not to proceed further with the export. For the number of export permit applications withdrawn in 2024 please see Table 5.

4. Military export and brokering statistics

The data contained in this report is obtained from permit utilization reporting, which exporters must provide to Global Affairs Canada consistent with the conditions listed on export permits for military goods and technology. The data displayed below includes the country of destination, the ECL item under which the export is controlled, and the value in Canadian dollars.

Further details related to export transactions (for example, names of exporting companies, values of individual contracts and transactions, and details of the specific technologies being exported) are protected due to the commercially confidential nature of such information.

Export controls apply to all foreign destinations. However, due to Canada’s close and long-standing military cooperation with the United States, including the 1956 Defence Production Sharing Agreement that underpins the integrated nature of North America’s defence industry, Canada and the United States have reciprocal arrangements to ensure permit-free/licence-free movement of most military items between our two countries. For Canada, this has meant permit exemptions for most Group 2 exports destined to the United States. Consequently, Global Affairs Canada collects data for exports of Group 9 goods and a small sub-set of goods for which individual permits are required when destined to the U.S., such as prohibited firearms, related parts and ammunition, and select items controlled under ECL number 2-4 (see Tables 11 and 12).

Data on Canadian military exports may be available from other sources such as Statistics Canada. These figures are derived from data collected by the Canada Border Services Agency based on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (HS) and may include non-military goods such as: commercial computers; civil-certified aircraft; guns and ammunition designed exclusively for industrial uses, such as the lighting of gas flares at oil wells; or other civilian equipment. Since there is no direct correlation between the commodity codes used by Statistics Canada and the ECL numbers, and because each source uses different methods of data collection, a meaningful comparison of the information from these sources is not possible.

An internationally accepted standard for statistics on worldwide military trade is the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) (see Annex D). The Register quantifies the number of complete weapon systems permanently exported and does not include parts, components or the wide assortment of non-lethal support systems (such as radar equipment, simulators and software designed for military use) that make up a significant component of Canada’s military exports. Since 1991, Canada has consistently submitted annual voluntary reports to UNROCA. Continuing on our practice since 2021, in 2025, Canada will submit to the ATT Secretariat the same public report on the export and import of full-system conventional arms recently listed under Group 9 in order to meet its reporting obligations under the ATT.

Global Affairs Canada also produces an Annual Report to Parliament on the Administration of the Export and Import Permits Act, which is also a statutory requirement under the EIPA. This report provides an overview of permit data and service standards, which includes Group 2 permits.

Data interpretation notes

The following data interpretation notes apply:

