11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2026 – Statement by Canada – Main Committee II

New York, May 4, 2026

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Delivered by Shawn Friele, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Canada to the International Organizations in Vienna 

Chair,

In a complex and deteriorating security environment, the NPT and its safeguards regime remain essential to our shared peace, security, and prosperity. We must work collectively to prevent a new era of nuclear proliferation with potentially disastrous consequences.

Against this backdrop, the IAEA’s role in advancing the Treaty’s effective implementation is paramount. Canada fully supports the Agency’s technical and impartial safeguards verification activities. These efforts provide vital assurances against nuclear weapons proliferation and strengthen our collective confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.

Chair,

Canada holds the principled view that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol form the de facto verification standard under Article III of the NPT. Together, these instruments provide effective assurances regarding both the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material in non-nuclear weapon states. We urge all Parties that have not yet done so to bring these instruments into force without delay. For Canada, adherence to an AP remains a condition of supply.

Multilateral export control regimes, such as the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group, also play a critical supporting role. These regimes facilitate and build confidence in the peaceful use and trade of nuclear technologies, materials, and equipment while minimizing proliferation risks. We encourage all nuclear supplier states to adhere to these regimes’ export guidelines and reinforce our commitment to transparency regarding their activities.

Chair,

IAEA safeguards are core to the NPT’s grand bargain, yet they face mounting challenges. Expanded nuclear energy deployment and technological advancements underscore the need for safeguards to continuously evolve. In this context, attempts to question the Agency’s technical competence or impartial verification mandate are deeply concerning. We fully support the IAEA’s efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation. This includes the further refinement and expanded implementation of state-level safeguards approaches, as well as collaboration with Member States to leverage emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence. 

Cases of non-compliance with the NPT’s non-proliferation obligations further undermine the credibility of the IAEA safeguards system and weaken confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear technologies. States Parties in non-compliance with their obligations must work cooperatively and without delay to address outstanding questions.

Canada fully supports a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis as the only viable means to ensure that Iran never develops or acquires a nuclear weapon. Iran’s long-standing non-compliance with its core safeguards obligations, including its repeated unwillingness to work cooperatively with the IAEA to address outstanding safeguards questions, poses a direct threat to the NPT.

Iran cannot unilaterally suspend the implementation of its legal CSA obligations under any circumstances. We urge Iran to take the necessary steps to resume cooperation with the Agency, including with respect to its outstanding enrichment activities and highly enriched uranium stockpile, to enable the Agency to provide the international community with the necessary assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

The DPRK’s expanding nuclear activities, including its increased uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and reactor operation, directly violate numerous UN Security Council Resolutions and undermine regional security. The DPRK must return to full compliance with its NPT non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards obligations. We reject any attempts to legitimize the DPRK’s nuclear status and non-compliance, which runs contrary to the core principles of the Treaty.

Chair,

In closing, Canada reiterates that the current Review Conference provides a vital opportunity to reinforce the legal, technical and financial elements of the IAEA safeguards regime, including by addressing long-standing cases of non-compliance. We urge States Parties to consider concrete recommendations, including the proposals contained in the NPDI, Vienna Group of 10, and Friends of Safeguards working papers to which Canada proudly contributed. In our view, these steps are critical to maintaining the NPT’s credibility as a non-proliferation instrument and its relevance as a unique contributor to international peace and security.