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11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2026 – Statement by Canada – Closing Plenary

May 22, 2026

New York

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Mr. President,

Prior to my concluding remarks I would state for the record that Canada supports the motion submitted before the close of the conference to move paragraphs 37 through 43 of NPT/CONF.2026/CRP.4 as sent at 6:35am this morning into a separate decision.   

Mr. President,

Thank you for your leadership throughout this Conference, and to the Chairs, Secretariat, and interpreters who make our work possible.

This was not an easy Conference.

Divisions are painfully real, and trust in the review process has been sorely tested.

Canada regrets that consensus was not possible today. 

Canada was prepared to support an outcome document, despite its obvious and serious flaws, because shared agreement still matters for the Treaty. 

But the absence of consensus carries a cost. It leaves us without agreed direction at precisely the moment when the Treaty needs it most.

Colleagues, we have said previously that the agreement to extend the Treaty in 1995 was a good-faith contract—not a gift.

Yet, today’s outcome avoids hard realities, favouring instead the narrow preferences of the few.
On Iran, the IAEA Board of Governor’s findings of its long-standing noncompliance are established fact and unambiguous. Iran can never be permitted to acquire or develop a nuclear weapon. Any outcome that does not reflect this reality undermines safeguards and disregards the good-faith compliance of other non-nuclear-weapon states. In this regard, Canada joins others in opposing as inappropriate Iran’s election as Vice-President to this Conference.

Canada reiterates its steadfast support for Ukraine. It is Russia’s war of aggression that has created nuclear safety and security risks that threaten the Treaty’s protection of the inalienable right to peaceful uses. The omission of the IAEA Director General’s seven indispensable pillars leaves a serious gap in our commitment to peaceful uses.

The DPRK’s expanding nuclear weapons programme represents a fundamental failure of the non-proliferation regime. This Conference’s inability to include even a basic reference is deeply troubling.

And on disarmament, we see backtracking on Article VI alongside resistance to transparency and accountability. Even modest proposals to improve national reporting are met with evasion, not engagement. We appreciate the willingness of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom to engage in interactive dialogue.

Canada has listened carefully to States Parties and their national security realities.

Because we must be willing to explain our positions to one another, not only assert them.

At the outset, Canada promised candour and consistency.

That is why Canada says plainly: the primary weight of responsibility for restoring the Treaty’s credibility rests with the nuclear-weapon States.

But responsibility is not abstract. It is demonstrated in choices. Some have engaged seriously, in particular the United States that offered multilateral strategic stability talks, supported by the United Kingdom and France, while others have worked to obstruct, avoid accountability, and protect narrow interests. Russia, in particular, has made concerted efforts over the course of this conference to systematically remove references to the real and serious challenges facing the NPT.

That distinction must be clear.

For too long, non-nuclear-weapon States have been expected to accept limited concessions in place of real progress.

This position is neither radical nor naïve; and does not set Canada against our allies; it is faithful to the Treaty itself.

It is simply asking the NWS to honour their word.

Canada will do our part to strengthen and defend safeguards and the IAEA; advance disarmament through verification, risk reduction, and other measures; and advocate for enhanced transparency and accountability.

Canada is invested in this Treaty’s success. But we cannot accept a lowest common denominator approach — and we will not treat it as the new normal.

Thank you.

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