1. Procurement contracts awarded by governments may have very high values and extended delivery schedules; a single contract may account for a large share of total military exports in a given year or over multiple years. Major changes in totals from one year to another may be explained by the beginning or end of a small number of high-value contracts.
2. Other than Table 9 and Tables 11, 12, 19, and Annex G the data presented does not include information on exports of military goods and technology to the United States. Data on permit applications for exports to the United States is included in Tables 5, 17, and 18. Due to Canada's close and long-standing military cooperation with the United States, Canada and the United States have reciprocal arrangements to ensure permit-free/licence-free movement of most military items between our two countries. For Canada, this has meant permit exemptions for most Group 2 exports destined to the United States. Consequently, Global Affairs Canada collects data for exports of Group 9 goods and a small sub-set of goods for which individual permits are required when destined to the U.S., such as prohibited firearms, related parts and ammunition, and specific items controlled under ECL number 2-4.
3. For greater clarity, detailed descriptions of Group 2 Military  goods and technology controlled under the EIPA can be found in “A Guide to Canada’s Export Control List”, which is available at Export Controls.
4. Readers will notice that some of the totals vary between tables. For instance, Table 6 reports annual values of total exports of military goods and technology by destination country, whereas Annex G breaks down the value of exports to individual countries according to the ECL item number. However, the total of exports by ECL item number to an individual country calculated from Annex G may be greater than the total value of exports to that destination reported in Table 6. This is because goods or technology included in a single export permit may be classified under multiple ECL item numbers. Table 10, Table 11, Figure 4, and Annex G, therefore, contain some double-counting, which inflates the value of total exports.
5. “Technology” controlled under item 2-22 of the ECL often cannot be easily quantified. For this reason, “lots” rather than unit quantities are commonly used where technology may be transferred via intangible means (such as through meetings or emails). The “value” assigned to such technology transfers is determined by the exporter in their reporting and may explain some low-value exports to certain destinations. The inclusion of such data within this report is consistent with past practice.
6. A multi-destination permit (or MDP) allows exports to multiple countries under a single permit. Group 2 MDPs only allow exports to like-minded countries that are members of the export control regimes to which Canada is party, and that have an effective system of export controls. MDPs are offered to exporters who have an exporting history with Global Affairs Canada. These exporters have implemented defined due diligence processes and procedures when planning, marketing and shipping ECL items to foreign clients to ensure a reasonable level of assurance that goods or technology will not be exported to unauthorized or illegitimate end-uses or end-users. The values exported under MDPs are included in all the tables reporting the total value of military exports. However, Tables 7, 8, 10 and 11, along with Figure 3, do not include the number of MDPs utilized per destination as a single permit can cover exports to multiple destinations.
7. The number of Group 2 permits issued in 2024 (reported in Table 5 as 2,438) is not equivalent to the number of Group 2 permits utilized in 2024 (reported in Table 8 as 2,010) because a single permit issued in any given year can be valid for up to a period of five years and be exported against during any of the years in which it is valid.
8. Exporters are not required to submit permit utilization reports to Global Affairs Canada for Group 2 exports where no value is being transferred. Examples include exports where goods were sent to Canada for warranty repair, and are being returned to the original owner; exports where goods were sent to Canada for testing, demonstration or trials, and are being returned; the return to foreign owners of controlled goods borrowed or leased by a Canadian company (e.g., deactivated automatic firearms used as movie props); exports of faulty or discrepant material; or exports of goods for destructive testing. The value of exports of such nature are omitted from this report as these types of transfers added no value in Canada. Only military exports where there was a value transferred are included in the Report.
9. Each permit application is unique. Applications can vary in a number of ways, including in the number of items (e.g. for a single item or for a large quantity of items) and the value (negligeable to high value). A larger number of permits does not necessarily translate to a higher value exported and vice versa.

Table 5: 2024 – Summary of export permit application status by ECL groups^{Footnote 15}

Notes for Table 5

Submitted Applications: Table 5 includes data on all export permit applications submitted between January 1 and December 31, 2024. It does not include information on applications that were submitted prior to 2024 (or those that were submitted on December 31, 2024, and not received until January 1, 2025) nor does it include information on export permit amendment requests. Items in an export permit application may be assessed under more than one ECL Group. To avoid counting the same application twice, applications containing more than one ECL assessment have been assigned to a single Group based on the following order of precedence: 9, 2, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 5. Therefore, an application containing both a Group 9 assessment and a Group 2 assessment will appear once in the Group 9 row and an application containing both a Group 6 and a Group 5 assessment will only appear in the Group 6 row. The status of all export permit applications reflected in the table is accurate as of December 31, 2024.

Issued: Means a permit has been approved and issued in 2024. If a permit was issued in 2024 and is subsequently cancelled, it is only counted once in the cancelled or suspended column.

Denied: Means a permit that was denied by the Minister, either directly by the Minister or by departmental officials further to policy direction received from the Minister. This occurs in fewer than 1% of cases annually and is generally for reasons related to Canada’s obligations under the ATT or Canada’s foreign and defence policies, as provided in the criteria for controlling the export of military, dual use and strategic goods outlined above. Information on denials is also reported in Table 5. Please note that Table 4 includes information on applications that were denied in 2024 including those that were submitted prior to January 1, 2024. Table 5 includes information on applications that were submitted in 2024 that had been denied up to December 31, 2024. The variance between Tables 4 and 5 is due to the fact that Table 4 includes applications that were submitted prior to 2024.

Returned without action: A permit application is returned without action by Global Affairs Canada if it is administratively incomplete, or if there is inconsistent information. An applicant that still wishes to pursue the export would be required to submit a new permit application.

Withdrawn: Permit applications may be withdrawn either at the request of the exporter or if the exporter is advised by Global Affairs Canada that a permit is not required. An exporter may decide to withdraw their application if the permit is no longer required because the commercial contract has fallen through, if a change to the contract requires them to resubmit the information under a separate application, or if the exporter becomes aware of political, commercial, or other types of risk that may affect their application and decides not to pursue the export. An application may also be withdrawn if the goods or technology proposed for export are not controlled, if the items are controlled but a permit is not required for their export to the United States, or if a General Export Permit applies. All of these situations are captured in the category of withdrawn permits. In 2024, a total of 220 applications were withdrawn because an individual export permit was not required. The remaining 132 withdrawals were at the request of the applicant.

Cancelled or Suspended: An export permit that has been issued may be cancelled for administrative reasons (e.g., at the request of the applicant as the permit is no longer required, or due to an error on the permit requiring replacement by a new permit), or for policy reasons at the direction of the Minister. An export permit that has been cancelled is no longer valid for the export of goods or technology. An issued export permit can be suspended for policy or compliance reasons and reinstated later.  

Under Review: Includes applications submitted in 2024 that as of December 31, 2024, were not completely processed, whose consideration was paused, or were otherwise under review.

Table 6: 2024 - Value of exports of military goods and technology by destination (excluding the U.S.)

Figure 3: 2024 – Number of utilized export permits for military goods and technology to non-U.S. destinations - percentage by region^{Footnote 18}

Table 7: 2024 - Top twelve non-U.S. destinations: utilized export permits for military goods & technology

Table 8: 2024 - Number of utilized export permits for military goods & technology by destination^{Footnote 20}

Table 9: 2024 –Number of issued export permits for military goods & technology by destination

Table 10: 2024 – Export value of military goods and technology by ECL item number, value and number of permits utilized^{Footnote 24}

Figure 4: 2024 - Exports of military goods and technology by ECL item number and value^{Footnote 25} (without ECL items 2-6: “ground vehicles and components”)^{Footnote 26}

Exports to the United States of certain Group 2 items

Global Affairs Canada collects data on military exports to the United States for Group 2 items only if they require a permit to be exported to the United States (which includes all Group 9 goods).

Within Group 2 of the ECL, export permits are required to the United States in the following circumstances:

• All exports of prohibited firearms controlled under item 2-1 (e.g. automatic weapons) or 2-2 (e.g. weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7mm) of the ECL must be authorized in advance with an export permit. Details on the application process can be found in the Export and Brokering Controls Handbook.
• Any ammunition controlled under item 2-3 of the ECL that is destined for end-use by police or military agencies. Permits are not required for the export of sporting ammunition.
• Goods controlled under item 2-4.a (e.g. bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles etc.) of the ECL.

In 2024, 79 export permits were utilized for the export to the United States of goods controlled under Group 2 of the ECL. See Table 11 for more detailed information.

Goods exported from Canada to the United States are thereafter subject to the United States export controls regardless of whether a Canadian export permit was required. Goods exported from Canada through the United States to a third country (i.e. transit/transshipment) require a Canadian export permit for the third country when they leave Canada.

Permits are also required for the export to the United States of certain goods controlled under other ECL Groups, including all items in Group 3 (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation List), all items in Group 4 (the Nuclear-related Dual-Use List), most items in Group 5 (Miscellaneous Goods and Technology), and certain items in Group 6 (the Missile Technology Control Regime List) and Group 7 (the Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation List).

Table 11: 2024 – Number of permits utilized and value exported for certain Export Control List Group 2 controlled goods and technology to the United States

Table 12: 2024 – Group 9 exports to the United States by quantity^{Footnote 27}

Brokering data

Table 13: 2024 - Transactions reported under General Brokering Permit No. 1 (GBP-1) by destination 

Once a broker has informed Global Affairs Canada of their intention to use General Brokering Permit No.1 (GBP-1) during the course of a given calendar year, utilization reports (including nil reports) are required. This table reflects the total value of items related to brokering activities that took place in 2024 under this GBP. As some brokering activities may span multiple years, the total dollar value of the items related to the brokering activity may appear in Table 13 for multiple years. Therefore, brokering activities reported in this year’s table may not have necessarily resulted in transfers taking place in 2024 but could potentially result in transfers taking place in subsequent years. Due to the nature of brokering, brokers are asked to apply for brokering permits early in discussions that could result in brokering transactions. As a result, some of the values provided are estimates. Brokers are required to ensure that the actual value at the time of the transfer does not exceed the estimate declared on the brokering permit. If the value of goods or technology increases between the time the application was made and the date of the brokering transaction, a Permit Amendment Request must be submitted to change the permit prior to the transfer. Thus, any estimate provided is the maximum possible value and quantity for each permit.

Note: Some values in Table 13 and Table 16 are counted more than one time. A brokering permit could be for brokering transactions related to exports from multiple countries and/or to multiple destinations, likewise a permit can be for more than one type of item. For this reason, the total amount brokered to GBP countries in Table 13 or the total amount authorized by brokering permits in Table 16 will be less than the total sum of the values in Table 13 and in Table 16.

Table 14: The Brokering Control List (BCL)

Table 15: 2024 - Summary of brokering permit applications received

Table 15 contains data on the status of brokering permit applications submitted between January 1 and December 31, 2024. The data is accurate on December 31, 2024.

Table 16: 2024 - Brokering permits issued by destination, value and ECL items

Table 16 includes data on the brokering permits issued in 2024. These permits authorize brokers to undertake brokering activities related to the parameters set out in their permit. All brokering permits issued in 2024 were for ECL Group 2 items, therefore all items are controlled under BCL 1(a). Some individual brokering permits may include multiple destinations and origin countries. Due to this fact, the value for one brokered item may be counted in multiple rows. The brokering permit data in this year’s table may have not necessarily resulted in transfers taking place this year but could potentially result in transfers taking place in subsequent years. The total value of brokering permits issued in 2024, not including double counting, was $559,590,328.33.

5. Service standard

The processing time for a complete export permit application is 10 working days where outside consultations are not required, and 40 working days where consultations outside the Strategic Export Controls Bureau are required. The performance target for achieving this standard is set at 90 percent. As a general rule, the nature and the final destination of a proposed export determines whether an application will be subject to outside consultations.

All export permit applications for military items, regardless of the country of destination, are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the EIPA assessment criteria. Furthermore, applications for export permits are subject to a comprehensive assessment process, based on a risk assessment of the items being exported, the consignee country, and the intended end-use and end-user. These assessments are conducted through intra- and inter-departmental consultations to evaluate the risks and implications of the proposed exports with respect to the mandatory EIPA assessment criteria, as well as considerations related to Canada’s foreign and defence policy and national security. Various Canadian government departments and agencies, including multiple divisions within Global Affairs Canada and Canada’s network of missions abroad, are involved in the consultation process. 

When determining if an application has been processed within the allotted service standard, the department takes into consideration whether the application has been submitted with all of the required documentation. The processing time calculation only begins the moment a complete application has been received and no further clarification or supporting documents are required from the exporter. Applications that are withdrawn, returned without action, or denied are also counted towards the service standard. The data below, which is accurate as of December 31, 2024, captures export permit applications that were submitted in 2024. However, it does not include those applications that were submitted in 2024, but that had not been fully processed as of December 31, 2024.   

More information on service standards can be found in the Export and Brokering Controls Handbook.

Please note that service standards are not legal requirements. Rather, service standards are an indication of performance targets that permit applicants can expect under normal circumstances.

Table 17: Export permit applications processed (2020-2024)^{Footnote 30}

Table 18: 2024 - Global Affairs Canada service standards for all military, dual-use and strategic export permit applications

6. Annexes

Annex A: Canada’s Area Control List (ACL)

The export or transfer of any goods or technology (including technical data, technical assistance and information necessary for the development, production or use of a good) to countries on the ACL is controlled and must be authorized by an export permit issued by the Minister under the authority of the EIPA. Export permits are normally issued only for those goods and technology that respond to humanitarian needs or circumstances, or for the personal belongings of an individual relocating to a country listed on the ACL.

As of December 31, 2024, there is one country is listed on the ACL: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), which was added on July 13, 2010.

Guidance on exports to North Korea is published in Notice to Exporters No. 172, which is available at: Export Controls to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Annex B: Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL)

Further to sections 4.1 and 7(2) of the EIPA, certain prohibited firearms, weapons, or devices, and components and parts thereof, that are included on the Export Control List, may be exported only to destinations on the AFCCL and only to consignees that are government or authorized by government. These must be approved by an export permit issued by the Minister under the authority of the EIPA.

The following goods and their components and parts, as defined in section 4.1 of the EIPA and subsection 84(1) of the Criminal Code, are subject to the AFCCL, when these items are also included on the Export Control List:

• an automatic firearm, whether or not it has been altered to discharge only one projectile with one pressure of the trigger;
• any firearm that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited firearm;
• any weapon, other than a firearm, that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited weapon;
• any component or part of a weapon, or any accessory for use with a weapon, that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited device;
• a cartridge magazine that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited device.

As of December 31, 2024, the following countries were listed on the AFCCL (as noted above, Montenegro and Brazil were added after that date):

1. Albania
2. Australia
3. Austria
4. Belgium
5. Botswana
6. Bulgaria
7. Chile
8. Colombia
9. Croatia
10. Czech Republic
11. Denmark
12. Estonia
13. Finland
14. France
15. Germany
16. Greece
17. Hungary
18. Iceland
19. Ireland
20. Israel
21. Italy
22. Japan
23. Korea, Republic of
24. Kuwait
25. Latvia
26. Lithuania
27. Luxembourg
28. Netherlands
29. New Zealand
30. North Macedonia
31. Norway
32. Peru
33. Poland
34. Portugal
35. Qatar
36. Romania
37. Saudi Arabia
38. Slovakia
39. Slovenia
40. Spain
41. Sweden
42. Switzerland
43. Türkiye
44. United Kingdom
45. United States
46. Ukraine

The AFCCL can be found at: Automatic Firearms Country Control List

Annex C: Canada’s international transfers (government to government transfers)

From time to time, the Government of Canada will provide surplus military equipment to foreign governments through sale or donation. When determining sales and donations to foreign governments, the Government of Canada considers a number of factors, including the nature of the goods, the country of origin, the applicable controls relating to its distribution and the applicable Government of Canada policies.

The Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy (ADM(Pol)) at the Department of National Defence (DND) is responsible for coordinating the assessment against ATT criteria of proposed State-to-State arms transfers under DND/Canadian Armed Forces authority not already captured under the Global Affairs Canada export control system.

DND consults subject-matter experts across DND, Global Affairs Canada, the Canadian Armed Forces, and any other relevant government departments for each of its ATT assessments. Consultees assess different risks, including, but not limited to:

• The risk of the transferred items’ diversion to groups other than the intended end-user;
• The risk of the items being used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law or human rights; and,
• The risk of the intended end-user using the transferred items to commit or facilitate acts of terrorism, transnational crime, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

Based on input received, DND determines an overall transfer risk and whether the transfer would be compliant with Canada’s obligations under the ATT.

Records pertaining to these types of transfers are kept by the Department of National Defence. If applicable, this information is also publicly reported in Canada’s submission to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).

Canada’s international government-to-government transfers in 2024 were:

Donations

• Ukraine: 277 Mk-83 Bombs
• Ukraine: 184 LAU-7 Guided Missile Launchers
• Ukraine: 29, Nanuk Remotely Controlled Weapon Stations
• Ukraine: 64, Coyote Chassis
• Ukraine: 29 M113 Chassis
• Ukraine: 900 SkyRanger R70s, Industry Purchase^{*Footnote 33}
• Ukraine: 50 Armoured Combat Support Vehicles, Industry Purchase^*
• Ukraine: 10 Zodiac Multi-Role Boats, Industry Purchase^*

More information on the sale and donation of surplus equipment is available at: Surplus military materiel. 

Annex D: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)  

Canada continues to actively promote greater transparency in the trade of conventional arms. In 1991, Canada was a founding contributor of the UNROCA, which is an international, voluntary transparency mechanism under which Member States of the United Nations supply information to the Register on imports and exports of seven categories of conventional arms, as well as small arms and light weapons^{Footnote 34}.

The Register is updated annually and makes a significant contribution to transparency, confidence-building and enhanced global security. Since the inception of the Register, more than 100 countries on average have made annual submissions to it; of these, about 60 have done so consistently, including Canada. As a result, the Register has become an important and authoritative source of information. The Register tracks data on the following seven categories of conventional arms: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. These same categories have been incorporated into the ECL through the creation of Group 9, which will facilitate reporting on exports of these items to both UNROCA and the ATT Secretariat.

Canada is also one of a growing number of countries that voluntarily submit data to the Register on military holdings and on procurement through national production. In addition, Canada is one of several Member States that voluntarily supplies information on imports and exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) to the Register as part of their annual report. This information goes beyond the voluntary minimum currently recommended by the UN.

Further information on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is available online at: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

Canada’s 2024 Annual Report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms represents actual exports of conventional arms and SALW as defined by UNROCA reporting best practices, from Canada, during the 2024 calendar year, against export permits issued by Global Affairs Canada, for military, security or police end-use in the destination country as well as government to government transfers.

Reports to UNROCA prior to 2016 listed total quantities of conventional arms and SALW that were authorized for export under permits issued in the course of the reporting year. This practice (i.e., reporting the “maximum allowable exports under issued permits”) was not optimal, as it did not allow for the tracking of actual, versus potential, transfers of conventional arms and SALW. Since 2016, Canada reports actual exports/transfers of reportable conventional arms and SALW that occurred during the reporting year.

Annex E: International cooperation on military trade

The major multilateral export control and non-proliferation regimes in which Canada participates are described below. Participating governments negotiate common control lists of goods and technology that are implemented by all, in accordance with national legislation. Each participating government makes its own licensing decisions in accordance with applicable domestic law. These lists evolve in response to changing international and technological circumstances. Updates and amendments are made on a periodic basis. 

Wassenaar Arrangement - Export Control List Groups 1 and 2

Most items have been included on the ECL because of Canada’s commitments to international partners that participate in multilateral export control regimes or because of Canada’s obligations as a signatory to international agreements that seek to control and monitor the movement of sensitive goods and technology.

The control regime that deals with the Dual-Use and Military goods and technology covered respectfully in Group 1 (Dual-Use List) and Group 2 (Munitions List (Military Goods and Technology)) of the ECL is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, founded in 1996. The Wassenaar Arrangement defines its objectives as:

“to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations.”

Through national policies, the Participating States seek to ensure that transfers of items covered by the common control lists do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that have the potential to undermine regional and global security and stability. Participating States also commit to take every precaution to ensure that such goods and technology are not diverted to illegitimate end-uses.

More information about the Wassenaar Arrangement and its 42 Participating States is available at Wassenaar Arrangement.

Nuclear Suppliers Group - Export Control List Groups 3 and 4

Canada has a long-standing nuclear non-proliferation policy that is designed, among other objectives, to ensure that Canada’s nuclear exports are not used for any nuclear weapon purposes or their development. As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that came into force in 1970, Canada will not provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production, of special fissionable material, to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

In the late 1970s, a group of nuclear supplier countries, including Canada, agreed on a set of guidelines for nuclear transfers to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State for peaceful purposes. These became known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines. In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group established a list of nuclear-related dual-use goods and technology that could make a major contribution to a nuclear explosive activity or a non-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

ECL Group 3 includes items that are nuclear-specific. ECL Group 4 includes nuclear-related dual-use items, i.e. items that are used in non-nuclear applications but that could also be used in a nuclear explosive activity or a non-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

More information about the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its 48 Members is available at Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Missile Technology Control Regime - Export Control List Group 6

The Missile Technology Control Regime was established in 1987 to address concerns about the proliferation of systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, namely, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. ECL Group 6 includes items agreed upon by the Partners of the Missile Technology Control Regime that are used in, or could be used in, the proliferation of systems capable of delivering chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

More information about the Missile Technology Control Regime and its 35 Members is available at Missile Technology Control Regime.

Australia Group - Export Control List Group 7

The Australia Group was established in 1985 with the objective of preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The participants (national governments as well as the European Union) in the Australia Group have developed common export controls on chemical substances and biological agents and related items that could be used in the production of chemical and biological weapons. 

More information about the Australia Group, including its 43 Members, is available at Australia Group.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - Export Control List Group 7

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was established in 1997 when the Chemical Weapons Convention came into force. The goal of the Member States is to achieve a world that is free of chemical weapons and of the threat of their use, and in which cooperation in chemistry for peaceful purposes for all is fostered. The ECL contains chemicals and precursors that are controlled under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Some of the Chemical Weapons Convention chemicals and precursors are also controlled by the Australia Group.

More information about the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is available at Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Arms Trade Treaty - Export Control List Group 9

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2013 to establish international norms for the conventional arms trade. Unregulated and irresponsible arms transfers intensify and prolong conflict, lead to regional instability, facilitate human rights abuses on a massive scale, and hinder social and economic development. The ATT promotes responsibility, transparency and accountability in the global arms trade. Canada became a State Party to the ATT on September 17, 2019.

More information about the Arms Trade Treaty and its 116 States Parties is available at Arms Trade Treaty.

UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (UNPoA)

In 2001, UN Member States adopted, by consensus, a politically-binding Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (Programme of Action or ‘PoA’).  The Programme of Action contains measures to address the following, inter alia: controls over production; marking; transfer controls; brokering; stockpile management; and, destruction, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

Organization of American States Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions (OAS CITAAC)

The Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions (CITAAC), a Convention under the Organization of American States (OAS), commits States Parties to report on their acquisitions of conventional weapons. 17 OAS member states have ratified CITAAC, including Canada, which has been a State Party since 1999.

Annex F: Index of destinations considered lower risk by Canada in 2024

Most export permit applications to the following destinations are considered low-risk and are thus generally subject to a streamlined assessment process. As previously mentioned, the service standard for applications to these destinations is typically 10 working days, as opposed to 40 working days for all other destinations. All export permit applications for military items, regardless of their country of destination, are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the previously mentioned assessment criteria, including the EIPA criteria. The countries listed below are also considered low risk within the context of Canada’s brokering controls. Controlled transactions brokered to any of these destinations are covered under General Brokering Permit No. 1. These destinations include like-minded countries that are members of multiple multilateral export control regimes of which Canada is a member and that have implemented an effective system of controls.

• Australia
• Austria
• Belgium
• Czech Republic
• Denmark
• Estonia
• Finland
• France
• Germany
• Greece
• Hungary
• Iceland
• Ireland
• Italy
• Japan
• Latvia
• Lithuania
• Luxembourg
• Netherlands
• New Zealand
• Norway
• Poland
• Portugal
• Republic of Korea
• Slovakia
• Slovenia
• Spain
• Sweden
• Switzerland
• United Kingdom
• United States

Annex G: 2024 exports of military goods and technology by destination and ECL item